



Saleh Said Agha

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The Revolution
which toppled
the Umayyads
*Neither Arab nor
‘Abbāsīd*



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THE REVOLUTION WHICH TOPPLED THE UMAYYADS

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Neither Arab nor 'Abbāsīd

BY

SALEH SAID AGHA



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*To the memory of my father, Sa'īd; to
my mother and her brother, 'Abd Allāh, and
to my siblings Naṣr and Mayy*

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* ‘The agents and forces that toppled the Umayyad Caliphate,’ Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Toronto, 1993.

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INTRODUCTION

ANTICIPATING THIS WORK

I. *The Issues*

The time frame for this study is the last three decades of the Umayyad caliphate, ca. 100-132/718-750. Its geographical setting is Kūfah and Khurāsān. The historical occurrence it attempts to understand is the fall of the Umayyad caliphate—or ‘The Arab Kingdom’, as Julius Wellhausen aptly termed it. Its immediate subject is the clandestine Organization, usually referred to as the Hāshimīyah, which initiated and coordinated the effort that culminated in this historical occurrence—the Revolution. The key question is the identity of the agents and forces that ushered in such a dramatic change at the end of the period. This is a complex question that involves three issues: (1) the identity of the branch of the Prophet’s family in whose name the agents of the Organization had conducted their propaganda; and that of the branch in whose name the forces of the Revolution, three decades later, brought down the Umayyad Caliphate; (2) the identity of the agents of the Organization; and (3) the identity of the forces of the Revolution. The first issue is called the ‘Abbāsīd connection; the last two are preponderately demographic.

II. *The ‘Abbāsīd Connection and Its Impact on the Primary Arabic Sources—The ‘Abbāsīd Riwāyah*

II.1 *The ‘Abbāsīd Riwāyah*

The Organization conducted its activity under the slogan *al-da‘wah ilā al-riḍā min Āl Muḥammad*, a slogan that can be paraphrased as: a call for the choice of a leader from the family of the Prophet with whom Muslims would find satisfaction, the term, *al-riḍā*, meaning one who is acceptable, one who gives satisfaction. The efforts of the Organization had as an end-result the installation of a caliph from the ‘Abbāsīd line of the Prophet’s clan. Then came the claim that the Organization had actually been, all along, conducting its activities on behalf of a known *Imām* from this line, and that *al-Riḍā* was, in effect, his code name. Thereafter, the entire three-decade-long struggle came to be universally known as *al-*

Da'wah al-'Abbāsiyyah (The 'Abbāsīd Mission), and the cataclysmic upheaval as *al-Dawlah al-'Abbāsiyyah*, (The 'Abbāsīd Revolution). Latent in this is a question of the authenticity of this 'Abbāsīd claim. Quite aside from the ideological issue of 'Abbāsīd legitimacy with respect to the different claims to the Prophet's legacy, this is primarily a historical-historiographical issue. In its historical dimension, we might call it the 'Abbāsīd connection; in its historiographical dimension, we might call it the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* (version).

In this probe, like in no other, history and historiography are inseparable. At every juncture of events, where the 'Abbāsīd connection bears on the affairs of the Organization, the study becomes an exercise in applied historiography.

The 'Abbāsīds, only six years after their nominal accession to power, were able to extend their hegemony and 'confiscate' the annals of both, the Organization and the Revolution. Their 'hijacking' of the history of the secret movement was a prerequisite to legitimizing their claim, and a much easier and manageable feat than the one they had pulled, by actually wresting the fruits of the open Revolution. The internal deliberations of the Organization, and its decrees and organizational measures had been highly guarded secrets. No neutral reporter or historian ever had the chance to transmit or record them. Inherently, the authentic sources of information consisted of a meager pool of eyewitness and participating elements. Those were easy to control and manipulate. Even written documentation, if there were any, would have been easily appropriated; and any discordant voices would have been violently silenced or bought, as indeed did happen.

Thus, the tightly kept secrets of the Organization became the exclusive property of the ultimate 'hijacker', and its 'records' were carefully 'nursed'. The 'Abbāsīds acquired a monopoly which gave their later propaganda handlers a free hand for endless interpolations, especially where an active role for their *Imām* was to be superimposed on events. This left the later historians with very little to work with and choose from. They had to deal with an essentially unified account peppered with deliberately and frivolously conflicting anecdotes which were floated either to serve certain political purposes, or to obliterate any genuine traces that might lead to truth land. The ploy worked for centuries, and other myths grew in its shadow. This does not mean that it cannot be unraveled. The following is a necessary general prelude to the many specific entanglements with the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*, which will crop up across this book.

Aside from the basic weakness of their claim, which they attempted to cure by apocalyptic prophecies, historical interpolations, and the false

claim of having received the *wasīyyah* from Abū Hāshim ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyyah, a major flaw in the ‘Abbāsids’ pretence was the gap of three months between the triumph of the Revolution, supposedly launched in their name, and the eventual proclamation of a caliph from their number. This interregnum was the major ailment their propaganda machine had to contend with. Unlike other intra-Organization affairs, the events of these three months were a matter of public record, which could not be completely obliterated. Since it could not be hidden away, the anomaly of not proclaiming the victorious *Imām* immediately upon victory had to be explained away. The true explanation (that the time was consumed by the aborted search for a *riḍā*) did not, of course, suit their basic claim that *al-Riḍā* was a code name for the ‘Abbāsīd *Imām*. The ‘Abbāsīd explanation¹ rested on two pillars: (1) manipulating the dates towards shortening the interregnum; and (2) blaming a culprit for the remainder of the interregnum, which could not be completely erased.

Finding the culprit was the easier part. Abū Salamah al-Khallāl’s efforts to implement the principle of choosing a *riḍā* by consultation were distorted. He was simply accused of two treacheries: (1) illegitimately harboring ‘Alīd sympathies; thus, his open consultations were depicted in the ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah* as conspiratorial efforts to transfer the *imāmate* to one of ‘Alī’s descendants from Fāṭimah; (2) detaining the ‘Abbāsīd family upon their arrival in Kūfah and concealing their presence from their Shī‘ah.

Blaming a culprit may explain the delay in proclaiming the caliph. But that was not sufficient. The ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah* had also to establish that, if the caliph was not proclaimed on time, it did not mean that the identity of the *Imām* was not known. Toward this end, the standard ‘Abbāsīd apocalypitics (asserting the automatic succession of Abū al-‘Abbās to his brother Ibrāhīm’s *imāmate*) were supplemented by a manipulation of the chronology of the relevant events; thus the attempt to unify the dates of the capture of Kūfah by the Revolutionary forces with that of Ibrāhīm’s demise in Marwān II’s prison in Ḥarrān. The interregnum was thus shortened to negligibility; and the remainder was easily explained away. It is not that the Revolutionaries did not know who their *Imām* was; it is just that they did not know that he had just died in Ḥarrān, and that his God-chosen successor had been in their midst for sometime.

¹ Extricable from the jumble of confused and contradictory accounts which consume the better part of the ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah* of the events of the three-months gap. See *infra*, pp. 120-4.

The various and contradictory reports on Ibrāhīm's arrest and his fate in prison are examined in detail by K.Y. Blankinship and need not be repeated here.² Blankinship also discusses the variant dates given to Ibrāhīm's arrest and demise.³ He distinguishes between two layers of reports—an older and a later. The older layer places Ibrāhīm's arrest at an earlier date, ca. 130/747-748; the more recent places it at a later date, Muḥarram 132/August-September, 749. Blankinship construes the second layer as a pro-'Abbāsīd attempt to "make the interregnum as short as possible to help establish their own legitimacy," and he concludes that the earlier date is more likely, and that "we can reject Ibrāhīm's appearance at the pilgrimage of 131/749, as well as his designation of Abū al-'Abbās as his successor, as apocryphal."⁴

An essential distinction must be drawn here between two aspects of the 'Abbāsīd claim as elaborated later in their theory. Although the two aspects are inseparably interrelated, they must be methodologically distinguished, since one is, in principle, historically verifiable; while the other is purely 'legalistic', arbitrary and ahistorical. What damages or discredits one does not necessarily damage the other. These are: (1) the political aspect which concerns their assertion of the existence of an operational link between themselves and the Organization, and their claim that the Organization worked for them; and (2) the ideological aspect which concerns their claim that the right to the *imāmate* was lawfully theirs, quite aside from any political involvement.

This second aspect could always be custom-tailored (as arbitrarily as it had been initiated) to suit any current requirements. With the turf of ideological improvisation freely open before the 'Abbāsīds, no historical fact could temper their allegations. According to their earlier claim,⁵ the first individual 'Abbāsīd 'substratum' in which the *imāmate* 'subsisted' was Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Abbās. Thus, the *imāmate* had taken a cross-linear horizontal direction—side-stepping the three 'Abbāsīd ancestors and 'subsisting' first in 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and then in his three sons: al-Ḥasan, al-Ḥusayn and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyyah, then in his grandson Abū Hāshim 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyyah, through whose *wayṣīyyah* the *imāmate* was transferred to the 'Abbāsīd line, where its first station was Muḥammad ibn 'Alī, only to be 'trapped' in his line until doomsday.

² Blankinship, 'Tribal factor,' pp. 589-603, esp. 591 ff.

³ Ibid., pp. 601-3.

⁴ Ibid., p. 603.

⁵ *Akhbār*, p. 165; Nawbakhtī, p. 69; Nāshīr, pp. 31-3; Qummī, p. 65; Shahrastānī, I: p. 243; Baghdādī, *Fīraq*, p. 28; Ash'arī, I: p. 21.

When, during al-Mahdī's reign (r. 158-169/775-785) and in view of the 'Abbāsīd entrenchment and the frequent 'Alīd challenges, this theory was no longer suitable; 'Abbāsīd ideologues such as Abū Hurayrah⁶ (probably Muḥammad ibn Farrūkh, no.268) took care of the situation. Now it turned out that the *imāmate*, after all, never departed from the 'Abbāsīd line, ever since there was one.⁷ The *'ilm* (sacred knowledge), the spiritual leadership, and the right to the top spot in the community had been transmitted from the Prophet directly, in an ascending diagonal direction, to his uncle, the first *Imām*, al-'Abbās ibn 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib. Thereafter, the *imāmate* was and would always be transmitted within the line of al-'Abbās, vertically and horizontally, as it did or would yet unfold. 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib was thus reduced, at certain junctures in the unfolding of the controversy, to the same status as other usurpers, and his offspring were forever stripped of any rightful claim.⁸

In both stages of the evolution of the 'Abbāsīd theory, the direction of the transmission of the *imāmate*, whether horizontal or vertical, had been divinely pre-ordained—*waṣiyyah* or no *waṣiyyah*. The danger of any discontinuity or an interregnum in the perpetual *imāmate* could thus never exist. Abū al-'Abbās, namely, Ibn al-Ḥārithiyyah, had been detected as the *Imām* who would accede to the 'throne' even before he was born or conceived;⁹ the prophecy was perpetually confirmed through the different phases of his childhood and youth.¹⁰ Therefore, this apocalyptic aspect of the ideological 'Abbāsīd claim could not be damaged by a historical fact, such as an early date for Ibrāhīm's arrest or death, nor by the absence of the *waṣiyyah* designating Abū al-'Abbās as Ibrāhīm's successor.

What was susceptible to question or attack was the political and historical aspects of the claim: If the Organization did subscribe to the

⁶ Nawbakhtī, p. 68; Qummī, p. 65; Nāshīr, p. 31.

⁷ Nawbakhtī, p. 69; *Akhbār*, p. 165; cf. Dūrī, 'Introduction,' pp. 17-8; Qummī, p. 65; Nāshīr, pp. 31-2; Shahrastānī, I: p. 243; Ash'arī, I: p. 21.

⁸ The controversy resonated also in poetry. A celebrated poetic articulation belongs to al-Mahdī's poet laureate, Marwān ibn Abī Ḥaṣṣah. It culminates with the following verse:

annā yakūnu, wa-laysa dhāka bi-kā'inin
lī-banī 'l-banātī wirāthatu 'l-ā'māni

(How can it come to pass—and, verily, it cannot—

that the descendants from daughters have the right of the legacy [which lawfully belongs to] parental uncles).

For Marwān's verses, and some other poetic expressions of the two sides of the controversy, see, Ibn Abī Ḥaṣṣah, pp. 104, 53-54, 99; Ibn al Mu'tazz, p. 51; Iṣfahānī, *Aghānī*, X: pp. 93,100.

⁹ *Akhbār*, pp. 29, 167-8, 169, 185, 207; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 79.

¹⁰ *Akhbār*, pp. 140, 172, 238, 239; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1453; Azdī, p. 18.

‘Abbāsīd ideology, as the claim went, then the Organization must have known who the automatic successor was—the absence of a *waṣīyyah* notwithstanding. If Abū al-‘Abbās was the designated, rather than the pre-ordained heir, then the relevance of Ibrāhīm’s alleged *waṣīyyah* would be paramount. If, on the other hand, the ideology was, as it actually was, a later elaboration, and the Organization’s link to the ‘Abbāsīds were a political commitment to the cause of a *riḍā* from the dynasty, then the most eligible successor to Ibrāhīm, within the dynasty, would probably have been the middle brother Abū Ja‘far—his non-Arab maternal lineage being insignificant in the Organization’s ideological milieu—or one of the uncles, probably ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī, or someone else, but not the younger and weaker brother, Abū al-‘Abbās. In all cases, the detrimental question remains: why was the more eligible or the designated or the pre-ordained heir not proclaimed immediately after the Organization established its rule in Kūfah?

This was the real issue with which the ‘Abbāsīd propaganda had to contend. As far as the question of the uninterrupted ‘subsistence’ of the *imāmate* in a legitimate *Imām* went, an earlier date of Ibrāhīm’s arrest, and even his early death, is by itself as irrelevant and unbearing as a later date. As long as the question of proclaiming a caliph did not become pertinent, the question of an interregnum was a non-issue. But whether Ibrāhīm was arrested ca. 130/747-748 or in Muḥarram 132/August-September 749, the pertinent and problematic question posed by the undeniable reality of the interregnum remained the same: Why was the *Imām* not immediately proclaimed caliph? And it had to be addressed by different, more effective means.

Therefore, ‘Abbāsīd propaganda availed itself of all the opportunities that each of the two sets of early and of late dates furnished, without bothering with the resulting inconsistencies. For example, despite its drawbacks, a report dating Ibrāhīm’s arrest to 129/747 allows ample room for a daring adventure by Qaḥṭabah, who got himself imprisoned in order to establish contact with Ibrāhīm and bear witness to the designation of Abū al-‘Abbās as successor.¹¹ At the same time, unifying the date of Ibrāhīm’s death with that of the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent in Kūfah; and shortening the period between these two events, on one hand, and the eventual ‘dredging’ of Abū al-‘Abbās from the basement where Abū Salamah had allegedly hidden him, on the other hand; allow for the assertion in some accounts that the Khurāsāniyyah had not known of Ibrāhīm’s demise before meeting his family in Kūfah. Then, when these two simultaneous discoveries dawned on the Khurāsāniyyah,

¹¹ ‘*Uyūn*, pp. 189-91.

al-Saffāḥ was immediately proclaimed caliph.¹² The intimation is that no real interregnum in the Organization's recognition of 'Abbāsīd legitimacy (i.e., no constitutional void) existed.

Optimizing on the manipulation of the chronology, an account in Ṭabarī claims that Abū al-'Abbās and his kin arrived in Kūfah in Ṣafar and were discovered by their Shī'ah forty days later.¹³ But even with this rock-bottom interval, and the best of all possible presentations, the undeniable interregnum still required further explanation. And further explanation was furnished through the demonization of Abū Salamah, as will be shown later.

II.2 *The Impact of the 'Abbāsīd Riwāyah on the Primary Sources*

That, in essence, is what we call in this book the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. It is inseparable from the issue of the 'Abbāsīd connection, since this latter exists only in this *riwāyah*. It is, however, so all-pervasive that no other *riwāyah* exists. Only the faintest hints of dispersed elements of other versions may be traced in the sources. Hence, the study of the 'Abbāsīd connection and the secret history of the Organization is itself a study of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. In this respect, it is the individual accounts, not the specific sources, that count. And it requires painstaking examinations of these individual accounts to expose and eliminate the interpolations of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. I tried to apply a rigorous and critical approach of internal examination of the reports, individually and in comparison with one another, as well as together, in such a manner as to elicit a tenable whole compatible with all of its component parts, and in concordance with the basic structure of the history of the age.

The basic structure of the history of the Umayyad period has not changed much since the publication of Ṭabarī's monumental work. The growing body of new source material is progressively proving to complement the previously known material rather than contradict it. This does not mean that contradictions do not exist. In both, previously known as well as newly discovered sources, the very same source transmits contradictory accounts. But the contradictions are mostly in the details, even though sometimes in very important and consequential details. But, it must be said, the uncovering of new source material does not necessarily have to lead to revisionism. It is true that such new material mandates a re-examination of conclusions hitherto arrived at. But, it is not inevitable that such re-examination yields results contrary

¹² Ṭabarī, III: p. 34-7; Jahshayārī, p. 87; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 99.

¹³ Ṭabarī, III: p. 27.

to the prevailing ‘conventional wisdom’. It could, as likely, produce corroborative evidence vindicating the long held views.

This is by no means a call to stop vigorous and profound enquiry. But it certainly is a call to refrain from hunting for sensational discoveries, and from attempting to *rewrite* the basic history of the period on the strength of twisted—forced or genuinely misunderstood—interpretations of such discoveries. It is a call to slow down, respect the textual and contextual integrity of the sources, and give ourselves the time to understand their implication—truly. The apocryphal and the veracious elements of the traditions have been, almost always, conspicuous, in the newly discovered as well as in the previously known source material. Even in Ṭabarī, and all other sources, the ‘Abbāsīd connection is not a comfortable *fait accompli*. There is more reason now to suspect that the alleged early ‘Abbāsīd connection to the Organization in both Kūfah and Khurāsān was a later exaggeration, if not an outright fabrication; and that the Organization had remained, till immediately after its victory, non-committal; and that it kept its lines and its options open to all potential Hāshimite candidates.

Of the major primary Arabic sources that have since been published, in whole, or in part such as Balādhurī’s *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, it can reasonably be said that no one single newly discovered source calls for a full-fledged re-examination of the issues more than *Akhbār al-Dawlah al-‘Abbāsiyyah* does.

Akhbār received well deserved appraisal before and after its publication.¹⁴ Its editors dated its authorship to the mid-third/mid-ninth century.¹⁵ This early date makes the author a predecessor of Ṭabarī by almost half a century, and a contemporary of Balādhurī. Indeed, he reported on Balādhurī’s authority, as he did on the authority of other historians and reporters. But more important is the material he uniquely reported on the authority of individuals from the inner circles of both the Kūfan and the Khurāsānian Chapters of the Organization.¹⁶ In this, *Akhbār* is a singular mine of information on the early stages of the movement, and on some of its secrets, activities, and deliberations. Its full lists of the members of the leadership structures of the Organization are unique.

¹⁴ Dūrī, ‘*Daw’*,’ pp. 64-82; Omar, ‘*Abbāsīd Caliphate*,’ pp. 16-9. Omar used the manuscript in his 1967 Ph.D. thesis, but his reliance on the less credible list of *nuqabā’* in Ṭabarī was used by Shaban to dismiss *Akhbār*’s value as ‘extravagant’, ‘*Abbāsīd Revolution*,’ pp. xxi-xxii; Dūrī, ‘Introduction,’ pp. 7-20; Sharon, ‘‘Abbāsīd da’wa’;’ idem, *Black Banners*, pp. 233-7; Daniel, ‘Anonymous,’ pp. 419-34.

¹⁵ Dūrī, ‘Introduction,’ p. 13; idem, ‘*Daw’*,’ p. 65.

¹⁶ Dūrī, ‘Introduction,’ p. 14-5; idem, ‘*Daw’*,’ p. 66.

The entire text is dazzling. It is the first complete and coherent story of the Revolution which has always held a special mystique for students of Arab studies. But, complete as it is, it is supposed to solve the riddles; instead, it intensifies a most poignant element of mystification. Whenever the name of the 'Abbāsīd Muḥammad ibn 'Alī or his son Ibrāhīm al-Imām crops up, in an otherwise coherent and tenable context, something strange happens—a distinct feeling that the text wanders between two parallel and completely different worlds. These two worlds, which could not have met as described, the text, nevertheless, merges as one. One of the two must be fictitious, or else the link between them is. Bukayr ibn Māhān and Abū Salamah al-Khallāl are multi-dimensional figures into whose real world, the reader can readily feel, the 'ghostly' dimensionless Muḥammad or Ibrāhīm arbitrarily 'walks' in and out.

Establishing the link was a work of fiction which, once in real power, the effective 'Abbāsīd propaganda machine accomplished. The machine did not have to tinker much with facts. The job, in this respect, called only for securing a presence of the 'Abbāsīd *Imām* at every meaningful, or corroborative juncture. To this end, facts had to be tampered with only to the extent necessary and sufficient. Later, when other issues cropped up, the machine must have had to behave differently. As far as the history of the clandestine Organization went, the job was easy, and it required only minimum but positive (additive) interference.

It is futile, therefore, to attempt, in this regard, to make any general statements on the individual characters of the different sources. The fact that Dhahabī is late does not discredit him. He expresses insights which he may owe to certain elements of a submerged tradition no longer extant. By itself, the fact that the works of Khalīfah ibn Khayyāt, Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad ibn Dāwūd al-Dīnawarī, and Aḥmad ibn Wāḍih al-Ya'qūbī are the earliest of the extant historical sources, does not mean much. The suspected 'Alīd sympathies of al-Ya'qūbī, al-Mas'ūdī, and Abū al-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī; the pronounced 'Abbāsīd loyalties of Balādhurī and the anonymous compiler of *Akhhbār*; the Iranian leanings of Dīnawarī; the folkloristic literary quality of Ibn A'tham's *Kitāb al-Futūḥ*; and the wide spectrum of the variant traditions which the great Ṭabarī offers; are all almost meaningless in this respect. The 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* permeates them all.

This said, however, it must be remarked that *Akhhbār*, with the continuity of its narrative and the uniqueness of many of its details, stands out as the master source for the material in parts one and three of this book. Ṭabarī is, of course, indispensable for the entire study. Balādhurī, with his distinguished scholarship, has a lot to offer in both of

his works—*Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, and *Futūḥ al-Buldān*. Without *Akḥbār*, the story would have been impossible to reconstruct, and the demographic study would have been severely deficient. Without Ṭabarī, the overall historical context would have been impossible to understand. Indeed, with only the two of them combined, the substance of this book as it stands would have lost only very little.

On the demographic issues, the sources are almost completely free from the interpolations of the ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah*, or can easily be liberated from its influence.¹⁷ The most vital recent discovery that bears on the issue of the identity of the Revolutionary forces is a letter penned by ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Kātib, to Naṣr ibn Sayyār, on behalf of Marwān II. On the strength of this letter, the editor, Iḥsān ‘Abbās, rejects the revisionist theory as represented by “Dennett, Lewis, Farūq ‘Umar, ‘Abd al-Ḥayy Sha‘bān, and Moshe Sharon,”¹⁸ and says:

[The letter] brings back historical research to a theory which van Vloten had presented, and which Wellhausen subsequently elaborated—namely, that those who supported the ‘Abbāsīd *Da‘wah* were the multitude of *mawālī*, driven by Persian (Iranian) nationalist feelings ... What matters here is that the letter restores to [this theory] its weight and supports it.¹⁹

‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s newly discovered letter, vital as it is, adds very little to the extant fragment of a previously known one.²⁰ Both letters add nothing substantial to Naṣr ibn Sayyār’s *bā‘yyah* poem, or to Qaḥṭabah ibn Shabīb’s speech in Jurjān, or to numerous other prime grade textual materials quoted verbatim, most of which had been known since the nineteenth century, but which had been largely ignored, dismissed as propaganda, or misrepresented.²¹ Actually, a revision of the revisionist theory had been long overdue. It did not have to wait for the discovery of ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s letter or any other new source material. This is so because the problem with the revisionist school is not a problem of sources; it is rather a problem of its scholars’ approach to the sources.

¹⁷ As far as the sources bear on the quantitative study of the identity of the agents of the Organization, see the section ‘The Statistical Base—The Historiographical Base,’ *infra*, pp. 226-9.

¹⁸ ‘Abbās, p. 90.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 90, 91.

²⁰ ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd, epistles nos. 8 and 38, pp. 198-201, 289. In this work ‘Abbās published fourteen epistles of ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s, contained in a unique manuscript, never known and never published before. The remainder of ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s epistles, all of which are published in this work, have been gathered from other manuscripts and from printed publications, some of them had been known earlier, others not. Of specific relevance are letters, no. 38 of the known and no. 8 of the new, pp. 289, 198-201.

²¹ See below, chapter eight.

III. *Modern Scholarship on the Issues*

On the peripheries of the first issue, the ‘Abbāsīd connection, modern scholars have generally been aware and skeptical of the apocryphal quality of the ‘Abbāsīd version of events. Generally speaking, the critique has revolved around specific events and accounts; Jacob Lassner brought this approach to an almost elaborate field by itself.²² The center around which such critical studies rotated has chiefly been the strength of the ‘Abbāsīd claim to the legacy of the Prophet in its ideological and genealogical dimensions. The real dimension truly relevant to historical studies was thus lost: how sterling was the ‘Abbāsīd claim of early involvement with the Organization? How early was ‘early’? And what status within the Organization did the quality of this involvement, when it did materialize, give the ‘Abbāsīds? The essence of the issue was, by and large, conceded to the ‘Abbāsīd version of events.

The first to address the question of *when* “the *Da‘wah* [became] ‘Abbāsīd” is Moshe Sharon. However, Sharon mainly addresses the issue in the context of his efforts to establish a variant chronology of what, to him, had essentially been an active ‘Abbāsīd role in the *da‘wah* even before it, in his reckoning, finally turned purely ‘Abbāsīd in the year 125/743, after Yaḥyā ibn Zayd’s death.²³ Blankinship casts serious doubts only on the personal legitimacy of Abū al-‘Abbās and not on the general ‘Abbāsīd claim of an early connection with the Organization, nor indeed on the claim that the Revolution was launched in their name—a claim Blankinship appears to accept.²⁴

The first serious effort to address the issue of the *authenticity* of the ‘Abbāsīd connection came to my attention just before the dissertation, which is the genesis of this book, was presented. The accidental identity of many insights and arguments advanced, in respect of this issue, in Patricia Crone’s article²⁵ and in this book is truly astounding. But while this may be distressing to an author, the important thing is that the findings of two independent investigations corroborate each other on this central issue. However, due credit must be given to Crone’s work.

The key to the issue is the meaning of *al-riḍā*. It is, says Crone, “precisely someone who owes his position to communal agreement; more specifically, he is someone elected by *shūrā*.”²⁶ Her obvious first

²² Lassner, ‘Propaganda,’ pp. 74-85; idem, *Shaping*; idem, ‘Secret agent,’ pp. 165-75; idem, ‘Son of Salīḥ’ pp. 91-104; idem, *Revolution*.

²³ Sharon, *Black Banners*, pp. 173 ff., 178; cf. Daniel, ‘Arabs, Persians,’ p. 544 n.5.

²⁴ Blankinship, ‘Tribal factor’; and see supra, p. xviii.

²⁵ Crone, ‘*al-Riḍā*,’ pp. 95-111. I owe the initial reference to Sharon, *Revolt*, p. 305.

²⁶ Crone, ‘*al-Riḍā*,’ p. 96.

conclusion is that “the movement called to *al-riḍā* because it had no specific candidate for the throne.”²⁷ The way the Kūfan leadership under Abū Salamah sought to steer the choice of a new caliph, contends Crone, corroborates this conclusion; and hence she rejects also the ‘Abbāsīd claim “that the imāmate had been hereditary within the ‘Abbāsīd family since Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī acquired it from Abū Hāshim.”²⁸ From this follows: “First, the story of Abū Hāshim’s testament is spurious... Second, the Hāshimīya movement owed its name to Hāshim, the eponymous ancestor of the Prophet’s house, not to Abū Hāshim... Finally, the relationship between the ‘Abbāsīds and the revolution customarily named after them is nothing if not problematic.”²⁹ She also considers the “possibility that, contrary to what is usually claimed, the ‘Abbāsīds were not the organizers of the revolution which enthroned them ... [T]he Khurāsānīs must... have adopted the call to *al-riḍā* before they committed themselves to the ‘Abbāsīds.”³⁰ These are cornerstones in my arguments to which Crone preceded me. However, she does not go much further in trying to reconstruct the connection. Her final conclusion is:

The relationship between the dynasty and the movement which enthroned it is evidently a problem which takes us far away from the meaning of *al-riḍā*, but it should be clear that the history of this movement has been subject to more ideological rewriting than is normally assumed: if *al-riḍā* meant what it appears to have meant, we must confess that we do not yet (or any longer) know how or why the ‘Abbāsīd revolution came to be ‘Abbāsīd.³¹

On the demographic issues, modern works tend not to distinguish between the two very distinct issues: that of the identity of the agents of the Organization; and that of the identity of the forces of the Revolution. Some do distinguish the clandestine stage from that of the open revolt. Sharon elaborates this formal and chronological distinction by devoting his first volume³² to the *Da‘wah* and his second to the Revolution.³³ However, he makes a distinction of sorts between two groups within the Arab community in Khurāsān, and he associates each of the two groups thus distinguished with one of the two stages. By doing

²⁷ Ibid., p. 99.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 100.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 102, 103.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 104, 105.

³¹ Ibid., p. 106. In a postscript Crone mentions that ‘T. Nagel, *Untersuchungen zur Entstehung des Abbasidischen Kalifates* (Bonn, 1972) also argues that *al-riḍā* was a person chosen by *shūrā*.”

³² Sharon, *Black Banners*.

³³ Sharon, *Revolt*.

so, Sharon adds a demographic dimension to his formal distinction. He argues for “the existence of a clear division between the Arab village settlers and the forces of Arab *muqātilah*.”³⁴ The settlers and their *mawālī*, he contends, provided the incubating context for the clandestine stage,³⁵ while the *muqātilah* were the ‘fighting force’ on whom, “more than on any other single element in the population, the popularity, military strength and final victory of the movement depended.”³⁶

For the most part, therefore, the two issues have been fused into one. The demographic composition of the constituency thus unified has not been analyzed beyond the rhetorical and inferential assertions of the preponderance of one ethnic group over the other during the three decades of the Organization’s heterogeneous history. A quantitative approach to the demographic question has not hitherto been attempted except in Bulliet’s study of conversion.³⁷ Although vouching for a certain ethnic identity of the movement has been a cornerstone in almost all of the theories advanced by modern scholars regarding the so-called ‘Abbāsīd Revolution’, the issue of the demographic composition of the agents and forces which made it possible has not been adequately addressed as an independent issue. It has almost always been subsumed in a study of the historical reasons for the fall of the Umayyads or the rise of the ‘Abbāsīds.

The views of most of these scholars, on the main and the related issues, are noted and discussed in the relevant parts of this book. The evolution of the controversy over the ethnic identity of the Revolution has been progressively and cumulatively depicted in the many reviews and critiques offered by more recent authors of their predecessors’ works.³⁸ With respect to this question, modern scholarship may be divided into two broad schools. With few exceptions in both cases, the first of the pair dominated the first half of the twentieth century, while the second dominated the other half.

The first school (the classical) is still best represented by Julius Wellhausen’s masterful insight into, and modern rearrangement of Ṭabarī’s material in his 1902 work, *Das Arabische Reich und sein Sturz*. “The final ruin of the Umayyads,” he wrote, “was brought about by a

³⁴ Sharon, *Black Banners*, p. 69.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 69 f.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

³⁷ Bulliet, *Conversion*.

³⁸ Examples: Dennett, ‘Marwān,’ pp. 1-5 of the Preface; Omar, ‘*Abbāsīd Caliphate*, pp. 57-8; Shaban, ‘*Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. xiii - xv; Daniel, *Khurasan*, pp. 60-1, n. 3; idem, ‘*Taqādum*,’ n.4, pp. 151-2, n.5, p. 152, n.8, p. 154, and pp. 152-8; idem, ‘Arabs, Persians’; Lassner, *Shaping*, pp. 3-7; idem, *Revolution*, pp. xi-xii, n.2; Marín-Guzmán, pp. 230-1.

rising of the Shīʿite Iranians in Khurāsān.”³⁹ That much G. van Vloten had realized in his assertion that it was the hatred of the oppressed Persians, the Shīʿites, and the expectation of a Messiah that fuelled the Revolution.⁴⁰ But Wellhausen adds a socio-cultural dimension to van Vloten’s almost purely racial interpretation;⁴¹ he says: “but the way was paved for this rising ... particularly by the tribal feud of the Arabs of that quarter.”⁴² While he recognizes that the majority of Abū Muslim’s adherents were Iranians,⁴³ i.e., that they “consisted of Iranian peasants and of the Mawālī of the villages of Marw,” Wellhausen also realizes that “there were Arabs among them also who mostly occupied leading positions.”⁴⁴ Thus, he tempers van Vloten’s racial interpretation; albeit he still vouches for Persian preponderance and an active role of the Shīʿite ideological dimension. Across the rays of this spectrum, the notion of loss of Arab supremacy remains the key notion. “The idea of the overthrow of the ‘Arab Kingdom’ in favor of a cosmopolitan Islamic state,” says Daniel, “became the standard interpretation of early Islamic history and dominated the secondary literature for more than fifty years.”⁴⁵ Actually, even with the proliferation of revisionist works, this theory has not completely lost its influence.

The second school (the revisionist) is formally recognized by some to have started with Dennett’s challenge in 1939 of Wellhausen’s conclusions.⁴⁶ But even before that, in 1923, H.A.R. Gibb had written:

The Tradition of the enthusiasm of the Iranians for Abū Muslim is true only of the period after his success. In our most authentic records, there is no trace of a mass movement such as has so often been portrayed.⁴⁷

However, Gibb actually challenged the theory of the massive following of the uprising only, not its ethnic identity. The theory of a Persian rising remained, therefore, unchallenged until Daniel Dennett attempted to establish that “the final crisis which brought to an end the dynasty and the empire was not the uprising of Persian, i.e. non-Arab elements, as van Vloten maintains, but the assertion of the essential Arab spirit of independence and hatred of discipline.”⁴⁸ Obviously, Dennett does not

³⁹ Ibid., p. 397.

⁴⁰ Vloten, p. 2. Cf. Dennett, ‘Marwān,’ p. 5 of the Preface; Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 60, n. 3).

⁴¹ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 60, n. 3.

⁴² Wellhausen, p. 397.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 489.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 532.

⁴⁵ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 60, n. 3.

⁴⁶ Cf. Shaban, *ʿAbbāsīd Revolution*, p. xiii; Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 60, n. 3.

⁴⁷ Gibb, *Conquests*, p. 94.

⁴⁸ Dennett, ‘Marwān,’ p. 12 of the Preface.

disagree with Wellhausen on the negative effects of Arab tribal feuds on the Umayyad caliphate, but he disagrees with him and with van Vloten on the ethnic identity of those who actively fought to destroy it. Dennett says:

The point is that if the Arab empire of the Umayyads was to be overthrown, no one had the military strength to do this except the Arabs.⁴⁹

Reversing in full measure the ethnic identity of the agents and forces of change was the crux of the works of two scholars: M.A. Shaban, in his Ph.D. thesis (Harvard University, 1960),⁵⁰ and then Farouk Omar in his thesis (University of London, 1967).⁵¹ According to Shaban, in his work based on his earlier thesis and published in 1970, Dennett's efforts did not come to full fruition due to his untimely death; and Omar's attempt was riddled with contradictions and virtually retrogressed to Wellhausen's position. It was Shaban, we are given to understand, who brought the revisionary efforts to maturity in his published work.⁵² Both scholars contend that the Revolution was prepared for, waged and won by 'Arab Settlers'. Shaban, uniquely, strives to support this theory by providing a socio-economic interpretation of the circumstances which led to the formation of this alleged class of 'Arab Settlers'.

After these two scholars, Moshe Sharon published, in 1973, a paper in which he states that the thesis of "van Vloten and Wellhausen ... cannot today hold its own, in face of the new sources."⁵³ Sharon, like Shaban, attaches too much importance to the question of Arab settlers in Khurāsān. Unlike Shaban, however, Sharon has both classes of the Khurāsānite Arabs, i.e., the 'settlers' and the *muqātilah*, join efforts in the open stage of the movement.⁵⁴ The "new sources" Sharon alludes to are essentially *Akhbār al-Dawlah*.

The works of these three scholars have become the 'classics' of the revisionist school. The point at which the three theories converge, i.e., that Arabs were the mainstay of the movement, gained tremendous influence which still permeates scholarly work. However, it has not gone completely unchallenged.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 285.

⁵⁰ Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. xi.

⁵¹ His thesis was later published, *Abbāsīd Caliphate*; also, Omar, *Ṭabīʿat al-Dāʿwah*.

⁵² Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, see the author's introduction to this work.

⁵³ Sharon, "Abbāsīd Da'wa," pp. xxi-xli, esp. xxx. Sharon's works are based on his thesis (The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1970).

⁵⁴ Sharon, *Black Banners*, passim; idem, *Revolt*, passim.

Elton Daniel published his work in 1979.⁵⁵ Daniel criticizes Shaban's theory of a restricted rising in Marw.⁵⁶ He argues for a mass rising:

The evidence is overwhelming that the revolt represented a true mass uprising throughout Khurāsān ... The strength of the movement flowed from the outlying Khurāsānī towns towards Merv, where the contest was to be decided.⁵⁷

As far as the ethnic question is concerned, Daniel contends that the revolution involved "... the Khurāsānī masses, both Iranian and Arab, peasant and urban. It was truly a mass uprising which involved virtually every group and area in the province."⁵⁸ But in what proportions, he does not venture to say.

The articulate, but extremely noncombatant and overly modest, refutation of the revisionist theory came from the seasoned Iḥsān 'Abbās in his 1988 work on 'Abd al-Ḥamīd.⁵⁹

With some of the revisionists, some of whom accuse Wellhausen of 'missing the implications' of the source material,⁶⁰ there sat in a new tradition of 'manhandling' the source material. The access to newly discovered sources which were not available to Wellhausen was, in the main, turned to little better than arbitrary selectivity. A loose approach to the textual precision of the material, only aggravated the situation. Wellhausen's patience, precision, fine sense of history and of the language, and his objectivity, all but vanished.

To date, the controversy has not been settled. In a historical milieu shrouded with mystery, wrapped in numerous myths, and historiographically lacking in sources of archival quality, controversies cannot be settled, nor should they be viewed negatively. But, while premises and conclusions are the more visible arena of contention, they are so only because they are the focus of interest for seekers of comfortable 'final truths'. It is the methodologies of establishing premises, and of leading from them to conclusions, that are the arena of real scholarly contention. Controversy over conclusions usually degenerates into battles of conviction, where the louder claims final victory. Controversy over methodologies usually blossoms into continued scholarly inquiry, where the sounder merely attempts to preserve the right to influence the fine-tuning of the debate. Luckily, the

⁵⁵ Daniel, *Khurasan*.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 52, cf. pp. 48-52.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 58, cf. p. 52.

⁵⁹ 'Abbās, pp. 90-1; and *supra*, p. xxiv.

⁶⁰ Shaban, *Abbāsid Revolution*, p. 157; for an example.

current state-of-the-art shows signs of a growing tendency towards this last model.

Critiquing the methodologies of the two most prominent scholars of the revisionist school, Shaban and Sharon, has been building up recently.⁶¹ With that, the conclusions drawn through these methodologies are being refuted or weakened, and the research is going back to a post-Wellhausen but pre-revisionist plateau.

Since the theses advanced in this book were conceived in its genesis ten years ago, I have not come across any evidence, or interpretation of evidence, which would prompt me to reconsider my conclusions. On the contrary, most of what have come to my attention of the recent researches on the various aspects of the issues tend to vindicate my methodology, and to substantiate my conclusions.

Wadād al-Qāḍī has established the authenticity of the two crucial letters written by ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn Yaḥyā on behalf of the caliph Marwān II,⁶² and she discussed them at length⁶³ along lines leading to conclusions not dissimilar to my own.⁶⁴

In his 1995 book, Mohsen Zakeri purports to:

concentrate on the role of the *āzādān* [‘the independent small landlords and warriors, who constituted the lesser nobility in the Sāsānid Empire’] under the Umayyads until the foundation of the ‘Abbāsīd rule ... The Arab tribal-military-class replaced the Sāsānid warriors, although the latter maintained cohesiveness long after the establishment of Islam. Survival of these warriors and the problems involved in adjusting to the new circumstances were constant sources of disorder and destabilization for the Umayyad administration ... many of [the *mawālī* were] Iranian armed forces who were partially disarmed in ‘Irāq, but in Khurāsān remained intact ... the underprivileged among them swelled the ranks of the Shī‘ī and the Khārījī rebels. As the ‘Abbāsīd propaganda spread in Khurāsān, the local Persian nobility with its armed militia gave support to them and regained some of its lost privileges.⁶⁵

Much more important than the concurrence on the Persian character of the Revolution is the automatic support which the existence of this power base in Zakeri’s work lends to my arguments for Persian empowerment and for the existence of a continuum of Persian militancy

⁶¹ On Shaban, see, for example: Daniel, ‘*Taqādum*,’ esp. pp. 160, 163, 169; Crone, ‘Qays and Yemen,’ esp. pp. 1, 20, 25, 34, 42; Agha, ‘Battle of the Pass’. On Sharon, see, for example: Daniel, ‘Arabs, Persians,’ esp. pp. 544-6; Agha, ‘Abū Muslim,’ pp. 334-5, 338, and passim; idem, ‘Qaḥṭabah’.

⁶² Qāḍī, ‘State letters,’ p. 242.

⁶³ Qāḍī, ‘Nābita,’ on letter no.9, pp. 32-7, and passim; on letter no.38, pp. 45-6.

⁶⁴ Cf., infra, pp. 200-206, and passim.

⁶⁵ Zakeri, p. 11 [‘p.9’].

throughout the Umayyad period, or at least the last three decades thereof.⁶⁶ Whatever merit Daniel's and Crone's remarks on Zakeri's work may have,⁶⁷ they do not detract from this fact. In my best judgment, Zakeri's work remains one of the most vital recent works which restore cogency to the classical theory.

Other implicit or explicit, direct or oblique, concurrencies and confluences with the classical theory have been increasingly materializing in recent research. Especially aware of the relevance of their works to the main issues, Elton Daniel⁶⁸ and Patricia Crone⁶⁹ have been addressing micro issues with far reaching implications to the process of refuting the revisionists' methods, propositions, and conclusions regarding the macro issues; towards affirming or inessentially modifying the classical views; or towards opening and reopening to fresh challenges new and old questions. Other recent researches have also been concerned with some micro issues with or without organically connecting them to the macro issues.⁷⁰ And, as far as I could construe them, some recent works toil towards mixed results.⁷¹

The new source material uncovered after Wellhausen corroborates and enriches his conclusions and the material that was accessible to him. It does add dimensions hitherto faint or unseen. And it does add numerous details and rich color to the picture. But, so far, the new material has been little more than extensive footnotes, or, at best, elaborate or corrective addenda to Ṭabarī, filling tiny or huge gaps. And, thanks to Wellhausen's respectful and balanced treatment of his material, modern scholarship on the subject, even that which contradicts him, has been little more than footnotes or addenda to his monumental classic—my effort here non-exempt.

⁶⁶ Cf. *infra*, chapter three, and pp. 212-9.

⁶⁷ See, Daniel, 'Arabs, Persians,' pp. 547-8; Crone, "Abbāsīd *Abnā'*?"

⁶⁸ Daniel, '*Taqādum*'; *idem*, 'Arabs, Persians'.

⁶⁹ Crone, '*Maḥalā'*'; *idem*, 'Qays and Yemen'; *idem*, "Abbāsīd *Abnā'*"; *idem*, 'Review'.

⁷⁰ Kennedy, 'Financing'; *idem*, *Armies*, esp. pp. 42-7, n.180 pp. 56-7. P. Pourshariati (as cited in Kennedy, *loc. cit.*; his article, 'Local histories of Khurāsān and the pattern of Arab settlement,' *Studia Iranica*, 27 (1998), pp. 41-81, could not be accessed) argues 'that Arab settlement was much more patchy than assumed in other secondary literature.' This should be precisely what I call an Arab 'military archipelago' (*infra*, pp. 185-6, 189); and it is central to my argument that the Arabs of Khurāsān were incapable of waging the revolution, even if they were disposed to do.

⁷¹ Examples of apparently adequately researched works (which nevertheless come across to me as confused, confusing, or genuinely caught in their own mixed conclusions) are: Marín-Guzmán in his article (his book, *Popular Dimensions of the 'Abbasid Revolution: A Case Study of Medieval Islamic Social History*, Colorado Springs, Three Continents Press, 1994, could not be accessed); Sakhnīnī; and Karev.

IV. *This Book on the Issues*

This book attempts to advance three theses, on the three issues, in three parts, using two methodologies, and employing three styles of relaying the findings. Rather than expounding this jumble in whole sentences, I prefer to present it in the following visual form:

	THE ISSUES	THE THESES	BOOK PARTS	STYLES	METHODOLOGIES
1	'Abbāsīd connection/ secret history of the Organization	no 'Abbāsīd connection/ complete fabrication	one	narrative	source-critical
2	identity of the agents of the Organization	preponderantly non-Arab <i>mawālī</i>	three	statistical/ analytical	quantitative
3	identity of the forces of the Revolution	preponderantly Persian/ Iranian sons of the land, newly converted	two	close textual analysis/ conceptual/ rhetorical	source-critical

There shall be no concluding part summing up the component chapters; therefore, here is an anticipation of what this book has to say.

The Organization and the Revolution were both preponderantly Iranian. But, in the context of the 'Arab Kingdom', hereafter referred to as the Establishment, there were three types of Iranians. First, there were the *mawālī*, who enjoyed a relatively long-standing in Islam, and who had attained affiliations within the tribal structures of the Establishment. Second, there were the Iranians who converted to Islam more recently, or who were willing to convert under the right circumstances and did convert on the eve of the Revolution; these are simply the converts. The third type were the Iranians who remained adherents to their indigenous religions. The entire movement emerged, unfolded, and was concluded in the context of Islam. The third type is, therefore, discounted. The *mawālī* were the champions of the Organization; the converts were those of the Revolution; and this was a revolution of the masses. Of course, there was in the ranks of both a presence from both types; and some Arabs also participated.

The Organization was founded by the urban *mawālī* of Yamānī (southern Arab) tribes in Kūfah. Indeed, they originated in a proto-Shīʿite milieu—mainly the following of the splinter group (from the pure Kaysāniyyah) who adhered to the *imāmate* of Abū Hāshim ‘Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyyah. But when the heirless Abū Hāshim died, ca. 100/718-719, the founders of the Organization went their own way. Religious but also worldly-wise, these fine politicians and strategists had grown weary of the endless splitting of the original Kaysāniyyah pursuant to the death or the ‘disappearance into concealment’ (*ghaybah*) of every latest *imām* of every splinter group. They had originally alienated themselves from the dogmatic ‘puritanism’ of the pure Kaysāniyyah (*al-Kaysāniyyah al-khālīṣah*), and followed a living leader. They had a program to implement, not a dogma to be enslaved to. They were closer to the activist Mukhtāriyyah. The question of the *imām* could be resolved by postponing it until the right time. At the turn of the Hijrī century, what they faced was a question of organization and down-to-earth leadership.

They founded their own independent Organization, a political party, uncommitted to any specific *imām*—neither an ‘Alīd nor an ‘Abbāsīd. Every member had to keep his own preferences until the time came to elect a *riḍā*. This was the first principle. The *riḍā* had only one restrictive qualifier, to be from *Āl Muḥammad*, i.e. the Banū Hāshim. This was the second principle; and thus the name al-Hāshimīyyah, to which I refer throughout this book as the Organization. The third principle was a call for social justice, i.e., racial equality, code-named *al-daʿwah ilā al-Kitāb wa al-Sunnah*.

When ‘Abbāsīd propaganda recycled the history of the Organization later, *al-riḍā* became *al-Riḍā* (and an *imām* became *al-Imām*) and stood as a code name for the ‘Abbāsīd *Imām*; al-Hāshimīyyah was made to have owed its name to Abū Hāshim; and Abū Hāshim was made to have bequeathed his Prophetic legacy to the ‘Abbāsīd Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī. The principles became tenets of piety, the political program an apocalyptic dogma, the formidable strategists naive adulators, the political party a Shīʿite sect; and, thus, al-Hāshimīyyah found its way into the books of the heresiographers.

When the Organization founded the Khurāsān Chapter, it entered Iranian territory *par excellence*, where the real masses were almost purely Iranian peoples. The limited Arab presence in the territory was permeated by Establishment structures and instruments. Of course, there were Shīʿite and other disaffected elements amongst the Arabs; but, where the numbers and the natural revolutionary ‘aptitude’ were was among the Iranians. That was the natural field for promoting the

political cause. Soon, converting the non-Muslims and recruiting them became one and the same activity. The process had an inertia all its own. Under the circumstances, the standards of the authenticity of conversion had to be lax; and under the leadership of Khidāsh, the chief envoy from Kūfah to lead the Khurāsān Chapter (ca. 109-118/727-736), laxity drew numbers, and numbers encouraged laxity. The Organization had not structured itself and was not ready for the flood. The patient and deliberate Kūfan leadership was cut off, and the still healthy Arab government cracked down. Khidāsh was executed, but the faceless masses were naturally elusive. The flame did not die.

The Kūfan leader, Bukayr ibn Māhān, seized the ‘opportunity’. He traveled to Marw in 120/738, convened a ‘general assembly’, and put in place an ingenious, loosely centralized and adequately elastic beehive-like structure. The structure was later further upgraded towards more elasticity. When Abū Muslim materialized on the scene, Khidāsh’s masses had been better regimented, and the Organizational frames were elastic enough to absorb more of them and of their successors. The rekindling of the undying flame was eminent.

The mysterious roots of Abū Muslim notwithstanding, he was profoundly familiar with Khurāsān and its grass-roots population. The amazing route he took to the higher echelons of the Organization holds for us clues on how he may have reached to the Hāshimite congregation in Makkah, some time between ca. 125-128/742-746. There, I conjecture, he cut a deal with Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-‘Abbās. The deal was a complete secret, primarily kept from the historic leadership and cadres of the Organization.

Only the ‘Abbāsids, with no claim at the time to the Prophet’s legacy, would have suited Abū Muslim’s ambition for *real* power. When the victorious armies of the Revolution entered Kūfah, the historic leadership of the Organization under Abū Salamah al-Khallāl embarked on a process of wide consultations, in an effort to implement the first principle of the Organization—to ‘elect’ a *niḍā*. Those were not Abū Muslim’s plans. Ibrāhīm now dead, Abū Muslim opted for his younger, and conceivably weaker brother. Abū Muslim’s generals in Kūfah mounted a coup aborting Abū Salamah’s consultations; and they installed Abū al-‘Abbās al-Saffāh. Approximately two months later, Abū Salamah was assassinated (in Rajab, 132/March, 750). Thus was the Organization in Kūfah finished. Its historic extensions in Khurāsān would soon follow suit, as brutally, and by other means.

This, in essence, is the narrative. It does tell the whole story, but it also subsumes facts and figures, which are analyzed and processed in methodologies and styles that cannot and need not be summarized here.

Part three of the book is an almost self-contained section, introducing its own methodology, and advancing its findings, which I hope would galvanize the book as a homogeneous whole.

A NOTE ON CONVENTION

All translations from Arabic are mine, unless otherwise indicated. Numbers within parenthesis (immediately following names of Organization members) indicate the serial numbers of the members' entries in the prosopographical appendix. Especially in part three, the uppercase has been extensively used where, ostensibly, it should not have been. This practice indicates that thus capitalized words are used as special terms. Most of these terms are monitored in the "glossary of terms defined", appended hereto. The Arabic terms *al-riḍā* and *imām* have been written, all through the book, in lowercase when they refer to their standard meanings, and in uppercase (*al-Riḍā/Imām*) when they refer to the special meaning which the 'Abbāsids forced. "Organization" and "Revolution" have been capitalized wherever they referred to *the* Hāshimiyah and to Abū Muslim's revolt respectively.

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PART ONE

THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION
AND THE 'ABBĀSID CONNECTION

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PROLOGUE

Major movements in history are usually associated with names of men or peoples, and with causes. A comprehensive identification between a movement, its cause, and its leader has usually occurred where the leader was the single most important or the only inspirational power behind the movement; or where he assumed an active role at a crucial and defining moment; or where he was the major or most visible factor instrumental in bringing about the final victory. The so-called ‘Abbāsīd Revolution was not named after a leader, a people, or a cause.

Dynastic names have been used to identify ruling dynasties, but rarely—if at all—to identify historic movements. There certainly had been an ‘Abbāsīd state; but the term ‘Abbāsīd Revolution is a contradiction in terms—a misnomer, or a case of mistaken identity.

The case is only made worse when the cause is further demoted to a genealogical controversy between clans and sub clans competing for the right to inherit the legacy of a great founder. One would think that the worst that could have happened is subsuming the historically overriding motion of people under the overriding historiographical interest of the triumphant dynasty; but there is even worse. The cataclysmic shift in the demographic balance of power within a super-power of the time was handed down to the heresiographers. Such a geopolitical earthquake was sought to be portrayed and understood in the light of the squabble over which line of the holy family claimed the legacy, and which ‘sect’ supported whose claim.

This is not how history is viewed here. History is the record of men’s endeavors to serve men’s purposes. Ideology can be an attendant, but nothing more, no matter how fervent or close to the stream of events it may be or look to be. Therefore, the question addressed here is: who did what? If we can elicit reasonable answers, we may be on the right track towards finding better answers to more questions.

This is, then, a study of the men who shouldered the cause. As the story of the men unfolds, the story of the movement will.¹

¹ This is precisely why I chose to entitle most chapters in this narrative part of the book with the names of men. Tags which better represent the more objective concordant stages in the historical evolution of the Organization were relegated to subtitle status.

Genesis: The Founding Fathers

The full formative features of an organized group, which had existed as early as the last decade of the first century/second decade of the eighth century, emerge only from *Akhbār*'s account of the beginnings of the *da'wah*.² Other sources relate only sporadic missions which the 'Abbāsīd Muḥammad ibn 'Alī allegedly initiated, sending certain propagandists to Kūfah and Khurāsān. Even Balādhurī's account, close as it is to *Akhbār*'s, does not strongly impart the extent to which the group was autonomously structured.³

According to *Akhbār*, 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib had deposited some of his knowledge of the future in a 'yellow scroll'. It contained the apocalyptic knowledge of the Khurāsān Black Banners, (*'ilm rāyātī Khurāsāna al-sūd, matā takūnu wa kayfa takūn ...*). The scroll was passed on to his son al-Ḥusayn and then to his other son Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyah, who bequeathed it to his own son Abū Hāshim 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad. Abū Hāshim, on his death bed, bequeathed the scroll to his distant 'Abbāsīd cousin, Muḥammad ibn 'Alī.⁴ He also bequeathed to him his claim to the *imāmate*,⁵ and a distinct group of twenty men (henceforth, the Principal Twenty, or, Founding Fathers) who had formed the nucleus of the proto-organization.⁶

By itself, this last asset is probably the only real element in the whole story, and, therefore, it is the starting point in our attempt to reconstruct the genesis and evolution of the Organization. The connection between Abū Hāshim and these Principal Twenty, or the Founding Fathers, is very likely to have been true—quite aside from the 'Abbāsīd claim that Muḥammad ibn 'Alī inherited their loyalty.⁷ The list of their names may have been one of the first 'entries' in the 'records' of the Organization. The assumption here is that the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* did not have to interfere with the list itself, and that we may, therefore, assume that these men were actually the Founding Fathers of the Organization.

² *Akhbār*, pp. 186-94, esp. 191 ff.

³ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, pp. 114-5; cf. Ṭābarī, II: pp. 1358, 1434; Dīnawarī, pp. 334-5; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 298, 308; Azdī, p. 18; 'Uyūn, pp. 179-81; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 159.

⁴ *Akhbār*, pp. 184-5; on the Black Banners, see Athamina, 'Banners.'

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-8; cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 114; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 298; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 159.

⁶ *Akhbār*, pp. 188, 190-2.

⁷ There are other variations of the 'Abbāsīd version of how the 'Abbāsīd connection started; but none provides this precious lead into the details of the genesis of the Organization. See, *Akhbār*, pp. 170-1, 173; 'Uyūn, pp. 179-80.

The fact that they had been more than a loose group of adherents, i.e., that they had been organized within a structure before Abū Hāshim died, emerges from a number of clues. Salamah ibn Bujayr is described as “the chief of the Shī‘ites with [Abū Hāshim], (*ra’su al-shī‘ati ma’a-hu or ra’isu-hum wa al-muṭā‘u fī-him*).”⁸ The existence of a list which *Akhbār* calls “*awwalu dāwāni Shī‘ati Banī al-‘Abbās*”, and the manner in which these men conducted their affairs and their meetings,⁹ leave no doubt that they had their own hierarchy, quite aside from the question of who the *imām* was, or of whether there existed a specific *Imām* or not.

All twenty men were Kūfans; seven of them had accompanied Abū Hāshim on his trip to Damascus, at the end of which he died. These seven were: Abū ‘Amr al-Bazzār (no.1), Ḥayyān al-‘Aṭṭār (no.23), his nephew, Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah (no.26), Abū Bistām Maṣqalah al-Ṭahhān (no.32), Abū Rabāḥ Maysarah al-Nabbāl (no.34), Salamah ibn Bujayr ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Muslī (no.45), and Muḥammad ibn Khunays (no.60). The other thirteen were: Abū ‘Amr al-Azdī (no.2), Abū Hāshim Bukayr ibn Māhān (no.15), Ḥafṣ al-Asīr (no.19), Abū Salamah Ḥafṣ ibn Sulaymān al-Khallāl (no.20), Abū al-Hudhayl Ḥayyān al-Sarrāj (no.24), Ma’n ibn Yazīd al-Hamdānī (no.31), Maysarah al-Raḥḥāl (no.33), Abū Ibrāhīm Muḥammad ibn al-Mukhtār (no.37), al-Mundhir ibn Sa’d al-Hamdānī (no.39), Mūsā ibn Surayj al-Sarrāj (no.40), Abū al-Faḍl Sālīm ibn Bujayr al-A’mā (no.46), al-Walīd al-Azraq (no.49), and Abū ‘Ikrimah (Abū Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq) Ziyād ibn Dirham al-Hamdānī al-Sarrāj (no.61).¹⁰

The two historically most important names are those of Bukayr ibn Māhān, the true founder of the Organization which evolved from this nucleus, and his successor, his son-in-law, Abū Salamah al-Khallāl. It is through the study of their enterprises that we propose to attempt to reconstruct the history of the Organization, depict its character, and probe the alleged ‘Abbāsīd connection to it. But before we embark on this, there are three remarks which must be made about some valuable indications, which may be drawn from the above list.

First, there is a good number of the Principal Twenty (nine of them) whose names carry a clear professional tag. This places the proto-organization at the hub of mercantile life and at the heart of the market place of Kūfah.

⁸ *Akhbār*, p. 182, cf. pp. 183, 192.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 191, 192, 194.

¹⁰ *Akhbār*, pp. 191-2. See their respective entries in the prosopographical appendix. Here, and throughout the book, the bracketed no. after the name refers to the serial no. in this appendix.

Second, all twenty Founding Fathers (with the possible, though unlikely, exception of Salamah ibn Bujayr) were non-Arabs. But a hefty proportion of them (fifteen of their number) were attached to Arab tribes as *mawālī*—all to Yamanite tribes, seven of them specifically to the Banū Musliyah of Madhḥij.

The above two elements combined produce a potent blend of social sophistication. This is a primary element in our disposition to view the simplistic interpolations of the ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah* with great suspicion.

Third, the inconspicuous name of Salamah ibn Bujayr ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Muslī, the first chief of the proto-organization,¹¹ is as important in pointing out the real roots of the proto-organization as Bukayr’s and Abū Salamah’s are in the reconstruction of its evolution and dissolution. There can be no doubt about the common ideological extraction of the men who made up the proto-organization nucleus. They all matured in the cauldron of the Kaysāniyyah and of the remnants of al-Mukhtār’s movement. But, to which of the Kaysāniyyah variations did these people belong? Only the name of Salamah ibn Bujayr gives us the historical clue, which is also compatible with future developments. He was the son of the martyr, *ibn al-shahīd*.¹² That was his major distinction. His father was one of the tough supporters of al-Mukhtār, *dhawū al-baṣā’ir*.¹³

Salamah ibn Bujayr, this study contends, headed a small organization of like-minded pragmatist activists who had much more to do with the Mukhtāriyyah brand of pragmatic politics than with the naïveté of the pure Kaysāniyyah who whiled it out waiting for the redeemer to come back from his concealment.¹⁴ And they, the proto-organization members and their cause, were extraordinarily favored by the presence in their midst of Bukayr ibn Māhān.

¹¹ Mentioned only in *Akhbār*, pp. 180, 182-3, 188, 190-3.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 182-3.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 180-2; cf. Ṭabarī, II: pp. 738-740.

¹⁴ On the ‘sect’ Kaysāniyyah, its history and ramifications, I draw on Wadād al-Qāḍī’s balanced work, *al-Kaysāniyyah*.

CHAPTER ONE

BUKAYR IBN MĀHĀN—THE EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION

(Ca. 105/723-126/744)

I. *A Personal Profile*

Abū Hāshim Bukayr ibn Māhān was a *mawlā* of the Banū Musliyah of Madhḥij. His father had also been a *mawlā* of Musliyah who had taken up residence in Jordan. The Banū Musliyah treated Bukayr as one of their own pedigree. He was enrolled in their *dūwān*, and he participated, along with other members of the tribe, in the campaigns of Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab in Khurāsān and in his conquest of Jurjān, in 98/716-717.¹ However, Bukayr's involvement in the affairs of the Umayyad Establishment in the East was not limited to fighting in the ranks of the *muqātilah*. He also spent some time in the entourage of al-Junayd ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Murrī, governor of Sind; he became his translator and won his approval as well as a fortune.²

His personal connections in this part of the empire appear to have been as vast as his travels and official endeavors there, even after he took up residence in Kūfah. In addition to friends and acquaintances, especially among the freshly instated Azd and Madhḥij community in Jurjān, and to his acquaintance with Sulaymān ibn Kathīr (no.350);³ Bukayr had family connections in Sind: his brother Yazīd ibn Māhān bequeathed to him a fortune; and it was a cousin of his who wrote Bukayr to inform him of his brother's death and of the inheritance.⁴ The suggestion that the *dā'ī* from Marw, 'Īsā ibn Māhān (no.211), was probably his brother⁵ is not too far-fetched. A late tradition attaches to Bukayr's name the *nisbah* 'al-Hurmuzfarahī', an ascription to the village of Hurmuzfarah of the Marw district.⁶ It is not certain whether or not Bukayr's family are the same Banū Māhān who had to their name a south eastern suburb in the Marw Oasis and, in the fourth/tenth

¹ *Akhbār*, p. 191.

² *Ibid.*, p. 201; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1467; Dīmawarī, p. 335; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 51.

³ *Akhbār*, pp. 191, 198-9, 201.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁵ Crone, *Slaves*, p. 178.

⁶ Sam'ānī, V: p. 635 (al-Hurmuzfarahī); Yāqūt, V: p. 403 (Hurmuzfarrah).

century, one of the three mosques in Marw.⁷ However, it is clear that Bukayr did have family relations in the Organization: one, probably two nephews, his sister's sons, 'Īsā ibn Ḥamzah al-Hamdānī (no.28)⁸ and probably al-Ḥasan ibn Ḥamzah (no.22), and a son-in-law, Abū Salamah.⁹

The most extensive reporting on Bukayr's pre-Organization background and on his revolutionary role and activities comes from *Akhhbār*, which presents a well-rounded three-dimensional character rarely encountered amongst the mostly faceless Organization members. What emerges is fairly detailed portrait of a resourceful and relentless man of stature, generosity, altruism, diligence, secretiveness, political finesse and formidable organizational ability.¹⁰

Even after his death, his image still loomed large in the minds and hearts of his followers and adversaries alike. For, in a sense, although he was only the fourth chief of the Kūfan Organization, he was in fact its true founder and the leader who extended its reach to the East. He was the first to make the systematic effort to create the structured and cohesive force which emerged as the formidable clandestine Khurāsānian chapter of the Organization, the vehicle which Abū Muslim 'hijacked' in his final drive to victory. Therefore, a reconstruction of the role of Bukayr's role in the Organization cannot be separated from the reconstruction of the genesis and evolution of the Organization itself.¹¹

II. *Early Involvement and the Creation of the Khurāsān Chapter*

Although we are indebted to *Akhhbār* for the most complete, detailed, reliable, and closely connected record of Bukayr's role and of the evolution of the Organization, *Akhhbār* supplies very few dates. And, while Balādhuṛī, in his *Ansāb al-Ashrāf*, offers a concise and coherent sequence of the evolution of the Organization (he even supplies some details which are totally absent from *Akhhbār* as well as from Ṭabarī), his account is rife with alternative reports and is completely lacking in dates. Ṭabarī, on the other hand, offers a strict chronology but provides little sense of a connected narrative or of a continual enterprise. His chronology is also

⁷ Le Strange, p. 399.

⁸ *Akhhbār*, p. 200.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 248, 249.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 196, 248; Dīnawarī, p. 336.

¹¹ *Akhhbār*, pp. 191, 194, 196, 198-9, 201, 247-8; see also Dīnawarī, pp. 335-6; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 50.

sometimes confused—the same events seem to recur under different years and are attributed to different personages. Therefore, establishing a precise chronology of the Organization's genesis and evolution is difficult if possible at all.

According to Ṭabarī, Bukayr was recruited in 105/723-724, upon his return from Sind and al-Junayd's service. This was achieved by five earlier members: Abū 'Krimah (no.61), Muḥammad ibn Khunays (no.60), Sālim al-A'mā (no.46), Maysarah al-Nabbāl (no.34), and Abū Yahyā (no.6).¹² Besides Ṭabarī, some other sources also first mention Bukayr at a relatively late stage—after some initial activities and a few serious approaches towards Khurāsān had already been made. According to Azdī, Bukayr first appears in 107/725-726. The account depicts him acting as a chief and dispatching to Khurāsān, amongst others, two of those who had, according to Ṭabarī, recruited him and ought to have been his seniors.¹³ His first appearance in Ya'qūbī occurs in 111/729-730, in Khurāsān, as an active *dā'i*.¹⁴ Although offering no date, Balādhurī first mentions Bukayr in the capacity of chief in Kūfah, i.e., as the successor to Maysarah al-Nabbāl, or the successor to Maysarah's successor, Sālim al-A'mā, whose tenure is ignored by all sources except *Akhbār*.¹⁵ Even Ṭabarī, who introduced Bukayr as a new recruit in 105/723-724, allows that he succeeded Maysarah in the same year, and presided over his senior recruiters. *Akhbār*'s account presents no such problems, and it offers a more plausible succession of events, more compatible with Bukayr's early succession as chief and also with his time-honored stature in the Organization. *Akhbār*'s account can be reconstructed as follows.

When Abū Hāshim died (ca. 100/718-719)¹⁶ and, allegedly, bequeathed both his claim to the *Imāmate* and his organization to the 'Abbāsīd Muḥammad ibn 'Alī, Bukayr had already been a member of that organization, which, supposedly, grew into The Organization. Bukayr's was the second name to be written down in the 'Abbāsīd *dīwān*, in Muḥammad ibn 'Alī's own hand, from the list Salamah ibn Bujayr (no.45) dictated to him. Thus, Bukayr was one of the most prominent Principal Twenty.¹⁷ His tenure in Sind, and other earlier travels which

¹² Ṭabarī, II: p. 1467; see also Dīnawarī, p. 335.

¹³ Azdī, p. 26; see also Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1489, 1492.

¹⁴ Ya'qūbī, *Tarīkh*, II: p. 319.

¹⁵ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 117.

¹⁶ The date commonly accepted is ca. 100/718-719, cf. Qādī, *Kaysāniyyah*, pp. 208-9, n.3. Other dates are also cited: 97/715-716, according to Ya'qūbī, *Tarīkh*, II: p. 298; 99/717-718, according to Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 155.

¹⁷ *Akhbār*, p. 191.

he had undertaken, mixing services to the cause with his own personal interests and, probably, commercial enterprises must have occurred while he was committed to some proto-form of the Organization.

When the second chief of the Organization, Maysarah al-Nabbāl, died, shortly after 100/718-719; Sālim ibn Bujayr al-A'mā (no.46) became the third chief of the still tiny group. He wrote to Muḥammad ibn 'Alī with the news; and Bukayr, who had just received from Sind the mixed tidings of his brother's death and his inheritance, insisted on postponing his journey to Sind in favor of carrying out the task of conveying the news to the *Imām*, a task for which he had been chosen. He traveled under disguise to Ḥumaymah, where he established a very intimate relation with the *Imām*, and advised him to relocate his personal residence to Kudād. This was necessary, Bukayr reasoned, in order to secure privacy and to ensure secrecy – concerns which would prove to be his lasting obsession. He also suggested that, as a further precautionary measure to protect his identity, the *Imām* should designate a trusted intermediary who would receive and forward all letters between himself and his adherents. The *Imām* accepted both proposals; he took Bukayr with him to Damascus, where he introduced him to his *mawlā*, Faḍālah ibn Mu'ādh, whom he designated as the proposed intermediary in spite of Bukayr's objections. However, Bukayr's security concerns were addressed by making Faḍālah swear that he would not divulge the *Imām*'s secret, even if it meant his own demise.¹⁸

Before leaving Damascus for Kūfah, Bukayr related to the *Imām* his vast experiences and travels, especially in Jurjān and Khurāsān. He concluded that the East was the most fertile territory for cultivating the cause of the House of the Prophet, and, in a colorful and melodramatic recounting, he reported how he had won the pledges (for that general cause of *Āl Muḥammad*) of a Persian Muslim, Yazīd ibn al-Nuhayd (no.385), in the company of an already committed group of the Banū Musliyah in Jurjān; and he told the *Imām* how he had also won the pledges of the later- celebrated Sulaymān ibn Kathīr. He then proposed to spread the propaganda in the East, only to find that this had already been the firm and religiously sanctioned conviction of the *Imām*, who readily gave him his permission to start, and consecrated him as the initiator of the enterprise, with the words “*fa'anta bikru hādihā al-amr wa bika iftitāḥuh.*” This was during the reign of 'Umar II.¹⁹

Back in Kūfah, Bukayr met Sālim and their comrades, dispensed the *Imām*'s instructions, and headed for Sind, by way of Khurāsān, in the

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 194-8.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 198-200.

company of Sa'īd al-Ḥarashī. This must have been in 103/721-722, when al-Ḥarashī was appointed governor of Khurāsān. Bukayr stopped first in Jurjān, where he spent a month as a guest of Abū 'Āmir Ismā'īl ibn 'Āmir (no.221) and Abū 'Ubaydah Qays ibn al-Sariyy (no.317), both of the Banū Musliyah.²⁰ (Jurjān would always be the first Eastern station on Bukayr's way to Khurāsān and the last on his way back to Kūfah; and this was so not only because of the natural geographical sequence. Jurjān was partly a conquest of Musliyah, a campaign in which he had participated; and it was also his Eastern 'home' when he was not in Kūfah. It was there that he began grooming the all-important circle of 'conspirators' who, though conspicuously underrepresented in the subsequent Organizational structure as depicted by the sources, would prove crucial in the affairs of the Organization some twenty-six years later.)

From Jurjān, accompanied by Abū 'Ubaydah, he left for Marw, where he spent two months as a guest of Sulaymān ibn Kathīr's. During this stop in Marw, Bukayr made some of the most important recruitments to the cause; and it appears that Khuzā'ah in particular flocked to him in impressive numbers. It is interesting to note, however, that the new recruits came to him in two separate and distinct blocks: those who were brought by Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, and those who came on their own. On the one hand, Sulaymān, an Arab of Khuzā'ah, brought Mālik ibn al-Haytham (no.252), another Arab of the same tribe, 'Amr ibn A'yan (no.127), Ziyād ibn Šālih (no.395), and Ṭalḥah ibn Zurayq (no.351), all three *mawālī* of Khuzā'ah; he also brought Abū al-Najm 'Imrān ibn Ismā'īl (no.209), a *mawlā* of Umayyah, and Abū Dāwūd Khālid ibn Ibrāhīm (no.237), an Arab of Bakr ibn Wā'il. On the other hand, al-'Alā' ibn Ḥurayth (no.121), a *mawlā* of Khuzā'ah, independently came to Bukayr with a group of anonymous members of the tribe and declared their allegiance separately. This episode foreshadows the most consequential autonomous status al-'Alā' enjoyed in the Organization's arm in Transoxania and Khwārizm. Among the notable recruits won over during this stop was Mūsā ibn Ka'b (no.292).²¹

After Marw, Bukayr journeyed to Sind on his personal business. There, he collected his inheritance and amassed still more fortune in al-Junayd's service.²² *Akhbār* reports nothing further about his stay in Sind, its duration, his revolutionary activities during the period, or even his return to Kūfah. However, we know from Ṭabarī, and from the fact that

²⁰ Ibid., p. 201.

²¹ Ibid., p. 201-2.

²² Ibid., p. 201.

al-Junayd's governorship of Sind ended in 105/723-724, that Bukayr went back to Kūfah that year.²³

III. *The Interim Leaderships of Maysarah al-Nabbāl and Sālim al-A'mā—Abū 'Ikrimah's Mission as the First Resident Envoy-in-Chief in Khurāsān*

The first two chiefs, Salamah ibn Bujayr and Abū Rabāḥ Maysarah al-Nabbāl (nos. 45, 34), had died in quick succession, and Sālim ibn Bujayr al-A'mā (no.46) became the third chief of the proto-organization, shortly after 100/719.²⁴ Maysarah was the first to start the practice of sending envoy-propagandists to Khurāsān. *Akhbār* does not report on Maysarah's activities; but other sources are almost unanimous on the names of some of the missionaries he sent. These were Muḥammad ibn Khunays, Abū 'Ikrimah Ziyād ibn Dirham, and Ḥayyān al-ʿAṭṭār (nos. 60, 61, 23).²⁵

More important, however, is the identity of the active leader who commissioned these envoys. Was it the ʿAbbāsīd Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī acting directly, or Maysarah acting on the instructions of the ʿAbbāsīd, or was it Maysarah acting independently? It is rather certain that the sources would involve the ʿAbbāsīd *Imām* one way or the other.²⁶ But it is of special interest that Balādhurī pointedly (?) makes the case for the independence of the Kūfan leadership. In one variation he writes: “[Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī] ... sent a man to Khurāsān ... It is also said that Maysarah [was the one who] sent him from Kūfah, he, [the man], was Muḥammad ibn Khunays.”²⁷

The chronology of these missions, which continued through Sālim's unassuming leadership²⁸ and the first years of Bukayr's, is very confused in the sources. The most important, however, is Abū 'Ikrimah's mission. Abū 'Ikrimah remained active in Khurāsān until he was executed in 107/725-726 by Asad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Qasrī during his first governorship of the province.²⁹ But the reference here is to the specific

²³ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1467.

²⁴ *Akhbār*, pp. 192, 194. Cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 117. Ṭabarī dates Maysarah's death to 105/724-724, and does not mention Sālim's leadership (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1467).

²⁵ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1434; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 115-6; Dīnawarī, pp. 334-5; Ya'qūbī, *Tarīkh*, II: p. 308; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 159.

²⁶ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1358; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 114-6; Ya'qūbī, *Tarīkh*, II: pp. 298, 308; Dīnawarī, pp. 334-5.

²⁷ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 115; cf. Ṭabarī, II: p. 1434.

²⁸ Cf. *Akhbār*, p. 205, for an account indicative of the character of this leadership.

²⁹ Cf. *Akhbār*, pp. 203-5; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1453, 1467, 1502-1503; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 114, 116; Azdī, pp. 18, 26; Dīnawarī, pp. 334-6; Ya'qūbī, *Tarīkh*, p. 308; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 195, 193, 197, 200.

episode of his encounter with the dissident Ghālib (no. 18). This must have occurred during Bukayr's tenure in Sind and Sālim's leadership.

Abū 'Ikrimah was reportedly sent to Khurāsān with the explicit instructions to follow in Bukayr's footsteps, i.e., to meet the people Bukayr had recruited and to report to Sālim, and, in the event Bukayr returned to Iraq, he was instructed to report to Bukayr.³⁰ He was also instructed to be cautious of a certain Ghālib.

Ghālib is mentioned in two versions of what appears to be essentially the same account. *Akhhbār*'s version is attributed to a first hand source, Mūsā al-Sarrāj (no.40).³¹ Ṭabarī relates Madā'inī's paraphrased version.³² Both versions report on Abū 'Ikrimah's first mission to Khurāsān. Except for Madā'inī's assertion that Ghālib was a "man from Abrashahr" (Nīshāpūr), and *Akhhbār*'s wording which suggests that he may have been from Kūfah (a resolvable discrepancy), all other differences between the two versions are complementary rather than contradictory, and are attributable to style and geographic perspectives. While Madā'inī reports in précis form and, as usual, from a Khurāsānian perspective Mūsā al-Sarrāj saw the events from the Kūfan end and, allegedly, reported them verbatim.

According to *Akhhbār*, when Muḥammad ibn 'Alī sent Abū 'Ikrimah off to Khurāsān, probably ca. 103/721-722, he cautioned him:

... Beware Ghālib and a small group of Kūfans who supported him in his view; amongst them are 'Ayyāsh ibn Abū 'Ayyāsh and Ziyād ibn Nadhīr; they are a small group of the Banū Tamīm; and Abū Khālid al-Jawāliqī; for they have endeavored to sow discord. We declare ourselves free of [any relation to] them, and thou shalt do the same. They, Ghālib and his comrades, were Fāṭimīyyūn who adhered to the *Imāmate* of Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn.³³

Madā'inī, too, reports that Muḥammad ibn 'Alī's warning to Abū 'Ikrimah of Ghālib; but he goes further to report a debate between the two in Marw. Ghālib is introduced here without his group. He came from Nīshāpūr to Marw, where Abū 'Ikrimah was conducting propaganda, allegedly 'Abbāsīd, amidst a large scale show of hospitality—"he took to feeding people." The two debated—one advocating the Ṭālibids, and the other the "Abbāsīds'.

Of course, this is improbable. It is not compatible with the 'Abbāsīd claim that the cautious approach of their propaganda was the reason

³⁰ *Akhhbār*, pp. 203-5.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4.

³² Ṭabarī, II: p. 1501.

³³ *Akhhbār*, p. 204.

why the Organization's efforts were conducted in the name of *al-riḍā min Āl Muḥammad*, concealing at once the identity of the *Imām* and that of the dynasty. It is also not compatible with the stringent warnings of the alleged 'Abbāsīd directives to their missionaries not to divulge their secret except to extremely trusted people; especially that the last such directive had been issued to Abū 'Ikrimah himself, before he embarked on his present mission. It defies the claim that the *Imām* had specifically warned his emissary of this one Ghālib. If someone as distrusted as Ghālib were to be let in on the secret of the *Imām*, or even the dynasty in general, Muḥammad ibn 'Alī, or any alternate 'Abbāsīd patriarch, would not have survived to die a natural death, and Ibrāhīm wouldn't have survived till the Khurāsāniyyah took Khurāsān and surged westwards.

This is one of many situations where we are faced with the task of unweaving the strands of false claims of early 'Abbāsīd involvement from the texture of historical facts. Once Muḥammad ibn 'Alī's alleged and practically inconsequential role is omitted, the result will be a tenable situation. The Organization's quarrel with Ghālib was not centered around his preference of any one specific contender as opposed to the Organization's preference of any other specific candidate. It rather had to do with the Organization's resistance to any early choices, and with its consistent policy of keeping its options open.

IV. *Bukayr's Accession as the Fourth Chief of the Organization—
First Phase: Remote Management Through Resident Envoys
(Ca.105-109/723-728)*

Between Abū 'Ikrimah's mission and Bukayr's reappearance, probably ca. 120/738, a huge gap of almost fifteen years exists in *Akhbār's* reporting of Bukayr's activities and the evolution of the Organization.

Essentially the same gap also exists in all other sources. But a few of these sources offer some sporadic reporting of some events of the first four years, until 109/727-728, and probably one or two years towards the end of the period. Ṭabarī reports some activity in his reporting on the events of the years 105, 107, 108, 109, 113, 117 and 118/723, 725-728, 731-732, 735 and 736; Azdī reports on the years 105 and 107/723-724 and 725-726; and Dīnawarī gives no dates to his very confused and brief account. Although the conciseness, continuity and lack of dates in Balādhurī's account leave no sense of any missing links, the gap exists, and, in *Akhbār*, it is a black hole. However, in these other sources, it takes on the deceptive appearance of a series of minor gaps, with major revolutionary activities interspersed in between.

The following is a brief attempt to draw a sketchy portrait of the evolution of the Organization during this historiographical gap. The period may be divided into two broad phases. The first covers the first four years of Bukayr's leadership, approximately 105-109/723-728. The second phase starts with Khidāsh's takeover of the Khurāsān Chapter, and it ends with Bukayr's regaining control over it, in 120/738.

Sālim's tenure must have ended when he lost his eyesight.³⁴ Bukayr succeeded him, shortly after coming back from Sind,³⁵ and he apparently continued the tradition of reliance on resident envoys to Khurāsān. A number of these envoys were frequently exposed; the ruthless governor, Asad ibn 'Abd Allāh, killed many of them in the years 107, 108, 109/725-728.³⁶

Actually, the combined product of these sporadic reports is mainly a repetitious replay of the same formulaic episode of dispatching propagandist envoys to Khurāsān. Specific names, roles, dates and destinies are confused and interchangeable. Also, some organizational measures are attributed, in these sources, to some of these envoys. *Akhbār*, more credibly, attributes these very same measures to Bukayr, after he had regained control of the Khurāsān Chapter.

One major fact, however, emerges from or, rather, is confirmed by these reports, namely that, during the first decade of the second century/third decade of the seventh century, the chief propagandists were still being sent to Khurāsān and controlled from Kūfah. No organizational measures had been taken to structure the movement. The outcome was three grave results for the Kūfan leadership. Firstly, the envoys were frequently exposed and executed. Secondly, there was no systematic reassessment of the propaganda, its message, and the extent of its success. Thirdly, when the right man appeared on the provincial theatre of Khurāsān, he did reassess the message of the movement, and he tuned it to suit the territory. The success with which he met, ironically, meant the severance of the Chapter's organizational ties to the Kūfan leadership. This man was the Kūfan envoy, Khidāsh *al-dā'ī* (no.58).

³⁴ Cf. *Akhbār*, p. 191.

³⁵ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 117; variantly on dates and immediate predecessor, *ibid*; Tabarī, II: p. 1467; Dīnawarī, p. 336; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 319.

³⁶ Muḥammad ibn Khunays, Abū 'Ikrimah, Ziyād *Khāl* al-Walīd al-Azraq, a certain Abū Mūsā, and 'Ammār al-'Ibādī (nos.60, 61, 55, 5, 9). See: Tabarī, II: pp. 1488, 1492, 1502-1503; Azdī, p. 26; also, but no dates given, Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 116; Dīnawarī, p. 336. Of course, 'Ammār al-'Ibādī (no.9) could himself be the celebrated and enigmatic Khidāsh, 'Ammār ibn Yazdād (no.58), see below.

V. *The Disruption: The Khidāsh Years—Independence of the Khurāsān Chapter*
(Ca. 109-118/727-737)

More important than the aforementioned differences between *Akhbār* and the other sources are their differences on the Khidāsh question. With Khidāsh, we are actually confronted with three major questions. First, who was Khidāsh? Second, what was his message? And, third, to what extent was he successful? *Akhbār* provides two different answers to the second question, but none to the other two. Ṭabarī, Balādhurī and a few other sources provide one uniform answer to the second question, and the only scant information we have about this taboo figure. This information, though sketchy, may be enough to provide an adequate indication as to what may have happened in this historiographical black hole.

Khidāsh's original name was 'Ammar or 'Umārah, son of Yazīd or Yazdād or Zayd or Budayl.³⁷ According to Balādhurī, he was a Christian potter from al-Ḥīrah. He converted to Islam and became a teacher in Kūfah.³⁸ We do not know how he joined the Organization, nor how he attained the status which enabled him to become an envoy propagandist. Accounts, as usual, differ on whether it was Bukayr who sent him to Khurāsān,³⁹ or Muḥammad ibn 'Alī.⁴⁰ Balādhurī's style, which pointedly introduces the alternative accounts with the expression "it was also said (*wa yuqāl*)," accentuates the presence of a submerged parallel tradition. But it is instructive to note that only Balādhurī and Nāshī' mention the account that makes Muḥammad ibn 'Alī responsible for sending Khidāsh to Khurāsān. Nāshī' even attributes it to Khidāsh's followers. It was not a comfortable affair to claim credit for.⁴¹

Khidāsh commenced his mission in 109/727-728,⁴² succeeding Abū al-Ḥasan Kathīr ibn Sa'd (no.59). Balādhurī reports that Kathīr simply

³⁷ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 116; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1503, 56; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 201; Ibn Kathīr, IX: p. 333; Ibn Ḥazm, *Fīṣal*, V: p. 27; Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216; Maqdisī, VI: pp. 60-1.

³⁸ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 117; cf. Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216.

³⁹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1588; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 117; Nāshī', p. 35; Maqdisī, VI: p. 60; Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216.

⁴⁰ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 116; Nāshī', pp. 34-5.

⁴¹ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 117.

⁴² Ṭabarī, II: p. 1503. But Ṭabarī also reports that Khidāsh was sent to the province in 118/ 736-737, (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1588). The difference between the two dates is substantial and consequential. Wellhausen doesn't argue for the first date, but he finds the second improbable (p. 514). Balādhurī gives no dates, but his sequence of the succession of the envoys appears to corroborate the earlier date. Ibn al-Athīr copies Ṭabarī on both dates, (IV: pp. 201, 135); the other sources date the event to 118, Ibn Kathīr, IX: p. 333; Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216; Maqdisī, VI: p. 60.

came back from Khurāsān after a tenure of three years; only then did Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, or Bukayr, dispatch Khidāsh.⁴³ In an anonymous account, Ṭabarī provides a different and consequential detail. Kathīr was still in Khurāsān, in a village called Mar‘am, preaching, apparently without much success, when Khidāsh came upon him. Ṭabarī, in this account, does not say that Khidāsh was sent by a higher authority. Actually, the nature of the encounter and its outcome suggest that it was an intrusion. “Kathīr was ‘illiterate’, *ummī*,” continues Ṭabarī, “so [Khidāsh] got the better of [him].”⁴⁴

Without going into the etymology of the term ‘*ummī*’, it can safely be assumed that, in this context, it must be understood in a general sense. Kathīr was ‘naïve’, not as cunning or ‘educated’ in the ways of conducting the movement’s propaganda as Khidāsh was. In the ensuing fight for the control of the Chapter’s apparatus, Khidāsh won. More important yet is the fact that he won the fight for its soul. Khidāsh must have found and articulated the proper message to address the provincial constituency.

What, then, was Khidāsh’s message? The standard tradition on which the sources are almost unanimous is that he changed the norms and procedures sanctioned by the ‘Abbāsīd Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, (*ghayyara sunana al-Imām*), and altered the practices of his own predecessors.⁴⁵ Deviation is the key accusation. The basic content of his message is also agreed upon by the sources, with shades of variation. He preached the religion of Khurramiyyah and permitted the partisans to share their women with one another, (*azhara dūna al-Khurramiyyah wa dā‘ā ilay-hi wa rakkhāṣa li-ba‘dI-him fī nisā’i ba‘d*).⁴⁶ Further specific preachings that are attributed to him redefined the precepts of Islam. Fasting is refraining from divulging the *Imām*’s identity, praying is invoking God in favor of the *Imām*,⁴⁷ pilgrimage is visiting the *Imām*,⁴⁸ and *jihād* (holy war) is shedding the adversaries’ blood by assassination, poisoning, strangling, and crushing skulls. He also preached the transmigration of souls (*tanāsukh*) and God’s transformation of himself in different images (*al-*

⁴³ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 116-7.

⁴⁴ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1503.

⁴⁵ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 117. Cf. Ṭabarī, II: p. 1588; Nāshī, p. 34; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 235; Ibn Kathīr, IX: p. 333; Maqdisī, VI: p. 61; Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216. This is also the gist of Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī’s alleged letter disavowing Khidāsh, *Akhbār*, pp. 212-3.

⁴⁶ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1588; cf. Ibn Kathīr, IX: p. 333; Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216; Maqdisī, VI: p. 61.

⁴⁷ Nāshī, p. 33; Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216.

⁴⁸ Ibn Khaldūn, III, p. 216.

qalb).⁴⁹ On the whole, from an Islamic point of view, “he represented wrong as right (*maththala al-bāṭil fī Ṣūratī al-ḥaqq*),”⁵⁰ “and stipulated reprehensible and detested stipulations (*wa ḥakama bi-ahkāmīn munkarātīn makrūhah*).”⁵¹ That is why, according to one version, he was called Khidāsh, because he tore the religion to pieces, *Khadasha al-dīn*.⁵² *Akhbār*, in its account of Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī’s renouncement of Khidāsh, lends credence to these traditions. The *Imām* ordered the partisans not to believe anyone who may attribute to him (i.e., as Khidāsh had done) a saying or a message which contradicts the Qur’ān and the *sunnah*.⁵³

The general picture that emerges from the above essentially uniform statements is generally accepted by modern scholars.⁵⁴ Moshe Sharon, however, argues against these traditions. He writes, “There is no neutral evidence whatsoever that [Khidāsh] was Khurramī.”⁵⁵ He gives more weight to the second tradition in *Akhbār* where Khidāsh is mentioned. According to this report, a certain Abū Khālid, originally a partisan of ‘*da‘wat Banī al-‘Abbās*’, dissented. After the death of Ibrāhīm al-Imām, Abū Khālid postulated that the *waṣīyyah* must be restored to the sons of ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib. A few years later, during Abū Muslim’s tenure, Abū Khālid and his followers rose in rebellion in Nīshāpūr. They were originally followers of Khidāsh, they were called the Khālidiyyah, but during al-Manṣūr’s reign, they came to be known as the Fāṭimiyyah.⁵⁶ Basing his argument on this unique report, Sharon draws the conclusion that Khidāsh had supported the cause of the ‘Alīds. That is why, he contends, the ‘Abbāsīd propaganda distorted his image.⁵⁷

We have no argument with Sharon’s conclusion regarding Khidāsh’s ‘Alīd sympathies; it may have been the case. Actually, the aforementioned Abū Khālid may very well have been the same Abū Khālid al-Jawāliqī (no.3) who was one of Ghālib’s dissident group of ‘Alīd sympathizers, of whom Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī allegedly warned Abū

⁴⁹ Nāshī’, p. 33.

⁵⁰ Maqdisī, VI: p. 61.

⁵¹ Balādthurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 117.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 117-8; Nāshī’, pp. 32-3. According to a different account, he himself assumed the name upon his arrival in Khurāsān, apparently as a *nom de guerre*, Balādthurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 116; Tabarī, II: p. 1588; Maqdisī, VI: p. 60; Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216. The first account is clearly a fabrication. Even if the poetry cited to corroborate it is authentic, ‘*wa Kīdāshu l-mūhillu idh khadasha d-dīna ...*,’ it means that the poet simply capitalized on the pun implicit in the root of the verb.

⁵³ *Akhbār*, pp. 212-3. See also below.

⁵⁴ Wellhausen, p. 510; Daniel, *Khurasan*, pp. 36-7; Madelung, ‘Mazdakism,’ pp. 1-12; Madelung, ‘Khurramiyya.’ See also below, pp. 212-9.

⁵⁵ Sharon, ‘Khidāsh,’ p. 2.

⁵⁶ *Akhbār*, pp. 403-4.

⁵⁷ Sharon, ‘Khidāsh,’ p. 2; Sharon, *Black Banners*, p. 169 ff.

‘Ikrimah.⁵⁸ It is Sharon’s categorical rejection of Khidāsh’s Khurramī affiliations which cannot be accepted. Of course, it is not in defense of the ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah* that we question Sharon’s theory, but for completely different reasons.

First, and foremost, there is no intrinsic contradiction between advocating the cause of a specific line within the holy family and preaching some extra doctrines. In this regard, the propagandist does not necessarily implicate the propagated, unless the latter is an accomplice in reaping the benefits. But even then, the stigma is not politically or ideologically irrevocable.⁵⁹

Second, in the case of Khidāsh and of Abū Muslim as well as any pragmatic operative, one’s message does not necessarily reflect one’s true beliefs. What historians look for is the resonance, the appeal with which the shrewd operative adorns his message, the ‘charm’, the rare quality of the ever-present harmonious affinity in populist movements between the ‘call’ and the ‘called’. The ‘caller’ has only to find the tune and play it with skill, not necessarily with conviction.

Khidāsh did happen on the Khurāsānite scene; he preached something which made people flock to him. The ‘Alīd cause had been preached across the land for decades—to no avail. This Khidāshist call was different. It rallied a completely different constituency to a completely different call. The admixture of indigenous Iranian beliefs and practices to the Islamic politico-religious motifs of the Organization appealed to the Iranian masses, not to the Arabized *mawālī* and the Arabs. The movement grew dangerously large. Balādhurī says that, during al-Junayd’s governorship (112-116/73-735), the *da’wah* spread and grew strong, “*intasharat du’ātu Banī Hāshim wa qawīya amruhum.*”⁶⁰

But the growth was too conspicuous for Khidāsh’s own good. A subsequent governor, Asad ibn ‘Abd Allāh, killed him in 118/736-737.⁶¹ But Khidāshism did not die with its founder, nor was it simply al-Khidāshīyah, a mere heresy in the heresiographers’ books,⁶² that out-

⁵⁸ *Akhhār*, p. 204.

⁵⁹ Examples abound; numerous radicals, *ghulāt*, called for numerous Hāshimites—‘Abd Allāh ibn Saba’ preached the divinity of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, for one prime example.

⁶⁰ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, p. 527. Other sources state that people responded to Khidāsh in great numbers, Ṭabarī, IV: p. 56; Maqdisī, VI: p. 61; Ibn Kathīr, IX: p. 333; Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216.

⁶¹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1589; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 117; Nāshī’, pp. 34-5; Ibn Ḥazm, *Fīṣal*, V: p. 27; Maqdisī, VI: p. 61; Ibn Kathīr, IX: p. 333; Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216. In an alternative account, Balādhurī reports that it was the ‘Abbāsīd partisans who killed Khidāsh, Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 117.

⁶² See Nāshī’, pp. 32-3, 35; Ibn Ḥazm, *Fīṣal*, V: p. 27.

survived its founder. As this study unfolds, it will investigate the human and ideological continuum in which Khidāsh's call resonated.⁶³

VI. *Second Phase of Bukayr's Leadership: Regaining Control over the Khurāsān Chapter, the 'General Assembly', Restructuring*

A long apocalyptic sermon by Muḥammad ibn 'Alī occupies the pages of *Akhhbār* between the last events preceding the gap (Bukayr's last appearance and Abū 'Ikrimah's mission)⁶⁴ and the first event thereafter (Bukayr's reappearance).⁶⁵ The void is, of course, not acknowledged. Bukayr reappears as if continuing an activity from the previous day, rather than resuming one which had been denied him for over a decade. Despite this, the chronology can easily be deduced, Bukayr reappears carrying two letters from the *Imām* to his Khurāsānian adherents. The first was a very lengthy, pedagogic letter.⁶⁶ The second was a much shorter letter renouncing Khidāsh.⁶⁷ This helps place Bukayr's reappearance after Kidāsh's execution, i.e., ca. 120/738. Furthermore, the *Imām's* apocalyptic sermon is quoted as having foretold that the beginnings of Umayyad decay would coincide with the simultaneous occurrence of the two cracks in the east and in the west, *fatqā al-maghrib wa al-mashriq*, and these two cracks are interpreted to have been the resurgence of the insurgency of al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj in Khurāsān and that of the Berber under Maysarah al-Saqqā' in North Africa; and Bukayr's reappearance is reported to have come on the heels of both flares,⁶⁸ i.e., ca. 119-120/737-738.⁶⁹ Moreover, the date of Bukayr's reappearance is explicitly stated in Ṭabarī. He reports that Muḥammad ibn 'Alī, in 120/738, sent Bukayr to Khurāsān on a damage control mission to contain the consequences of Khidāsh's conduct there.⁷⁰

Before leaving these two accounts, it must be noted that an internal contradiction in Ṭabarī's account confirms a suggestion imparted by *Akhhbār's* muddled report: namely, that Bukayr, the pillar of the Organization in both Kūfah and Khurāsān, had to be reintroduced to the Khurāsānian chapter, and in a humiliating manner at that.

⁶³ See below, especially the immediately following section, and chapters three, six, and eight.

⁶⁴ *Akhhbār*, p. 205.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 208-12.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 212-3.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

⁶⁹ Cf. Ṭabarī II: p. 1608 ff.; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 222.

⁷⁰ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1640.

Akhbār, the more confessional or avid ‘Abbāsīd mouthpiece, claims, in a grandiose fashion, that the much strengthened and expanded ‘Shī‘ah’ of Khurāsān venerated Bukayr the instant they met him; then, when the *Imām*’s lengthy and pedagogic letter was read to them, they prayed for him and extolled his letter. Next, when Bukayr produced the shorter letter renouncing Khidāsh, and absolving the *Imām* of what Khidāsh had falsely attributed to him, they responded by confirming that they had already received from the *Imām* something to the same effect, and that they were in a state of obedience and compliance. Now, in reverse order, came an ostensibly uncalled for and rather inexplicable letter, introducing Bukayr and recommending him as the *Imām*’s confidant who should be strictly obeyed. If Bukayr had been sufficiently known to the partisans as to be met with veneration before any letter was read, why did he have to be introduced! The only effort made to explain this anomaly was the claim that the letter had been sent earlier with Qaḥṭabah, who was able to produce it only in this circumstance because he had been detained by sickness. Of course, the response to the letter was that the adherents grew yet more respectful and aggrandizing of Bukayr, and they entrusted him with their affairs.⁷¹

The more objective Ṭabarī, despite the internal contradiction apparent in his account when taken in its totality, presents elements from which a more logical version may be reconstructed. What is puzzling in Ṭabarī’s account, however, is that he speaks of two angry parties—Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, on the one hand, and his presumed Khurāsānian adherents, on the other—each performing two sets of actions in succession and, indeed, almost in the same breath. These two courses of action taken by each party are mutually incompatible, and one of them is definitely untenable under the supposedly prevailing psychological mood of its perpetrator, and in view of the declared infuriator-infuriated relationship between the two parties. First, the *Imām*, angry with his adherents for following Khidāsh’s misleading guidance, snubbed them and discontinued all communications with them; the adherents, puzzled by their *Imām*’s attitude, delegated, in a concerned and deferential gesture, Sulaymān ibn Kathīr to find out why, and, ostensibly, to appease him. The *Imām* chastised his adherents, and sent their envoy back, virtually empty handed—with a sealed, but blank scroll. They then realized that they had been misguided by Khidāsh. Next, in a blatant reversal of roles, the *Imām* sent his own envoy, Bukayr, to his adherents, with a letter disowning Khidāsh, and

⁷¹ *Akhbār*, pp. 208-213.

washing his hands of his legacy (after an untold number of years of silence!). The defiant adherents snubbed his envoy and sent him back in humiliation. Unabashed, the *Imām* sent Bukayr once again, this time with a coded message – “sticks tipped, some with iron and some with brass,” which Bukayr distributed amongst the *naqībs* and other adherents. Then they understood that they had deviated from the *Imām*’s course, and they repented.⁷² Wellhausen, appropriately, and almost sarcastically remarks: “They must have understood the meaning of the sticks better than I.”⁷³ It simply does not add up!

Both the confusion in *Akhbār*’s account and the internal contradiction in Ṭabarī’s precipitate a lingering and unmistakable suspicion that both accounts, like most others where the ‘Abbāsīd connection is tapped, originated in a milieu of ‘enriched’ historical data, where the bare historical facts had been subjected to a thorough, though not unflawed, process of weaving strands of ideological fiction into the fabric of historical reality. Both accounts are unsuccessful attempts to paper over the intentional obliteration of the records of over a decade, that obliteration which caused the aforementioned historiographical gap. This tampering with historical data was meant to salvage the claim of an early, continuous, and effective ‘Abbāsīd involvement from the potential damage which the denial of the events of an entire decade could wreak upon it. This is especially so in the case of *Akhbār*, an account that implicitly boasts putting the entire history of the *da‘wah* in the limelight of reliably transmitted history. The bare facts were that, during the gap of a decade or so, the Khurāsān chapter had broken away from the Kūfan headquarters. After the elimination of Khidāsh, the Kūfan leadership succeeded in regaining control, but only after some stiff resistance on the part of the provincial cadres.

In his attempts to gloss over the disruption, the compiler of *Akhbār* does not cease to blur the issues and the sequence of events. Concluding the section in which the *Imām*’s letters were read to the obedient crowd of Khurāsānian adherents, and introducing Bukayr’s next action, *Akhbār* states:

When [the *Imām*’s letter ordering the partisans to obey Bukayr] was read to them, they aggrandized Abū Hāshim [Bukayr] all the more and entrusted him with their affairs. He stayed in their midst, reaching out to the districts of Khurāsān through his envoys and propagandists; and he became subject to [widespread] attention.

⁷² Ṭabarī, II: p. 1641; cf. Nāshī’, p. 34; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 235; Maqdisī, VI: p. 61; Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 216.

⁷³ Wellhausen, p. 511, n.1.

Then, when the situation in Khurāsān became tumultuous, (*thumma lammā Idṭaraba amru Khurāsān*), Bukayr gathered the ‘Shī‘ah’ in Sulaymān ibn Kathīr’s house.⁷⁴

On its face value, the above text appears to relate, in chronological order, four consecutive occurrences. These are:

- (1) Bukayr’s effortless and smooth assumption of the reins of leadership of the Khurāsān chapter;
- (2) his immediate and unchallenged settling into the role, conducting a province-wide propaganda campaign;
- (3) then, the occurrence of some trouble of an unexplained nature in Khurāsān.
- (4) And, in the wake of the above disturbance, Bukayr’s convening of a meeting of the ‘Shī‘ah’.

This is actually a scrambled order of events. A key to restoring a more viable order may be found if we take a closer look at the situation in Khurāsān.

If the chronology established hitherto is accepted, it must also be accepted that there was no turmoil on the provincial scale in Khurāsān around this time. Asad ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Qasrī had died early in 120/738,⁷⁵ concluding a successful second tenure as governor of the province, during which he had crushed the Turgesh and effectively extinguished al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj’s revolt in Dhū al-Hijjah 119 or 118/December 737 or 736.⁷⁶ An interim period of four months followed his death, during which the position was filled by Ja‘far ibn Ḥanzalah al-Bahrānī,⁷⁷ or by Ja‘far and then by Juday‘ ibn ‘Alī al-Kirmānī, in short but peaceful succession.⁷⁸ Then, in Rajab of the same year, i.e., 120/June-July 738, the powerful Naṣr ibn Sayyār was installed.⁷⁹ Thus, these were hardly tumultuous times in the province.

Therefore, the ‘tumultuous situation’ referred to in *Akhbār*’s statement must be explained in terms of the internal commotion within the ranks of the Organization. Ṭabarī’s preceding account, in both its two contradictory varieties, is firmly grounded in the fact that this commotion was a lingering consequence of the events of the Khidāsh years. The ‘tumultuous situation’ did not arise after Bukayr had arrived in the province. It had actually accrued from the chaotic growth of the Organization; and it materialized in the authorities’ cracking down on

⁷⁴ *Akhbār*, p. 213.

⁷⁵ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1635-8; cf. Wellhausen, pp. 473-4.

⁷⁶ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1603 ff.; cf. Wellhausen, pp. 471-2.

⁷⁷ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1638.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, IV: p. 78.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

the Organization. The situation thus arising was alarming to the Kūfan leadership, but it was also an opportunity for that leadership; to try to regain control of the mutinous Chapter. Thus the usually articulate Balādhurī explicitly states that, after Khidāsh's elimination, "Bukayr went to Khurāsān and mended what Khidāsh had spoiled."⁸⁰

Nor could it have been all that simple for Bukayr to immediately regain control upon his arrival (as *Akhbār's* celebration of the alleged harmony and as Balādhurī's synoptic brevity would have us believe). Despite its internal contradictions, Ṭabarī's version of Bukayr's reappearance⁸¹ depicts in no uncertain terms the resistance he had to contend with. Moreover, even from *Akhbār's* unique report of the proceedings of the meeting at Sulaymān ibn Kathīr's house, a fairly clear idea can be gleaned of Bukayr's uncertain and cautious tentativeness as well as the conflicting interests and currents in the ranks of the partisans.⁸² Therefore, rather than being the last event in Bukayr's present trip to the province, this meeting must have been only a milestone, albeit the major and conclusive one, in his struggle to regain control of the Chapter.

The meeting must have also taken place during the relatively lax interim period between the tenures of the two strong governors. It is probably not likely that a meeting of such size and importance, even though it took place on a private estate, would have escaped notice by the watchful eyes and the punishing hands of either Naṣr or Asad, both of whom possessed a record of efficient intelligence operations against such clandestine activities. Moreover, both Ibn Ḥanẓalah and al-Kirmānī (and the latter's heirs) would subsequently display some sort of affinity to the new regime or to the victorious Organization. Although nothing more should, or could, be made of them, the following facts merely favor this interim period over the periods bracketing it as the probable time frame for the meeting. Later Ja'far became close to al-Manṣūr, and served in the new government until at least 146/763,⁸³ and Kirmānī's sons and followers allied themselves with Abū Muslim in

⁸⁰ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 118. Sharon takes the expression, '*thumma lammā idṭaraba amru Khurāsān*,' at face value, and uses it to date the assembly to 126, 'when the tribal struggle was being renewed in Khurāsān,' (*Black Banners*, p. 189). Lassner understands it better, although still in the context of 'Abbāsīd involvement, (*Revolution*, pp. 77-8). The article 'then', (*thumma*), must not be strictly read as a conjunction denoting a chronological order in which the events depicted in *Akhbār's* account occurred. It is linguistically accepted, and historiographically more sensible, to read it as an article for inception (*harf isti'naḥ*).

⁸¹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1640.

⁸² Cf. *Akhbār*, pp. 214-5; also *infra*, chapter thirteen.

⁸³ Ṭabarī, III: pp. 116, 125, 223-4, 291, 318, 327.

Jumādā II, 130/February, 748.⁸⁴ Therefore, this meeting took place, probably, sometime in the second quarter of 120/738.

This meeting, which took the proportions of a general assembly, marked the real birth or at least the vital re-birth of the Organization as a potent, hierarchically and functionally structured underground movement, jealously guarded and firmly controlled. This organizational revamping created a flexible but solid, beehive-like organization, which ensured secrecy and an extensive reach into the remote districts of the province, but which also kept the reins gathered in Marw, and the power concentrated in the hands of an elite group headed by a Marwite. It also restored and provided for a sustained dependence on Kūfah for spiritual inspiration and strategic guidance and command. It was thus a superbly balanced blend of strict central control enshrined in secrecy and an elastic allowance for maximum room to reach the vast landscape of untapped and alienated masses.

The general assembly created an elaborate leadership structure and manned it. *Akhbār* provides the following lists: 12 *naqībs* (headmen); 12, or 20, or 21 *naẓīr naqībs* (alternate headmen); 58, actually 59, *dāʿīs* (propagandists); and yet a second list of 70 *dāʿīs*, actually 65; and, finally, 37 *dāʿī dūʿāts* (junior propagandist?).⁸⁵ Some names occurred in more than one of these lists. In all, a total of 147 names, all Khurāsānians, make up the above six lists.⁸⁶

Before adjourning, Bukayr accepted the pledges of all present, to guard their secret, and he solicited financial donations for the *Imām*. When a big sum of money was collected, he was ready to leave. He left Sulaymān ibn Kathīr in charge of the Organization, and recommended that they defer to the discretion and judgement of Abū Ṣāliḥ Kāmil ibn al-Muẓaffar (no.232). A company of Marwite 'Shīʿites' travelled with him on his usual route to Jurjān, where they stayed for a month, collected Jurjān's generous donations, were joined by another company of Jurjānid 'Shīʿites,' and then they all headed west to Kūfah.

In Kūfah they were joined by Abū Salamah and, allegedly, proceeded to Ḥumaymah, where the collected donations were handed over to the *Imām*.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-1.

⁸⁵ *Akhbār*, pp. 213-23.

⁸⁶ A detailed analysis of these lists and their significance is undertaken in chapter thirteen, *infra*. Cf. Omar, *Abbāsīd Caliphate*, pp. 72-4, 352-6; Sharon, *Black Banners*, pp. 189-98; Daniel, *Khurasan*, pp. 33-6; Lassner, *Revolution*, pp. 77-82.

⁸⁷ *Akhbār*, pp. 223-4.

VII. *Shuttle Management and the Maturity of Bukayrism—
Asserting the Strategic Independence of the Organization
and Its Uniqueness on the Proto-Shī'ite Theatre*

This above exercise would become a pattern for Bukayr, whose shuttle management of the Organization lasted all through the first half of Naṣr ibn Sayyār's ten years governorship. At least two, or probably three more such trips are reported.

The first of these three is the one which cannot be confirmed as having been a separate trip. We meet Bukayr in Kūfah, on his way back from Ḥumaymah. In one of the rare occasions where *Akhbār* supplies any dates, it explicitly states in this instance that this return to Kūfah occurred at the beginning of 122/740.⁸⁸ This could scarcely have been the return ending the trip mentioned above, which featured the 'general assembly', in the second quarter of 120/738; this is, of course, provided the above chronology is correct. Of course, it does not have to have been the final leg of a trip to Khurāsān either, as it could have theoretically been a come-back from a separate trip to Ḥumaymah. This is doubtful, however, since the whole Ḥumaymah connection is viewed here with great suspicion.

VII.1 *The Assertion of the Organization's Independence in the Context of Zayd ibn 'Alī's Rising*

The more important feature of this juncture, however is that it coincided with the preliminaries of Zayd ibn 'Alī's revolt in Kūfah and occurred just before its actual eruption; this must have been in Muḥarram 122/December, 739. Bukayr's position (and, by extension, that of the Organization) towards this 'Alīd revolt is a telling element in exposing and understanding the role and nature of 'Abbāsīd apocalypics. This position is also an exponent of the real connections of the Organization on the Hāshimite scene, and of its obstinate and ruthless insistence on the independence of its strategic agenda.

The author of *Akhbār* carefully and skillfully synthesizes three reports attributed to three different participants cum witnesses. The fabric he thus weaves brings together apocalypics fiction, subtle apologetic and factual reporting. First, an unnamed source relates:

I heard Abū Hāshim [Bukayr] saying: Muḥammad ibn 'Alī said unto me: 'The time has come over you when the uprising of a man from my family in Kūfah is impending; he shall be deluded in his uprising like others

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

[before him] have been, and he shall be slain in vain and crucified. Thou shalt warn the Shī'ah in your domain of his enterprise.'⁸⁹

Second, 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Umayr al-Muslī (no.7) reports that he and others of the same Kūfah Shī'ite milieu visited Bukayr as he came back to Kūfah from Sharāt,⁹⁰ at the beginning of 122/739-740. This coincided with Zayd's preparations and the growing awareness of his imminent insurrection. Bukayr asked Ibn 'Umayr about the news, thus initiating the following interesting conversation:

I, [Ibn 'Umayr], said: 'We have been speaking [of the fact] that Zayd ibn 'Alī is about to rebel; the people of Kūfah have agreed (*alḥaqa*) to rise with him. Your neighbor, Abū Kidām, has buckled down to his enterprise.' Abū Kidām was a man from Hamdān, [attached as] a neighbor of Banū Musliyah. [Bukayr] said: 'Woe to Abū Kidām! It is as if I can picture him imminently slain or banished, and Zayd crucified in Kunāsah.' His, [Bukayr's], statement enraged me, [Ibn 'Umayr], because of my sympathies towards Zayd and Zayd's Family; so I said: 'You have always been bringing us lies with which you depress us. By God, I indeed anticipate that God would eradicate the regime of Banū Umayyah by means of Zayd, and you would [then] boast no precedence [of a contribution to his cause].' Bukayr said: 'I know what you do not know. Stay in your homes and avoid Zayd's men and do not mix with them; for, by God, he will indeed be killed and crucified in the gathering place [in the communal presence] of your comrades. As for what you said about the eradication of the reign of Banū Umayyah, how imminent that is!' Then he, [Bukayr], summoned his brethren, [fellow members of his order], amongst the Shī'ah, *ikhwānu-hu mina al-Shī'ah*, cautioned them of Zayd's enterprise, relayed to them their *Imām's* statement about him, and ordered them to stay in their homes until their time came when their banner would be hoisted.⁹¹

The author interrupts Ibn 'Umayr's report here to inject a dose of naked reality into the woven account. The third reporter, Yaqṭīn ibn Mūsā (no.51) is made to interject:

Yaqṭīn ibn Mūsā said: At the time, I had been exclusively devoting [myself] to Abū Salamah. It happened that we were at Abū Hāshim's, [Bukayr's], when someone came to him and said: 'Zayd has risen in revolt and has ordered the people to come to the mosque.' [Yaqṭīn] said: So he, [Bukayr], said: 'Let us move away from these [people] and their evils.' He left [Kūfah], and we, myself and Abū Masrūr 'Īsā ibn Ḥamzah, left with him. We came to Ḥīrah and resided there until Zayd was killed and crucified. Then we went back to Kūfah as people had calmed down.⁹²

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 230.

⁹⁰ The Jordan district where Ḥumaymah is located.

⁹¹ *Akhbār*, p. 231.

⁹² Ibid., p. 231.

Ibn ʿUmayr then is made to resume from where Yaqṭīn stops:

ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmayr said: Then I met Abū Hāshim and said to him: 'By God, I have never witnessed anything more astonishing than your talk! By God, you were as if you had been seeing [with your own eyes] Zayd's episode and what happened to him. Indeed, he is now crucified in Kunāsah.'⁹³

Of course there is no intention here to undermine the whole account. It is too unique and precious for that. We must, however, try to unweave the strands of familiar ʿAbbāsīd apocalypics and apologetics from the fibres of reality. It is superfluous to say that Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī's prediction of Zayd's revolt is difficult to accept. But even if we were to grant that, since Zayd's preparations were not a well-guarded secret, the *Imām* might have known about it, then there would be no reason to make such a big thing out of it. Multitudes of others knew about it; in fact, the whole Shīʿite community of Kūfah did, as did, without recourse to any special refined intelligence effort, Iraq's governor, Yūsuf ibn ʿUmar al-Thaqafī who aborted the uprising without much ado.⁹⁴ Were it to be assumed that the *Imām* had the foresight or the intuition to anticipate Zayd, a co-member of the *de facto* 'board of chiefs' of the Banū Hāshim, simply because he must have known Zayd's views and temperament, it remains untenable that he would have foreseen Zayd's failure, crucifixion, and death. Nor did Bukayr have any way of supplementing the *Imām*'s prophecy by specifying Kunāsah as the site of crucifixion.

If this reflects the wishful thinking of the ʿAbbāsīds at the time, and the apologetic flavor of their future opportunistic make-believe sorrow over the destinies of the ʿAlīds who had fallen victim to the Umayyad sword,⁹⁵ it certainly has no place in the authentic annals of the Organization and in its real connections to the different branches of the Hāshimite clan. This also applies to the aggrandizing of Bukayr's supplemental or native prophetic talents, which are echoed in other reports as well.⁹⁶

This familiar lofty, wisely and compassionately knowing image was bestowed on Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, and on his heir Ibrāhīm, both in partnership with Bukayr. And it was conveniently smuggled into the stream of recorded historical events for the purpose of fabricating an

⁹³ Ibid., p. 231.

⁹⁴ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1699 ff.; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 135 ff.

⁹⁵ E.g., *Akhbār*, p. 242.

⁹⁶ Cf. e.g. *Akhbār*, pp. 247, 249-50; Azdī, p. 136; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, IV: p. 481.

early, active and paramount presence for the ‘Abbāsids at the helm of the Organization and on the ‘Shī‘ite’ theater.

The theater, of course, did exist, at least in its proto-type formations; but any positively or negatively active presence belonged only to the real players: the alert Umayyad authorities, the frothy Kūfan ‘Shī‘ite’ masses in a state of flux, the temperamental and impatient Zayd ibn ‘Alī with his tiny group of dedicated and committed followers, and the noncommittal, cautious, patient, scheming, secretive, cunning Organization, which held its own strategic cause above that of any and all Hāshimite contenders, be they Ṭālibids, Ja‘farids, ‘Alīds, Fāṭimids, Ḥanafids, or ‘Abbāsids—that is, if the latter were real contenders at all.

Akhhbār is not particularly a source of information on Zayd’s movement, which is well-documented in the general historical sources and in some specific ones as well. It is interesting, however, to note that *Akhhbār* agrees with other sources on the relatively huge number of 15,000 adherents who were enrolled in Zayd’s *ḍuwān* in Kūfah. Both *Akhhbār* and Iṣfahānī state that this figure represents adherents in Kūfah alone; Ṭabarī does not qualify. And, while Iṣfahānī mentions Khurāsān amongst the areas where Zayd did have pledged (but uncounted) supporters, *Akhhbār*, predictably, does not.⁹⁷ But what is truly novel in *Akhhbār*’s account is the exposure of the active role assumed by the Organization in frustrating and discouraging support for Zayd amongst the general ‘Shī‘ite’ masses, a role which undoubtedly contributed to the deflation of his movement, even before its eventual demise.

What emerges from this account is the simple fact that the Organization refused to be prematurely rushed into action by amateur or over-zealous revolutionaries. In this respect, the Organization was a novel phenomenon in the history of ‘Shī‘ite’ movements (or, for that matter, of all Islamic revolutionary movements hitherto, save the Prophet’s, whose movement though incomparable to any, was also very well planned and carefully prepared—although substantially conducted in the open). The Organization resisted an active *imām* setting the pace. This corollary confirms and renders applicable to the Organization a perceptive observation by Wadād Qaḍī. She contends that a major influence of al-Mukhtār on subsequent Kaysāniyyah splinter sects was the neutralization of the *Imām* to such an extent that he was denied any executive or decision-making powers.⁹⁸

One more precious yield of this rich account is the extremely vivid portrait it depicts of this cross section of the Kūfan ‘Shī‘ite’ scene,

⁹⁷ *Akhhbār*, p. 232; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 135; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1685.

⁹⁸ Qaḍī, *Kaysāniyyah*, p. 109.

specifically in the Banū Musliyah quarter.⁹⁹ It shows that other contemporary ‘Shī‘ite’ leanings coexisted in this particular community, which was alleged to have been an exclusive domain of the ‘Abbāsids, but which was, more realistically, the Kūfan bastion of the Organization.

VII.2 *Shuttle Pattern and Frequency*

Bukayr’s next reported trip to Khurāsān¹⁰⁰ took place sometime after Zayd had been killed,¹⁰¹ and it allegedly ended in Humaymah shortly before Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī’s death ca. 124/741-742,¹⁰² or earlier, at some unrelated date.¹⁰³

Though it is difficult to date this trip with precision, it may be possible, by inference, to substantially narrow it down to a probable date.¹⁰⁴ When Zayd revolted, Bukayr had just come back to Kūfah from a recent trip, and, unless a particular urgency called for it, it is unlikely that he would have immediately embarked on another. The sequence of the narrative in *Akhhbār* suggests that Bukayr made the trip after Yaḥyā ibn Zayd had already fled to Khurāsān, after he had spent six months in Sarakhs hiding in the house of Yazīd ibn ‘Umar, and after he had

⁹⁹ See also *Akhhbār*, pp. 192, 194, 247, 249.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

¹⁰¹ In Ṣafār 122/January 740, Ṭabarī, II: p. 1701.

¹⁰² *Akhhbār*, p. 239.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

¹⁰⁴ Putting aside the question of the authenticity of the Humaymah connection it is probably safe sometimes to use the dates mentioned in connection with it as a tentative frame of reference, in order to help establish a chronology of events that relate to the Organization. For, even though our suspicion that the later ‘Abbāsīd propaganda machine did superimpose reports of ‘Abbāsīd involvement on an existing structure of authentic events may very well be justified, it remains credible to assume that such a calculated and cunning process would have made every effort, where tenable, to bring its additive or fabricated material into conformity with the existing facts. It is probably as credible to assume that, when such conformity was untenable, the cosmetic operation would have moved into an advanced level of interference with the bone structure of authentic events, to change or rearrange them. Therefore, each case must be taken on its own merit. But, some self-evident guidelines do exist (indicators which point out to the researcher which of the two types of ‘conformity’ is being encountered). If a potential incompatibility was benign, precedence would have had to be given to the facts; and the fabricated material would have had to be custom-tailored to suit the ‘specifications’ mandated by the authentic events, especially where such events would have occurred in the context of the overt affairs of the community. If the potential incompatibility was consequential, historical facts were not sacrosanct, especially where such facts would have occurred in a clandestine context, where only a limited and manageable number of individuals would have been privy to the situation. History was manipulatable (indeed, even Prophetic traditions were). In the ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah*, everything was permitted, even the glorification of Mu‘āwiyah’s *ḥilm*, so long as it helped make believable ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abbās’ improbable daring and insolence.

moved to Balkh to stay in hiding at al-Ḥarīsh ibn Abī al-Ḥarīsh's.¹⁰⁵ This must have consumed the remainder of the year 122/740. Hence, Bukayr's present trip could not have taken place before 123/740-741, and probably late in the year, if the end of the trip is to be related with Muḥammad ibn 'Alī's death in 124/741-742. This indicates a lapse of two years between these two trips punctuated by Zayd's death and the fleeing of his son. All that may be suggested by this, however, is that two years elapsed between the present and the previous reported trips; but theoretically, there could have been one or more unreported trips between these two. No frequency pattern can therefore be established for Bukayr's trips during this period of shuttle management.

On this present trip, Bukayr followed the same routine. He started in Jurjān where he spent a month, then moved on to Marw where he conducted his propaganda and sent his emissaries to the districts from a secret headquarter, at the house of one of the adherents—in this instance, Kāmil ibn al-Muzaffar. When Naṣr ibn Sayyār was informed of his presence, Bukayr moved from Ibn al-Muzaffar's house to that of Khālīd ibn 'Uthmān or 'Īsā ibn A'yan, stayed for one more month and then went back to Kūfah, after which he, allegedly, went to Ḥumaymah.¹⁰⁶

VII.3 *Was Yahyā ibn Zayd an Aborted Possibility for a Suitable Riḍā?*

The role played by Bukayr in Kūfah, i.e., discouraging the 'Shī'ites' from supporting Zayd, he now repeated, discouraging the Khurāsānians from supporting Yahyā, undoubtedly for the same strategic reasons and allegedly under the same pretext. Saīd Bukayr, warning his partisans:

Yahyā ibn Zayd is hiding in your midst, and you will soon behold him rising against these people, [the Umayyads]. None of you should rise with him or contribute to his cause, for he is indeed [a] slain [man], and the *Imām* has already announced his [future] death to his family.¹⁰⁷

But the highlight of *Akhhbār*'s account of Bukayr's present trip is the nature of the tip brought to Naṣr ibn Sayyār:

... A man of the Banū Tamīm by the name Abū al-Ḥajjāj had mixed with the Shī'ah but did not thoroughly know the essence of what they were about; he came to Naṣr and submitted to him that in Marw a propagandist (*dā'yah*), whose followers had become numerous, was

¹⁰⁵ *Akhhbār*, p. 232.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 232-3.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

propagandizing for Yaḥyā ibn Zayd, and that he was residing in such a place—and he described Bukayr's place.¹⁰⁸

It is of course expected of *Akhbār* to deny, or relegate to a misconception, any hint suggesting that another Hāshimite, other than the 'Abbāsīd of the time, could have been a possible candidate for the Organization's propaganda or, more accurately, a potential *riḍā* in the common Shī'ite perception or anticipation. But a closer look into the nature of Yaḥyā's movement and its circumstances suggests that the very possibility that *Akhbār* relegates to a misconception may very well have been the more likely state of affairs.

At the time, i.e., ca. 123/740-741, Yaḥyā, a terrified youth of only nineteen years of age, was in deep hiding in Balkh and could not have shown any promise—or danger—of a premature and independent insurrection which the Organization might have viewed as a potentially disruptive movement. Even when he did eventually rebel in 125/742-743, he was rather coerced into doing so by being fetched from his hiding place, and by the subsequent relentless efforts of Naṣr's men to drive him west into the ruthless grip of Iraq's governor, Yūsuf ibn 'Umar, whom he dreaded.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, even Bukayr's discouragement and prohibition of all forms of support for Yaḥyā's ill-conceived, ill-timed, ill-executed and inconveniently independent movement cannot be accepted. Although such an attitude on Bukayr's part towards such an adversely qualified movement is, by itself, credible, it cannot be considered so at the time when it is reported to have been expressed, and under the circumstances which clearly indicate that Yaḥyā's movement, unlike his father's, occurred perforce and without any preliminaries, and well after Bukayr's reported warning.

Moreover, Yaḥyā's first hiding place was the house of Yazīd ibn 'Umar, a brother of a member of the Organization, Tamām ibn 'Umar (no.352), and possibly a member himself. Yaḥyā was so popular amongst the 'Shī'ah' of Khurāsān that their wealthy competed in an auction to buy the chains with which he had been bound, and it sold for twenty thousand dirhams.¹¹⁰ All the boys born in Khurāsān in the year he was killed were named after him,¹¹¹ and his murder was later used by Abū Muslim as a rallying theme against the authority that slew him. After his capture of Khurāsān, Abū Muslim brought down Yaḥyā's crucified body, performed prayers and buried it, ordered that he be mourned

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 233.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 242-4; Tabarī, II: pp. 1770-4; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 152-8.

¹¹⁰ Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 155.

¹¹¹ Mas'ūdī, VI: p. 3.

throughout the province, and pursued his murderers and executed every one of them he could find.¹¹²

So, the allegedly skewed perception of Abū al-Ḥajjāj, Naṣr's informer, may have been not so skewed after all. Yaḥyā, the unassuming, terrified 'Alīd youth, son of a martyr, could very well have been a perceived candidate for the position of a figurehead *Imām* of a still uncommitted Organization, which was conducting its propaganda in the name of a secret, unknown, or more accurately, as yet unchosen, but acceptable descendant of the Prophet's House, *al-riḍā min Āl Muḥammad*.

VII.4 *Ibrāhīm al-Imām 'Succeeds' His Father in the Finest 'Abbāsīd Tradition*

Muḥammad ibn 'Alī died, but not before a final fit of apocalyptic utterances in which he foretold Bukayr and the company of everything to come, from the tribal strife in Khurāsān to the accession of Abū al-'Abbās and the slaying of Marwān ibn Muḥammad in Egypt at the hands of a Musliyyite, and an assortment of other things.¹¹³ Bukayr stayed for a few days with the *Imām's* successor, his son Ibrāhīm, and then made for Khurāsān, by way of Kūfah, in a hurry to break the news. He performed the same routine, and, on his way back, he was accompanied by a delegation of 'Shrīite' notables, from both Marw and Jurjān, to meet Ibrāhīm, introduce themselves to him, and reaffirm their loyalty.¹¹⁴

In 125/743, they arrived in Kūfah, where they learnt of caliph Hishām's recent death and the accession of al-Walīd II.¹¹⁵ Ṭabarī, however, places the whole trip in 126/743-744 but expresses his reservations by introducing his report with the phrase: "according to what some [reporters] claimed."¹¹⁶ Bukayr and the Khurāsānian delegation stayed in Kūfah for only a short time and proceeded to meet Ibrāhīm in Makkah. Makkah's being the place suggests that the meeting may have occurred during the pilgrimage season, i.e., Dhū al-Qa'dah—Dhū al-Ḥijjah, the 11th—12th months of 125/September of 743. This presents a slight difficulty in dating the sequence of events. For them to have heard in Kūfah of Hishām's recent death and Walīd II's accession, Bukayr and his company must have arrived there in the same month, i.e., ca. Rabī' II or, at the latest, early Jumādā I, the 4th or 5th months

¹¹² *Akhhbār*, pp. 288, 327; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 158; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 260.

¹¹³ *Akhhbār*, pp. 237-9.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 240-1.

¹¹⁶ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1869.

of 125/February or early March of 743; otherwise, they would have heard of the news in Khurāsān or on their way from there to Kūfah. This leaves at least six months between their arrival in Kūfah and the pilgrimage season, and this is too long for it to have been the short period they are reported to have stayed in Kūfah between their arrival there and their departure to meet Ibrāhīm in Makkah. The internal logic of the account further corroborates their leaving Khurāsān before Hishām's death, i.e., also before the hunting party went after Yaḥyā ibn Zayd at the outset of Walīd II's reign. In a provocative remark made to Ibrāhīm by a zealous member of the Khurāsānian delegation, the zealot said: "... we left Zayd [ibn 'Alī] crucified in Kunāsah and his son [Yaḥyā] exiled in the land."¹¹⁷

Now Bukayr and company handed over to Ibrāhīm a huge sum of money which they had brought with them. Ibrāhīm's brother, Yaḥyā ibn Muḥammad, the future infamous butcher of Mawṣil during the reign of al-Saffāḥ, took notice of his brother's good fortune and threatened to expose his revolutionary connection unless he paid him off. Ibrāhīm bought his brother's silence for 5,000 dirhams and cautioned the 'Shī'ah' of his extremely weak character.¹¹⁸ The Khurāsānian delegates went back home to extol Ibrāhīm's virtues, and Bukayr went with Ibrāhīm to Sharāt, where we witness Ibrāhīm's grief over the news of Yaḥyā ibn Zayd's slaying.¹¹⁹ Bukayr also took the opportunity to ask the *Imām* about his father's prophecy regarding the timing of their triumph and the hoisting of their Black Banners. Ibrāhīm obliged by expounding the religious significance of the color and confirming the prophecy, a confirmation made complete with his declaration of the year 130/747-748 as the decisive date. Now he instructed Bukayr to proceed to Khurāsān and to order the 'Shī'ah'

¹¹⁷ *Akhbār*, p. 241. Of course, the meeting may have occurred during a pre-planned minor pilgrimage, *'umrah*. It may also have never taken place. In all cases, it is of very little consequence, except inasmuch as it underlines the later 'Abbāsīd intent on securing a presence for their alleged *Imām* in every toss and turn of 'events', which may or may not have happened, but which firmly and consistently fall into a pattern of foretelling and vindication. Being no exception, this alleged meeting was also used as the first opportunity to prove that the new *Imām* was his father's son. He erupted with a dense bout of apocalypics, proving, once again, that this clan's claim to the leadership of the Organization rested on a simple but rigid, naively 'manufactured' formula, which restricted every single alleged encounter between an 'Abbāsīd *Imām* and the Organization's delegates to the familiar terms of the equation: the *Imām*'s insatiable appetite for financial donations and binding moral homage, repeatedly paid, in return for his boundless willingness to lay the future fully exposed, in 'obscene' detail, before a bewitched audience composed of the elite leadership of one of the most sophisticated and worldly-wise movements that Islamic history has ever witnessed.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

there to dye cloth and banner in black, in order to have them ready for the appointed time,¹²⁰ i.e., four full years in advance!

VIII. *The Twilight Year and the End—Passing the Torch to Abū Salamah*

While on his way to carry out the *Imām*'s instructions, Bukayr was detained in Kūfah by some of his creditors who had him imprisoned for default in repayment.¹²¹ He had been a very wealthy man, but had spent his fortune, as well as the money he had borrowed, on the cause.¹²² Thus incapacitated, he had to deputize Abū Salamah to carry out the mission. The reports on the duration of Abū Salamah's absence on this mission are confused;¹²³ but, when he did come back, he found Bukayr still in prison. Only then did the wealthy son-in-law bail out his direct boss and father-in-law.¹²⁴ Why Abū Salamah did not make this show of generosity in the first instance, before the dignified man had to suffer the indignity of jail in bankruptcy, is anybody's guess. *Akhhār* doesn't even appear to recognize the anomaly.¹²⁵

Two months after his release, Bukayr fell ill. During his illness, news came of al-Walīd II's murder; and Maṣṣūr ibn Jumhūr, the new governor, arrived in Iraq¹²⁶ in the first days of Rajab, 126/the early twenties of April, 744.¹²⁷ This places Bukayr's term in prison between *c.* late 125 and Rab' II, 126/autumn, 743 and February, 744, a time frame compatible with the broad chronological sequence of *Akhhār*'s continuing account.

In this account, *Akhhār* also fields one of its numerous and conflicting reports regarding Abū Muslim's first access to the Organization; it states: "And in the days of Abū Hāshim's [Bukayr's] imprisonment, Abū Muslim came to be known, and he dedicated his time exclusively to Abū Hāshim; he was introduced to the *dar'wah*, and he mingled with its constituency."¹²⁸ The same element, i.e., bringing Bukayr and Abū Muslim together, during a term that Bukayr spent in prison, is also

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 245.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid., p. 248; cf. Dīnawarī, p. 336.

¹²³ See below.

¹²⁴ *Akhhār*, p. 248.

¹²⁵ Of course, the dim corners and corridors of clandestine movements are fertile grounds for breeding all sorts of conspiracy theories. It may not be so wild to suggest here that the more energetic, designated or natural successor had grown impatient; so, when the opportunity presented itself, he seized it.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 249.

¹²⁷ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1836-7.

¹²⁸ *Akhhār*, p. 249, cf. p. 265.

echoed in an account by Madā'inī, where he reports that Bukayr bought Abū Muslim from 'Īsā ibn Ma'qil al-'Ijlī (no.30). Madā'inī places the event in 124/741-742, and attributes Bukayr's imprisonment to a tip exposing his revolutionary activity, rather than to financial default. But Madā'inī's report is essentially confused; its depiction of this event as having occurred in the wake of Bukayr's return from his Sind tenure (as "a clerk for one of its officials") betrays a jumbled mass of information, which also lacks specificity.¹²⁹ Moreover, as the case is with all other reports, in which accounting for Abū Muslim's roots is an element, it is futile here to attempt using his presence even as a tentative criterion by which other elements of the report may be verified.

Bukayr's illness (ca. Rajab 126/April-May 744) was severe, apparently brief, and terminal. His bedside was attended by his daughter, Ḥamāmah, her husband Abū Salamah, and a new bride from a marriage which he, apparently due to lack of time or strength or both, did not consummate. Present also were: a neighbor of his, called Mudrik (no. 35) from Banū al-Ḥārith, two men from the Banū Hamdān, and three men from the Banū Musliyah: 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Umayr al-Muslī, 'Amr ibn Shabāb al-Musī, and Usayd ibn Dughaym al-Muslī (nos.7,10, 47). The last two are responsible for the solemnly vivid account of Bukayr's last day. Mudrik and the two Hamdānīs relayed to him the news of al-Walīd II's murder. When, in his agony, he finally understood the news, he broke into a brief, but detailed, interpretation of the apocalyptic signs of the approaching demise of the Umayyads. He intimated to Abū Salamah that it was time for him to buckle down to his enterprise. "He babbled on incomprehensibly until he was overcome."¹³⁰ Before the party left, he had perished.¹³¹

Leadership of the Organization passed to Abū Salamah. But, while the succession in *Akhbār* is automatic,¹³² due to Muḥammad ibn 'Alī's anticipatory designation of Abū Salamah as Bukayr's successor,¹³³ other sources strike a middle course between the imperatives of organized work and the requirements of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. They report that Bukayr appointed his own successor, and that he wrote to the *Imām* with his decision. The *Imām* sanctioned the appointment, and he wrote to the

¹²⁹ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1726-7; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 51.

¹³⁰ *Akhbār*, p. 250.

¹³¹ *Akhbār*, pp. 249-50. Bukayr's death must be dated close to al-Walīd II's assassination, (probably to ca. Rajab 126/April-May 744). Ṭabarī places Bukayr's death in 127/744-5 (II: p. 1916). Wellhausen had to follow Ṭabarī, and he depicts an active Bukayr in 127/744-5 (p. 518). Sharon, to fit the event in his overall ill conceived chronology, neglects *Akhbār*'s report and adopts Ṭabarī's (*Black Banners*, p. 182).

¹³² *Akhbār*, p. 250.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

partisans ordering that Abū Salamah be obeyed. The trouble with this reporting is that it defers such a vital executive decree by the highest echelons of a meticulous, calculating and superbly structured Organization till its careful and far-sighted leader is in the final throes of death. Except for *Akhbār*, Ṭabarī and Jahshiyārī, the other sources, including the careful Balādhurī, name the *Imām* of the time as being Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī- not Ibrāhīm, his son. And only Ṭabarī attaches a date, 127/744-745, to the event.¹³⁴

Perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the crucial weight of Bukayr’s character, and his formative role in the Organization’s genesis, is Naṣr ibn Sayyār’s. So large Bukayr’s image loomed, even after he had been physically gone and politically superseded, that his name was still associated with the Jurjān’s hefty participation in the Revolution. When all the districts of the East had risen up with Abū Muslim and news of Jurjān’s build-up under the leadership of Abū ‘Awn (no.109) had reached Naṣr, his frustration was brought to the point of desperation, and he blamed it on none other than the deceased Bukayr. Said Naṣr:

... And those of their comrades in Jurjān, amongst them have emerged men who have been thoroughly bred in this affair ... and their master, who festered in the land, corrupted Jurjān, and dispatched [agitators] all over the districts of Khurāsān, is Abū ‘Awn, comrade of their daemon (*tāghiyatuhum*) Bukayr ibn Māhān.¹³⁵

Thus, understanding Bukayr’s role is essential to the understanding of the Organization—its character, structure and strategy. But it is also of such brittle quality that it collapses upon the application of internal criticism. Occasionally, the sources will furnish some scattered material which support the theory that the independent Organization cultivated numerous connections with the Hāshimites, none of which, though, was binding. But this is rare and it belongs to submerged traditions. His pragmatic maneuvering to safeguard the security of the Organization took precedence in his strategy over ideology. When he steered the Organization away from Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s uprising, he did so for calculated political reasons, not to be in compliance with the divinely illuminated directives of some *Imām*. Bukayr’s role defines the Organization since it bounced from its Khidāsh years. What happened after he died, and before Abū Muslim carried out his internal coup and relegated the Kūfān leadership, along with its surrogates in Khurāsān, to the status of impotent spectator, was an obtainment. The two main

¹³⁴ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 118; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1916; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta‘rīkh*, II: p. 319; Dīnawarī, p. 336; Jahshiyārī, p. 84; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 154.

¹³⁵ *Akhbār*, p. 293.

phases of the movement must therefore be viewed within two frames of reference: Bukayr's serene, 'aristocratic' structuralism, followed and superseded by a resurgence, at the hands of Abū Muslim, of Khidāshist grass-roots activism.

CHAPTER TWO

ABŪ SALAMAH AL-KHALLĀL—THE TRANSITION FROM BUKAYRISM TO THE NEO-KHIDĀSHIST ABŪ MUSLIMISM (126/744-128/746)

I. *A Personal Profile, and a Socio-Economic Portrait of the Early Leadership of the Organization*

Ḥafṣ ibn Sulayman al-Khallāl, Abū Salamah, was a *mawlā* of Musliyah,¹ or of its mother tribe, Banū al-Ḥārith ibn Ka'b,² or of al-Subau',³ or of its mother tribe Hamdān.⁴ Hamdān and Madhḥij, of which Musliyah was a branch, were profusely intermingled in Kūfah. Except for the special connection of Musliyah, and especially its *mawālī*, to the Organization, particularly in its formative stage, the above divergence does not really matter. The intricate Musliyite internal relations, and the fact that the majority of the Principal Twenty, and all four of Abū Salamah's predecessors, i.e., the 'aristocracy' of the movement, were *mawālī* of Musliyah, may appear to favor *Akhbār*'s solitary but well informed report.

Of his family background, we only know that he was Bukayr's son-in-law, husband of his daughter, Ḥamāmah.⁵

Abū Salamah's professional affiliation, coupled with his wealth, provide a clue to the social and financial conditions prevailing amongst the high concentration of adherents within the ranks of Kūfan trade organizations, or what prototypes of such organizations must have existed at the time.⁶ For 'Amrawayh al-Zayyāt, Musāwir al-Qaṣṣāb, and

¹ *Akhbār*, p. 191.

² Azdī, p. 120; 'Īyūn, p. 181.

³ Ṭabarī, III: pp. 20, 25; Azdī, p. 120; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 115; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 195; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 400; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma'ārif*, p. 371.

⁴ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 118; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 7.

⁵ *Akhbār*, pp. 248-9; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 118; Jahshayārī, p. 83; Ibn al-Tīqīqā, p. 154.

⁶ Manufacturers, wholesalers, export merchants, brokers, dealers, retailers, artisans and/or employees in such trades as: *Khallālūn*, 'vinegar-dealers'; *sarrājūn*, 'saddle-makers' (nos.24, 29, 40, 57, 61); *qaṣṣārūn*, 'fullers or bleachers' (nos.41, 48); *ṣarrāfūn*, 'bankers' or 'money exchangers', Abū Salamah himself; *bazzarūn*, 'seed-squeezers' (no.1); *abzarīyyūn*, 'spice dealers' or 'seed and nut-roasters' (no.51); *attārūn*, 'druggists' (no.23); *jawālīqīyyūn*, 'pot-makers' (no.3); *zayyātūn*, 'oil-dealers' (no.11); *nabbālūn*, 'arrow-makers' (no.34);

Yaqūn al-Abzārī (nos.11, 42, 51) to have been friends of Abū Salamah and for him to have picked the first as his chamberlain and the other two as companions and dining partners of the future caliph, it is reasonable to assume that they belonged to the socio-economic class as Abū Salamah, himself.

The Organization itself did not finance the activities of its prominent members. Its financial resources consisted mainly of the donations of ordinary adherents—the time-honored practice of the Shīʿite donation of the *khums*. The other source of financing was what the wealthy members, like Bukayr and Abū Salamah himself, provided. Most of the emissaries who traveled the land posed as merchants. Naturally, they must have had something to show to the suspicious and watching eyes of the authorities to verify their pretence; and some of them did not even have to pretend, for they, indeed, were merchants. It must be concluded that these emissaries who took time off to travel extensively for the cause, or to spend months on end in the exclusive company of their leaders, were either making money on such trips, or could otherwise afford the altruistic expense. Of these wealthy Kūfan businessmen/members of the Organization, we also know specifically of ʿĪsā ibn Ibrāhīm al-Sarrāj and Mūsā ibn Surayj al-Sarrāj (nos.29, 40).

But what we know of Abū Salamah goes beyond proving the riches of yet another businessmen member of the Organization. From scattered reports emerges an outline of a mode of ‘conglomerate’ corporate commercial activity on the Kūfan business scene. None of the sources dispute that Abū Salamah was very wealthy and that he financed the cause from his own resources. The nature of his business, however, was subject to slightly divergent reports. Dhahabī states that Abū Salamah was a money exchanger.⁷ Balādhurī says: “he was a money exchanger; and it is [alternatively] said a vinegar dealer.”⁸ Ibn Khallikān denies altogether that Abū Salamah was a vinegar dealer, and attributes the *nisbah* to the fact that his residence was in the vinegar dealers’ quarter (*ḥārat al-Khallālīn*) in Kūfah. He asserts that al-Khallāl “dealt in money exchange (*kāna yuʿāliju al-ṣarf*);”⁹ i.e., he was not a mere money exchanger but that he was involved in the business, probably in a higher capacity. Ibn Khallikān’s deletion of the vinegar trade from the list of Abū Salamah’s business interests can be best understood in the light of a

raḥḥālūn, ‘saddlers’ (no.33); *qaṣṣābūn*, ‘butchers’ (no.42); *fākhrāniyyūn*, ‘potters’ (no.58); *tahhānūn*, ‘millers’ (no. 32).

⁷ Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 7.

⁸ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 118.

⁹ Ibn Khallikān, II: pp. 196-7; *Akhbār*, pp. 248-9.

remark in *Akhhbār*,¹⁰ explaining that he was called al-Khallāl only after he had been killed. If the precision was intentional, *Akhhbār*'s and Ibn Khallikān's wordings can easily be understood to intersect a lowest common imparting the conviction that giving Abū Salamah this occupational *nisbah* (without specifying what status he had enjoyed on the social scale of the trade) was meant as a derogatory label. *Akhhbār* is careful to explain that the name had explanation in the fact that Abū Salamah was a proprietor of a chain of stores where vinegar was sold for his account (“*Kānat la-hu ḥawānūt yubāʿ la-hu fī-hā al-khall.*”)¹¹ In another remark, *Akhhbār* identifies Abū Salamah—incidentally—by saying: “he used to sell (*kāna yabīʿ*) vinegar in Zurārah.”¹² Coupled with the preceding tidbit, this remark can be constructed as pinpointing Zurārah (a quarter in Kūfah) as the focal point of Abū Salamah's interests in the vinegar business. In *Akhhbār*, Abū Salamah emerges as a ‘tycoon’ with a variety of business interests. As an employer, he installed Abū Muslim in his own money exchange business (“*ajlasa-hu fī al-ṣarf*”). Then, as an investor in other varieties of business, he bought shares for him in a saddle dealership and fixed him up in partnership with another wealthy and notable ‘Shīʿite’ (“*ashraka bayna-hu wa-bayna Mūsā al-Sarrāj.*”)¹³

These people were not poor artisans; and a good many of them were wealthy business proprietors in their own rights. If this takes the cutting edge from the concept of economic deprivation as a driving factor and as an element of cohesion in the ranks of this current leadership, other factors of motivation and unity did exist. The proto-Shīʿite ideological component was certainly one such factor. But the major and undisputable factor was the fact that they all (or at least their overwhelming majority) were ethnic non-Arabs who, as *mawālī*, were not completely alien to the sub-structure of the Arab Ruling Establishment. Later, in Khurāsān, the equation will change, but only to bring into the ranks small groups of disaffected ethnic Arabs and masses of nationally inflamed and economically deprived non-Arabs, who either never attempted or never had the chance to attain the reasonably comfortable and relatively assimilating status of *mawālī*.

As befits his social status and financial fortunes, Abū Salamah comes across as a cultivated character. He was generous and hospitable, articulate and elegant, endowed with a delightful sense of humor, political finesse and administrative skills; and he was urbane, well-bred,

¹⁰ *Akhhbār*, p. 249.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 249; cf. Ibn al-Ṭiṭṭiqā, p. 154.

¹² *Akhhbār*, p. 259. In Arabic, the verb *yabīʿ* does not necessarily denote retail selling.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

well mannered, seasoned, decent, gallant, brave and high-minded.¹⁴ And, of course, he was literate and highly educated,¹⁵ unlike the illiterate Kathīr ibn Sa'd (no.59) whose tenure, as delegate-in-chief of the Khurāsānian Chapter, had been the gate through which the populist Khidāsh had stormed the Organization. This polished profile establishes Abū Salamah as the ultimate and last example of Bukayrist elitism.

II. *In Bukayr's Shadow: The Expansion and Upgrading of the Organizational Structure of the Khurāsān Chapter*

II.1 *A Prominent Founding Father Superficially Reported*

Abū Salamah's activities, while in the shadow of Bukayr, are not widely reported, neither in *Akhhbār*, nor in the other sources. He does, nevertheless, come across as a prominent 'member of the board' through a variety of appearances and activities.

He is first encountered as one of the Principal Twenty, when his name was the third to be inscribed in the "*dūwān* of the 'Abbāsids."¹⁶ He appears, in 122/739-40, during Zayd ibn 'Alī's uprising, as a pivotal figure commanding loyalty as well as a monopoly on Yaqtīn ibn Mūsā's time.¹⁷ He did not express any views, however, and he does not appear to have joined the Bukayr-led exodus boycotting Zayd's movement.

If he was secretly or openly sympathetic to the 'Alīds, as later charges indicate, he was not actively demonstrative about it in Zayd's instance. Naturally, trying to impose his view would have been out of line with the independent strategy of the Organization. But the mere existence of such a leaning would also confirm the acceptable coexistence of conflicting Hāshimite sympathies in the ranks of the practically uncommitted but, in general principle, 'sh'īte' Organization. The coexistence of such conflicting sympathies on the level of a leadership which had been, at least so far, unquarrelsome and steady-handed, underlines the absence of a commitment to the 'Abbāsids, or, for that matter, to any other Hāshimite branch or person. The issue was not pertinent yet -- that is, not until Abū Muslim's internal coup eliminated or undercut the previously coexisting wings in favor of his own choice.

¹⁴ Some of these attributes are: *fakīh*, *mumtīz*, *adīb*, *'ālim bi-al-siyāsah*, *'ālim bi-al-tadbīr*, *lahu khībratun bi-al-umūr*, *shahm*, *shujā'*, *'ālī al-himmah*. See, e.g., Jahshayārī, p. 86; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 116; Ibn Khallikān, II: pp. 195-6; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 7; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 155.

¹⁵ *Akhhbār*, p. 249; Jahshayārī, p. 86; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 155.

¹⁶ *Akhhbār*, p. 191.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

In this atmosphere of unity of purpose and positive coexistence, Abū Salamah quietly performed his normal revolutionary duties as one of the most notable of the Organization's elite. He was jailed for his activities;¹⁸ he recruited partisans (e.g., Yaḡḡīn ibn Mūsā, Musāwir al-Qaṣṣāb, al-Walīd al-Azraq);¹⁹ he cultivated his recruits (and his personal 'acquisitions') in the service of the movement, as we see in his training of Abū Muslim, who was manumitted and launched into the ranks.²⁰ If the report is true, it may have had a tremendous psychological impact on the formation and unfolding of Abū Muslim's relationship to his previous master and mentor.

Perhaps the most superficially depicted of Abū Salamah's activities during the post-Kidāsh period was his playing the role of a constant idle fixture in all of Bukayr's alleged encounters with the two *Imāms*, Muḡammad and Ibrāhīm. It was part of Bukayr's routine on his way back from Khurāsān to drop by his headquarters in Kūfah, take Abū Salamah in his company, and resume his travel to Ḥumaymah or Makkah to meet Muḡammad ibn 'Alī or, later, his son Ibrāhīm. As far as *Akhhbār*'s 'dramatic' plot went, Abū Salamah's presence is inconsequential. Save for Muḡammad ibn 'Alī's alleged designation of Abū Salamah as Bukayr's successor,²¹ and for the fact that the report on Ibrāhīm's grief over Yaḡyā ibn Zayd's slaying is attributed to Abū Salamah as an eye-witness,²² the presence of the next chief of the Organization in these alleged encounters is completely ornamental.²³ A completely unassuming and unassertive Abū Salamah is hardly a tenable concept. Yet, it must not come as a surprise that he does not contribute a single word to the immensely apocalyptic and mostly one-sided 'dialogues' featuring a single star. For the *Imām* to break into one of his messianic monologues, it usually takes one 'interlocutor' to ask a question or volunteer a thinly veiled inviting remark. A primitive dramatic plot requires only one pseudo-partner in the 'dialogue', and Bukayr usually fulfilled the role. If anything, these alleged encounters, where Abū Salamah had to be featured, only confirm his forceful presence on the stage of actual events, upon which the later 'Abbāsīd propaganda machine superimposed Muḡammad's and Ibrāhīm's roles.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

¹⁹ *Dīnawarī*, pp. 336, 358.

²⁰ *Akhhbār*, pp. 259, 263, 265-8.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 242.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 224, 241.

II.2 *The Institution of the Three Regional Commands in Khurāsān—the Journey of the Three Black Banners*

This forceful presence welled to the fore with Abū Salamah's first reported assumption of an active role. When Bukayr was detained in Kūfah and could not personally carry the *sawād* message to Khurāsān, Abū Salamah was his natural choice to carry out this most important mission. Bukayr gave him three Black Banners and (of course, pursuant to the *Imām's* instructions) instructed him to hand them over: one to the Shī'ah of Marw, one to those of Jurjān, and to dispatch the third to Transoxania. Abū Salamah was thus "the first [man] to arrive in [Khurāsān] with the Black Banners."²⁴

This obtrusive reversal of the real geographical direction of the flow of symbolism, although only of minor historical significance, is yet one more indication of the transparent attempt of later 'Abbāsids propaganda to depict the dynasty as the driving force and inspiring leadership behind the movement; and it is of significant historiographical consequences.

Perhaps it is appropriate to dwell here, briefly, on the matter of *sawād*. Despite the inherent ahistorical nature and overwhelming messianic overtones, *sawād*, or, most blatantly, "the 'science' of the Black Banners of Khurāsān" (*ilm rāyāti Khurāsāna al-sūd*),²⁵ was a major theme in the vast 'Abbāsīd 'Operation Pretence'.²⁶ Actually, this 'black bannerology' was not an 'Abbāsīd monopoly. Al-Hārith ibn Surayj had hoisted his Black Banners some fifteen years before Abū Muslim did;²⁷ and the Zaydite poet, al-Kumayt al-Asadī, applauded and incited him:

Else, hoist the banners black against the sinners and aggressors, (*wa-illā f-arfa'u r-rāyāti sūdan 'alā ahli d-ḡalālāti wa-t-ta'addī*).²⁸

And, inasmuch as the Prophet's banner, (*al-'Uqāb*) was black, some of his other banners were white; for example, 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib triumphed at Khaybar under one of the latter.²⁹ If it was because the Umayyads had waved the white color, or because 'Alī's banner at Ṣiffīn was black, and black was the color of good omen for the entire clan of 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib,³⁰ then the entire clan, not only Banū al-'Abbās ibn 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib, were heirs to the symbolic legacy. Realistically, the best of all

²⁴ Ibid., p. 245.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 185; on the Black Banners, see Athamina, 'Banners.'

²⁶ See, e.g. *ibid.*, pp. 179, 199, 207, 245-8.

²⁷ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1570, 1919.

²⁸ Ibid., II: p. 1575; Kumayt, verse 7 of the poem 162 in I: pp. 159-60.

²⁹ Ibn Hishām, II: p. 334, also p. 328, I: p. 612.

³⁰ *Akhbār*, pp. 245-6.

possible ideological milieu for the ‘Abbasids may be assumed to have been one which did not particularly exclude them as partners in this pan-Hāshimite legacy.

Moreover, the qualified democracy of consensus inherent in the ‘philosophy’ of *riḍā*, or *al-Riḍā*, can only be assumed to have gravitated, in the popular perception as well as in the minds of considerable segments of the leadership of the Organization, around a ‘vote’ or ‘votes’ for one or more of the eligible ‘Alīds. The fact is that the black symbols were reared and hoisted in the east, probably charged as much with Persian symbolism and sentiment³¹ as with the ‘Shī‘ite’ identification with the martyrdom of Hāshimite standard bearers—who happened to be ‘Alīds, to the last one in their long chain.

Eventually, from the east the Black Banners began to march.³² They marched amidst mixed loyalties and a declared policy of non-commitment to any specific hāshimite candidate. This then came to be appropriated, in the final outcome of a series of ‘hijackings’, by the ‘Abbāsids, and was used by them as the major introductory phase of their enormous operation of historical embezzlement of symbols and fundamentals of Shī‘ite claims to legitimacy.

Be that as it may, Abū Salamah carried out the mission as instructed. He handed over three Black Banners—one to Abū ‘Awn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Yazīd, the chief of the shī‘ah in Jurjān (no.109), one to Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, their chief in Marw and the head *Naqīb* (no.350), and he sent one to Transoxania with Mujāshī‘ ibn Ḥurayth (no.282), or with ‘Amr ibn Sinān (no.130).³³ Beneath the thick camouflage of later ‘Abbāsīd interpolations, it is clear that the Kūfan leadership (still under the long shadow of the now incapacitated Bukayr but already in the able hands of his *de facto* successor who continued in his tradition) was affecting a major and advanced tactical move.

The subordinate command east of Kūfah had been centered only in Marw. The Organization had grown,³⁴ and Bukayr’s earlier structuring of the Khurāsānian Chapter, in 120/738, must have become too centralized for the imperatives of steady expansion in the districts. The necessary seeds of further decentralization were latent in Bukayr’s arrangements, and now was the time for them to sprout. By handing over three banners—black or otherwise—the Kūfan leadership of the Organization was creating and designating three regional field

³¹ Cf. Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 102.

³² Dhahabī even says that Abū Muslim was the first to enact, for the ‘Abbāsids, the donning of black (*Sīyar*, VI: p. 51).

³³ *Akhhār*, pp. 247-8.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

commands east of Kūfah: (1), the regional headquarters in Marw, (2), a new command east and north thereof, in Transoxania and Khwārizm, and, (3), another new command west and northwest of Marw and Khurāsān proper, in Jurjān. In Bukayr's celebrated tradition of solid but elastic beehive-like structure, a considerable measure of regional centralization, still strongly controlled from Kūfah, was maintained in this latest upgrading of the flexibility of the Organization. Thus, Sulaymān ibn Kathīr in Marw was still in charge of the whole territory, assisted by his administrative officer, Kāmil ibn al-Muzaffar.³⁵

The actual significance of these three banners, enshrouded as it were in the fabricated mystique of 'Abbāsīd pretensions, has been overlooked in modern scholarship. Implanting the 'Abbāsīd *Imām* at the heart of events not only stole the credit from two great tacticians such as Bukayr and Abū Salamah, but it also clouded the strategic independence and ingenuity of the Organization and, above all, blurred beyond recognition the very possibility that any new organizational measures were at all being taken. The historiographical consequences have been immense. Compounded by meager (virtually non-existent) reporting in the sources on the pre-eruption activities outside Marw, this dislocation of credit, and the complete blindness to these latest organizational measures, led to a severe under-estimation of the crucial contributions made to the initial and ultimate success of the Revolution by the Khwārizm-Transoxania and the Jurjān Chapters. Thus was the supremely vital role of al-'Alī' ibn Ḥurayth (no.121) and his Sughdian, partly ex-Murjī'ite constituency, all but obliterated; and thus was the role of Abū 'Awn 'Abd al-Malik ibn Yazīd (no.109), with his south-eastern Caspian constituency, diminished and almost reduced to their distinguished and widely reported service in the march to Kūfah, Zāb, and beyond.³⁶ It is this opaque historiographical blend which led to the inflation of the role of Marw in the eventual military capture of Khurāsān. It is this opacity which precluded a normal understanding of Abū Muslim's strategy and tactics, and of the fact that he must have acted in compliance with his understanding of his demographic and geographical assets and liabilities.³⁷ The inadequacy of the sources, and the over-zealous rush of a fashionable trend in modern scholarship to challenge Wellhausen's conclusions, have thus been fused to render unrecognizable such a decisive organizational move in the history of the Organization.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

³⁶ See below, chapters six and thirteen and *passim*.

³⁷ See chapter three below.

III. *The Succession*

On the above mission, *Akhbār* reports, Abū Salamah stayed in Khurāsān for four months. Through an inarticulate mixing of an orderly sequence of events with a jumbled anticipatory flash of future event, *Akhbār* slips and imparts the wrong impression that Abū Salamah was still in Khurāsān when al-Walīd II was killed, and when, subsequently, the tribal strife erupted in Khurāsān.³⁸ Al-Walīd II was killed late in Jumādā II, 126/mid April, 744.³⁹ By that time, Abū Salamah had already bailed out Bukayr from jail, following his return to Kūfah, at least two months earlier. Bukayr's term in prison coincided with Abū Salamah's absence, both in Khurāsān and in transit, for five to six months, i.e., between ca. late 125 and Rabī' II, 126/autumn, 733 and February, 744. When Bukayr died, probably ca. Rajab 126/April-May, 744, Abū Salamah was by his bedside, and the reins of leadership fell naturally into his hands.

The real weight of Abū Salamah's authority and influence within the Organization had made him Bukayr's *de facto* replacement in the last mission and, later, his natural successor. It was not invented or bestowed upon him by Bukayr's will or the *Imām's* designation. It must have been the sheer balance of power within the multi-loyalty Organization that positioned him first in line for the succession. He must have had a preponderant power base, which his personal qualities and alliances helped him groom and preside over. And, if he was truly an 'Alīd loyalist, he could not possibly have been a twenty-fourth hour solitary defector, as charged later; rather, he must have reflected the sympathies of his power base. Moreover, it must never be forgotten that he had been one of the most prominent Principal Twenty Founding Fathers—all of whom were 'Alīd loyalists.

IV. *Brief Hands-on Phase—*

Abū Salamah's Only Trip to Khurāsān as Leader of the Organization

IV.1 *Chronological Problems and Abū Muslim's Involvement*

Within months of taking charge, it is to be inferred, Abū Salamah took his first, and last, trip to Khurāsān as the leader of the Organization. Although the sequence of events (as reported in the only continuous account we have) is slightly confused, it is clear that there could not have

³⁸ *Akhbār*, p. 248.

³⁹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1836.

been more than one such trip. *Akhbār* reports that Abū Salamah, accompanied by Abū Muslim as his servant, visited the *Imām*, Ibrāhīm, carrying gifts for him from Khurāsān. This means that he was concluding an earlier trip to the province. At the end of this visit, Ibrāhīm instructed Abū Salamah to go to Khurāsān.⁴⁰ He did; and this was the present trip which he must have concluded in, or shortly after Sha'bān 127 /May-June 745, i.e., just a year after Bukayr's death. Abū Salamah had come back from his earlier trip to Khurāsān, the journey he had undertaken as second-in-command, approximately three months before Bukayr died. The period of twelve or thirteen months between Bukayr's death and Abū Salamah's return from this trip could not possibly have accommodated a third trip between the previous and the present, unless we assume that all three took place on the heels of one another, without a pause even for attending to such serious matters as the aftermath of Bukayr's death and the succession. Of course, Abū Salamah's visit to Ibrāhīm, if it did occur at all, could have been the one he presumably ought to have paid after returning from the trip in which he had filled in for Bukayr. But this still presupposes that Abū Salamah had come back, bailed Bukayr out, stayed for more than two months until the latter fell sick and died, all before visiting Ibrāhīm—and all the while holding on to the money and gifts he had brought, and, more importantly, not recognizing the need to report to him on his vital mission. This would have been awkward. That is, if the 'Abbāsīd connection holds any measure of truth.

Projecting Abū Muslim's later prominence, Dhahabī briefly reports, a visit which Abū Muslim and Abū Salamah, ostensibly as equals, paid to Ibrāhīm at Ḥumaymah, where he ordered them both to travel to Khurāsān.⁴¹ Dhahabī's report does not pose the problems that the continuous context in *Akhbār* poses. But it is precisely such problems that help expose the inaccuracy that sometimes attends wholesale 'Abbāsīd interpolations into the stream of events. In this instance,⁴² Ibrāhīm's prophetic vision of Abū Muslim's future achievement is compounded by Abū Salamah's simplistic belief in the intimations of Abū Muslim and Idrīs ibn Ma'qil (no.27) regarding Abū Muslim's apocalyptic dreams, dreams which were a substantial part of his credentials. Actually, Abū Muslim had started appearing on the scene of events with in the company of Abū Salamah on his previous trip to Khurāsān in 125-

⁴⁰ *Akhbār*, pp. 266-7.

⁴¹ Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 50.

⁴² *Akhbār*, p. 267

126/743-744;⁴³ and from this point on he started playing an active role. Therefore, it was time he was introduced to the *Imām*; or, more accurately, it was time the *Imām* made an interjection into the stream of events, in order to meet him. The classic setting for such an appearance has always been a visit with the *Imām* by the current leader of the Organization; and it was made to be so in this instance also. It is more likely that there was no such visit.

Some reasonable time must have elapsed after Bukayr's death, perhaps not less than six months, before Abū Salamah was ready to consider that a trip to Khurāsān. This brings the event to early 127/744, probably Muḥarram or Ṣafar/October-November. It would mean that by placing Bukayr's death and Abū Salamah's succession and his trip to Khurāsān all together in 127/744-5.⁴⁴ Ṭabarī subordinated the date of the earlier occurrences to that of the later. This date also fits perfectly with *Akhbār's* description of the situation in Marw upon Abū Salamah's arrival there and in Kūfah upon his return. When he arrived in Marw, its people "were still in their trenches engaged in tribal strife (*alā al-ʿaṣabiyyah*)."⁴⁵ Thus, Abū Salamah's arrival in Marw in the first quarter of the year 127/last quarter of 744 would fit in with the raging of the tribal strife. Upon his return, he arrived in Kūfah after the Khārijite al-Daḥḥāk ibn Qays had captured the city,⁴⁶ an event that took place in Shaʿbān 127/May 745.⁴⁷ Thus Abū Salamah's absence, on this trip, would come to around six months, which is a fair approximation for an average trip.

IV.2 *The General Political Situation Surrounding the Trip*

Especially Ṣafar (or late Muḥarram) appears to have been very opportune for the trip. This timing befits the changing conditions in the province, and at the heart of the empire, and the nature of the message Abū Salamah had for the Khurāsān Chapter. The previous six or seven months had witnessed the greatest existential shock the Umayyad house and the entire Establishment had ever suffered -- the assassination of a sitting caliph, al-Walīd II, and the accession of his assassin, Yazīd III. The resulting tremors never subsided, and the damage was irreparable—an unhealing chasm in the reigning dynasty, a new caliph

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 247,249

⁴⁴ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1916.

⁴⁵ *Akhbār*, p. 268. This *ʿaṣabiyyah* had started sometime after Shawwāl 126/July-August 744, when Kirmānī rejected Naṣr ibn Sayyār's confirmation as governor, by Iraq's new governor, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1864.

⁴⁶ *Akhbār*, p. 268.

⁴⁷ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1905.

who could not win consensus, and a resurgence of tribal strife. In the last month of 126/September-October, 744, the usurper died, leaving an untenable situation for his heir-apparent, his brother, Ibrāhīm ibn al-Walīd ibn ‘Abd al-Malik, whose assumption of authority was never to be completed.⁴⁸

Almost immediately, in Muḥarram 127/October-November 744, neither an ‘Alīd nor an ‘Abbāsīd, but a Ṭalībīd Hāshimite, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mu‘āwiyah ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Ja‘far ibn Abī Ṭalīb, who shared with the ‘Abbāsīds their later claim of having received the *waṣīyyah* from Abū Hāshim,⁴⁹ rose in rebellion in Kūfah, claiming the *Imāmate*. He was supported by the Zaydite faction of the Kūfan ‘Shrītes’, amongst others. And he was later joined, in Fars, by many Hāshimītes, amongst whom, ironically and notably, were the celebrated ‘Abbāsīds, ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī, ‘Īsā ibn ‘Alī, and non less than Abū Ja‘far ‘Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad, the future al-Manṣūr).⁵⁰ Ibn Mu‘āwiyah was soon defeated in Kūfah, and he withdrew westward, to Fars and Jibāl,⁵¹ taking with him whatever potential dangers any unauthorized ‘Shrīte’ uprising posed to the Organization’s agenda.

IV.3 *In Khurāsān, a Flourishing Organization Ready to be Transformed into a Grass-Roots Movement*

The time was therefore ripe for a reconnaissance trip to assess the position of the Organization in the province in light of the above-mentioned crucial events, and also to inspect the fruits of the last organizational measures Abū Salamah had implemented some nine months earlier. The situation could not have been a surprise, but it was pleasant:

The Shrīah met him; they had grown numerous and had brought into the open some of their treatises; many people had accepted their call; and those who used to oppose them had grown fearful of them.⁵²

Abū Salamah’s instructions to the adherents, befitted the impassively and carefully calculated methods that had always characterized Bukayrist tactics; but they were also sufficiently advanced to suit this newly found confidence, strength and opportunity. In Jurjān he said:

⁴⁸ For these occurrences, see in Ṭabarī the events of the year 126, esp., II: pp. 1775, 1825 ff., 1870 ff.

⁴⁹ Others also claimed to have received the *waṣīyyah* from Abū Hāshim, see: Nawbakhtī, pp. 52-4; Qummī, pp.35, 38-42; cf. Qāḍī, *Kāysāniyyah*, p. 241, and passim.

⁵⁰ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1977; Jahshayārī, pp. 98-9; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 183.

⁵¹ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1879 ff., 1976-7.

⁵² *Akhbār*, p. 268.

Your enterprise has ripened, so prepare and be ready; when the year 130 begins [September 747], proclaim your call; blacken your clothes, and sharpen your weapons; but do not get into the open before that, unless something forces you to do so and to defend yourselves.

He dispensed the same instructions in Nasā, Abīward and Marw.⁵³

Setting a date three years in advance is not foreign to the ‘Abbāsīd pattern of recounting history. Of course, Abū Salamah’s instructions were supported by a letter from the *Imām* bringing to his adherents the glad tidings of their future victory, and instructing them to prepare for the time which he, the *Imām*, had fixed for them.⁵⁴ This, however, does not undermine the fact that the Organization did plot for the future, and that a certain sense of urgency was setting in. The right time for the long-planned uprising was approaching. The features of Abū Salamah’s trip, which had not been part of Bukayr’s routine, only confirm the extent of the Organization’s expansion: Nasā and Abīward, quite off the highway between Jurjān and Marw, had never been on Bukayr’s itinerary; Balkh, farther east, also appears to have been one of the recently maturing centers. Abū Salamah visited Nasā and Abīward in person, and to Balkh he sent Abū Muslim to meet Ziyād ibn Šāliḥ (no.395) and his fellow propagandists.⁵⁵ Fruits of the further decentralizing arrangements, which had been implemented by Abū Salamah in his previous trip, must have started to ripen. The exceedingly occupied governor Naṣr ibn Sayyār, and his government at the center of Arab power in Marw, were increasingly turning their energies inwardly to handle their immediate internal crises. Though never really distracted, Naṣr was reduced to a wide-eyed and impotent second spectator.

The Organization flourished all over the province, but especially in the remote and off-center districts, naturally to the detriment of the Arab center of power, and, ironically, came at the expense of the historical leadership of the Organization. The last drive towards effective decentralization had apparently overachieved its desired goals. It had over-expanded and diluted the narrow and compact historical popular base of the Organization—so much so that the reins would soon slip away from the prudent impassive hands of the seasoned and tempered handful of the well-to-do, assimilated, and ideologically inspired *mawālī* of the *miṣr* (Kūfah). These reins would soon pass to the

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 267-8.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* Ṭabarī’s account of this trip is very brief, but it highlights the *Imām*’s letter, to the Khurāsānian adherents, relaying to them his appointment of Abū Salamah in charge of their affairs (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1916-7).

⁵⁵ *Akhbār*, p. 268.

frenzied grip of the coarse and inflamed multitudes of deprived, alienated, and ‘ideologically negotiable’ masses of the east Iranian landscape. Abū Muslim’s time had dawned on the blood-and-history drenched banks, hamlets, desert, and oases of Khurāsān.

Abū Salamah, in a last performance of a Bukayrist ritual, left Sulaymān ibn Kathīr in charge of the Shī‘ah in Khurāsān. This ritual would soon become a relic of the past, as would Abū Salamah’s active involvement in the affairs of the province. Thus, Abū Salamah’s first trip was also his last. Soon, Abū Salamah’s involvement would be restricted to management by correspondence, the East would begin to set the tempo, commands would begin to flow from east to west, and the historical Kūfan Establishment within the Organization, and its Khurāsānian surrogates, would soon be sentenced to death or to oblivion. If the introduction of Abū Muslim into the Organization gently and tangently touched Bukayr’s last months in life and leadership, his active presence in its ranks, and the mysterious process of his infiltration of its highest levels of command, venomously cut right through Abū Salamah’s years of otherwise very competent leadership.

Had Bukayr’s Khidāsh been Abū Salamah’s Abū Muslim, or vice versa, nothing much would probably have changed besides having the inverted characters play out the roles and destinies of their counterparts. ‘Abū Muslim’ would probably have been sucked into that twelfth (Hijrī) decade black hole, while ‘Khidāsh’ would have led the victorious masses of the late thirteenth decade. For, the same forces which had cut off Bukayr and the Kūfan leadership from the Khurāsānian revolutionary bases, and which were ultimately smashed by the ruling Arab Establishment, were, themselves, the forces which cut off Abū Salamah from the same bases, and ultimately smashed the ruling Arab Establishment. Only, a decade earlier, they had been much weaker and less organized, and they had been operating under unfavorable historical circumstances, against a foe who had been much healthier. Of course, under this highly hypothetical but demonstrative substitution, an infinite number of personal variables would have been different. Bukayr, for one, was not Khidāsh’s mentor or master, nor, as it happened, was his destiny so savagely interlocked with the triumphant will and profound apprehensions of the emissary who wrested the regional command. The unfolding and final outcome of the Abū Salamah-Abū Muslim drama provides only a sampling of a wider knowledge of the inter-revolutionary dynamics, a knowledge we might never come to possess in any satisfactory proportions.

CHAPTER THREE

ABŪ MUSLIM AL-KHURĀSĀNĪ—THE HIJACKING OF THE KHURĀSĀN CHAPTER OF THE ORGANIZATION

I. *Roots?*

“As for his lineage, it has been subject to much disagreement, and it is futile to [try to] examine it exhaustively,” said Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā.¹ Was Abū Muslim a slave,² a free man,³ a servant,⁴ a *dihqān*,⁵ an Arab,⁶ a Persian,⁷ from Iṣfahān,⁸ from Khurāsān,⁹ Salm ibn ‘Uthmān, Ibrāhīm ibn Khatkān,¹⁰ the descendant of the great Persian wazīr Buzurgmihr,¹¹ the son of the disowned illegitimate Salīṭ ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-‘Abbās,¹² a

¹ Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 139.

² *Akhbār*, pp. 260, 263, 265, 266, 268; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1726, 1769; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 119-20; Dīnawarī, pp. 338, 340; Ibn A‘tham, VIII: p. 154; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 477; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 253-4; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 51; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 139.

³ *Akhbār*, pp. 263, 265; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1769, 1960; Azdī, p. 53; Dīnawarī, pp. 339-40; Ibn A‘tham, VIII: p. 154; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 139; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 252.

⁴ *Akhbār*, pp. 247, 253, 254, 255, 258, 260, 263, 265; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1960; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 84, 119, 120; Azdī, p. 50; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 327; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 78; Ibn A‘tham, VIII: p. 154; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 477; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 252; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52.

⁵ *Akhbār*, p. 225; cf. Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 145; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, IV: p. 49.

⁶ *Akhbār*, pp. 256, 263-4, 265; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma‘ārif*, p. 420; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 78; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 155.

⁷ *Akhbār*, pp. 257-8, 263, 265; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 120; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 252; Ibn Khallikān, III: pp. 145, 155; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 139.

⁸ *Akhbār*, pp. 225, 253, 257-8, 263, 265; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 118, 120; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma‘ārif*, p. 420; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 252; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 49, 52; Ibn Khallikān, III: pp. 145, 149; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 139.

⁹ *Akhbār*, p. 256; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 119; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma‘ārif*, p. 420; Ibn A‘tham, p. 154; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 477; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 145 (from Mākhawān of Marw).

¹⁰ Salm ibn ‘Uthmān: *Akhbār*, p. 258; Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Uthmān, and other variations on Ibrāhīm ibn Khatkān, ibn Ḥayyākān, Abū Ishāq, or nicknamed Ḥayyākān: *Akhbār*, pp. 254, 255, 265, 266; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 85, 118, 120; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 327; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 145; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 252; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52.

¹¹ Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 252; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 145; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 139.

¹² *Akhbār*, p. 256; Ṭabarī, III: p. 114; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 79, 205; Azdī, p. 165; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 367; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma‘ārif*, p. 420; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 20; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 253; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 154; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 66; Ibn

cross of some matchable elements of the above, or something else?¹³ It may be assumed that Abū Muslim himself may have been behind much of the mystification and the favorable elements, that the later ‘Abbāsīd propaganda only added, to the thickly opaque enigma, the degrading elements, and that the Persian sentiment turned it into mythology. Scores of old¹⁴ and modern¹⁵ scholars have approached the issue with skepticism or resignation.

With the discovery and subsequent publication of *Akhbār*, a new wealth of information, not any less contradictory, became available. Scholars writing after that, notably Omar, Daniel, Sharon, and Lassner, revisited the question of Abū Muslim’s origins, reviewing the new and the old material. With the exception of Daniel, who still saw “some evidence for each one of [the contradictory] views,” and conceded the “futility of trying to discover the truth about Abū Muslim,”¹⁶ each of the other three scholars tried to reconstruct a composite portrait. The

al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 139; For Salīṭ’s episode, see: *Akhbār*, pp. 149-50; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, pp. 76-9; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, pp. 19-20; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, pp. 139-40.

¹³ A Kurd: *Akhbār*, p. 256; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 155; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma‘ārif*, p. 420; A Yamanite Arab of Murād of Madhhij, or generally of Madhhij: *Akhbār*, pp. 263-5; a *mawlā*: *Akhbār*, p. 257; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1916; a slave from Harāt or Būshanj: Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 119; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 254; a native of Khuṭarniyah: Ṭabarī, II: p. 1960; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 120; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 78. Khuṭarniyah, in rural (*sawād*) Kūfah, was also the place where al-Mukhtār al-Thaqafī owned an estate called Liqfā, Ṭabarī, II: p. 520. Wellhausen made an interesting linkage from the coincidence (p.506). Mother, a slave girl, named Washīkah: Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, pp. 120, 185; Dīnawarī, p.339; Father, from Bābil or Khuṭarniyah, named Zādhān ibn Bindād Hurmuz, or a certain ‘Uthmān, descendent of Khosrau himself: Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 120; A singular account in Dīnawarī, father: ‘Umayr ibn Buṭayn al-‘Ijlī, pp. 339, 340; etc.

¹⁴ Most sources expressed their resignation, either explicitly such as Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, or by simply reviewing all or most contradictory accounts without expressing a preference, such as *Akhbār*. No one source vouches for any specific accounts. The following are further sources inspected but not analyzed in the preceding manner: Ibn Khaldūn, III: p. 217; Maqdisī, VI: pp. 92-3; Ibn Kathīr, X: p. 69; ‘*Uyūn*, pp. 182-3; Ibn Taghrībirdī, I: pp. 335-6.

¹⁵ Almost all modern scholars concede the difficulty, but some do specify certain likelihoods, which are, either compatible with their analysis of the overall situation, or on which the majority of traditions concur. Wellhausen is firm on a non-Arab origin; in one instance he considers Abū Muslim to have been a *mawlā* of Khuṭarniyah; in another, he leaves open the possibilities: either a *mawlā* or a slave (pp. 505-6, 518-9). Moscati says: ‘... probably a slave of Persian origin.’ Claude Cahen is resigned to the fact that Abū Muslim ‘remains for us what he was in his own time, an enigma’ (cf. Omar, *‘Abbāsīd Caliphate*, p. 76). Frye realizes that ‘the origin of Abū Muslim cannot definitely be determined from Islamic sources,’ but he asserts that it is ‘immaterial’ (pp. 28-38, esp. p. 28). The question does not detain Dennett, who accepts Ṭabarī’s account (II: p. 1769) that ‘Abū Muslim was purchased and given his freedom’ (*‘Marwān*,’ p. 282). Lewis realizes the sources disagreements, but erroneously asserts that they ‘agree that he was a Persian and a freedman of Ibrāhīm’ (‘‘Abbāsīds,’ p. 15). Shaban reiterates Frye’s position (*‘Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 153).

¹⁶ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 101.

underlying assumption, of course, is that the truth does subside somewhere in the heap of contradictions, and that it can be found by synthesizing the various elements, as in the case of Omar and Sharon, or by an extensive and elaborate analysis culminating in highly hypothetical scenarios, as in the case of Lassner.

Omar concludes that “Abū Muslim was, therefore, a Persian *mawlā* who spent his youth mostly at Kūfah ...”¹⁷ Sharon follows in his footsteps and reaches almost the same conclusions.¹⁸

Lassner’s more elaborate efforts yield similar but more specific results, which, though more thoroughly argued, are no more convincing. On whether Abū Muslim was a slave or a freeman, Lassner leads the reader, through a legal argument, to the conclusion that “Abū Muslim could not have been legally acquired by the ‘Ijlīs, nor could he have been resold ...,” and that “there is no reason to doubt that [he] served the ‘Ijlīs and then the ‘Abbāsīd revolutionaries in al-Kūfah, and that he was later sent personally to serve the *Imām* as his client.”¹⁹ Was he the son of Salīṭ? No, nor did he claim to be, Lassner contends; it was al-Manṣūr who faked the whole episode in order to justify the execution of the loyal *mawlā* of the family.²⁰ Abū Muslim was neither a noble Persian, nor an Iraqī, nor a Khurāsānite, but a native of Iṣfahān, asserts Lassner.²¹

The problem with the assumption that the truth can be inferred is that its advocates do concur with all other scholars on the obvious ‘article of faith’—that the ambiguity was intentional. If so, it must follow that the inference cannot be made by tracing what may appear to be traceable. Nor, given the extreme contradictions, can a reconciliation of any elements be hoped to produce a synthesis, except by arbitrarily dismissing some traditions as well as the inconvenient variations of the accepted traditions. Reconciliation was arbitrarily attempted by Omar and Sharon. The laborious Lassner is caught in his own circular argument. He admits that “there is suspicion that much of this obfuscation is intentional,”²² and then he looks for the truth in ‘claims’ which he requires to be “articulated in convincing detail [to seem] proof enough ...”²³ He failed to see that, under the historiographical

¹⁷ Omar, *‘Abbāsīd Caliphate*, pp. 80, 76 ff.

¹⁸ Sharon, *Black Banners*, pp. 203-8, esp. 206.

¹⁹ Lassner, *Revolution*, pp. 106, 100-07.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-17, esp. 110-11; also, *idem*, ‘Son of Salīṭ.’

²¹ Lassner, *Revolution*, pp. 117-26, esp. 118, 121, 125, 126; also, Lassner, ‘Secret agent.’

²² Lassner, *Shaping*, p. 61; cf. Lassner, *Revolution*, p. 100.

²³ Lassner, *Revolution*, p. 123.

circumstances which he himself admits, any such ‘claim’ would have been ‘articulated in convincing detail’ only if its sole purpose was to mislead, not to make the obliterated tracks traceable. If at all seekable, one may be better off seeking the ‘truth’ in the odd accounts which may, just may, have escaped the multiple operations by the two sets of deft hands, and by popular adulation.

It is not only futile to try to sort out the mess; it is also impossible to make it less opaque. Where the issue is strictly Abū Muslim’s real roots, we are as resigned as Ibn al-Ṭiqīqā was.

The case being so, we are reduced to explaining Abū Muslim’s conduct by Abū Muslim’s conduct. Where a linkage to the roots is absolutely necessary in order to explain the psychology of a specific situation, we are reduced to conjectures and plausibilities. Therefore, what matters in this context is how Abū Muslim conducted himself, and how he presented himself. How he conducted himself is the subject of some substantial parts of this study. The way he presented himself is best illustrated by what he himself said, according to *Akhhār*, to Naṣr ibn Sayyār’s messengers, who were sent to find out who he was:

Aslam ibn Ṣubayḥ claimed that they asked him that day: ‘Where are you from?’ He said: ‘I am a man from the *muslimūn*; I do not affiliate myself to a tribe to the exclusion of another; my father perished in a country not his own; I have been a recipient of favors from more than one person, [favors] which have been subject to various gossip; but, Islam is my lineage, to the family of Muḥammad is my support, and I follow a correct course of action with those I am with.’²⁴

The perfect mystery was bolstered by its own subject; but it was not a mystery without some framing features. Belonging to the religion of the community is the defining property of identity, not a tribal affiliation, not a known father, not even a recent social background lit by his contemporaries’ cognizance of it, i.e., not any of the defining characteristics encoded in the imperial structure of reference within the Establishment.²⁵ “Who are you?” asked Naṣr’s messengers, “I am ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muslim,” he answered.²⁶ Shaban is correct in considering this name to have been the “key to [an] image,” and as “the best possible slogan for the Revolution ...;”²⁷ but he is not as correct in his attending historical analysis. What the full assumed name (Abū

²⁴ *Akhhār*, p. 283.

²⁵ Such characteristics were trivialized by Abū Muslim; in another account, he said: ‘to know about my conduct is more beneficial for you than knowing about my lineage (*Khabarī Khayr laka min nasabī*).’ Tabarī, II: p. 1965; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 132.

²⁶ *Akhhār*, p. 282, in another variation of the same account.

²⁷ Shaban, *‘Abbāsid Revolution*, p. 154.

Muslim ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muslim al-Khurāsānī) actually and brilliantly depicted was, at once: the egalitarian Revolutionary ideal, but also the characteristic profile of the Iranian convert *par excellence*²⁸—be he from Mākhuwān, Iṣfahān, or rural Kūfah; free, manumitted or slave; ‘Someone’ ibn ‘Uthmān ibn Yasār, or ‘Someone’ ibn Zādhān ibn Bindād Hurmuz.

It must, however, be stressed that the foregoing argument for abstention is applicable only to the issue of Abū Muslim’s roots. Once the discussion approaches the semi-to-dimly lit skirts of his Kūfan experience, the historiographical rules must change.²⁹ In the accounts on Abū Muslim’s origins, some elements which bear on his Kūfan experience are more useful in illuminating a riddle pertaining to the future leader than in trying to resolve the mystery of the roots of the child. How was it possible for someone who ascended from nowhere to wrest control, so easily and quickly, of the fruit for which experienced and intelligent men had toiled for three decades? Or, did Abū Muslim ascend from nowhere? Those elements do offer some clues to this riddle. When consolidated and juxtaposed, together with some odd or isolated accounts,³⁰ these clues contribute to a scenario more credible than any which may emerge from the collectivity of the more uniform accounts. It must be admitted, however, that veracity is not the target; it is not attainable. The target is plausibility, based on the few available historiographical building blocks. Quite a few aspects of the ‘plot’ would inevitably be conjectural. This may be risky; but, since there is no better recourse, it may be viewed as a more advanced ‘product’ than an incredible ‘scenario’, whose virtue lies merely in its being built upon the heap of the most repeated accounts.

II. *The Kūfan Sojourn/The ‘Ijīte Connection—What Significance?*

Contradictions between divergent accounts (and variations within the same account) notwithstanding, the threads of the intricate web intersect

²⁸ For conversion and the converts, see below, chapters six and eight.

²⁹ Part of the problem with Omar, Sharon, and Lassner, is that they did not draw this line. They apparently extended the historiographical status, which may apply to the relatively visible Kūfah situation, to cover the hopelessly dark ‘roots’. Moreover, they did so without contributing much to a convincing, or plausible, resolution of the more pertinent riddle of Abū Muslim’s future leadership.

³⁰ In the specific case of Abū Muslim, as well as in any other case where massive disinformation permeates the sources, the odd and isolated reports must be viewed favorably, though with caution.

at two points: Abū Muslim's 'Ijlite connection,³¹ and his *sarrājūn* (saddle-makers) connection.³² The two connections are not contradictory. Only one account³³ has it that Abū Muslim went, from his childhood up to his liaison with the 'Abbāsīd house, only through the tutelage of 'Īsā ibn Ibrāhīm al-Sarrāj (no.29). Other accounts depict the *sarrājūn* connection as subsequent and parallel to the 'Ijlite.

The Banū 'Ijl are an especially interesting tribe. Genealogical descendants of the Banū Lujaym of Bakr ibn Wā'il, they were the sister tribe of the famous Banū Ḥanīfah ibn Lujaym³⁴ of Yamāmah, in the east of the Peninsula. The Banū Ḥanīfah had been the most adamant opponents of Islam, of Quraysh, and of the Ḥijāz, until they were defeated in the apostasy wars. 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib's descendants from the Ḥanafiyyah woman were connected to some of the most politically consequential movements in Umayyad and early 'Abbāsīd history – to Kaysāniyyah, to Irjā', and to the genesis of the Organization. This probably has nothing more than a symbolic signification.

But the Banū 'Ijl themselves had their own mixed history in pre-Islam and during the early Arab conquests. Goldziher asserts that they had "completely passed into the Persian nationality."³⁵ They were, nevertheless, the acclaimed Arab heroes of the battle of Dhū Qār against the Persians.³⁶ But again, some of them in Baḥrayn did merge with Persian immigrants from Iṣṭakhr.³⁷ Daniel's cautionary note, that "the supposed Persophile tendencies of the 'Ijl ... [have] probably been a bit over-emphasized,"³⁸ may have some merit. Automatic extension of pre-Islamic alliances to the late Umayyad period is not always a safe course.

³¹ *Akhbār*, pp. 249, 253, 255, 257-67; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1726-7, 1969, 1960; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 118-9, 120; Azdī, p. 50; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma'ārif*, p. 420; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 327; Dīnawarī, pp. 338-40; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 78; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 477; Ibn A'tham, VIII: p. 154; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252-3; Ibn Khallikān, III: pp. 145-6; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 49, 51, 52.

³² *Akhbār*, pp. 253-5, 260, 266; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1726-7; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 84-5, 119-20; Azdī, p. 50; Baghdādī, *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Ibn A'tham, VIII: p. 154; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 477; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252-4; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 51-2.

³³ *Akhbār*, p. 254; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 84-5; Baghdādī, *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 252.

³⁴ Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, pp. 312-3.

³⁵ Goldziher, 'Islamisme,' pp. 1-29; quote from p. 23: 'les Banou 'Idjl, passa complètement à la nationalité persane,' in Watt's translation (*Formative*, p. 46).

³⁶ The story pervades the primary Arabic sources; see, e.g. Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 312; Ṭabarī, I: pp. 1028-37, and passim.

³⁷ Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, p. 100; Watt, *Formative*, pp. 46-7; Watt, 'Idjl,'; Schleifer, 'Idjl.'

³⁸ Daniel, *Khurasan*, n.27, p. 119.

One noteworthy feature in a portrait of the Banū 'Ijl of the last two decades of the Umayyad era is that some of their number were implicated with the notorious *ghulāt* movements in Kūfah, notably al-Mughīriyyah and al-Manṣūriyyah, described as *Khannāqūn* (stranglers), and *Raḍḍākhūn* (head-crackers).³⁹ Ibn Ḥazm describes the descendants of Iyās ibn Muḍārib al-'Ijlī as *ghāliyyah Khannāqūn*.⁴⁰ Of course, it would also be wrong to establish this portrait as a stereotype of the tribe.

Our immediate concern is the house of Ma'qil the 'Ijlite, whose two sons, Idrīs and 'Īsā (nos.27, 30), in addition to the *mawlā* of 'Ijl, 'Āṣim ibn Yūnus al-'Ijlī (no.12) were directly embroiled in the affairs of Abū Muslim and the Kūfan leadership of the Organization. The house of Ma'qil owned extensive estates in Iṣfahān and a mansion in Kūfah.⁴¹ They also apparently had business interests in the bazaar of the city, as Idrīs ibn Ma'qil is described to have been a *'aṭṭār* (druggist).⁴² But it seems that they had started from humbler origins, and that Idrīs himself was responsible for the acquired fortune of the family, by means not above suspicion.

Ibn Ḥazm neutrally states that Idrīs “was a druggist, then his descendants' position became lofty (*Kāna 'aṭṭāran thumma jallat ḥālu waladīh*).”⁴³ Balādhurī is more detailed and specific:

Idrīs ... used to work in perfumes and milk sheep. He came to *al-jabal* [i.e., Jibāl province] with a number of his kin and dwelt in one of the villages of Hamadhān known as Mis. Then they became rich and acquired estates. Idrīs jumped a merchant to whom he owed money, and he strangled him. It is also said that he strangled him and took his money; so he was taken to Kūfah, where he was imprisoned during the governorship of Yūsuf ibn 'Umar.⁴⁴

Balādhurī's account is echoed in other sources; however, regardless of why the 'Ijlites were imprisoned,⁴⁵ more important is the picture that emerges of a clan of adventurous frontier pioneers, who lived a rather

³⁹ Watt, *Formative*, p. 47; Omar, *Abbāsīd Caliphate*, p. 78, n.134; Daniel, *Khurasan*, n.27, p. 119. On the *Ghulāt* and these two specific movements, and their founders, the 'Ijlites al-Mughīrah ibn Sa'īd and Abū Manṣūr al-'Ijlī, nicknamed al-Kisf, cf. Hodgson, 'Early Shī'a,' pp. 1-13; Hodgson, 'Ghulāt;' Macdonald; Madelung, 'Manṣūriyya;' idem, 'Mughīriyya;' Qāḍī, *Kaysāniyyah*, pp. 167, 221, 243-56, 262-4, and passim.

⁴⁰ Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 213.

⁴¹ For example, *Akhbār*, pp. 255, 264, 260.

⁴² Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 385; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 313.

⁴³ Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 313.

⁴⁴ Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 385.

⁴⁵ It has also been reported that they were imprisoned for tax evasion, or other tax related offences (*Akhbār*, pp. 255, 259, 266; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 146); or because they had been officials of the previous governor (Azdi, p. 50; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, p. 327; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52) or because they were Hāshimite partisans (Dmawarī, p. 339).

shadowy life in their remote abode, which they turned into a stronghold, and in which they cultivated suspicious connections that smack of a 'banditry' of sorts.

Merchants were robbed in a high-way brigandry on the estates of ʿĪsā ibn Maʿqil, during Khālid ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Qasrī's governorship of Iraq. Khālid inquired about ʿĪsā; he was told he bestows his care on the robbers, and that he is for them a sanctuary in which they take refuge.⁴⁶

Ibn Qutaybah introduces Idrīs as the one whose abode was the frontier of Iṣfahān, "*al-nāzil bi-haddi Aṣbahān.*"⁴⁷ The officials of the area wrote to the governor of Iraq, Yūsuf ibn ʿUmar, with two complaints against ʿĪsā: the first was that he evaded the tax; the second was that he lived on the frontiers ("*wa-anna-hu nāzil fī al-tukhūm.*")⁴⁸ If it were simply for tax evasion, the local police ought to have been able to apprehend the culprit. But, in view of the stronghold status of his abode off the trodden roads, the sub-governor of Qirmāsīn, himself, had to make the arrest,⁴⁹ no doubt at the head of a sizable force. When the brothers were apprehended, they were not alone, but with a number of others from the Jibāl province, "*maʿa qaʿum ... min ahli al-jabal.*"⁵⁰

These were not common criminals. Even if the reason for ʿAṣīm's imprisonment was spilling blood (*'bi-dam'*), or some other scandalous deed ("*bi-sababin min asbābi al-fasād.*")⁵¹ and even if Idrīs was apprehended because he strangled his creditor, their apparent affinity with the Kūfan leadership of the Organization precludes a simplistic judgment. Their possible ties to their urban ʿIjlite brethren, the 'stranglers' and the 'head-crackers' of Kūfah, may add to their portrait a socio-political and ideological dimension. Their connection to Abū Muslim corroborates the foregoing; and his connection to them gives rise to a most important question about the real links in Abū Muslim's life, between his enigmatic past and his future in the lime light of history.

All the threads within the traditions which connect Abū Muslim to the ʿIjlites lead to the prison in Kūfah;⁵² and there, despite their contradictions on almost every detail, they intersect at one point. Almost all of these accounts give the direct and crucial role of brokering the

⁴⁶ *Akhhbār*, p. 253.

⁴⁷ Ibn Qutaybah, *Maʿārif*, p. 420.

⁴⁸ *Akhhbār*, p. 259.

⁴⁹ Ibid. Nor were the sons of Maʿqil the only ʿIjlites with this frontier mentality, their descendants and other kin displayed the same; cf. Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 386, 398.

⁵⁰ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 119.

⁵¹ *Akhhbār*, pp. 255, 259; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 119.

⁵² Except in Dīnawarī, where the prison is in the unlikely Wāsīt, p. 339. For the other traditions, see footnote no.31 above.

introduction of Abū Muslim to the high echelons of the Organization to ‘Āṣim ibn Yūnus al-‘Ijlī. ‘Āṣim emerges as the central figure in what, one may conjecture, appears to have been an orchestrated act to position Abū Muslim in a favorable spot and to ‘launch’ him straight into the beating heart of the Organization. Idrīs and ‘Īsā played auxiliary parts; and one gets the impression that they were little more than accessories necessary to provide the camouflage of social and political insignificance, accruing to Abū Muslim from allegations of lowly birth into a state of bondage on their estate.⁵³

Of ‘Āṣim we know very little outside this episode. His father was recruited by Bukayr ca. 124/741-742 in the context of these same events.⁵⁴ But, while the sources are not always clear on whether or when ‘Īsā and Idrīs became partisans,⁵⁵ only one account claims that ‘Āṣim was recruited in prison;⁵⁶ other accounts are emphatic on his long-standing partisanship, and some even depict him in an influential capacity.⁵⁷ And, while the imprisonment of ‘Īsā and Idrīs is attributed to a variety of reasons,⁵⁸ most accounts give a criminal reason for ‘Āṣim’s.⁵⁹ Probably more important is that, while ‘Īsā and Idrīs were relatively bound to their property and interests, ‘Āṣim may have been less bound and thus freer to roam the land.

This last feature bears a similarity to Abū Muslim’s unbound adulthood, and the similarity may permit us to wonder about a number of possibilities. But let us first turn to some significant questions about

⁵³ It was ‘Āṣim who told Bukayr about Abū Muslim, so Bukayr recruited him (*Akhbār*, p. 265). Or, alternatively, he brokered the deal of Abū Muslim’s sale, suggesting it to Idrīs, and pleading with Abū Salamah to make the purchase (*Akhbār*, p. 266). Alternatively, when Abū Salamah wanted to verify the legality of the deal, he turned to ‘Āṣim; ‘Āṣim inquired and confirmed the slave status of Abū Muslim, which verified the legality of the deal (*Akhbār*, p. 263). The suspicion that the deal may have been orchestrated becomes paramount when correlated with the claim that Abū Muslim admitted his slavery (*Akhbār*, p. 263). In a parallel tradition, the three or four *naqībs*, who would provide the link to Makkah and the Hāshimite congregation, met Abū Muslim when they visited ‘Āṣim in the prison. ‘Īsā and Idrīs were there merely as Abū Muslim’s masters; clearly so in Ṭabarī, II: p. 1726; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 119; Azdī, p. 50; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52. The distinction in Organizational status between the ‘Ijlites is not made in Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 327; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 146.

⁵⁴ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1726; cf. Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 51.

⁵⁵ According to Dīnawarī, p. 339, they had been devout partisans. Ṭabarī reports that Bukayr recruited them in prison, in 124/741-742, II: p. 1726; Balādhurī and *Akhbār* do not address the issue.

⁵⁶ According to *Akhbār*, p. 259, Ḥaḥḥ al-Asīr recruited ‘Āṣim in prison.

⁵⁷ See footnote no.53 above.

⁵⁸ See footnote no.45 above.

⁵⁹ *Akhbār*, pp. 255, 259; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 119; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 146.

Abū Muslim's adulthood, i.e., between his mysterious birth and his sudden 'stardom' in Kūfah:

- (1) If he came to 'Ijlite custody as a child, in bondage or otherwise, did he stay with them on their secluded estate right up to his *rendezvous* with history in the prison of Kūfah? Or,
- (2) did he leave them for some time, cultivate himself in the world, and come back when his venture turned sour or fruitless? Or,
- (3) did he make his very first contact with them when he was already a hardened man of the world—perhaps a defeated and bitter, but adamant, unrelenting and trained revolutionary, or perhaps, Revolutionary from the rank and file seeking a conduit to the top circles?

The first question cannot be entertained. A man as politically cultivated and as mutinous as Abū Muslim could not have spent his entire life, prior to a stunning rise in the world, in seclusion and bondage. Even if he was born to bondage, he must have somehow attained a degree of mobility and exposure. Operatively, from a political and historical point of view, such mobility and exposure would have put him in situations congruent with circumstances naturally resulting from positive answers to the second and third questions. The psychology and the drama would, of course, be interestingly different.

A major hypothesis here is that Abū Muslim was geographically mobile. The hypothesis does rest on grounds of plausibility, supported by scant, but strong indications in the source material. The tradition which excludes an 'Ijlite connection, by putting Abū Muslim in the exclusive custody of 'Īsā ibn Ibrāhīm al-Sarrāj,⁶⁰ does provide for geographical mobility. According to a composite of the variations of this tradition, al-Sarrāj took custody of the child when he was seven years of age. He used to roam the land with his merchandise, his territory being Iṣfahān, Jibāl, Raqqah, Naṣībīn, Āmid; i.e., not Khurāsān and the East. Abū Muslim is, apparently, supposed to have been always with him. He, reportedly, met Muḥammad ibn 'Alī when he was twenty years old or younger, in the company of al-Sarrāj, and he was still under one or the other of his earlier names. In one variation of the tradition, ascribed to a descendant (?) of Abū Muslim's,⁶¹ the newly appointed leader of the Organization descended on Khurāsān, under his newly assumed name, when he was nineteen years of age. When al-Sarrāj died, he had not discovered that Abū Muslim was his foster child, Ibrāhīm ibn 'Uthmān ibn ... ibn Buzurgmihr.

⁶⁰ See footnote no.33 above.

⁶¹ Baghdādī, *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, X: p. 207.

The problems with this account are numerous, not least of which is the fact that it exclusively falls in the dark area of Abū Muslim's past. It does not partake in the semi-lit zone of an open performance as the traditions on the 'Ijlite connection do. In obliterating any traces of a possible Khurāsānite link, this tradition displays a streak of deliberate denial which permeates the main body of the source material. In all cases, the geographical mobility for which it provides, when taken within the specific context of Abū Muslim's real reach, is nothing more than a change of scenery. It simply exchanges the land-serfdom for the ever-present personal control by al-Sarrāj. This is not the geographical mobility we mean.

The early geographical mobility, to which Abū Muslim's subsequent history attests, must have been coupled with full personal freedom to roam the land on his own and to implicate himself in any enterprise he chose, for any length of time, in Kūfah and the Tigris environs, as well as farther east, in Rayy, Nasā and beyond.

An incidental and unique account in Ṭabarī has Abū Muslim positioned right in the midst of the radical Mughīriyyah circles, in Kūfah, as early as 119/739. When Khālid ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Qasrī, governor of Iraq, killed al-Mughīrah ibn Sa'īd al-'Ijlī and Bayān ibn Sim'ān al-Nahdī, he interrogated one of their comrades, Mālik ibn A'yan al-Juhanī, and released him. "When Mālik was alone with his confidants, amongst who was Abū Muslim *ṣāhib* Khurāsān," he boasted, in two verses, how he had mystified the governor into releasing him.⁶² The fact that the Mughīriyyah were a *ghāliyyah* splinter group of the Kaysāniyyah is important; still more important is the 'Ijlite element, and the fact that the episode took place around the date mentioned. This means that Abū Muslim had been loose and active, in the revolutionary circles of Kūfah, at least five to six years prior to the prison scene. Most

⁶² Ṭabarī, II: p. 1620-1. There is a strange ambiguity in the report, but it does not bear on the present point. The governor interrogated Mālik, supposedly about his links to the executed rebels; the Arabic statement that follows, '*fa-sadaqa-hu 'an nafsi-hi fa-'aṭṭaqa-hu,*' should normally translate into: 'he [Mālik] told him [the governor] the truth about himself; so he released him.' But this translation does not fit with the governor's harsh attitude, nor with Mālik's later boasting of deceiving him. Therefore, we must read the key word as '*fa-saddaqa-hu,*' meaning that the governor believed what Mālik told him about himself, so he released him. This is passable, although it makes for an awkward Arabic formulation, which may be explained by assuming an omission, i.e., that Mālik had told the governor something about himself, and about others who do not appear in the sentence. This may explain the word '*shubḥah,*' obscuring, in Mālik's hemistich, '*wa alqaytu-hu fī shubḥah,*' boasting how he got away, probably by giving the governor dubious information on his comrades. More important, it is the only explanation of Abū Muslim's comment, years later, that, if he found Mālik, he would kill him on the strength of his own admission, '*bi-'iqrāri-hi 'alā nafsi-hi.*'

important is that this account of Ṭabarī's does not appear to have been fabricated to serve any specific purpose. It acquires its credibility from what may appear to be its weakness—its very uniqueness and incidentality.

On the margins of the prison scene and, less importantly, thereafter, Abū Muslim, now in the light of more reliable reporting, appears to have been at home in Kūfah, moving in the circles of the professional quarters, the *ṣarrāfūn*, the *sarrāḡūn*, and the *qaṣṣārūn*, where “he used to sit ... and his companions from amongst them [were] Mūsā ibn Yazīd and ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Īsā”⁶³ (nos.41, 48). This, however, does not necessarily mean that Kūfah was home; but, even if it were, there is nothing to preclude the possibility of a lengthy and intense Khurāsānite experience.

Abū Muslim's familiarity with the East cannot be doubted, nor can it be simply explained by the relatively short period when he later frequented the territory as Abū Salamah's messenger to the Khurāsānite Chapter. Lassner admits that “it appears reasonable at first thought that a genealogy from Khurāsān would have stood Abū Muslim in good stead given his complex political dealings in that province.” But he dismisses the thought on grounds that “no such claim is articulated in convincing detail.”⁶⁴ Lassner's reasoning has already been discussed and rejected. But I do not want to press the case for a ‘genealogy from Khurāsān.’ The point here is that ‘his complex political dealings in that province,’ which Lassner recognizes and no one disputes, cannot be explained by a belated introduction to the province; nor can his success be explained by the short period between this introduction and his grooming of these ‘complex political dealings’ into full bloom.

The accounts that trace Abū Muslim's roots to Khurāsān,⁶⁵ especially Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih's, Ibn A'tham's, and, to a slightly lesser extent, Balādhurī's, must not necessarily be construed as vouching for a genealogy ‘from Khurāsān’. The first two simply say that he had been in Khurāsān; Balādhurī says that he had been “a slave of someone from Harāt or Būshanj.”⁶⁶ Therefore, aside from this futile discussion, one may be content with the fact these accounts do point to an early connection to the province. Moreover, establishing Abū Muslim's long-standing familiarity with Khurāsān from the source materials, in addition to the above reasoning, will, therefore, have to be based on accounts whose credibility (like that of Ṭabarī's account about Abū

⁶³ *Akhbār*, pp. 260, 255, 266; cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 120.

⁶⁴ Lassner, *Revolution*, p. 123.

⁶⁵ See footnote no.9 above.

⁶⁶ Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 477; Ibn A'tham, VIII: p. 154; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 119.

Muslim's Mughīriyyah connection) derives from their uniqueness and incidentality.

The general portrait in the sources depicts Abū Muslim traveling Khurāsān in disguise, on a miserable donkey.⁶⁷ He traveled extensively until his disguise became a threateningly known hallmark.⁶⁸ He did not stick to the highway, as would probably be expected from a messenger heading from Kūfah to Marw; but this is understandable, since he must have wanted to escape detection. He covered Rayy, Nīshāpūr, Abīward, Nasā, and their villages; he crossed garrisons, even recruited their chiefs of police, had encounters—good and bad—for which he later repaid in kind.⁶⁹ It may be said that these accounts pertain only to the time frame of his known involvement, after 126/743-744, as Abū Salamah's messenger. Maybe so, and the point needs not be argued. The central idea here is that from the tenor of these reports emerges a picture of a man widely and profoundly familiar with the land, its peoples, and its untrodden roads. This man did not only travel in insignificance; but, faithful to the obscure profile he presented of himself, he also posed as an insignificant persona even before the eyes of his Revolutionary leaders and their attendants. Abū Salamah said: "As for him, he admitted that he is a slave of the man who sold him to us (*ammā huwa fa-qaḍ aqarra anna-hu 'abdun li-man abā'a-hu min-nā*)."⁷⁰ Sulaymān ibn Kathīr dismissed him as "this unknown, whom nobody knows what egg cracked to bring his head [into existence], nor which nest he outgrew (*hādihā al-majhūl alladhī lā yudrā ayyatu bayḍatin tafallaqat 'an ra'si-hi wa-lā min ayyi 'ushshin daraq*)."⁷¹ A servant of Sulaymān's explained why the household had once neglected to feed Abū Muslim: "He was too insignificant for us to be attentive to him (*kāna aṣghara 'indanā min an nallaḥḥa ilayh*)."⁷²

This, however, was not the light in which the *dihqān* of Nīshāpūr saw Abū Muslim:

It has been said that Abū Muslim came to Nīshāpūr on a donkey with a saddle; not a human soul was with him. One night he went to the mansion of the fādihūsān and knocked at the door; the household were alerted and went out to him. He said to them: "Tell the *dihqān* that Abū Muslim is at the door asking [demanding? = *yaṭlub*] you for one thousand dirhams and a riding animal." They told the *dihqān*, who asked: "In what attire and gear is he?" They told him that he was alone and in the most

⁶⁷ *Akhhār*, pp. 225, 262; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 120; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252, 254, 357.

⁶⁸ *Akhhār*, p. 262.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 225, 262, 263; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1949 ff., Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 254, 357.

⁷⁰ *Akhhār*, p. 263.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 270-1.

⁷² Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 120.

miserable attire. [The *dihqān*] was silent for a while, then he ordered [that] one thousand dirhams and one of his best riding animals [be brought], he admitted [Abū Muslim] and said: ‘Oh Abū Muslim! We have given you what you have asked for. Should any other need arise, we are at your disposal.’ Abū Muslim said: ‘We shall not neglect [to reward] what you have done.’

When [Abū Muslim] reigned, one of his relatives said: ‘If you capture Nīshāpūr, you take all you want of the property of its Magian *dihqān*, the fādihūsban.’ Abū Muslim said: ‘We owe him a favor.’ When Abū Muslim seized Nīshāpūr, gifts were sent to him by the fādihūsban. He was told: ‘Do not accept them, and demand money from him.’ He said: ‘I owe him a favor.’ He did not touch him or any of his people or his money. This is a sign of high-mindedness and ideal sense of honor.’⁷³

That Abū Muslim repaid the *dihqān* fits into a pattern of two-eyes-for-an-eye, which characterized Abū Muslim’s later practical expression of his appraisal of his long experience with the territory and its inhabitants.⁷⁴ That the *dihqān* sought to solicit Abū Muslim’s good graces after Abū Muslim seized power is understandable; but why before that? Since the *dihqān* was not an inspired ‘Abbāsīd *Imām*, who could prophetically see and construe the signs inherent in Abū Muslim’s stature, what did he see in this miserable-looking night caller whose bare *kunyah* was enough to identify him? What awe, respect, love, or hope did Abū Muslim’s as-yet-unknown name strike or inspire in the heart of the unfrightened and deliberate *dihqān*? Did this aristocratic, Magian native of the land recognize the ignoble slave, the descendant of Buzurgmihr or Khosrau, or the tireless veteran Persian revolutionary?

The relevant question about Abū Muslim is not genealogical—slave or free, Arab or Persian, native of Kūfah or of Khurāsān ... etc. This, important as it is, is irresolvable. The real question is whether, before coming into the light of the prison scene in Kūfah, he had a wide and profound personal history spanning the territory from Kūfah to Khurāsān, and whether such history displays a mutual affinity between Abū Muslim and the Iranian landscape in the East. Although it cannot be claimed to have been decisively proven, there is no doubt here that this must have been the case.

⁷³ Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 357.

⁷⁴ He rewarded ‘Umar ibn al-Mukhtār (no.364) for having been a long-standing good friend, who had protected him from a group of angry Muḥjibites at Rayy (*Akhhār*, p. 263). Likewise, he rewarded Mu‘ādh ibn Muslim (no.262), who had helped him feed his donkey (*Akhhār*, p. 225). But he destroyed Būnābādh of Nīshāpūr, because one of its buffoons had amputated his donkey’s tail (Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 254). And he killed a group of people in the area of Nasā-Abīward because they had turned him down when he tried to convince them to give back a camel they had stolen from a shepherd (*Akhhār*, p. 225) etc.

A relation of such dimensions between an individual and a collectivity requires depth of time. Abū Muslim is largely portrayed as a young or a very young ‘Abbāsīd operative. The confusion about his age is surpassed only by the confusion about his origins.⁷⁵ In all cases, the concept of an Abū Muslim too young to have achieved this type of relation with the populace, which we are suggesting he achieved, is incommensurate with the portrait of the experienced and able leader he soon emerged to be; after all, even as a legend, he was never acclaimed as another Alexander, groomed in a reigning royal environment. The concept of an overly young Abū Muslim is also untenable in the light of the stories of his own marriage and of those of the marriages of his two daughters.⁷⁶

From the preceding discussion, Abū Muslim emerges as a reasonably grown up man when he appeared in the *ghulāt* circles in Kūfah, in 119/737. By then, or at least by the time he appeared in the prison scene, ca. 124-125/742-743, he had become a well-traveled revolutionary with profound familiarity and complex connections in Khurāsān. Within this general frame of more likely facts, the plausible ‘scenarios’ are numerous and highly conjectural. The following is, I presume, the most tenable.

III. *The ‘Abbāsīd Connection—A Plausible Scenario*

A year before Abū Muslim appeared in Kūfah, the Umayyad authorities had, in 118/736, cracked down on the Organization and executed

⁷⁵ He is reported to have been twenty years of age when he allegedly met Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī towards the end of Hishām’s reign, 125/743 (*Akhhbār*, pp. 254-5; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 84-5); or nineteen, or even eighteen, when he was sent to Khurāsān as a leader of the Chapter, in 128/745-746 (Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252, 259; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 52; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 149). Other accounts date his birth to 100/718-719, thus symbolically identifying his age with that of the Organization (Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma‘ārif*, p. 420; Ibn Khallikān, III:149; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 48).

⁷⁶ In 129/746-747, Abū Muslim married the daughter of the *naqīb* ‘Imrān ibn Ismā‘īl (no.209) (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1960, 1988; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 252; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 52). No date is given to his giving his two daughters, Fāṭimah and Asmā’, in marriage, to the important *dārī*, Muḥriz ibn Ibrāhīm (no.280) and his son Fahm ibn Muḥriz (Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 252). Of course, he must have done so before he was killed in 137/754-755, and most likely when he first arrived in Khurāsān as a member of the Organization, since marriages were used to cement alliances. But, even a later date would still be inadequate for the two brides to have been the granddaughters of the *naqīb*. They must have been children from a previous marriage. How old must Abū Muslim have been—and in which decade must it have occurred—when he entered into a marriage which would have produced two daughters, themselves eligible for marriage around the end of the third decade?

Khidāsh.⁷⁷ Bitter, but full of ambition and resilient, Abū Muslim took off to the capital of Shīʿite and radical movements, where the disconnected headquarters of the Organization was located. He had probably hoped to infiltrate the top echelons and to restore, through his person, the severed ties to the center of inspiration, as an introductory step towards reconstructing the huge but shattered and leaderless Chapter in Khurāsān. Traveling the untrodden roads, by chance or by design, he came upon the ʿIjlite stronghold, where he either resumed an earlier connection, or started and carefully bred a new one. He may have met ʿĀṣim there; or it may have been that the roads of these two unbound rebellious wandering spirits crossed, somehow, somewhere, earlier, or later.⁷⁸ Abū Muslim must have then continued his journey to his target, where he would commence his decade-long Kūfan sojourn.

In Kūfah, he embarked on a professional career in anonymity, mainly or exclusively in saddle making. But he never lost sight of his real target.⁷⁹ He nurtured social and political relations with other professionals of the market place, and with the *ghulāt* movements. Traveling with al-Sarrāj, if it so came to pass, he may have frequented the ʿIjlite estate, which may have also served as a meeting point with his contacts farther east. But, should that be discounted, the possibility that he may have kept in personal contact with the province through other means cannot be dismissed.

When the prison scene occurred, Abū Muslim had had five or six years to concoct, with his ʿIjlite friends, their roles which they performed in the scene, and which culminated with Abū Muslim's accomplishing his first concrete step towards his goal. ʿAbbāsīd interpolations aside, there is no unresolvable conflict between the factual elements of the traditions which center around Abū Salamah's purchase of Abū Muslim, and the factual elements of the traditions which concur on a role for the four Khurāsānite *naqīb*s who, on their way to Makkah, passed by the prison, saw Abū Muslim and recognized the 'signs' (al-

⁷⁷ Supra, pp. 16-20.

⁷⁸ In one account about Abū Muslim's origins, *Akhbār* states that he claimed descent from Banū Murād, and that thus he and ʿĀṣim became acquainted: '*fa-waqʿat al-maʿrifah bayna Abī Muslim wa ʿĀṣim ibn Yūnus al-ʿIjlī bi-dhālika al-sabab*' (p. 265). Although the connection between the Yamanite Murād and the Rabaʿite ʿIjlī is not clear, the important point is that, for some reason, Abū Muslim and his future broker may have gotten acquainted outside the context which presupposes that al-Khurāsānī was somehow bonded to the ʿIjlites.

⁷⁹ Balādhurī relates, on Ibn al-Kalbī's authority, that, one day, while Abū Muslim was attending to his manual job, he saw people running; he inquired about the reason; when told that they were watching an elephant, he said: 'What is so strange about an elephant? The marvel is to see me toppling a realm and bringing about another' (*Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 120).

‘*alāmāt*’) in his person. The ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah* embraced all versions of both traditions, and secured all roads to lead to the *Imām*, be it Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, or his son and successor, Ibrāhīm.⁸⁰

Once Abū Muslim penetrated the upper echelons of the Organization, it was not difficult for him to prove his trustworthiness and diligence. His familiarity with Khurāsān made him ideally suited for the role of messenger to the leadership of the Chapter there. Nothing could have been more appropriate for his plans. This afforded him the time to revitalize his connections there (if they were at all dormant), and to prepare the logistics for the eventual takeover of the entire Chapter. Until then, he had to keep a very low profile before his prospective victims, but not in the eyes of his real constituency. One more necessary step in the preparations was to secure a Hāshimite ally.

That Abū Muslim did manage to forge a relation with Ibrāhīm personally, at some point after he penetrated the leadership of the Organization, is compatible with his later choice of Ibrāhīm’s younger brother, Abū al-‘Abbās al-Saffāh, for the caliphate, and it gives meaning to the crucial presence of his plant, Sābiq al-Khwārizmī, in Ḥumaymah, and to the maneuvers of his men in Kūfah to secure al-Saffāh’s appointment.⁸¹ The question is about the channels through which he was connected to Ibrāhīm, and about the quality and the internal balance and dynamics of the relation.

The direct internal channels, leading from the Organization’s leadership exclusively to Ibrāhīm,⁸² cannot be accepted. Indeed, we maintain that they did not exist. The tradition that Abū Muslim accompanied the *nuqabā’* to Makkah,⁸³ even while he was attached to

⁸⁰ *Akhbār*, pp. 225, 254, 256, 257, 260, 266; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1769, 1916, 1960; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 84, 119; Ibn Qutaybah, *Mā’arīf*, p. 420; Dīmawarī, pp. 339-40; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rīkh*, II: pp. 327, 332; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 78; Ibn A‘tham, VIII: p. 154; Baghdādī, *Ta’rīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252, 254, 295; Ibn Khallikān, III: pp. 146, 149; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 48, 49, 52; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 139.

⁸¹ *Infra*, pp. 124-35.

⁸² See footnote no.80 above. According to *Akhbār*, pp. 268-9, in one of the many variations of the account of how Abū Muslim was transferred to the *Imām*’s entourage, Ibrāhīm is reported to have asked Abū Salamah to relinquish him. Abū Salamah went back to Kūfah, presumably leaving Abū Muslim in Ḥumaymah. Inexplicably, however Abū Muslim is reported, in the same account, to have frequented Khurāsān with Abū Salamah’s letters to Sulaymān ibn Kathīr and his comrades. What can only be a one-time occurrence is made to appear as a frequent exercise; and the person who could only be either still with Abū Salamah in Kūfah acting as his messenger to Khurāsān, or with Ibrāhīm in Ḥumaymah, was made to be in both places at the same time.

⁸³ Some variations of this tradition relate that Abū Muslim endeared himself to the *nuqabā’* and offered to go with them. They took him to Makkah, where they met Ibrāhīm, who recognized Abū Muslim and took him for himself etc. If we discard the monopoly Ibrāhīm allegedly held on the *nuqabā’* and their communications in Makkah, the tradition becomes acceptable in its general outline. Cf. *Akhbār*, pp. 255-6; Balādhurī,

Abū Salamah and/or al-Sarrāj, provides a more plausible forum. In Makkah, while they were conducting their usual pan-Hāshimite communications, the *nuqabāʾ*, trustingly and inadvertently, exposed the Hāshimite theatre to Abū Muslim, and exposed Abū Muslim to whomever may have been interested amongst the congregation of *Āl Muḥammad*. Thus, two men, each with his own agenda, were on the look and alert. Each had something to offer to the other, and each had something for which the other voraciously hungered. Ibrāhīm boasted a Prophetic kinship but no direct genealogical descent, and an almost non-existent claim to the legacy, which the ‘Alīds, as descendants, had almost exclusively claimed, unchallenged. He needed an operative on the field to place him on the map of genealogical claims. Abū Muslim was an operative on the field; but, on his own, outside the context of the Organization and his patrons, as the representative of his real grass-roots constituency only, he lacked a connection to the symbolic legacy, in the name of which only—he knew—he could do something positive for his cause.

Abū Muslim and Ibrāhīm, this most tenable of plausible scenarios continues to presume, cut a side deal, not much dissimilar to the one Mu‘āwiyah and Ziyād ibn Abīh had cut, almost eighty-five years earlier. They must have been aware of the infamous but brilliant feat, and they probably modeled their bargain after that precedent. Here is where the roots of Abū Muslim’s claim, that he was the son of Salīṭ ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abbās, should be sought.⁸⁴

The presumed terms of the deal may be gleaned from fragments scattered in the ‘Abbāsid *riwāyah* itself under different guises and in various forms—some directives attributed to the *Imām*, denials and accusations in the context of denouncing Abū Muslim, and certain attitudes and patterns which mark both the behavior of some men and the direction of events in the post-victory stage. Those presumed terms may be summarized as follows. In return for being endorsed as the *Ridā*, when the time came, Ibrāhīm would agree to share power on geographical basis — the West would be his domain, while Abū Muslim would enjoy absolute supremacy in the East; or even to be content with

Ansāb al-Ashraf III, p. 119; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rīkh*, II: p. 327; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252-3; Ibn A‘tham, VIII: p. 154; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 146; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 49. Other variations stop short of the Makkah trip, Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1727, 1769; Dīnawarī, p. 339; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 252; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 52. In a third variation, Ṭabarī, IV: p. 166 puts Abū Muslim’s first trip to Makkah under the events of the year 127/745.

⁸⁴ Lassner recognizes the historical similarity, but only as a symbolic potential completely fabricated and initiated by al-Manṣūr, to justify the execution of Abū Muslim (*Revolution*, pp. 107-17, esp. pp. 111-4).

a figure head status while delegating real power to Abū Muslim. Abū Muslim would be *amīn Āli Muḥammad*, not as an appointed official, but as the member of the family who is singled out for this honor. Ibrāhīm would acknowledge Salīṭ as having been the son of ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abbās, and Abū Muslim as Salīṭ’s son. Abū Muslim would marry into the family. Perhaps, in due course, even earning a spot in the line of succession would not be beyond him.

The very idea of cutting a deal with Ibrāhīm, or, for that matter, with any other Hāshimite, was contrary to the central principle of consensus intrinsic to the doctrine of *al-riḍā*. But Abū Muslim was not about ideology. He was about power politics. The strategic dimension of the doctrine, that which allowed the Organization to maintain its independence in pursuing its agenda free from the heavy shadow of a specific candidate must have been most dear to Abū Muslim. He wouldn’t have jeopardized it. But this dimension was not threatened by this presumed deal. It was protected and ensured by the very nature of the deal and by the internal balances and dynamics of the relation between the two men and what each of them represented. Abū Muslim must have reckoned that he himself was the stronger party. He possessed the materiel while Ibrāhīm possessed only a very poor share in a symbolism, which could be upgraded only by an Abū Muslim victory, and only if Abū Muslim was still willing then. No one else was privy to the deal, not even, or especially not, the leaders of the Organization. Therefore, the element of an open commitment, which would have represented an undue pressure on Abū Muslim, was absent. The fulfillment of the two men’s pledges would depend on their good wills, especially that of Abū Muslim’s, and on the fact that it was a good deal for both of them—at least when it was cut.

Epilogue

What Abū Muslim could not have foreseen were the untimely deaths of his two successive convenient choices from the ‘Abbāsīd clan, Ibrāhīm and his younger brother, al-Saffāḥ, and the accession of a different type of man. But these occurrences, eventful as they were, were mere historical accidents. More important than what Abū Muslim could not possibly have foreseen is what he miscalculated—the irreversibility of the dynamics of symbolism, legitimacy, and power, once they have interacted positively for an adequate period of time in favorable conditions. It appears that Abū Muslim did not appreciate the fact that the harder he fought on behalf of ‘Abbāsīd legitimacy the less dependant on his good will the ‘Abbāsīd legitimacy would become; that it would—

as it actually did—acquire a life of its own; and that, once he championed it publicly, he would not be able to counter it.

While still working with plausibilities, we might as well recognize that the formative features of an opening act may be sought in the contours of the closing act. And while Dhahabī is not a primary source, we may be well advised to read him as an early critic of the ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. In his exposition of one of the final acts of the ‘Abbāsīd/Abū Muslim drama, Dhahabī lays bare the essence of the presumed deal, and the psychological dynamics governing it. When the nasty exchange between them escalated, Abū Muslim wrote to al-Manṣūr:

In [choosing] your [line of the family], I had been [over-] interpretative [of the ideology]; and I had erred (*innī kuntu fīkum muta’awwīlan fa-akhḥa’i*).⁸⁵

This is an admission by Abū Muslim that he personally had been responsible for the ‘Abbāsīd option. When the noose tightened around his position, he consulted one of his trusted men, Abū Ishāq al-Marwazī, who analyzed the situation for him as follows:

This man, [al-Manṣūr], harbors old grudges against you. Since [opposing him] had been your choice then [when you antagonized him], had you then taken as an ally a man from ‘Alī’s family, it would [therefore] have been closer [to doing the right thing]; [or] had you accepted his appointment of you to Khurāsān, Syria, and the *ṣā’ifāh* (summer campaign), you would have had more time, and you would have been at liberty [to maneuver]; you would have dispatched [emissaries] to Madīnah and lured [or spirited] an ‘Alīd and installed him as *Imām*, (*fa-wajjahta ilā al-Madīnati fa-ikhtalasta ‘Alawiyyan fa-naṣṣabtahu imāman*); you would have won the hearts of the peoples of Khurāsān and Iraq; and you would have hurled at Abū Ja‘far an equal of his to match him; then you would have been on a judicious course. [But now], do you [really] want to fight Abū Ja‘far when you are in Ḥulwān, his soldiers are in Madā’in, and he is an undisputed caliph!? It is not [as viable] as you thought.⁸⁶

In effect, Abū Ishāq was retracing history, pointing out to Abū Muslim that he ought to have done, what he had done earlier, when he chose the weaker party; only that, this time around, he ought to have exchanged the ‘Abbāsīd for an ‘Alīd.

IV. ‘Hijacking’ the Khurāsān Chapter

It is only for methodological reasons that the characterization of the foregoing scenario is not upgraded from plausibility to veracity. For all

⁸⁵ Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: pp. 67-8.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

other purposes, this scenario is compatible with the unfolding of the subsequent events, which we shall try to extract from the doctored 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*.

The two men left Makkah carrying their secret: Ibrāhīm went back to Ḥumaymah to sit and wait in hope. Abū Muslim went back to Kūfah to resume his double mission, ostensibly as Abū Salamah's messenger to Khurāsān, and actually as the leader-in-waiting, cultivating and rearing his power relations, and calmly mobilizing his grass-roots constituencies.

Abū Salamah settled for a style of management by correspondence reminiscent of Bukayr's management through resident envoys, and, ironically, he would soon reap almost the same bitter fruits. It is not known how many trips Abū Muslim made to Khurāsān between ca. Sha'bān, 127/May-June, 745, when Abū Salamah had concluded his last trip, and early 129/Autumn, 746, when Abū Muslim stayed on for the lightning double blow he was soon to administer on both fronts: the internal and the external, becoming, first, the leader of the Khurāsān Chapter, and then the master of the East.

How did Abū Muslim become leader of the Khurāsān Chapter? Inevitably, as the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* would have it, Ibrāhīm simply appointed him.⁸⁷ The imposition of the *Imām's* role, with the attending imperatives of obedience to him and harmony with his designs, wreak havoc on an otherwise coherent, humanly and historically understandable, stream of events. For, from this point on, there is scarce agreement on any detail.

According to some accounts, Ibrāhīm offered the position to Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, who declined, then to Qaḥṭabah, or Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah, who in turn declined.⁸⁸ Then he chose Abū Muslim,⁸⁹ or he suggested his name and Qaḥṭabah and Sulaymān warmly endorsed him.⁹⁰ But why was a new appointment required? Because, when the civil strife started in the province, Sulaymān wrote to Abū Salamah, requesting him to write to Ibrāhīm to urge him to send a member of his own family to head the Chapter;⁹¹ or, because some of the *nuqabā'* came to Ibrāhīm in person asking him to send them a leader;⁹² or Ibrāhīm

⁸⁷ On this point, the sources are unanimous, except that Ya'qūbī and Ibn A'tham attribute the appointment to Muḥammad ibn 'Alī (*Ta'rikh*, II: p. 332; Ibn A'tham, VIII: pp. 155-6).

⁸⁸ *Akhbār*, p. 256; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1937; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 119.

⁸⁹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1937.

⁹⁰ *Akhbār*, p. 256; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 119.

⁹¹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1949.

⁹² *Akhbār*, p. 256; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 119; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 147.

simply took the initiative.⁹³ He wrote to the *nuqabā'* ordering them to obey Abū Muslim,⁹⁴ ordered Abū Muslim to heed Sulaymān,⁹⁵ and wrote to Abū Salamah informing him of the appointment and instructing him to execute it.⁹⁶ When Abū Muslim arrived in Marw, in 127/745,⁹⁷ 128/746,⁹⁸ or 129/747,⁹⁹ he lodged with Sulaymān,¹⁰⁰ or with his own father-in-law, Abū al-Najm 'Imrān ibn Ismā'īl.¹⁰¹ Sulaymān and the others were dutifully obedient and venerating;¹⁰² alternatively, he was apprehensive of the imprudent choice of the inexperienced young man and sent him back to sender;¹⁰³ or he raged in outright indignation and hurled a jar of ink at Abū Muslim fracturing his head, and the meeting dispersed on this note.¹⁰⁴ The matter was eventually settled. The settlement was reached in the name of the inviolable entitlement of the *Imām* to the blind and absolute obedience of his shī'ah, by virtue of his sacred knowledge.¹⁰⁵ But then something strange happened:

Abū Muslim reverted to Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, informed him of what he had received [from the Imām], and had him read what had been written to him. Part of what had been written to him was: 'If Sulaymān ibn Kathīr accepts to take on the [responsibility of leading] the *dā'wah*, and if he nominates himself for the task, submit to him. If he declines to take on the responsibility, do not, [nonetheless], disobey [any of] Sulaymān's commands, and give him priority in all your arrangements.'¹⁰⁶

If so, what was the dispute about?! Actually, by substracting the *Imām's* alleged role, the elements of truth emerge, in reasonable harmony, from two essentially similar accounts in *Akhbār* and Ṭabarī,¹⁰⁷ their wide divergence on many particular details notwithstanding.

⁹³ *Akhbār*, p. 269; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1960; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 121; Azdī, p. 65.

⁹⁴ *Akhbār*, p. 268; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1937, 1960; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 121; Azdī, p. 65.

⁹⁵ *Akhbār*, p. 272; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1937; Azdī, p. 65.

⁹⁶ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 121.

⁹⁷ Azdī, p. 65.

⁹⁸ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1937, 1949.

⁹⁹ *Akhbār*, p. 269.

¹⁰⁰ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, pp. 119, 121.

¹⁰¹ *Akhbār*, p. 269.

¹⁰² Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, pp. 119, 121.

¹⁰³ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1960-2; cf. p. 1937.

¹⁰⁴ *Akhbār*, pp. 269-72. For other abuses attributed to Sulaymān and to his son Muḥammad, see Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 168.

¹⁰⁵ *Akhbār*, p. 271; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1961-2.

¹⁰⁶ *Akhbār*, p. 272.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 269-73; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1959 ff.

When he felt ready, Abū Muslim simply stayed in the province, never to see Abū Salamah again. Within the Khurāsān Chapter, he delivered his blow quickly and almost surgically. The clandestine nature of the movement did not allow for a lengthy and messy struggle which would have alerted the authorities. In addition to his commanding posture on the grass-roots level in the remote districts, Abū Muslim had carefully cultivated some very effective alliances in the villages of Marw, and on the different levels of the Organization leadership, including the *nuqabāʾ*. Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, the senior *naqīb*, was virtually isolated; after a brief flare of temper, he had no choice but to fall in line. After he won, Abū Muslim, ever the master strategist and tactician, appeased Sulaymān by deferring to him and according him the honors he expected—albeit only temporarily. They agreed to put a dignified face on the coup, by having Sulaymān himself write to the partisans in the districts, informing them of his decision to yield the leadership to Abū Muslim.¹⁰⁸

V. *The Revolution*

Now in firm control of the Khurāsān Chapter, Abū Muslim was in a position to unleash the dynamics of the popular uprising he had been grooming for so long. In Ṭabarī's words:

The partisans—*nuqabāʾ* and others—heeded and obeyed Abū Muslim ... He spread the *duʿāt* [all over] Khurāsān, and people joined in throngs and grew numerous, and the *duʿāt* permeated all of Khurāsān (*wa samiʿat al-shiʿat alu mina al-nuqabāʾi wa ghayrihim li-Abī Muslimin wa aṭāʾuh ... wa baththa al-duʿāta fī aqṭārī Khurāsāna fa-dakhala al-nāsu afiwājan wa kathurū wa fashati al-duʿātu fī Khurāsāna kullihā*).¹⁰⁹

This text, probably not unintentionally, is reminiscent of the Quranic verse marking the massive spread of Islam amongst the Arabs: “*wa raʾayta al-nāsa yadkhalūna fī dīni Allāhi afiwājan.*” One did not really have to rely solely on Dīnawarī's confused account, or to wait for the discovery of *Akhhbār*'s manuscript, to realize the unmistakable character of the mass Revolution.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ *Akhhbār*, p. 273. This is how we construe the strange passage which immediately follows the *Imām*'s alleged letter (*Akhhbār*, p. 272), as a face-saving compromise by which Abū Muslim graciously appeased Sulaymān, and which claimed that Sulaymān had the option, but declined.

¹⁰⁹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1962.

¹¹⁰ Dīnawarī's depiction of a mass movement, pp. 338, 340-1, 344, 356, 359-60. Gibb dismisses Dīnawarī's account, and ignores Ṭabarī's, asserting that: ‘In our most authentic records there is no trace of a mass movement...’ (*Conquests*, p. 94). Shaban restricts the movement to Marw (*Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 152). Daniel does recognize the mass movement, but he excludes Transoxania (*khurasan*, pp. 51-2, 58, 86).

The detailed story of the open Revolution and its immediate preliminaries, from the time Abū Muslim arrived in the province to stay, has been masterfully told by Wellhausen.¹¹¹ Later, M. Sharon recounted the story in extensive detail.¹¹² Wellhausen synthesized his narrative from analyzing Ṭabarī's three accounts,¹¹³ and reconstructing the elements of a viable scenario. Of course, *Akhbār* was not available to Wellhausen. Sharon correctly realizes that "the tradition in *Akhbār*, relating to Abū Muslim's tribal policy is more complete and more genuine than the accounts of Ṭabarī, Azdī and Dīnawarī."¹¹⁴ However, the nature of these sources, complimentary in many respects, imposes itself on Sharon, albeit in a selective manner; he, therefore, tries "to reconstruct the complete picture from the traditions of Ṭabarī and the *Akhbār*."¹¹⁵

Actually, even though "*Akhbār* provides a wealth of previously unknown details, ... it also reinforces the basic veracity of the historiographical tradition which was hitherto the mainstay of Umayyad studies. What accrues from a careful probe of the account in *Akhbār* does not structurally alter what derives from Ṭabarī."¹¹⁶ Yet, one must remain alert to the fact that the events during this stage were still taking place on the covert level as much as they started occurring on the overt; and that the interaction and the overlapping between the two levels were at their highest intensity. In the composite account derived from the complimentary traditions, *Akhbār's* contribution to our understanding of the secret deliberations, and of the profound implications of Abū Muslim's strategy and tactics, is of sterling quality, despite interpolations and some confusion.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, *Akhbār's* account, once clarified and cleansed from interpolations, leaves no doubt that a sharp distinction must be drawn, geographically, between the Marw oasis and the outlying districts, and, strategically, between the role assigned in Abū Muslim's strategy to each of these two geographical

¹¹¹ Wellhausen, pp. 521-39, for the events in Khurāsān; pp. 538-42, for Qaḥṭabah ibn Shabīb's campaign.

¹¹² Sharon, *Revolt*, pp. 51-175, for the events in Khurāsān, pp. 179-217; for Qaḥṭabah's campaign.

¹¹³ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1949-2003, on the authorities of Madā'inī, Abū al-Khaṭṭāb, and an anonymous source.

¹¹⁴ Sharon, *Revolt*, p.60. But I tend to be reserved about Sharon's detecting 'distortions which Ṭabarī's accounts succeeded in introducing into the studies of van Vloten and Wellhausen' and about his considering that *Akhbār's* 'balanced and logical summary' corrects them. If they were 'distortions' which allowed van Vloten and Wellhausen to see the '*dā'wah*' as predominantly Persian, the same abound in *Akhbār*.

¹¹⁵ Sharon, *Revolt*, p.70.

¹¹⁶ Agha, 'Abū Muslim,' p. 345.

¹¹⁷ Cf., *ibid.*, pp. 333-5.

constellations. Ethnically, once the demographic situation in each of the two constellations is understood, it becomes almost undeniable that the Iranian masses were the mainstay of the Revolution.

In view of Wellhausen's and Sharon's efforts, we shall not attempt here to reproduce what will inevitably be mere repetitions or endless contentions over details. The foregoing distinctions, however, mandate a brief pause to highlight their profound impact on our understanding of the dynamics of the Revolution and of the demographic character of its real constituency.

The events in the Marw oasis, in this context, cover the period from the first eruption, on Ramaḍān 25, 129 /June 8, 747, until Abū Muslim, "without striking a blow,"¹¹⁸ entered the city on Rabīʿ II 7, 130/December 15, 747.¹¹⁹ These events largely comprise extended and complex political and geographical maneuvers, mainly by Abū Muslim, but also by the warring Arab tribes, parties to the long standoff at the oasis. As far as the shifting alliances bear on the issue of the demographic and ethnic identities of the Revolutionary forces and their adversaries, some of these events are discussed in various parts of this book. Actually, except inasmuch as it weakened the Arab army, the tribal factor was not of much immediate consequence—the modern scholarly squabble over it notwithstanding.¹²⁰ What is worth noting is the ostensibly reverse correlation between Marw's being the seat of Arab power and Abū Muslim's pointed selection of the oasis to be the vortex of his mortal struggle with that power. Abū Muslim realized that, "almost purely Iranian, the outlying districts had become defacto demographic strongholds of the revolution before the revolution erupted." The presence of the Revolutionary leadership in these outlying districts was not as crucial as its presence in Marw, which, by contrast, "housed the Umayyad Arab provincial government nominally heading the main bulk of the once formidable Arab army, but actually paralyzed by the tribal stand-off that split its ranks." All Abū Muslim needed was an imposing presence in Marw, which, through political maneuvering, would help him perpetuate the 'deadlock at Marw,' and

¹¹⁸ Wellhausen, p.491.

¹¹⁹ *Akhhār*, p.315; Ṭabarī's anonymous source, II: p.1993. Madā'iri dates the event to Rabīʿ II, 7 or 9, while Abū al-Khaṭṭāb delays it two full months, to Jumādā II, 9 (Ṭabarī, II: pp.1990, 1984, 1987); Balādhurī advances it to Rabīʿ I (*Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p.130).

¹²⁰ There were three main warring Arab parties: the loyal tribes, mainly Muḍarite, with the governor, Naṣr ibn Sayyār; the anti-Muḍar-but-not-anti-Establishment opposition party of the Azdī, led by the two sons of al-Kirmānī, 'Alī and 'Uthmān; and the Khawārij, led by Shaybān ibn Salamah and allied to a Rabīʿah faction from the Banū Ḥanīfah under 'Alī ibn Ma'qil al-Ḥanaḥī.

allow his militias in the outlying districts to overpower the thinly spread, police-like, Arab forces.¹²¹

Wellhausen does realize that a mass rising occurred, although he restricts it to Khurāsān proper, thus excluding Transoxania and much of Ṭukhārīstān.¹²² His concentration on the events in Marw, and the fact that *Akḥbār* was not known to him, had a diluting effect on his understanding of the significance and extent of the geographical orchestration. Although he mentions the fact that Abīward, Marw al-Rūdh and Harāt had been won before Marw, he gives it no more than one sentence.¹²³ Most other modern scholars share Wellhausen's focus on the events in the oasis, simply because more information about the oasis is available in the sources. "This politically proportionate but demographically and strategically disproportionate focus... [resulted with the fact that] the great significance of the strategy of orchestration as crucial evidence of a mass Iranian uprising was either diluted or completely lost."¹²⁴ A few extracts from my article on Abū Muslim's conquest of Khurāsān may further clarify this matter:

The stark contrast, both of chronology and manner, in which the revolution made its sweeping territorial gains in the outlying districts first, and in Marw last, conveys the essence of Abū Muslim's strategy and tactics. When this strategy started yielding its quick and successive gains, Naṣr b. Sayyār was still in Marw, holding his own but completely paralyzed by his inability to stop the tribal war thanks, in good part, to this very strategy. Within a few months of first eruption, the entire territory (north, east and south of Marw, and the territory immediately to the west of the oasis) was swept clean, leaving only a southwesterly corridor – the one that Naṣr b. Sayyār would soon use in his flight via the Sarakhs highway to Ṭūs, Nīshāpūr, up to the Sāwah oasis. All the while, Abū Muslim was conducting his political maneuvers in Marw. The bewildered governor described the revolutionary strategy with photographic accuracy: '[...] It is as if you are witnessing the ropes being put around our necks.' It was death-by-asphyxiation for Arab rule in Khurāsān... Around seven months after first eruption on Ramaḍān 25, 129, the capitulation of Marw came like the fall of an over-ripe fruit. Abū Muslim, without striking a blow, entered the city on Rabī' II 7, 130/December 15, 747. He had reaped the ultimate benefit of his binary strategy of perpetuating a deadlock at Marw through political maneuvering, and of overpowering the Arab forces in the outlying districts... His commissioned commanders and coordinating officers did not march with any armies from Marw. The Marw revolutionary

¹²¹ For above quotations, see, Agha, 'Abū Muslim,' pp. 341, 342 and 344. For a full discussion of Abū Muslim's strategy, see the whole article.

¹²² Wellhausen, p.498.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p.529.

¹²⁴ Agha, 'Abū Muslim,' p. 345.

resources could only sustain the show of force Abū Muslim needed right there... These commanders simply traveled to their armies, which had always been stationed where the soldiers were born. Abū Muslim's conquest of Khurāsān was not achieved by marching armies, but by local eruptions... In the various accounts of how all of Khurāsān fell to the revolutionaries, with the exception of two cases, we do not hear of major battles of the sort that occur between armies, not even in Marw. Save for Balkh and Ṭūs, two battles which had their own logic, the conquest was almost always a matter of killing or expelling the government's man in a given district. The multitudes must usually have engulfed the comparatively tiny garrisons; or the garrisons simply disbanded and melted away, or fled to the larger regional Umayyad strongholds. The only two battles in which Khurasanite Umayyad forces were engaged were last-stand battles made by such remnants who converged on two main locations from scattered and stampeded detachments. In the east, the vanquished remnants of the garrisons of Transoxania and eastern Ṭukhāristān converged on Tirmidh, and thus occurred the battle for Balkh. In the west, after the fall of Marw, the remnants from Sarakhs, Nasā, Abīward, and the rest of central and western Khurāsān, in addition to the bulk of the Marw garrison, converged on Ṭūs (and Jurjān). In Ṭūs the Arabs of Khurāsān fought their last battle.¹²⁵

VI. *The Role of Transoxania and the Battle for Balkh*

There is unanimity, in modern studies, on placing Transoxania outside the Revolutionary geography, either by default, or by portraying it as a passive existence, or by writing it off as being actively pro-Umayyad. All three views are untenable; but all three are probably the inevitable results of the sources' underreporting of the role of al-'Alā' ibn Ḥurayth and his constituency, and of the failure of modern scholarship to detect this historiographical flaw. Scholars who wrote before the publication of *Akhhbār* could not have detected this flaw. *Akhhbār* is the first and only source to establish the crucial connection between the obscure Revolutionary al-'Alā' ibn Ḥurayth and his profound legacy; and it does this by citing his full name—son of Ḥurayth ibn Quṭbah and nephew of Thābit, the two celebrated and popular Sughdian leaders.¹²⁶

Wellhausen did not go beyond excluding the territory from the active Revolutionary domain.¹²⁷ Barthold is not specific about the role of the territory in the Revolution, but he realizes the coalition between the 'most heterogeneous elements,' and that Abū Muslim "attracted the

¹²⁵ Agha, 'Abū Muslim,' pp. 343-5.

¹²⁶ *Infra*, chapter six.

¹²⁷ Wellhausen, p. 498.

dihqāns and the rural population.”¹²⁸ Gibb, who vouched for a no-mass-rising, was deluded into translating Naṣr ibn Sayyār’s statesmanship in handling the Sughdian issue¹²⁹ into a reciprocated pro-Naṣr and pro-Umayyad Sughdian sentiment.¹³⁰

Shaban is all but completely oblivious to anything outside Marw. Omar registers, in passing, the capitulation of Marw al-Rūdh, Harāt and Abīward,¹³¹ but he sees no “strong historical evidence ... of deep dissatisfaction ... which would have led to a complete upheaval against [the Umayyads] in the cities of Khurāsān and *Māwarā’ al-nahr*.”¹³²

Sharon assigns the territory to areas which still had to be subjugated after Abū Muslim had gained control “of the territory of Khurāsān to the east of the line Marw-Marw-ar-Rūd-Herāt ... Abū Dāwūd was sent to try his luck in subjugating Transoxania,”¹³³ which means that it had not been subjugated yet. Actually, the sources to which Sharon refers in order to support his statement do not say what he says they say.¹³⁴

Despite his earlier and strongly founded recognition of the geographically widespread support for the Revolution,¹³⁵ Daniel excludes Transoxania from the revolutionary coalition. On the strength of ‘common interest’ and ‘genuine friendship’, he declares it pro-Umayyad.¹³⁶ The alliance between the Umayyad Establishment and the

¹²⁸ Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 198.

¹²⁹ *Infra*, chapter six.

¹³⁰ Gibb, *Conquests*, pp. 92-4.

¹³¹ Omar, *‘Abbāsīd Caliphate*, p. 106; like Sharon and Shaban, he is absorbed with the events in Marw, pp. 89-106.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 107.

¹³³ Sharon, *Revolt*, p. 175.

¹³⁴ Balādhurī only relates how Abū Dāwūd deceived ‘Uthmān ibn al-Kirmānī into crossing the River, promising him the governorship of Transoxania; then he killed him (*Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 131). Ṭabarī and Dīnawarī state the known fact that Abū Dāwūd was sent to Ṭukhārīstān, not Transoxania proper. To Samarqand, it was Sabbā’ ibn al-Nu’mān who was sent. More important, both texts use Khurāsān in its wider sense, i.e., including Ṭukhārīstān and Transoxania, and both explicitly state that Abū Muslim sent his officials after he had established his control over the entire area. Thus, Ṭabarī, II: p. 2001, ‘... lammā ... ghalaba ‘alā Khurāsān wajjaha ‘ummāla-hu ‘alā bilādi-hā fa-istā‘mala Sabbā’ ibn al-Nu’mān al-Azādī ‘alā Samarqand wa Abū Dāwūd Khālid ibn Ibrāhīm ‘alā Ṭukhārīstān.’ And Dīnawarī, p.362, ‘istawlā ‘alā Khurāsān wa istā‘mala ‘ummāla-hu ‘alay-hā fa-kāna awwalā man ‘aqada la-hu min-hum Zīnbā’ [I read: Sabbā’] ibn al-Nu’mān ‘alā Samarqand wa-wallā Khālid ibn Ibrāhīm ‘alā Ṭukhārīstān.’ Sabbā’ (no.322), also killed later by Abū Muslim, had been one of the very few Organization members embroiled in the tribal strife on the Kirmānī side. It is not strange that he was sent to Samarqand within the context of Abū Muslim’s wide maneuvers to scatter the Kirmānī men all over the province. Furthermore, Samarqand must have been quiet and did not require a top lieutenant. Abū Dāwūd was Ṭukhārīstān’s man; moreover, there was trouble there that called for his expertise. This is a different but related story that will presently be investigated.

¹³⁵ Daniel, *Khurasan*, pp. 48-52.

¹³⁶ He says: ‘Of all the Iranian provinces, it is unlikely that any was more openly and actively pro-Umayyad than Transoxania. It would be a mistake to believe that Umayyad

‘native aristocracy of Transoxania,’ as well as of other Persian territories, is a matter of undisputed historical record, although it cannot be asserted that it had always been a stable alliance. So are the personal ‘genuine friendships’ which Qutaybah, Asad ibn ‘Abd Allāh, and Naṣr cultivated. But this does not bear evidence to corroborate the theory Daniel advances. The alliance between any native aristocracy and a foreign ruling establishment has always been a precarious ‘institution,’ but it never prevented the masses of any society from rising in revolt. It did not in Khurāsān proper, nor in most of Ṭukhārīstān, so why should it have in Transoxania!? The areas Daniel tries to exclude from the ‘true mass uprising,’ for which he vouches,¹³⁷ he himself includes, a mere thirty-five pages earlier.¹³⁸

Daniel further rests his argument on Ṭabarī’s account of the fighting near Balkh, which Daniel dates to 130/747-748, and on the revolt of Sharīk ibn Shaykh al-Mahrī (no.336) in Bukhārā, in 133/750-751, and on the subsequent turbulences. He tries to illustrate two points: First, “the greatest difficulty [with which] the Abbasids asserted control over these frontier areas,” and, second, “the intensifying dissatisfaction with Abbasid rule.”¹³⁹ He does not examine the implications of the fact that the period intervening between Sharīk’s revolt and the Revolution was apparently peaceful and uneventful.

Occurring around four years after the Revolution had scored its first triumphs in the East, Sharīk’s revolt does not necessarily bear any indications regarding the geopolitical situation and the demographic composition of the antagonistic forces at the time the Revolution broke out. If anything, it bears witness to the natural post-victory disintegration that plagues any revolutions whose mainstay is an extremely complex and extended coalition. The fact that certain forces in Bukhārā (or even the entire Bukhārā population) revolted in

strength there was derived solely from the many troops they had there... Umayyad support went much deeper than that. The Umayyad leadership and the native aristocracy of Transoxania, the Syrian muqātilah and the Iranian march lords and warriors, had a common interest in resisting Turkish encroachments... This coincidence of interest was cemented by many genuine friendships... Thus many of the Iranians who fought the ‘Abbāsīd forces in Khurāsān came from the principalities of Transoxania. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the ‘Abbāsīds asserted control over these frontier areas.’ *Ibid.*, p. 86, see also p. 58.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹³⁸ In refuting Shaban’s theory, that Marw was ‘the source of the revolt,’ and in consolidating his own, that it was ‘only its focal point,’ Daniel lists (according to Dīnawarī, Ṭabarī, *Akhhār* and Azdī) among the areas which rose in revolt: ‘... Soghdia, ..., Khuttalān, Kish, and Nasaf ... Khwārizm, ..., Bukhārā.’ (Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 51, and notes 138, 141).

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.86, 87 ff.

133/750-751 against the Revolutionary government does not mean that either Transoxania as a whole, or even Bukhārā in particular, was anti-Revolutionary in 129-130/747-748. The pro-ʿAlīd character of Sharīk’s revolt¹⁴⁰ is proof enough that it may have been a violent expression of the disappointment of one of the wings of the coalition for whom the chosen ʿAbbāsīd was not a *riḍā*. In fact, Sharīk’s statement, “This is not the basis on which we supported [or swore allegiance to] Muḥammad’s House (*mā ʿalā hādihā itibāʿnā [or bāyaʿnā] Āla Muḥammad ...*),”¹⁴¹ strongly indicates that he himself, and probably his followers, had been ardent supporters of the Bukayrist Organization—supporters who broke with Abū Muslim three to four years after the Revolution had erupted and won, and in good time for them to make known their dissatisfaction with the fact that Abū Muslim had exchanged their *riḍā* for his ʿAbbāsīd *Riḍā*.

Daniel’s understanding of the fighting around Balkh, and his dating it to 130/747-748 are even less accurate. As it were, the fighting was a natural attendant to the initial breakout of the Revolution. It is clearly evident from Ṭabarī’s account¹⁴² that these events had started before the capitulation of Marw and even before the Umayyad forces stationed in large garrisons such as Balkh had started to disintegrate. What probably misled Daniel is Ṭabarī’s style. Ṭabarī commenced his account of the assassination of the two sons of Kirmānī, a later occurrence located in the events of the year 130, by recounting how the events in and around Balkh, with which ʿUthmān ibn al-Kirmānī was yet to be associated, had started. Ṭabarī’s usage of the Arabic equivalent of the English past perfect, ‘had sent’ (*kāna wajjaha*) seems to have eluded Daniel. Consequently, his understanding of the composition and alignment of the forces of the two antagonists was further removed from the facts which the account establishes.

A proper reconstruction of these events must start with the events of the first eruption on Ramaḍān 25, 129/June 9, 748, in Saqīdunj, when Abū Muslim affected his first orchestrated deployment of his commanders to the districts. This means that the events on which Daniel rests his argument had started three months before the end of the year 129, and six months before the capitulation of Marw. It was one of the first salvos in the severely underreported chain of purges which took place in a masterly orchestrated manner in the outlying districts of Khurāsān-Ṭukhārīstān and Transoxania.

¹⁴⁰ See Narshakhī-Frye, pp. 62-4; Narshakhī, pp. 91-3.

¹⁴¹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 74; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 171; Yaʿqūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 354; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 60; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 345.

¹⁴² Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1997-2000; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 313.

The Umayyad forces from Balkh, Tirmidh and the fleeing remnants from the other districts of Ṭukhāristān mobilized under the Umayyad prefect of Balkh, Ziyād ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qushayrī. They assembled somewhere in the district of Jūzajān,¹⁴³ wherein was the town Ṭālaqān.¹⁴⁴ If the place was Janduwayh, a village of Ṭālaqān, then the two forces did engage in the very first battle ever between the two antagonists.¹⁴⁵ According to Ṭabarī, “when Abū Dāwūd approached [the Umayyad forces], they turned away in flight.”¹⁴⁶ Whichever way, the Umayyad forces must have been hard pressed between massive eruptions all around, and at the rear. For, their flight was not to Balkh, as would have been expected, but to Tirmidh, which had been a Qaysite stronghold on the northern bank of the Oxus since the days of Mūsā ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Khāzim al-Sulamī. The road to Balkh lay open before Abū Dāwūd, who entered it without further ado.¹⁴⁷

Abū Muslim, apparently in constant need for his staunchest ally to be close to him in order to offset Sulaymān ibn Kathīr’s influence in the ranks of the leadership of the Organization,¹⁴⁸ summoned Abū Dāwūd to Marw and appointed in his stead another, a more prominent, notable of the Rabī‘ah alliance, Abū al-Maylā’ Yaḥyā ibn Nu‘aym al-Shaybānī.¹⁴⁹

This chieftain had been a pillar of the Umayyad Establishment in Khurāsān, and a pivot of tribal politics in the province. He had been subgovernor of Āmul under Asad ibn ‘Abd Allāh, in 117-118/735-737. To him Asad entrusted the task of the execution of Khidāsh. When Asad died in 120/737-738, and before caliph Hishām chose Naṣr ibn Sayyār, Abū al-Maylā’ was one of the candidates nominated for the governorship of the province. Although he joined al-Kirmānī’s rebellion against the government of Naṣr, he, like al-Kirmānī himself, was by no reckoning an anti-Establishment Revolutionary. One month after Abū Muslim declared the Revolution, Abū al-Maylā’ counseled the Yaman and Rabī‘ah rebels to reconcile themselves with Naṣr. Conceivably aware of the ethnic dimension of the Revolution, and the threat it posed to the foundations of the Establishment, he warned his faction: “Choose: either you perish before Muḍar, or Muḍar perish before you.”

¹⁴³ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1997.

¹⁴⁴ Le Strange, p. 423.

¹⁴⁵ According to Yāqūt, II: p. 170.

¹⁴⁶ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1997.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ For Abū Dāwūd’s role in countering Sulaymān’s opposition and buttressing Abū Muslim’s position, see *ibid.*, p. 182; *Akhhār*, p. 271.

¹⁴⁹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1997.

Apparently unheeded by his rash tribesmen, this thoroughly tribal politician played along and joined the unwitting and short-lived alliance of convenience between his frivolous faction and the cunning Revolutionary command of Abū Muslim.¹⁵⁰

Abū Muslim could not have been oblivious of his new appointee's history or disposition. Therefore, Daniel's finding this appointment 'rather surprising'¹⁵¹ is justified, but only at first sight. Considering Abū Muslim's cautious and untrusting nature, and his shrewd political maneuvering, it must be concluded that he had pondered the move and calculated the risk. Abū Muslim's calculations we can only surmise. Theoretically, his confidence in the solidness of indigenous popular support may have been strong enough to lull him into a false sense of security, enough to make him think that his precarious choice for the office could not do any serious damage. But this is not very likely, because Abū al-Maylā' could not have been the only option Abū Muslim had. Choosing him must have emanated from keen intention rather than necessity. The bulk of the dispersed Umayyad forces that had manned the garrisons of Ṭukhāristān and Transoxania, both of which had been purged since the outset of the eruption, must have since regrouped in Tirmidh, just across the Oxus from Balkh. In fact, with Āmul and Zamm closed on them, Tirmidh became the only option for the remnants from Transoxania. It made perfect military and political sense for Abū Muslim to create in Balkh a replica of the Marw situation, to pit against one another the demoralized loyal and the unwittingly rebellious elements of the same withering Establishment—a tactic not foreign to Abū Muslim. Staying as disengaged as possible from this foreseen fray in the strongest and most important Arab stronghold outside Marw afforded Abū Muslim the best opportunity to attend to the situation in Marw with free hands and with his trusted ally on his side, while his natural enemies, current and latent, consumed one another.

Abū Muslim's plan, if this was indeed his premeditated plan, backfired—thanks to the reawakened strategic perceptiveness of Abū al-Maylā'. He must have seen, on the field, the extent of damage the Revolution was progressively doing to the Establishment and to Arab presence. In his warning to his fellow tribesmen a few months earlier, he had said: "This man, [Abū Muslim], brought his cause to the open only a month ago, and he is already [leading] an army as [large as] yours."¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Tabarī, II: pp. 1583, 1589, 1662, 1925, 1966 for the quotation, 1970.

¹⁵¹ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 86.

¹⁵² Tabarī, II: p. 1966.

Presiding in Balkh over a superficial coalition between a contingent of his own tribesmen and the masses of the new rising regime, essentially foreign to him, he saw the entire landscape around him swept clean of the defenders of the realm to which he essentially belonged; and Marw itself was on the verge of collapse. Abū al-Maylā' saw his worst fears come true. In such circumstances, his own Rabī'ah brethren saw the light and came around to his original position. They heeded Naṣr's famous desperate plea, albeit only outside Marw, and too late:

Let Rabī'ah in Marw, and its sister [tribes] know:
 they ought to grow indignant before indignation becomes futile
(abligh Rabī'ata fī Marwin wa ikhwatahā
*an yaḡḏabū qabla an lā yanfa'a l- ḡḏabu)*¹⁵³

So, Abū al-Maylā' wrote to Ziyād ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Qushayrī, the displaced Umayyad subgovernor of Balkh and de facto leader of the Umayyad coalition elements regrouped now in Tirmidh, seeking reconciliation; the latter responded favorably. The entire Umayyad forces present in the area came back from Tirmidh and linked up with Abū al-Maylā' somewhere on the southern bank of the Oxus, one parasang from Balkh, setting the stage for the only close-to-real showdown east of Tūs.¹⁵⁴

The composition of this Umayyad coalition is an important key to the understanding of the demographic structures of the antagonists, since it is the only factual element to which Daniel anchors his exclusion of Transoxania from the Revolutionary coalition. It is clear that all three major Arab alliances—Muḏar, Yaman and Rabī'ah—were represented.¹⁵⁵ The currently ruling alliance, Muḏar, and the official government apparatus were represented by the displaced subgovernor of Balkh, Ziyād ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān of the Banū Qushayr, and the two other veterans, Muslim ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān of the Banū Bāhilah and 'Īsā ibn Zur'ah of the Banū Sulaym. The last two are likely to have also been subgovernors of some other districts who had also been displaced by the Revolutionary eruption.¹⁵⁶ The 'loyal opposition', if this term can be applied to the Yaman and Rabī'ah, joining ranks with Muḏar, completes the configuration of the clearly Arab 'wing' of the Umayyad coalition in this encounter.

¹⁵³ Naṣr ibn Sayyār, p. 28; cf. infra, pp. 206-12.

¹⁵⁴ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1997.

¹⁵⁵ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1998.

¹⁵⁶ Muslim ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān, like Abū al-Maylā', had been nominated for the governorship of the province; he had also been tapped by Naṣr, all through the latter's governorship, as subgovernor of Balkh, of Tūkhāristān, and in other official capacities, cf. Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1663-4, 1723, 1920-1, 1927-9.

The Iranian ‘wing’ of this coalition, *man ma’a-hum mina al-A‘ajim*, comprised the princes of Ṭukhāristān and Transoxania, *mulūk Ṭukhāristān wa-mā khalfā al-nahr wa-mā dūna-hu*.¹⁵⁷ The presence of the native aristocracy is no wonder; nor is that of Muqātil, the son of the celebrated Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī. Muqātil was a very prominent *mawlā*—one of those whom Naṣr ibn Sayyār called ‘genuine’ (*ṣamīm al-mawālī*), probable allies of the Establishment.¹⁵⁸

No one should deny the presence of Iranians in the Arab ranks, or of Arabs in the Revolutionary ranks. Natural allies flocked to where their interests lay. But this is not the question. The question is who represented whose interests, what these interests were, and what majorities were on which side. These complex questions will be dealt with in parts two and three of this book.

¹⁵⁷ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1998, 1997.

¹⁵⁸ Ḥayyān, Muqātil’s father, was a *mawlā* of an uncle of Abū al-Maylā’—Maṣqalah ibn Hubayrah al-Shaybānī; in Qutaybah’s days he was the commander of the official division of the ‘*dīwānized*’ *mawālī* in the army. His son Muqātil was no less prominent. On Ḥayyān see, e.g. Ṭabarī, III: pp. 535, 552, 568-71, 582-3, 610, 619, IV: p. 54; on Muqātil and his father, Ḥayyān, see Crone, ‘Muqātil,’ pp. 238-45.

CHAPTER FOUR
REPERCUSSIONS IN KŪFAH

I. *The Irrelevance of al-Khallāl*

From the time Abū Muslim took his last trip to Khurāsān as Abū Salamah's envoy, in early 129/Autumn 746, and stayed on in the province, a gradual process of drastic reshuffling in the Organization's network and chain of command started taking shape. In *Akhbār's* absolutist terms of *Imāmate* authority, this historical process takes the form of a decree by Ibrāhīm ordering four landmark measures:

[1]Then Ibrāhīm dispatched [Abū Muslim] to Khurāsān, with a letter to his *Shī'ah*; its text [read]: '... I have dispatched to you the glory of time, (*majd al-dahr*) 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Muslim, my *mawlā*. Thou shalt yield to him the reins of [power as regards] your affairs, and leave to him the burdens of [managing] your war with the enemy ...' [2] Ibrāhīm ordered Abū Muslim to report to Abū Salamah, [3] and he ordered Abū Salamah to stay in Kūfah. [4] Ibrāhīm assigned to Abū Muslim, in case he triumphed, the governorship of Khurāsān, Sijistān, Kirmān, Jurjān, Qūmis, Rayy, Iṣbahān and Hamadhān; and he assigned to Abū Salamah the governorship of the lands below the Hamadhān Pass—Iraq, al-Jazīrah and al-Shām.¹

The absolute authority conferred on Abū Muslim by the *Imām*, by virtue of the first measure, is also mentioned by Ṭabarī and Balādhurī, who also impart a weaker sense of the face-saving intermediate role reserved for Abū Salamah in the second measure.²

This account is misleading only inasmuch as it portrays Ibrāhīm as an active and obeyed commander-in-chief. Indeed, the upset, or, more accurately, the reversal of the chain of command, and the shift in the real center of power did occur. But the agent of change was not Ibrāhīm; nor could it have been Abū Salamah or any of the Kūfan power brokers. The real agent of change was the net resultant of the balance of power on the field. In eight years, Bukayr's organizations of 120/737-8, further extended by Abū Salamah's arrangements of ca. 125-126/743-744, had comprehensively transformed the earlier balance of power, and shifted the center of gravity to Khidāsh's (and Abū Muslim's) grass-

¹ *Akhbār*, pp. 269-70.

² Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 121; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1937, 1950.

roots constituency. If the agent of change has to have the face and the name of an individual, those can only be Abū Muslim's. He reduced Abū Salamah to what Khidāsh had reduced Bukayr, but, thanks to Bukayr's post-Khidāsh organizations, the more mature and expanded Organization was this time around in a position to mobilize the entire Iranian landscape, to sideline the Organization's Kūfan leadership, and to deliver the fatal blow to the ruling Arab Establishment.

What the first and third measures boiled down to was a throwback to the pre-Bukayr revival era, before Bukayr, through his effective organizations of 120/738, had ended two decades of experimentation. But it was not a reversion to the early years of that era, those benign years of Abū 'Ikrimah, Muḥammad ibn Khunays and Kathīr ibn Sa'd, when the pattern of leadership rested on a 'remote-control' style of delegating to Khurāsān a Kūfan envoy-in-chief. The third measure, that of forcing Abū Salamah to stay in Kūfah, and consequently to cease meddling in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter, was a virtual 'declaration of independence', a violent relapse to the dread which the Khidāsh years represented to the Kūfan elite. Abū Salamah could not have opted for or agreed to the new measures.

The fourth measure was designed by the 'doctors' of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*, in retrospect, to explain the temporary power which Abū Salamah managed to hold on to in the domains west of the Tigris for almost six months after the Khurāsāniyyah entered Kūfah, and to justify Abū Muslim's orders to his sub-governor in Fars, to kill Abū Salamah's officials, whom he dared dispatch east of the imaginary line.³ Furthermore, this measure carries residual echoes from the presumed deal between Abū Muslim and Ibrāhīm.

The second measure is the most cunning of all. It preserves a semblance of composure and smooth hierarchical flow of command within the ranks under the effective *Imām*, commander-in-chief. As thus, it must have been partly designed as a face-saving measure. But it also partly reflects what had actually happened. Of course, Abū Muslim had no interest in completely burning his bridges with the West. His designs had probably never been confined to the Iranian territory. An Islamic empire, heavily drenched in Iranian influence, must have appeared to him to be a desirable and attainable, though probably dispensable, goal. If he was securely in control in Khurāsān, he still needed a bridgehead in the West. Naturally, Abū Salamah, and the Kūfah Chapter of which he was still in control, were the necessary and sufficient assets, at least

³ *Akhbār*, p. 378; cf. Tabarī, III: p. 71; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 343.

until Abū Muslim could put his deal with Ibrāhīm into effect. To that extent, a benign exchange of messages, for a necessary period of time, was a comfortable option. But this did not include the submission of reports, nor being at the receiving end of instructions. Allowing for the expected exaggerations and interpolations of *Akhbār*, the only source that reports such details, this was exactly what had happened—that is, until such time as Abū Muslim was able to completely change the equation in Kūfah, as he had done in Khurāsān.

I.1 *Pseudomanagement by Correspondence*

The period between Abū Muslim's takeover in Khurāsān and the advent of the Khurāsāniyyah in Kūfah witnessed the degeneration of Abū Salamah's historic leadership into virtual irrelevance. A substantial part of the business that he actually conducted, or which he was humored into believing that he was actively involved in, was done by correspondence, not through effective representatives on the field. In most cases, he initiated communication but received no replies. Even when he was on the sending end, instead of dispensing orders, he reported intelligence and donated uninvited and sometimes unnecessary recommendations and redundant advice. In the rare cases when he did receive a reciprocal communication, it was not of the type that reported field positions or sought instructions. Of the thirty-some reported exchanges specifically relevant to Abū Salamah, most of which we find in *Akhbār*, he initiated eighteen and received only five, one of which was a reprimand and two of which were sort of general briefings drafted and sent after the fact. He sent three letters to Abū Muslim and received from him two. He sent four letters to Qaḥṭabah and received one. He also sent eleven communications to prominent figures and forces, in and around Kūfah and the rest of Iraq, and received none. (But these last eleven letters were not internal Organization communications; and, anyhow, Abū Salamah was at the time of these communications running the show in Kūfah; and these letters were sent either to incite others to revolt or to handle the Organization's growing administrative needs.) He received a letter from the *Imām*, and one from Abū 'Awn.⁴

But to understand the degree of Abū Salamah's new *de facto* irrelevance (and the subsequent revival of his residual relevance), this complex movement of mail must be seen within context. The period

⁴ *Akhbār*, pp. 277, 306-7, 337, 349-51 355, 367-69, 375, 378, 394; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 143, 174; Tabarī, II: p. 1949, III: pp. 19-20; Dīmawarī, p. 365; Azdī, pp. 119-21, 125; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 349, 352; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 97-8; Khalīfah, II: p. 427; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: pp. 218-9.

bracketing and bracketed by these exchanges (late Ramaḍān, 129/mid-June, 747 until shortly before Rajab, 132/February-March, 750) was the most crucial in the history of the Organization. It was the period of open Revolution—the ultimate phase, towards which thirty years of secret preparations had been driving. It unfolded in five distinct stages:

- (1) The eruption of the Organization in Khurāsān into the open, and the capture of Khurāsān proper and the lands east of it. This stage was completed ca. Shaʿbān, 130/April, 748.
- (2) The first phases of Qaḥṭabah's campaign, since it was launched at Abīward in mid Shaʿbān, 130/April 19th, 748, until Qaḥṭabah dealt the Umayyad forces one of his crushing and hitherto most decisive blows at Jābalq and captured Iṣfahān on Rajab 23, 131/March 4th, 749.
- (3) The last phases of Qaḥṭabah's campaign, from the victory of Jābalq, through his crossing of the Euphrates on Muḥarram 5, 132, and up to his mysterious death on the 8th of the same month (respectively the 24th and 27th of August, 749). This stage culminated with the entry of Qaḥṭabah's forces, led by his sons, into Kūfah, on the 10th of Muḥarram/29th of August, two days after his death.
- (4) A period of around three months between the advent of the Khurāsāniyyah and the accession of Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Saffāḥ, on the 12th of Rabīʿ II, 132/November 28th, 749.
- (5) The subsequent three months during which Abū Salamah served as the new caliph's *wazīr*, until his assassination in Rajab, 132/February-March, 750.

The content of Abū Salamah's correspondence and the direction of its flow realistically reflect the distinctiveness of these five stages and the attendant fluctuations in the nature of relations between the two leaderships in Kūfah and Marw.

I.1.1 *Abū Salamah and the Eruption of the Revolution in Khurāsān*

Akhbār alleges that Ibrāhīm's standing instructions to the Khurāsān Chapter had been to avoid exposure before Muḥarram, 130/September, 747, the proposed date for the declaration of the Revolution.⁵ Then, certain tactical considerations forced Abū Muslim to advance that date.⁶ Strangely, it was not in *Akhbār* that the *Imām* made an appearance at this juncture. It was Madāʿinī who brought him into the picture by reporting that it was he who issued the orders to Sulaymān ibn Kathīr and Abū Muslim to declare the revolt

⁵ *Akhbār*, p. 267, see also, pp. 268, 273, 274, 277, 278.

⁶ See Agha, 'Abū Muslim,' p. 339.

immediately.⁷ If true, which is unlikely, Madā'inī's account means that Abū Salamah had been side-stepped by the *Imām*. That he was side-stepped is quite true; but not by the *Imām*. Abū Muslim no longer required any ratification for his decisions.

A few days after the eruption, and after the Revolutionaries had performed their first communal prayers on the day of *'īd al-ḥijr*, Shawwāl 1st, 129/June 15th, 747, Abū Muslim received Abū Salamah's first, and last, letter during this stage. Abū Salamah still spoke of the Muḥarram target date. Of course, when he wrote this letter, he knew nothing of the new situation; and, if there were any instructions from the *Imām* overriding the Muḥarram date, he didn't know of them. In his letter, however, he supports his instructions by citing the *Imām's* approval of them. His instructions were so prudent and apropos that Abū Muslim ended up, whether out of obedience or convenience, carrying them out almost to the letter, albeit not promptly. Wrote Abū Salamah:

When you emerge into the open, nothing should outweigh [your decision to] dig a trench for yourself and your followers; this is the *Imām's* opinion, and in it [lies] your strength. Naṣr [ibn Sayyār's] enemies and those who have been fighting him will resort to you to find strength. Keep avoiding war for as long as you can; advance and retreat; and do not antagonize Naṣr until the advent of Muḥarram.⁸

Forty two days later, Sulaymān ibn Kathīr and other battle hardened and experienced warriors suggested a trench, and Abū Muslim, only then, moved to implement what Abū Salamah had suggested, acknowledging, by the way, that he had received instructions to this effect.⁹

During the remainder of this stage, Abū Salamah appears to have kept his silence and stayed on the sidelines, except for sending his messenger to deliver to Abū Muslim a rather odd and pointless letter from the *Imām*, 'informing' him of what was happening on his own turf ... etc.¹⁰ When this stage was concluded by the capture of Marw and the unequivocal victory in Khurāsān, Abū Muslim wrote directly to the *Imām* with the good tidings, and he sent a copy of the same to Abū Salamah.¹¹

⁷ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1951-2.

⁸ *Akhhbār*, p. 277.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 306-7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

I.1.2 *Abū Salamah and the First Phases of Qaḥṭabah's Campaign*

The early phases of Qaḥṭabah's campaign were exclusively conducted through direct and constant communications between himself and Abū Muslim. Field realities weighed so heavily that even the author of *Akhbār* abandoned his norm of pushing the *Imām's* image into the forefront of events. In fact, the entire Kūfan leadership was relegated to inaction while Qaḥṭabah was sweeping western Khurāsān, Jurjān, Qūmis, Ṭabaristān and Jibāl. Administrative and political appointments, tax collections and fiscal policy, military tactics, plans and reinforcements, and all sorts of strategic and tactical decisions were taken in Marw, or on the campaign trail.

Even the incapacitated but officious Abū Salamah did not interject before Qaḥṭabah had occupied Rayy in north-central Iran and started his incursions into the eastern and central parts of Jibāl in Ṣafar, 131/October, 748. Abū Salamah wrote to Abū Muslim with some intelligence on the Umayyad mobilization under Ibn Duḅārah and urged him to send reinforcements to Qaḥṭabah. He also wrote to Qaḥṭabah 'ordering' him to bide his time at Rayy until he 'reconnoitered' the field—a strange order from a layman to an able general. Did Qaḥṭabah really need this tempering order? *Akhbār's* account goes on to show both Abū Muslim and Qaḥṭabah heeding the intelligence and the orders. Qaḥṭabah had been preparing to leave Rayy and to advance west when he received Abū Salamah's letter. Consequently, relates *Akhbār*, he postponed his plans and stayed at Rayy waiting for reinforcements from Abū Muslim. Reinforcements kept arriving in successive waves over a period of around five months until they reached ten thousand troops under eleven generals. This figure amounted to one-third of Qaḥṭabah's original troops.¹² This is an odd account. There is nothing strange in Abū Salamah's officious donation of military intelligence to his marching brethren and their increasingly independent field and regional commands. But Qaḥṭabah's reported behavior is untenable. It is not possible that he had failed to field his own scouts, nor that he had been preparing to resume his advance before receiving their reconnaissance reports. Even if he was relying on the Kūfan Organization for such intelligence, he would not have made up his mind regarding his next move and its timing before receiving the reports which he must have been anticipating. Moreover, if, after receiving Abū Salamah's letter, he had to put off his intended plans for as long as five months in order to wait for the build-up of reinforcements

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 337, 339.

of as formidable a size as that which he ultimately received, then his initial plans must have been grossly misconceived, in a manner that is incompatible with his military abilities. The flaw in this account can be detected in the allegation that Qaḥṭabah had been preparing to advance from Rayy. It was designed to impart the improbable impression that, when he received Abū Salamah's 'orders' to halt, he was disposed to obey, and that he called off his plans and stayed for five very long months in compliance with his superior's orders. In all cases, no reply from Qaḥṭabah is reported.

It was not until after the battle at Jābalq and the capture of Iṣfahān on 23 Rajab 131/March 18th 749, that Abū Salamah's relevance was relatively recognized anew. Qaḥṭabah wrote to Abū Muslim with the tidings of the astounding victory. Abū Muslim wrote back glorifying him and, notably, instructing him to write Abū Salamah and to comply with whatever instructions he received from him.¹³ Five more months would elapse before Qaḥṭabah did so. The behavior of Abū Muslim and Qaḥṭabah is understandable. The superior politician realized what the magnificent general did not, or probably did but naturally resisted. After the major Umayyad force east of the Tigris had been crushed, the Revolutionary forces, along with Qaḥṭabah's immensely growing renown, would soon be approaching Iraq, Abū Salamah's turf and the site of the expected decisive showdown with the core of Umayyad power. A resurgence of the relevance of Abū Salamah and the Kūfan Organization and, should he triumph, an immense boost to Qaḥṭabah's prestige were all but inevitable. The cunning Abū Muslim recognized the sagacity of a rapprochement with the durable boss whom he had reduced to a spectator. He must have also realized that promoting a situation in which Qaḥṭabah subordinated himself to Abū Salamah would only give the Kūfan more of what he already had—a benign toothless moral authority; but that it would go a long way towards the containment of the more dangerously growing prestige and moral but armed authority of Qaḥṭabah. Thus, he prodded him to defer to Abū Salamah. But the proud and probably ambitious general did not comply.

I.1.3 *Abū Salamah and the Last Phases of Qaḥṭabah's Campaign*

So, it would be sometime before Abū Salamah's full effectiveness was gradually restored, at a pace inversely proportional to the shrinking distance between Kūfah and the advancing Khurāsāniyyah. In the meantime, Abū Salamah persevered, unabashed, in the spirit of his

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 349, 350.

previous letter to Qaḥṭabah. During the prolonged siege of Nihāvand he sent him an insightful letter, urging him to conclude the standstill by extending to the besieged guarantees of safe conduct to any destination they may choose. He reasoned that the crippling psychological impact on the Umayyad forces resulting from their crushing defeat at Jābalq was fading. And Qaḥṭabah saw the light.¹⁴ But, after Nihāvand was captured, he wrote to Abū Muslim, and sent him the heads of the slain—not a word to Abū Salamah, though.¹⁵

Abū Salamah was, nevertheless, growing exceedingly active. He seized the opportunity of the chaos that plagued Ibn Hubayrah's camp and sent his messengers and propagandists to Maṣṣil, and also to the deserts outskirting Baṣrah and Kūfah, to ferment revolt amongst its Bedouins. Scores of booty-hungry tribes and tribal chieftains rose and donned black all over Iraq and the bordering areas—in Ḥulwān, Khāniqīn, the *sawād* of Baṣrah and Kūfah and the entire lower Euphrates, and in Takrīt. Only the *amṣār* were still held by Ibn Hubayrah.¹⁶ But these elements, alien to the Organization, recognized the approaching victorious general rather than the hiding clandestine organizer; they communicated with Qaḥṭabah, and he wrote directly to them and to few notables of Baṣrah, thus overstepping Abū Salamah.¹⁷

When Abū Salamah allegedly received the news of Ibrāhīm's detention, Qaḥṭabah had already entered Ḥulwān, the last post in the Jibāl province on the north-eastern border of Iraq, in Dhū al-Ḥijjah, 131/July-August, 749; and the governor of Iraq, Ibn Hubayrah, had pitched his camp not very far off, in the trench at Jalūlā' on the highway to *al-Sawād* and farther south-west to Kūfah.¹⁸ Abū Salamah wrote to Qaḥṭabah with both pieces of news. He recommended that he should avoid contact with Ibn Hubayrah's forces, outflank him and dash into Kūfah, "for the people of Kūfah are unanimously with you, and they are of the same conviction as you are." The messenger who carried this letter was Abū Masrūr Īsā ibn Ḥamzah, Bukayr's nephew (no.28); he later reported Qaḥṭabah's on-the-spot response to the letter, verbatim: "Indeed, by God, he is right, and I shall carry out his instructions."¹⁹

But he still refrained from writing. The only communication Qaḥṭabah is reported to have sent to Abū Salamah was issued only after he had crossed the Euphrates, on 5 Muḥarram 132/24 August, 749, at

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 351 ff.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 354.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 355.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 355-6.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 357, 363.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 363-4.

Dimimmā, a little south of Anbār, almost as close to Kūfah as he would ever get. He simply intimated to him the news of his crossing.²⁰

II. *Al-Khallāl in Twilight—*
The Affair of Muḥammad ibn Khālīd al-Qasrī

Although a cause for jubilation, Qaḥṭabah's significant achievement of crossing the last major waterway on his way to Kūfah did not, however, spell final victory in the battle for Iraq; Ibn Hubayrah's main force had not been engaged yet. True to form, the cautious Abū Salamah did not drop his guard. He would not emerge into the open yet, but he would not wallow in passivity, either. Kūfah was fraught with anti-Umayyad elements, who were naturally inclined to be the allies of any revolution but who were not members of the Organization. Inciting such elements into rebellion would not pose much danger, in case of failure, of exposing the still underground Kūfan network.

Prominent among such elements were Ṭalḥah ibn Ishāq ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ash'ath, a nephew of the rebel of al-Ḥajjāj's era, 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ash'ath al-Kindī, and Muḥammad ibn Khālīd, son of the celebrated ex-governor of Iraq, Khālīd ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Qasrī of Bajīlah, who had been vindictively killed by the Umayyads. Both notables and their followers belonged to the Yamanite alliance that had been battling the Umayyad regime since Marwān II's accession. For these elements, the time was ripe for settling old scores with the Umayyads; and they rose in revolt. What happened in the five or eight days between Qaḥṭabah's crossing of the Euphrates and the Khurāsāniyyah's entering of Kūfah was vital, and it merits a closer examination.

The various reports in the sources are in general agreement that Muḥammad ibn Khālīd took control of Kūfah and expelled representatives of the Umayyad authority in the name of the House of the Prophet, *Āl Muḥammad*, a few days before the Khurāsāniyyah entered the town. On the specific details, however, there is little agreement. Abū Salamah's role is one point of disagreement. Other points on which the sources also disagree are: (1) the number of Ibn Khālīd's followers, (2) the reaction in Kūfah and the degree of support the general populace put behind his uprising, (3) the date of the uprising and its timing in relation to Qaḥṭabah's death, and (4) the date of the Khurāsāniyyah's march into the town.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

Dīnawarī's report,²¹ which alleges that Muḥammad Ibn Khālid took the initiative of contacting Abū Salamah before making his move, can probably be discounted. It is not very likely that Abū Salamah's position within the Organization, the Organization's role, or even its existence for that matter were publicly known. As far as Ibn Khālid's role is concerned, Balādhurī's and Madā'inī's accounts²² are synoptic in nature; they lack dates and other specifics. Both fail to mention Abū Salamah in the context, and both place Ibn Khālid's uprising after Qaḥṭabah's demise. But, while Balādhurī augments the number of Ibn Khālid's followers to eleven-thousand who scared the Umayyad governor into flight, Madā'inī puts them at the deflated figure of eleven only, who took advantage of the fact that the Umayyad governor, 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Bashīr al-'Ijlī, had already deserted.

The more detailed accounts of *Akhbār* and Abū Mikhnaf²³ are diametrically opposed where they intersect and informatively supplementary where they can be utilized as two scans issuing from two vantage points, overlooking the same turf, but from different angles and through differently powered, focused and colored lenses—*Akhbār*'s author being inclined to demonstrate a measure of cohesion in Kūfah and a neat performance by the Organization, and Abū Mikhnaf, of the Yamanite Azd, being disposed to highlight the role and the extraordinary valor of Muḥammad ibn Khālid and his kin of the Yamanite Bajīlah. A certain measure of consistency does exist in the internal logic and sequence of dates in both accounts, each on its own merit; but this still does not permit the resolution of certain difficulties by means of internal criticism. Wherever they provide irreconcilable information, the issue must be resolved by external criteria. Thus: (1) Abū Mikhnaf asserts that Ibn Khālid rose on the eve of 'Ashurā', i.e., Thursday evening, 9 Muḥarram 132/28 August 749, entered the government palace on Friday morning, two days *after* Qaḥṭabah's demise, and stayed in control of the town until Monday morning, i.e., 13 Muḥarram/1 September, when al-Ḥasan ibn Qaḥṭabah and the Khurāsāniyyah marched into town. The concordance of days and dates is perfect, and the duration of Ibn Khālid's interim control of the town is not contested. (2) *Akhbār* assigns the same events, consecutively, to Monday, 6 Muḥarram 132/25 August 749, two days *before* Qaḥṭabah's demise and only one day after his crossing of the Euphrates, and to Friday, 10 Muḥarram/29 August. *Akhbār*'s concordance of days and

²¹ Dīnawarī, p. 365.

²² Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 138; Ṭabarī, III: p. 20.

²³ *Akhbār*, pp. 367-9; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 18-20.

dates is no less perfect than Abū Mikhnaḥ's, and its dates allow for the same duration of three to four days of interim control by Ibn Khālid.

The criteria by which to resolve this conflict must be sought in the other sources, the majority of which date the Khurāsāniyyah's advent in Kūfah to 10 Muḥarram/29 August.²⁴ Jahshayār's explicit, and Ya'qūbī's inferred dating of the event to 11 Muḥarram,²⁵ may be explained away by the very narrow difference of one day, a discrepancy potentially attributable to the practice of marking the beginning of each new day, in the Muslim calendar, by sunset. Despite the conspicuous coincidence with the Shī'ite holy day of 'Āshūrā', and since there is nothing intrinsically preclusive of the coincidence, the agreement of most sources makes 10 Muḥarram/29 August the more likely date and, thus, lends more credence to *Akhbār's* chronology.

A difference of three days should not really matter, especially in the chronology of a period where the divergence of a few months is not uncommon. But the juxtaposition of Qaḥṭabah's crossing of the Euphrates, on the first hand, and his demise three days later, on the other, reflects the psychological dynamics during that eventful week and also corroborates *Akhbār's* chronology. Abū Mikhnaḥ's assertion that, two days after the event, both parties, i.e., the Umayyad forces and Muḥammad ibn Khālid's rebels, were still not aware of Qaḥṭabah's death cannot be taken seriously. When he was killed, Qaḥṭabah's forces were a little north of the village of Shāhī,²⁶ five parasangs (approximately 27 km.) from Kūfah; that is hardly a couple of hours horse-ride. It is more likely that the news of the crossing on Muḥarram 5/August 24 reached Kūfah on the same day and emboldened the rebels, as is suggested in *Akhbār's* account, so they rose on the 6th. Abū Mikhnaḥ's report of the all-too familiar Kūfan abandonment of Ibn Khālid when the Umayyad forces were approaching, can be better understood when coupled with the news of Qaḥṭabah's misfortune, which must have emboldened the government forces and frightened the Kūfan masses.

Thus, both reports can be read together, and a tenable scenario may be synthesized as follows. Abū Salamah, encouraged by Qaḥṭabah's closeness on the western bank of the Euphrates, moved to ferment trouble for the Umayyads in Kūfah. This was the Organization's own agenda, not some amateur adventurer's attempt to implicate it (not

²⁴ Khalīfah, II: p. 423; Azdī, p. 119; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 57; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 334.

²⁵ Jahshayārī, p. 84; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 344-5.

²⁶ Cf. Ṭabarī, III: p. 15; *Akhbār*, p. 369.

another Zayd or Yaḥyā ibn Zayd episode). But, still cautious, Abū Salamah sent somebody to instigate Muḥammad ibn Khālid, not by relaying a personal message from him, but by exciting the aggrieved man's long yearning for vengeance. He instructed his messenger to point out to Ibn Khālid the opportune circumstances, and to suggest to him a prompt rising with his *mawālī*, kinsmen and his father's protégés, all clad in black. He sent another messenger with a similar message to Ṭalḥah ibn Ishāq. Muḥammad was most eager; he immediately raised a one-thousand-man force from the aforementioned categories and ordered them not to retire for the night before preparing their black garments. On the next day, 6 Muḥarram, Muḥammad gained a head start and was subsequently joined by Ṭalḥah. Abū Salamah secretly spread his men amongst the populace, and the whole of Kūfah was agitated. Ibn Hubayrah's chief of police deserted the government palace, and Ibn Khālid occupied it; then he accepted the public's homage on behalf of the House of the Prophet, no specific *Imām* being named yet. Still behind the scenes, Abū Salamah intimated to Muḥammad to seal the treasuries in Kūfah and al-Ḥīrah, and he nominated four persons for the task, who may have been members, or close associates, of the Organization. He wrote to Qaḥṭabah, informing him of these arrangements, and ordered him to read the letter to his troops, presumably to boost their morale. Ibn Hubayrah, for his part, sent to Kūfah a force led by al-Ḥawtharah ibn Suhayl, who, upon approaching Kūfah, heard the news of the uprising and halted his advance at the village of Shāhī. Thus ends Abū Salamah's neat, successful operation in *Akḥbār's* account.²⁷

The messy epilogue is furnished by Abū Mikhnaf in the guise of being the whole story.²⁸ The majority of Muḥammad's supporters abandoned him upon hearing of the advancing Umayyad force. Only some horse-men of the Yaman held out with him. Upon learning of the mass desertion in Muḥammad's ranks, Ḥawtharah prepared to march on him. This is a vicious and puzzling circle for the historian. Did the news of desertion embolden Ḥawtharah to advance, or did the news of Ḥawtharah's advance scare the Kūfans into desertion? It is more likely that the news of Qaḥṭabah's death was the missing link. Abū Salamah, still behind the scenes, lost his nerve and ordered Ibn Khālid to vacate the palace and retreat to the lower Euphrates. The courageous Yamanite did not heed the cautious organizer, and his desperate position was soon alleviated by Yamanite Syrian troops who had

²⁷ *Akḥbār*, pp. 367-9.

²⁸ Ṭabarī, III: pp. 18-20.

deserted Ḥawtharah. Thus Ḥawtharah had to call off his planned assault and retreat to Wāsiṭ.

III. *Al-Khallāl Resurges into Supreme Relevance*

The simple and glaring fact that emerges from Muḥammad ibn Khālīd's episode is that Abū Salamah had no military divisions of his own, and that his legitimacy was rooted in something else. Kūfah had always bred discontent and oozed promise, which lured the romantic and the ambitious of the proud tribal desert Arabs only to relinquish them to martyrdom and to find itself wallowing in sorrow and reeling in the impotent desire for revenge. However, this was not the game for the hard-nosed pragmatists of the Kūfan bazaar. Abū Salamah and his comrades had learned their lesson bequeathed to them by all previous anti-Umayyad revolts in Kūfah, but most notably by the nearly successful enterprise of al-Mukhtār. They had, therefore, sought and secured a non-Kūfan and non-tribal based spearhead for a Kūfan-inspired movement, planned for in Kūfah, but provided for elsewhere. Of course, they had forgotten that a spearhead does not always come detached. In the right historical circumstances, it comes complete with its own spear-base, the striking arm, and the guiding will, as indeed did happen, amply demonstrating the later wisdom of al-Mutanabbī:

wa-man yajʿali ḍ-ḍirghāma liṣ-ṣaydi bāzahu
taṣayyadahu ḍ-ḍirghāmu fī-man taṣayyadā
 (Whoever renders the lion for his falcon in a hunt,
 the lion will hunt him amongst its prey)

The temporary restoration of Abū Salamah's full moral authority was probably made possible, or at least enhanced, by the arrival of the Khurāsāniyyah less their leader. The emerging situation automatically reduced Muḥammad ibn Khālīd to a formally subordinate, but actually irrelevant, status. But, more importantly, it marked a more pronounced replay of the turning point in the history of the Organization, which had been marked by Abū Muslim's arrival in Marw, in early 129/Autumn 746. The claws and teeth acquired for the Organization were not secured by its historic leadership, but by its forceful and militant rising stars, who fed on real sources of nourishment.

And, as it had been in Marw and the rest of Khurāsān, so it was now in Kūfah and virtually the rest of the empire—two Revolutionary powers juxtaposed within the same ideological compass and cohabiting in the same geographical seat of authority. Both powers had their legitimacy anchored in their belonging to the same Organization and,

ostensibly, subscribing to the same ideology and strategic agenda. True, for Abū Salamah, seniority and historic status were a major asset and a basis for his almost automatically, renewed, albeit temporary, supremacy. But this did not belittle or in any way negatively reflect on the *de facto* prominence of some of the latecomers, notably Abū Muslim and some of his lieutenants. The gauge of revolutionary legitimacy must have been, as it has always been, measured in the light of one's conspicuous subscription to an ideological continuum rather than by earlier dates of enrolment in a political body which embodies that continuum. The decisive determinant of ultimate ascendancy in the ranks must have been, as it has always been, the possession of the physical power by which the revolution asserts itself. This has always been the unailing pattern of revolutions in their post-victory eras, even when the instrument of revolution is a unilateral political party with a single and declared loyalty – how much more so when the instrument is a multilateral umbrella Organization based on a wide coalition of personalities, trends, groups, tribes and ethnic communities.

III.1 *The Regained Legitimacy—The Doctrine of al-Riḍā and the Elusive Hāshimīyyah*

The strategy of non-commitment to any one specific Hāshimite was a long-standing policy unwaveringly upheld by the Organization; it had been enshrined in the proclaimed call for the eventual accession of someone, anyone, from the Family of the Prophet, who, when the time came for him to be *chosen*, would be acceptable to all those who paid allegiance to the Organization on the basis of this proclaimed strategy. The concept of satisfying a *constituency*, which is yet to choose, is firmly embedded in the doctrine of *al-riḍā*, and it is diametrically opposed to all Shī'ite doctrines providing for the transmission of the *Imāmate*.

The Organization had a lowest common denominator with all proto-Shī'ite leanings and factions, in that it opposed the Umayyads and restricted the *Imāmate*, and the right of accession to the top office in the community, to the circle of the Family of the Prophet. But, within this holy circumference, the adamant position of the Organization, that the choice must be absolutely open, was truly unique. In the slogan, *al-riḍā min Āl Muḥammad*, the restrictive second half is distinctly, but generally, Shī'ite; while the admissive first part is incompatible with all other Shī'ite doctrines known hitherto or elaborated thereafter: The doctrine of a *waṣīyyah* established by a forerunner *Imām* was the hallmark of all Kaysāniyyah splinter groups who remained distinct from the Organization. The doctrine of automatic *intiḳāl* (transmission) through the right of birth, by preordained Divine will, was the doctrine

underlining the loyalty of the contemporary advocates of the *Imāmates* of Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d.113/731-732) and his son Ja‘far al-Šādiq (d.148/765-766), and it was rudimentary to the more elaborate thought of the *Imāmiyyah* later. Both doctrines were deeply rooted in the belief that the rightful *Imāmate* resided with a predetermined individual who could not be subject to nomination or confirmation by ordinary human beings. Even the more admmissive Zaydite doctrine of *khurūj* or *qiyām*, which underlined the practices and preachings of Zayd ibn ‘Alī and his followers, and which was elaborated later by Zaydite doctors, was not compatible with the doctrine of *al-riḍā* as espoused by the Organization. Two preconditions for such an *Imāmate* were too restrictive. First, the *Imām* had to be an ‘Alīd, descendant of the Prophet’s daughter, Fāṭimah, through either her Ḥasanid or Ḥusaynid lines. Second, while only any such descendant would be eligible, one would truly qualify only if he himself led a revolution against the unjust rulers.

The doctrine of *al-riḍā*, on the other hand, presupposes a revolution led by anyone and inspired by the principles of fighting injustice, a revolt which, *after* its victory, would reach a consensus in choosing an *Imām* from a wider and unrestricted pool of eligible candidates from the ranks of The Family. ‘The Family’ was never defined except by its being that of the Prophet Muḥammad; and this definition, at least in its theoretical inclusive-exclusive dimension, embraced, or, in the absence of a direct male heir to the Prophet, could be construed to embrace all the Prophet’s vertical, diagonal, as well as horizontal relatives. This, when the net is cast widest, included all the descendants of the common ancestor, Hāshim. (Of course, on occasion, the Umayyads even extended these lines beyond the ancestral ceiling of Hāshim to ‘Abd Manāf, in whose lineage Hāshim and his brother, their own ancestor ‘Abd Shams, were joined.) Inasmuch as the contending relatives of the Prophet excluded one another, the Organization included them all in its pool of eligible candidates. And as far as the Organization refrained from being affiliated with any specific branch, it was, by elimination, identified with the trunk from which they all sprang and, by the same token, parted company with the house of Umayyah—that was Hāshim. Whence, in our view, the label Hāshimiyyah.

The Principal Twenty, or the Founding Fathers of the Organization, may have initially been followers of Abū Hāshim ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyah, but that does not necessarily mean that the Hāshimiyyah label was derived from his name.²⁹ A battery of arguments can be

²⁹ Modern scholarship generally accepts the link between Abū Hāshim’s name and the name of the movement. This position cuts through the lines of the classical and

advanced against this assumption. Abū Hāshim was actually a diminutive figure whose achievements did not exceed the fact that, unlike his father, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyyah, and his brother, al-Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyyah, he was the only one in this non-Fāṭimid ‘Alīd branch who personally asserted a claim to the *Imāmate*. When he died, ca. 100/718-719, the number of his followers in Kūfah had not reached thirty men,³⁰ all of whom, apparently, had responded to the recruiting efforts of Salamah ibn Bujayr—not to those of Abū Hāshim.³¹ He had not been known in Khurāsān, nor had the Organization started to spread there. Even Bukayr’s early efforts there, ca. 98/716-717, were conducted in the name of the Family of Muḥammad. When the Organization merited the name of a movement, Abū Hāshim had long been gone; and when it started being referred to by any label, Hāshimīyyah or otherwise, he was hardly in memory. He was not martyred in the cause, despite wild allegations of his being poisoned.³² There was no conceivable link that would have associated the Organization, in the public perception, with his name.

It is probably more genuine to assume that ‘Hāshimīyyah’ was used and understood in a context of opposites, i.e., as opposed to ‘Umawīyyah’, just as earlier and later references to other movements and sympathies used the labels ‘Zubayriyyah’ to indicate a sympathy and a movement whose champion was not al-Zubayr ibn al-‘Awwām, ‘Ṭālibīyyah’ to indicate a sympathy and scores of uprisings whose champion was not Abū Ṭālib ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib, ‘Abbāsīyyah’ to indicate a sympathy and a regime whose champion was not al-‘Abbās ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib. These labels were mostly coined after the most prominent and recognizable defining element in a lineage, an element which would unmistakably distinguish groups within the context of the hostilities and contradictions of the time. And they tend to maintain a symmetry—as in ‘Ṭālibīyyah’ versus ‘Abbāsīyah’ within the line of a common ancestor, Hāshim; and ‘Hāshimīyyah’ versus ‘Umawīyyah’ within ‘Abd Manāf’s line. Abū Hāshim ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyyah would have defined nothing as opposed to anything.

The responsibility for this equivocation lies with the ‘Abbāsīd propaganda machine in its earlier stage, when the ‘Abbāsīd claim to

revisionist schools. See for example, Vloten, pp. 81-2, 91-2; Wellhausen, p. 503; Lewis, ‘Hāshimīyya;’ Omar, *Abbāsīd Caliphate*, p. 63 ff.; Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 150-1; Sharon, *Black Banners*, p. 84.

³⁰ *Akhbār*, p. 194. See also the prologue and chapter one above.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 188-9; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 325-6; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 126; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: pp. 475-6.

legitimacy derived from ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib’s, whose legacy, they alleged, was bequeathed to them by the *waṣīyyah* of this particular, most conveniently heirless grandson of his, Abū Hāshim. But other movements claimed also to be followers of other recipients of Abū Hāshim’s *waṣīyyah*,³³ and none was ever called ‘Hāshimīyah’.

Then one wonders, although the analogy cannot be binding: if the Organization was called ‘Hāshimīyah’ after *Abū* Hāshim, why was it not called ‘Bahshamīyah’ or ‘Abū Hāshimīyah’, by analogy with the later Mu‘tazilite Bahshamīyah, called so after *Abū* Hāshim ibn al-Jubbā‘ī, and the Abū Muslimīyah, called so after *Abū* Muslim al-Khurāsānī?

The most significant argument is, ironically, the weakest—at least technically. That is, it could be easily discredited for its circular quality. While using the refutation of a relation between Abū Hāshim’s name and the ‘Hāshimīyah’ label in order to corroborate our interpretation of the doctrine of *al-riḍā*, we, at the same time, would be using that interpretation as a premise in this argument aiming at refuting that relation. However, refuting the Abū Hāshim association is an assumption implicit in the only viable interpretation of at least the theoretical implications of the doctrine of *al-riḍā*. Sustaining such an association creates a paradox between the admissibility of a turf of candidacy open to all members of the Family of the Prophet, and the restrictiveness of a pre-assigned loyalty to a specific *Imām* or to his handpicked successor.

There is only one meaningful explanation of *al-riḍā* as a term and as a doctrine. The superficial ‘Abbāsī equivocation which would have us subscribe to the trivialization of the concept into a ploy invented by Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī to serve as a screen of secrecy in order to protect his identity³⁴ mocks common sense and twists language and history. ‘*Riḍā*’ means ‘satisfactorily acceptable’, and, as a code name, it cannot stand for a predetermined fait accompli product, unknown to those to whom he should be satisfactorily acceptable. Moreover, the Organization was not innovative in using either the term or the doctrine, which are implicitly enshrined in the concept of *Shūrā*, and which were also used by al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj in their absolutely unqualified form³⁵ almost contemporaneously with their qualified usage by the Organization. The dynamics of secrecy wouldn’t have worked,

³³ Nawbakhtī, pp. 52-5; Qummī, pp. 35-41; Nāshī, p. 30; Ash‘arī, I: pp. 6, 21-3; Shahrastānī, I: pp. 242-9; Baghdādī, *Firaq*, p. 28; cf. Qāḍī, *Kaysāniyyah*, pp. 208-9, 239 ff.

³⁴ *Akhbār*, pp. 194, 200, 204.

³⁵ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1567.

anyway, by simply protecting the identity of one remote individual *Imām* while exposing the entire machinery of an organization allowed under the alleged policy to openly spread its propaganda amongst the general populace, provided that it conceals the name of the *Imām* behind the code word. Said Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī:

‘*Wa-l-takun daʿwatukum wa-mā talqā bihi al-‘āmmah an taḍuwaḥum ilā al-Riḍā min Āli Muḥammad ... wa-l-yakun ismī mastūran ...*’ (‘Let your propaganda and what you represent to the general populace be that you summon them to the [cause] of him who would be satisfactorily acceptable from [amongst the ranks] of the Family of Muḥammad ... and let my name be concealed’)³⁶

The doctrine was of far too much strategic value to be reduced to a code word, a thin veil of secrecy. The summons to the cause of an acceptable *Imām* was extremely appealing to all sectors disaffected with the Umayyads; and in it were ‘sweet’ echoes of the *shūrā* and the *jamā‘ah*, consultation and consensus. It invested heavily in the yearnings of such non-Shīʿite groups as the Murjīites and the followers of al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj. The restrictive qualification, applied by the phrase ‘*min Āli Muḥammad*,’ could not have been too damaging amongst the moderate non-Shīʿites, who had no political or ideological reasons to exclude the Family of the Prophet. Fanatic anti-Shīʿites were not targeted by the propaganda, anyway; actually, they were the enemy. Amongst new converts, it hardly mattered, as long as the Organization, which was probably instrumental in their conversion in the first place, was poised to break the archenemy—the Umayyad Establishment. For factional Shīʿites who had already committed their loyalties or anchored their sympathies, the admissiveness of the wide qualification could not have been thought of as a threat, since very few would have surmised it possible that a non-‘Alīd would be considered. It may also be reasonably assumed that quite a number of them were even hopeful that their own candidate would make a plausible *riḍā*. This mix of the authentic ideology of *al-riḍā* and the shrewd propaganda which assured all the sectors targeted was the core of the long-standing and brilliant strategy which preserved for the Organization its independence and freedom of choice, and which served as the glue which held together such an extensive coalition.

From the purely practical point of view, there was a major drawback in this strategy. A mechanism for the arrival at the promised consensus had never been worked out. It must have been lamentable for the pure

³⁶ *Akhbār*, pp. 200, 204.

ideologues; and, pragmatically, it could have been catastrophic had there been an equilibrium in the balance of power between the eventually contending wings. The possibility is amply demonstrable in a very interesting dialogue between Qaḥṭabah and a soldier who refused to pay his allegiance to the unknown acceptable *Imām*. Even though the context is doubtful, and the entire story appears to have been invented to offer one of the explanations of how Marwān II came to know the identity of Ibrāhīm, the dialogue remains significant, even if only inasmuch as an early fabricator could envision the possibility. Marwān II is reported to have expressed his wish to know the identity of the “one whose Shī‘ah are in Khurāsān.” Someone volunteered to discover the secret. He traveled east, and when Qaḥṭabah captured Jurjān he came up to him:

He said: ‘I came to swear allegiance.’ Qaḥṭabah said to him: ‘swear it.’ The man said: ‘to whom do I swear allegiance?’ [Qaḥṭabah] said: ‘to *al-Riḍā min Āli Muḥammad*.’ The man said: ‘this is an anonymous homage which cannot be legally binding.’ Qaḥṭabah said: ‘and how [is that]?’ [The man] said: ‘what would you say, if the people of every country took a man from *Āl Muḥammad* and said: ‘*al-riḍā* is in our hands,’ to whom, from amongst them, would my allegiance be?’³⁷

Of course, the possibility existed; but it never came to pass, as will be seen in due course.

Because there was no parity between the physical forces of the Revolutionary wings, a long standstill or internal war was avoided. But now, with the Khurāsāniyyah in Kūfah and victory at hand, the time had come for choosing and proclaiming the *Imām*. The inherently ‘anti-democratic’ dynamics of imposition native to a revolution were naturally incompatible with the ‘democracy’ of consensus implicit in the doctrine of *al-riḍā*. The absence in the ideology of the Organization of an enshrined mechanism to choose the promised *Imām* relieved from a potential impediment those who had already made their choice and possessed the power to impose it. Thus expired, perforce, the cementing effect of the original strategy, and, inevitably, there arose a situation pregnant with its own brand new dialectics of legitimacy and power.

The configuration of the contending powers cannot be very difficult to sketch out in broad terms. On the one hand, there were Abū Muslim and his wing. They had already made their choice in favor of the relatively obscure ‘Abbāsīd branch of the Hāshimite tree—a choice which could have been only more enthusiastically condoned in view of the absence of the relatively stronger Ibrāhīm, whose elimination

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

cleared the way for the even more convenient choice of the less likely Abū al-‘Abbās. Abū Muslim had been firmly in control of Khurāsān and the East, and in Kūfah he now enjoyed the strongest hand, due to the arrival of the Khurāsāniyyah, of which substantial contingents were united in absolute loyalty to him. With a clear and singular purpose, and with the advantage of not having to contend with a mechanism of choosing the *Imām*, Abū Muslim and his men in Kūfah had only to iron out some natural irregularities in the military ranks before they could impose their will.

On the other hand, there was Abū Salamah with his historic leadership and probably an untold number of naturally dispersed elements, still entrenched behind the inherently incohesive doctrine of *al-riḍā*, now obsolete in the Revolutionary context. In disarray, deprived of a solid military base and a singular rallying point around a specific candidate, or even around an agreed-upon mechanism, it would be only until the other wing had put its act together that Abū Salamah and his wing would be forced to relinquish their search for a *riḍā* within the ranks of the more naturally eligible pool of ‘Alīds, and coerced into ‘accepting’ the hand-picked *Imām*.

III.2 *The Effect of Qaḥṭabah’s Sudden Demise on the Balance of Power*

The co-existence of the two powers would not have been tenable for much longer. But a sudden occurrence temporarily upset the steadily emerging balance. The arrival in Kūfah of a decapitated Khurāsāniyyah was of immeasurable consequences. Whether by design or accident, Qaḥṭabah’s elimination also eliminated the formidable personal influence his presence would have certainly exercised on events; though it cannot be said, with any measure of certainty, in which direction. For all that we are told, he could have equally been an impediment or a booster for Abū Muslim’s designs.

It is an extremely attractive proposition to ponder the hypothetical question: What would have happened had Qaḥṭabah not perished before reaching Kūfah? What, specifically, would the power relations have been between the established historic spiritual leader, entrenched in Kūfah, and the magnificent general, marching into town in the halo of his glorious triumphs? And what would the power relations have been between a Kūfah thus reshaped and militarily empowered, and the gray wolf anxiously and suspectingly waiting in Marw? Would Qaḥṭabah have attempted to transform his Organizational rank into the self-luminous stature his triumphs had earned him, or would he have been content with his subordinate status, derived from Abū Muslim’s actual and Abū Salamah’s honorary supreme command? Would the ultimate

outcome have been what actually came to pass, and would Qaḥṭabah have been no different from his comparatively diminutive sons and the other generals who had to give in to Abū Muslim's designs? Or would his presence have simply spared the 'Abbāsids and Abū Muslim three months of the tug-of-war with Abū Salamah, and three more to rid themselves of him? Or would his assertive exercise of a political role have drastically changed the course of Arab and Islamic history to the tune of a completely different dynasty or dynasties?

But, alas, these intensely interesting and poetically legitimate questions cannot be pursued, for they are not the stuff of history. Qaḥṭabah's untimely death made everything that did not happen, which otherwise might have, irrelevant and ahistorical; and, in the process, it dimmed beyond any clear vision a whole series of events which most likely did happen. One thing is certain, however. Qaḥṭabah's death did upset, at least temporarily, an increasingly significant element in the emerging balance of power. His personal aura could not automatically be transferred to his successors. The tremendous influence he 'packed' in his 'person' as a part of the historic leadership of the Organization and as the leader of the victorious Revolutionary army vanished. A prompt investment of this potent blend of historical and Revolutionary legitimacies was made impossible. Assuming he was in full agreement with Abū Muslim, his death deprived their wing of a decisive and prompt opportunity to immediately declare the accession of their candidate, in the glow of his unimpaired victory and his illustrious presence. If, alternatively, he was of a different mind, his death gave Abū Muslim more room to maneuver and to secure an ultimate victory, which otherwise might have not been so attainable. Thus, with the temporary neutralization of the cutting edge of the Khurāsāniyyah's victory, the subsequent period of the tug-of-war was the natural result of a temporary equilibrium that was brought about by the sudden withdrawal of a decisive factor, namely Qaḥṭabah.

III.3 *Al-Khallāl Takes Charge*

It was al-Ḥasan ibn Qaḥṭabah (no. 178), according to the majority of sources, who succeeded his father.³⁸ Ḥumayd ibn Qaḥṭabah (no. 198) is also reported to have been the successor.³⁹ And Jahshayārī avoids the

³⁸ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 138; Madā'inī and Abū Mikhnaf in Ṭabarī, III: pp. 15, 17-21; Khalīfah, II: p. 423; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma'ārif*, p. 371; Azdī, p. 119; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 480; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 57; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 334.

³⁹ *Akhbār*, p. 371; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 345.

question by simply stating that both entered Kūfah together.⁴⁰ The question is not insignificant, and it is more likely that the influential generals of the campaign opted in favor of the milder and more diplomatic al-Ḥasan over his more abrasive and assertive impetuous brother.

At any rate, the Khurāsāniyyah's arrival in al-ʿAbbāsiyyah, the immediate suburb of Kūfah,⁴¹ was the clear signal for Abū Salamah to emerge from behind the scenes into the forefront. To the question of whether or not his seniority was spontaneously recognized, the sources furnish an array of answers ranging from depicting him as being extracted from near obscurity and appointed to the top position, to showing him as forcefully assuming an uncontested authority. The abrupt and synoptic style of Khalīfah appears to be responsible for the account that shows Abū Salamah in an unmistakably inferior role. "[The Khurāsāniyyah] entered Kūfah, and they appointed over it (*istaʿmalū ʿalā al-Kūfah*) Abū Salamah."⁴² In this account al-Ḥasan inexplicably appears as Abū Salamah's superior, and Abū Salamah is reduced to a regional governor. A second category of accounts cannot be traced to a mother account, but it is also synoptic, although neutral and uninformative as to Abū Salamah's status in the hierarchy.⁴³

A more detailed, and dramatic, account is furnished by Madāʾinī, who appears to ascribe it to a very unlikely source. A certain ʿAbd Allāh ibn Badr, who fought against Qaḥṭabah in Ibn Hubayrah's ranks, and who was defeated and chased by the Khurāsāniyyah for as far from the scene of Qaḥṭabah's last words as he could run, crowns his own report of the battle and of Qaḥṭabah's fatal wounds by transmitting Qaḥṭabah's last instructions: "The *wazīr* of the *Imām* is Abū Salamah, so when you reach Kūfah surrender [the reins of] this enterprise to him."⁴⁴ Besides the apocryphal quality of the account, and the fact that Qaḥṭabah's death was so shrouded in mystery that a last will does not appear to be credible, such a will was probably unnecessary. Qaḥṭabah was the most, but not the only, senior official of the Organization

⁴⁰ Jahshayārī, p. 84.

⁴¹ *Akḥbār*, p. 373; Ṭabarī, III: p. 18.

⁴² Khalīfah, II: p. 423; cf. Azdī, p. 119; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 334.

⁴³ Abū Mikhnaf simply states that the Khurāsāniyyah came to Abū Salamah and 'extracted him' (Ṭabarī, III: p. 20); Jahshayārī says that they 'brought him out and surrendered to him the reins of leadership' (p. 84); Ibn Qutaybah reports that al-Ḥasan ibn Qaḥṭabah 'surrendered to [him] authority and [he] took charge' (*Māʾārif*, p. 371). A third synoptic category simply shows Abū Salamah in charge (Yaʿqūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 345; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 57).

⁴⁴ Ṭabarī, III: p. 16.

amongst the troops. Scores of *dā'īs* and a number of *nuzarā'* who knew Abū Salamah in person were present.

Madā'inī completes his compilation of eye-witness reports by attributing to a certain 'Umārah, a *mawlā* of Jibrā'il ibn Yaḥyā, a vivid description of the procession of the Khurāsāniyyah towards Abū Salamah's residence:

Al-Ḥasan entered [Kūfah]; on the way they were asking: 'Where is the house of Abū Salamah, *wazīr Āl Muḥammad?*' And they were guided to it. They proceeded until they reached his door; then he came out to them, and they brought to him one of Qaḥṭabah's riding animals; he rode until he reached the Sabī' Cemetery where he accepted homage from the Khurāsānites.⁴⁵

The need to ask for directions from the general populace in order to locate *Wazīr Āl Muḥammad's* residence is not compatible with the general picture of a victorious army seeking its resident political leader. If there was no one amongst the incoming troops who knew the house, was there also no one in Abū Salamah's entourage to meet the troops and guide them? Whatever else Abū Salamah might have been, he certainly was not a lone member of the Organization in the quarters and streets of Kūfah. Aside from this anomaly, the general outline of this report, and its reverential tone, are in agreement with *Akhbār's* unique report, although much shorter on detail.

Akhbār unequivocally portrays an assertive and sure-handed Abū Salamah strongly assuming authority, demanding 'red carpet' treatment, and basking in the pious veneration from the rank-and-file of the Khurāsāniyyah whose entry into the town was transformed into a mass feast of jubilation framed in full military regalia; and at the center of the carnival was Abū Salamah:

Abū Salamah sent [a message] to Ḥumayd ibn Qaḥṭabah [instructing him] to enter Kūfah in the best bearing, and that they [should] display their decorations and strength and unsheathe their weapons and [hoist] their flags. [Ḥumayd] complied; he mobilized the troops and dispatched them in regiments to Nahr Banī Sulaym. Abū Salamah made his appearance and declared what he was about ... Ḥumayd dispatched to him a group of generals ... they dismounted and kissed his hand, and the prominent [members of their troops] kissed his hand and prayed [for God] to bless him. He went to the military [camp]. They started seeking one another and saying: '*tū Abī Salamah dūdī?*' [Persian for: 'have you seen Abū Salamah?'] If the [questioned] said: 'yes', [the questioner] hugged and kissed him in veneration to Abū Salamah ... He reached the camp and people were standing up for his sake. The generals welcomed him;

⁴⁵ Ṭabarī, III: p. 20; cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 138.

they all, without exception, dismounted for his sake and kissed his hand. He reviewed their lines, greeting their commoners and praying [for God] to bless them. Then he dismounted. A room had been prepared for him, in which he boarded. The folk yielded to him; they listened to him, obeyed his orders and put their faith in him. He retired for the night with the Khurāsāniyyah surrounding his room and aggrandizing him ... When he woke up, he gathered the generals and the prominent members of the military ... he said [... a speech...] They responded by mentioning their obedience and the strength of their conviction ... and they talked about it in Persian⁴⁶

In tribal Arabic, this would sound surrealistic. At no one point in their history, hitherto or thereafter, have tribal Arabs accorded such a saintly status to a leader, not even to the Prophet. Scanning it for any demographic indicators of meaningful tribal Arab presence, the above scene could as well have been extraterrestrial. It is so characteristically non-Arab, that, if it were to be accepted to the letter, no further probe into the demographic composition of the audience of this extravaganza would be required in order to prove that no Arab tribal presence was vocally represented—not even the celebrated Tayyi’ fighting contingent. *Akhbār*’s unflinching tendency to make mountains out of molehills regarding harmony within the ranks of the Organization is, however, too obvious to permit an unconditional acceptance of the above text.

Exaggeration aside, what remains of this text is viable and it provides the following features which are corroborated elsewhere and in the further unfolding of events. Firstly, Abū Salamah, who never ceased writing to Qaḥṭabah and Abū Muslim, officiously dispensing information and instructions, even when he appeared to be irrelevant, could not have handled the Khurāsāniyyah’s approach to Kūfah differently. He did write to Ibn Qaḥṭabah, and he did issue some instructions. For, unlike the recent days of irrelevance, his communications now would acquire the character of executive instruments.

Secondly, Ibn Qaḥṭabah, newly installed and free of the potentially prestige-jealous charisma of his father, had neither the basis nor the opportunity nor, probably, the wish to provoke discord or to force a showdown over who was really in control. Abū Muslim loyalist elements in the staff, even if they had been furnished beforehand with standing orders to wrest control, must have known that the time was not ripe yet for their designs. The decisive engagement with the Umayyads was yet to come, and even the battle for Iraq was not over yet. The staff of the

⁴⁶ *Akhbār*, pp. 374-6, and p. 374, n.6, for the translation of the Persian expression.

army, reflecting the varied loyalties within the Organization, were not a single homogeneous body. Some must have been ideologically loyal to the Organization's doctrine of *al-riḍā*, regardless of whether they had any specific preferences or not. Even if they were all unaware of the designs of the Abū Muslim wing, they could not be taken for granted. Although the rank-and-file were overwhelmingly free of factional and tribal loyalties and were loyal to the Marw command of Abū Muslim, they were almost certainly not aware of any tensions or hidden designs, and any sudden rifts in the ranks of their leaders would have been confusing and damaging to their morale. So, the whole army, displaying a deceptively unified facade, complied with Abū Salamah's instructions, allowing him to naturally appear, together with what he represented, as the uncontested supreme commander of the emerging power.

Thirdly, a victory parade, complete with the jubilation of the troops and the acclamation of the leader, was thus a by-product. Abū Salamah's wish to parade the newly found military strength of the Organization in Kūfah is as psychologically understandable as it was tactically prudent and necessary. Whether the acclamation reached the awesome proportions described in *Akhbār* is not ascertainable. But any degree of veneration, excessively exceeding a formal greeting addressed in the name of the office impersonated by the greeted, can probably be ascribed to the overwhelmingly non-Arab mass of the rank-and-file who must have been awe-stricken to behold the person of their redeemer. Also, the widespread chatter in Persian cannot be easily envisioned of masses of jubilating Arabs, regardless of the degree to which Persian may have proliferated in their daily conversations.

Fourthly, the spontaneous and rather sudden easing of Abū Salamah into supreme 'vice-royalty' under the glaring eyes of the soldiers must have confirmed his legitimacy, probably bought him some extra time, and deluded him into believing that he was given a mandate, not only to manage the affairs of the emerging polity, but also to implement the doctrine of *al-riḍā* and commence the search for the future *Imām*. He was wrong on more than one count.

The official designation accorded to Abū Salamah was *Wazīr Āl Muḥammad*; he was the first in the new realm to carry the *wazīr* title.⁴⁷ The functions of the post had not yet been defined, but, if the mode in which Abū Salamah exercised his powers was to define the post, it would have evolved into the top executive office in the realm, especially since Abū Muslim's designation of *Amīn* was not perpetuated.

⁴⁷ Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, pp. 153,155; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401.

The ceremonies had hardly ceased when Abū Salamah started exercising unlimited powers. In his first speech, he accorded the Khurāsāniyyah the status of most-favored citizens in the realm, tripled the ‘*aḥā*’ of their rank-and-file in comparison to what the Umayyads paid their soldiers, decreed that it would be paid in monthly installments, promised the officers and people of precedence and seniority special benefits proportionate to their contributions, and fixed the ‘*aḥā*’ of the generals, *nuqabā*’ and people of special valor at between one and two thousand dirhams, and that of those immediately below them at between a hundred and one thousand; and all was said and done in the first person, singular.⁴⁸ The tripling of the base ‘*aḥā*’ of the ‘privates’ may have been intended to gratify the relatively few such ‘privates’ who had been enlisted in the *ḍiwān* of the Umayyads and joined the Revolutionary ranks; it would also have lured more fighters into the ranks; but, above all, it was meant to be a well-deserved reward for the non-*ḍiwān* masses who had joined the Revolutionary forces in Khurāsān in lieu of an irregular pay of three or four dirhams.⁴⁹ Beyond that, Abū Salamah’s stipends policy mirrored the preferential stratification established by ‘Umar I and practiced by the Umayyads. The only difference was that the beneficiaries now overwhelmingly came from the other end of the ethnic spectrum.

The issue of who the *Imām* was or would be, or why he was not proclaimed or sought, was not raised. Abū Salamah simply said that the *Imām* would soon be amongst them, and that he would give them more than what they hoped for.⁵⁰

The first camp the Khurāsāniyyah pitched in Kūfah, at al-‘Abbāsiyyah,⁵¹ or at Nukhaylah,⁵² appears to have been too close to civilian life; so Abū Salamah set out with the army to Ḥammām A‘yan,⁵³ three parasangs (approximately sixteen km.) from Kūfah.⁵⁴ He settled there, “dispensing executive orders and managing the affairs [of the new polity],” “records, *dawāwīn*, were brought into his presence, and letters started going and coming from and unto him.”⁵⁵ He appointed officials to the various administrative functions in his central administration. He dispatched tax collectors to ‘every district’ and collected the *kharāj*. He

⁴⁸ *Akhbār*, pp. 375-6.

⁴⁹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1969.

⁵⁰ *Akhbār*, p. 376.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

⁵² Ṭabarī, III: p. 20.

⁵³ *Akhbār*, p. 376; Ṭabarī, III: p. 20.

⁵⁴ Ṭabarī, III: p. 21.

⁵⁵ *Akhbār*, p. 378; Jahshayārī, pp. 85-6.

appointed subgovernors and dispatched them, with or without troops, to districts already reduced or still holding-out, on the plain and in the mountain, west of the Euphrates and east of the Tigris and in-between. He responded to Abū 'Awn's request for reinforcements in preparation for the anticipated confrontation with Marwān II, and wrote to Abū Muslim to do the same. Attending to the pressing military situation in the Sawād and the Middle and Lower Euphrates territory, he deployed most of the military forces at his disposal to Wāsiṭ, Madā'in and Hīt; and he took the initiative, or accepted the offer of Sufyān ibn Mu'āwiyah ibn Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab, and appointed him governor of Baṣrah, ordering him to fight its Umayyad governor, Salm ibn Qutaybah ibn Muslim.⁵⁶

III.4 *The Dynamics of the Game Between Abū Muslim and Abū Salamah*

Unlike Abū Muslim, who never appointed a governor to oversee his seat of power, Marw, Abū Salamah appointed Muḥammad ibn Khālid al-Qasrī as regional governor in his own seat of power, Kūfah, thus demonstrating that his own office was beyond and above narrow regional concerns. As a matter of fact, and as Abū Muslim must have realized, Abū Salamah held during this period most of the cards of moral legitimacy, no matter how precarious that hold may appear in hindsight. He was directing the battle for Iraq and was becoming too closely involved with the evolution of the military situation in the north, where Marwān II and Abū 'Awn were scrambling for the big confrontation. [It must be noted that it was at this point that Abū Muslim recalled Mūsā ibn Ka'b from Rayy, as will be seen] A substantial portion of Khurāsān's military might had been deployed to the west. Despite the fact that Abū Muslim had nothing to worry about in connection with the loyalty of the majority of the rank-and-file, not to mention the generals sworn to him, the theatre was rife with ominous potentials. The untuned loyalties of many of the historically senior officers of the Organization, and the unpredictable positions that sectors such as the Ṭayyi' contingent and others might take in the still fluid state of the ideological medium governed by the doctrine of the *al-riḍā*, were all factors to be taken into consideration. Abū Salamah's fraternizing with the military could have resulted in a nasty situation were he to have been provoked too prematurely.

⁵⁶ *Akhbār*, pp. 376-8; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 138, 143, 145, 174, 176; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 20-2; Azdī, pp. 119, 125; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 345; Khalifah, II: pp. 424, 426-7; Ibn Qutaybah, *Mā'ārif*, p. 371; Jahshayārī, pp. 85-6.

Abū Muslim must have opted for a temporary extension of his accommodating style in dealing with Abū Salamah, and this is amply demonstrated in their correspondence during the period. The question of form was of the utmost importance. Abū Muslim, in his time-honored style of temporary appeasement of an adversary whom he decided not to engage just yet, did with Abū Salamah what he had done with Naṣr ibn Sayyār.⁵⁷ In a show of deference, he adorned his letters with the addressee's name first; to Abū Salamah he used to write: "To Commander, *al-Amūr*, Ḥafṣ ibn Sulaymān, the *Wazīr of Āl Muḥammad*; from 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muslim, the Confidant, *Amīn*, of *Āl Muḥammad*."⁵⁸

Wazīr Āl Muḥammad and *Amīn Āl Muḥammad* were the titles by which Abū Salamah and Abū Muslim were conventionally referred to,⁵⁹ at least after, or even after the capture of Kūfah, when the specific *Ridā*, if there were any, ought to have been proclaimed. It is interesting to note that both titles, *wazīr* and *amīn*, were assumed by al-Mukhtār in the name of his alleged *Imām*, the detached Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyyah.⁶⁰ In these capacities al-Mukhtār had exercised absolute authority in Kūfah in 66-67/685-687. But whereas the two titles (among others) had been, in the case of al-Mukhtār, combined in the person of one single individual in order to define his supreme executive powers, they were in this case assumed by, or accorded to, two cooperating yet contesting individuals. Conveniently, neither designation was defined, and the issue of official superlatives was avoided. We do not know how Abū Salamah used to address Abū Muslim in his letters to him.

Of the content of most of the correspondence, nothing is known. It can be assumed, however, that it must have dealt with the two major issues confronting the Revolution: (1), the expected showdown with Marwān II, along with the attending preparations, reinforcements and troop deployments; and, (2), the question of choosing and proclaiming an *Imām*—a context in which some names may have been suggested, at least by Abū Salamah, who had started the process of selection. Expectedly, there is no trace suggesting any exchange in connection with the second issue before every party had shown its hand.

⁵⁷ *Akhbār*, p. 303; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1956.

⁵⁸ Azdī, p. 119; Ya'qūbī, *Tarīkh*, II: p. 352; Jahshayārī, pp. 84-5, where *amīr* appears as a corruption of *amīn* in Abū Muslim's title; cf. *Akhbār*, pp. 378-9; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 156.

⁵⁹ Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 116; Ṭabarī, III: p. 60; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 482.

⁶⁰ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 509, 534, 608, 611; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf V*, pp. 218, 222; Ibn A'tham, VI: pp. 93, 96.

On the first issue, one such exchange is reported. Abū ‘Awn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Yazīd (no.109) had already crossed the Lower Zāb river and advanced towards the Upper Zāb river; he wrote to Abū Salamah reporting his position. Abū Salamah was concerned, so he wrote to Ḥumayd ibn Qaḥṭabah, whom he had dispatched to Madā’in, ordering him to send to Abū ‘Awn three of his officers with their troops; he imposed the draft on the Kūfans whom he had conscripted; and he wrote to Abū Muslim urging him to send more troops. Abū Muslim wrote to three of his generals, who were deployed to Rayy, Nihāvand and Dīnawar, to send troops or to advance themselves to Abū ‘Awn’s aid.⁶¹

It is interesting to note that Abū ‘Awn, already outside the Persian provinces proper, west of Ḥulwān, was reporting to Abū Salamah. All moves in these territories, military or otherwise, were directed by Abū Salamah. However, when more troops were required, a requirement that could be fulfilled only from the Persian provinces, Abū Salamah did not write directly to the generals who were deployed almost along the provincial borders, in Dīnawar and Nihāvand, positions much closer to him than to Abū Muslim in Marw. Rather, he had to proceed through Abū Muslim, the uncontested master of the East. Therefore, Balādhurī’s assertion that Abū Salamah was the one who summoned Mālik ibn al-Haytham from Sijistān⁶² cannot be accepted as an accurate report alert to the delicate intricacies of the real channels of command.

When Abū Salamah did grow too assuming as to just how far his territorial mandate went, he was in for a shock. He sent his own appointees to the Persian province of Fars. Abū Muslim’s appointees had already been there, and their chief official wrote to Abū Muslim with the news. Abū Muslim instructed his appointee: “coax them until you are confident of [containing] them.” The official apprehended Abū Salamah’s appointees, and then Abū Muslim sent someone who killed them.⁶³ If there was room in Abū Muslim’s politics for maneuvering in order to achieve the strategic ceiling of his ambitions on the scale of the whole empire, he certainly had no tolerance for the slightest tampering with his strategic bottom line—absolute mastery over Persian territory. Even when, later in the same year, Abū al-‘Abbās al-Saffāḥ appointed his uncle, ‘Īsā ibn ‘Alī, to Fars, the ‘Abbāsīd prince narrowly escaped the

⁶¹ *Akhbār*, p. 378.

⁶² Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 145.

⁶³ *Akhbār*, p. 378; cf. Ṭabarī, III: p. 71; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 343.

fate of Abū Salamah's appointees. All the same, he was prevented from assuming authority.⁶⁴

Despite some indications to the contrary, Abū Muslim's ruthlessness was never translated into a demonstration of rash temper when such a demonstration did not serve him. His order to his appointee to 'coax' the intruders but to curb them can have only one indication. He had not put his act, in Kūfah, together yet. Although it is not possible to work out a meaningful, even if approximate, chronology of the entire three months between the capture of Kūfah and the accession of al-Saffāh, the internal logic of certain events places them in an obvious sequence. When Abū Muslim's men in Kūfah pulled off their coup, his men in Fars were ordered to kill Abū Salamah's detained appointees. And it must have been at this point that Abū Muslim officially marked the end of this period of the tug-of-war, exactly as he had done with Naṣr ibn Sayyār a little over two years before, and with other adversaries as well. It could not have been earlier, as Ibn 'Abd Rabbih suggests:

When he became reprehensive of his intentions, [Abū Muslim wrote] to Abū Salamah al-Khallāl, [citing the Holy Qur'ān, II: 14,]: 'When they meet those who believe, they say: 'We believe'; but when they go privily to their Satans, they say: 'We are with you.'⁶⁵

If Abū Salamah was a hypocrite, which is most likely an unfair slander, his futile efforts did not take him nearly as far as Abū Muslim's maneuvers took Abū Muslim. Abū Salamah's one-man show in Kūfah lasted for only three months,⁶⁶ and, beneath all his forceful exercise of executive powers and what appeared to be a controlled situation, it was marked by an extremely fluid state of affairs.

⁶⁴ Ṭabarī, III: p. 71; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 343.

⁶⁵ Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: pp. 218-9. English rendering of this Quranic verse is that of Arberry's.

⁶⁶ Two and a half months only according to Jahshayārī, p. 87.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE 'ABBĀSID COUP AND THE DEMISE OF THE ORGANIZATION

I. A Methodological Interlude

Over and above its being a decisive historical landmark, the advent of the Khurāsāniyyah in Kūfah drastically changed the historiographical rules of the propaganda game for the doctors of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. Prior to this juncture, most of what it took to weave the 'Abbāsīd thread into the strand of events was simply to naively thrust the 'Abbāsīd *Imām* onto the historical theater—dark enough under the thick blanket of the clandestine phase. Most of what it takes the modern historian in order to neutralize these interpolations, and to restore a semblance of coherence to the historical narrative is to perform a simple 'surgery' to remove the 'Abbāsīd 'appendix'.

It is from this juncture on that the propaganda game became more demanding, and the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* most aggressive, transparently abrasive, and all-pervasive. The mainstream of events had started to unfold under the public eye—the army alleged to be the *Imām's* entered the new capital city but could not proclaim its *Imām* before two or three months had elapsed!¹ To bridge this conspicuous gap, the doctors of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* did not spare any detail from their crude interference, be it 'cosmetic' or 'bone surgery'. It is not, therefore, so startling to find that a careful examination of the body of accounts which were produced or tolerated by the 'Abbāsīd propaganda machine, and of the very few accounts which escaped its censorship,² brings to light some ludicrous

¹ The Khurāsāniyyah entered Kūfah on 10 Muḥarram 132/29 August 749 (Khalīfah, II: p. 423; Azdī, p. 119; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 57; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 334), or on 11 Muḥarram (Jahshayārī, p. 84; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 344-5). Abū al-'Abbās was proclaimed caliph on 12 Rabī' II 132/28 November 749 (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 141). Other dates are also given to the proclamation of the caliph; the earliest is 3 Rabī' I 132/20 October 749 (Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 335; Suyūfī, p. 257); and the latest is 28 Dhū al-Hijjah 132/7 August 750 (Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 349. See also other dates in: Ṭabarī, III: p. 23; Azdī, p. 123; Khalīfah, p. 262; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 349). Be that as it may, even the latest date of the Khurāsāniyyah's arrival, and the earliest date of Abū al-'Abbās' proclamation, leave a gap of more than fifty days for the 'Abbāsīd propaganda machine to explain.

² In this respect, the source material may be classified in three general categories. The first category comprises the majority of early sources, which carried basically the general corpus of accounts which represent the 'Abbāsīd version. The uncritical

assertions, incredible incompatibilities and unbridgeable contradictions which render the situation in Kūfah, as painted by these accounts, absolutely untenable.

From this point on, history and historiography become so intertwined that a viable reconstruction of history can scarcely be achieved without an in-depth and step-by-step, probe of the historiography. Here, what it takes the modern historian in order to expose the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* and to restore a semblance of coherence to the historical narrative is no longer a simple surgery. On this turf, the modern historian can scarcely establish a fact within his proposed scheme before demolishing a number of falsehoods and extracting from their rubble the elements which would go into the composition of one of his more credible hypothetical 'facts'. Essential as it is, this exercise can be disruptive, possibly distracting, and potentially conducive to opacity. In this book, we have already had a share of such disruptions; and we shall have more. But, at this specific juncture, the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* becomes especially too dense and too prolific to allow us to take it to task on the details within the scope which a book admits.³ However, a perceptive

approach of these sources to the accounts which they transmit does not entirely undermine the basic credibility owed to the bare skeletal structure of events which forms the substructure of this tradition. Once stripped of 'Abbāsīd interpolations and prejudiced interpretations, this underlying structure of events will be seen to fit with the logic of the struggle between the historical Revolutionary legitimacy of the militarily weaker adherents to the doctrine of *al-riḍā*, and the legitimacy of triumph of the stronger militant faction which represented the victorious will of the independent-minded Khurāsāniyyah, who opted for a feeble figure-head who would owe his position to their favors. This category of sources includes Balādhurī, Ṭabarī, Ya'qūbī, Mas'ūdī, Jahshayārī and Azdī. Except for the relatively tempered and delicate phraseology of Madā'inī, in Ṭabarī, which does not drastically interfere with the overall plot of events, the tradition carried by these sources rests on the main allegation that Abū Salamah 'hid' the 'Abbāsīd troop and concealed their presence in Kūfah from the generals and the partisans until, by accident, one of these generals met a *mawlā* of the clan. The second category reflects a cautious and hesitant critique of the above tradition, delivered indirectly by diluting the conspiratorial tones in Abū Salamah's role, and by omitting any reference to the dramatic events associated with the accidental meeting and subsequent events. This is mainly offered by Dhahabī, who appears to have capitalized on Madā'inī's delicate phraseology. Certain aspects of Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā's account also belong to this category. The third category comprises few early and late sources which carry traditions diametrically opposed to the suggestion of a conspiratorial role played by Abū Salamah and narrate stories completely different from the one carried by sources of the first category. These include Dīnawarī, Ibn A'tham, one unique account by Dhahabī in *Sīyar*, and certain aspects of Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā's confused account. The three categories are critically examined at length in, Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 217-34; and in the remainder of this present chapter.

³ The exercise has been undertaken in part one, chapters VI and VII of the dissertation, which is the origin of this book. Independently, a number of readers have, however, concurred on criticizing these two chapters as being opaque, and distracting. I concur. Therefore, I decided to restructure—through omission, relocation,

look, cognizant of the socio-psychological dynamics that govern the modes of political conduct in the post-victory era of a coalitive revolutionary movement, may provide an insight through the thick camouflage superimposed on historical events by the 'Abbāsīd propaganda manipulations.

Within a revolutionary coalition which had been built around an agreement to seek consensus within a general framework of lowest common denominators, certain dynamics govern the behavior of the various players in the immediate aftermath of victory and during the crucial period of attempting to arrive at the desired consensus. Some players would probably be disposed to suspend their prejudices and honestly play the game by the rules, in faithful adherence to their pledges. Other players may be relatively secure in their knowledge—or their illusion—that their preferences are the preferences of the majority. These types of players tend to be the more relaxed, open and benevolent. They are normally oblivious or dismissive of what they deem to be an unnecessary application of factors of coercion. On the other hand, there may exist some players who harbor the will to override the basic agreement on seeking consensus, by imposing their own preference—especially if their preference is less likely to be that of the majority. When such players do exist, they tend to be more nervous, secretive and lethal, and they would normally try to mobilize and apply a battery of coercive factors. Such are the dicta of sociological and historical common sense. However, this is not how the all-pervasive historical 'doctoring' of the 'Abbāsīd tradition painted the situation in Kūfah during the period between its capture and the accession of Abū al-'Abbās al-Saffāh. Nor could it be expected to have done otherwise.

The 'Abbāsīd false claims had technically committed their later propagandists to perform a complete reversal of facts. By twisting the doctrine of *al-riḍā* into a code word standing for the 'Abbāsīd *Imām* in particular, they dislocated the Revolutionary legitimacy from seeking consensus to seeking the installation of an 'Abbāsīd. This reversal automatically placed Abū Salamah, along with the 'silent majority', in the nervous camp, which then, allegedly, sought to carry out its designs by secretive, conspiratorial means. By the same token, it placed the remote Abū Muslim, along with the operative lieutenants loyal to him in Kūfah, in the relaxed camp. Thus, in the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*, the three most logical consequences of the momentous and complex upheaval were transmuted into absurd occurrences:

condensation, and relegating to footnote status. If I am wrong, it is my responsibility alone, and the cumbersome material, intact, is accessible in Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 192-256.

(1) Abū Salamah's assumption of his role, by conducting consultations aiming at the selection of a *riḍā*, was transmuted into a childish conspiracy to abduct and hide the 'lawful' 'Abbāsīd *Imām*, and to transfer the fruits of the Revolution to the 'Alīds.

(2) The coup which installed al-Saffāḥ—a natural outcome of Abū Muslim's victory and his ability to project his military might in Kūfah—was painted as the happy result of a stroke of luck which restored 'poetic justice'.

(3) And, the elimination of the loser, Abū Salamah—an objective obtainment of the violent politics of revolutionary upheavals—was muddled beyond historical comprehension.

In the historiography of the clandestine phase, the formative forces of history had given way to the 'Abbāsīd apocalypics. Now, at the outset of open history, these live and objective forces give way to ludicrousness.

II. *Abū Salamah's Search for a Riḍā*

As far as the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* goes, there was no need to search for a *riḍā*, because *al-Riḍā* had all along been known, ever since Abū Hāshim ibn al-Ḥanafīyyah bequeathed his 'inheritance' to Muḥammad ibn 'Alī the 'Abbāsīd; or, according to later elaborations, since Ibn al-Ḥārithīyyah, i.e., Abū al-'Abbās, was born; or even earlier. Abū Salamah's dispensation of his duty, as the chief coordinator of the process of seeking the candidate most satisfactory to the Revolutionary coalition, must, therefore, be characterized as anything but what it truly was. Actually, Abū Salamah, after taking charge in Kūfah, settled into his required role. The 'Abbāsīd propaganda doctors would later take care of how the natural course of events should be reshaped and retold—as follows.

The 'Abbāsīd troop arrived in Kūfah sometime⁴ after the Khurāsāniyyah had captured the city. 'Confident' of their being *the* Āl

⁴ In Ṣafār (Ṭabarī, III: p. 27; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 97) or Muḥarram 132/August-September 749 (Ya'qūbī, *Ta'riḥ*, II: p. 345). The more probable is a date in Muḥarram close to, but after, the Khurāsāniyyah's arrival in town on Muḥarram 10/August 29 (Agha, 'Agents,' p. 214, cf. also pp. 206-13). Taken together, Balādhurī's statements, that the 'Abbāsīds had arrived in Kūfah before the Khurāsāniyyah, and stayed for forty days before Abū al-'Abbās was proclaimed caliph on 12 Rabī' II/28 November (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 122, 139, 141), do not add up; for this makes for a period of more than 90 days. The fact that the general tendency of the sources of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* is to shorten as much as possible the period between Abū al-'Abbās' availability in Kūfah and his accession (Ṭabarī makes it forty days, III: p. 27; others make it two months: Ya'qūbī, *Ta'riḥ*, II: p. 345; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 97; Jahshyārī, pp. 85, 87) is in unison with the attempt to shorten the period between Ibrāhīm al-Imām's death, or the

Muḥammad, they 'innocently' sought out 'their' *wazīr*, only to fall in his 'trap'. The 'sinister' Abū Salamah 'hid' them for an extended period of time from those who, in the 'Abbāsīd cause, had "come out from the bottom of Khurāsān." Despite the Khurāsāniyyah's clamor, he persisted in denying the *Imām's* presence in the Khurāsāniyyah infested city!⁵

In the meantime, according to all varieties of the 'Abbāsīd version, Abū Salamah was actively involved in carrying out the more lethal part of his conspiracy. He had met in Kūfah with members of the 'Alīd Shī'ah and deliberated with them concerning the issue of transferring the fruits of the enterprise to the descendants of 'Alī, and specific names were mentioned.⁶ He wrote to the most prominent two or three amongst them: Ja'far al-Šādiq ibn Muḥammad al-Bāqir ibn 'Alī Zayn al-'Ābidīn ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, and 'Abd Allāh al-Maḥḍ ibn al-Ḥasan ibn al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī;⁷ other sources add a third, 'Umar al-Ashraf ibn 'Alī Zayn al-'Ābidīn ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī,⁸ brother of the celebrated 'Alīd martyr, Zayd ibn 'Alī, and uncle of the above candidate, Ja'far al-Šādiq. Abū Salamah's messenger, Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Aslam, grandson of a *mawlā* of the Prophet,⁹ went to al-Madīnah either twice, first to Ja'far al-Šādiq, then to 'Abd Allāh al-Maḥḍ,¹⁰ or only once, with all two or three letters, copies of the same text, and with the instructions to go first to Ja'far, then, if Ja'far declined, to 'Abd Allāh, and last to 'Umar.¹¹ The letter invited the first respondent of the three to come to Abū Salamah in Kūfah, so that he would transfer the *da'wah* to his benefit and make the people of Khurāsān pay homage to him. 'Umar, the third candidate to whom the invitation should not have arrived, since the second candidate responded favorably, is irrelevantly

Revolutionaries' knowledge of it, and the succession of Abū al-'Abbās to the *Imāmate* (supra, Introduction). Both ploys were necessary to deal with the interregnum problem which plagued the 'Abbāsīd claims.

⁵ Except for Sābiq al-Khwārizmī (who mysteriously enjoyed the gift of being unbound whenever his masters happened to be bound by the sinister—but stupid—anti-'Abbāsīd forces), the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* maintains that Abū al-'Abbās and his entourage were 'abducted' by the sinister Abū Salamah, who detained them in a secret place, and concealed the fact of their presence from their Shī'ah, from the time they had arrived until their Shī'ah rescued them and immediately proclaimed Abū al-'Abbās. (For the variations on this story, see: Khalīfah, II: p. 424; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 122, 139; Tabarī, III: pp. 27, 34-5; Azdī, pp. 120-1; Jahshayārī, pp. 85-6; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 96-9; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 345-349; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 57). We shall not be detained further by this issue; for a full exposition of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* of these crucial events, see Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 198-234.

⁶ Jahshayārī, p. 86; Azdī, pp. 120-1.

⁷ Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 97-8; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 349.

⁸ Jahshayārī, p. 86; Azdī, p. 121; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 154.

⁹ Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 97.

¹⁰ Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 349.

¹¹ Jahshayārī, p. 86; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 97-8; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 154.

given further attention only by Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā. He reportedly commented: “I do not know the sender that I may reply to him.”¹²

The responses of the other two prominent candidates merit a closer look. If the report is essentially true—and there is no reason to reject the bare basic fact that Abū Salamah did communicate with the ‘Alīds—then the ‘Abbāsīd interpolations form an exquisite and almost flawless piece of propaganda. That Ja‘far al-Šādiq rejected the lure of the Revolution while Marwān II was still alive and fighting is perfectly compatible with the ideological and political position of the later Imāmiyyah Shī‘ites. Ja‘far himself was responsible for the elaboration of the doctrine of *taqiyyah* (dissimulation) under duress, which justified the pacifism which characterized the political conduct of his father, Muḥammad al-Bāqir, and his grandfather, ‘Alī Zayn al-‘Ābidīn. They had kept their relative peace with the Umayyads. Ja‘far also did the same with the Umayyads, as he soon would with the ‘Abbāsīds; and the political stance of the sect which evolved around this tradition would eventually be transformed into a prolonged act of peaceful waiting and expectancy of *al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar*. Ja‘far was not to be expected to volunteer or to coalesce with revolution.

‘Abd Allāh al-Maḥḍ, on the other hand, represented a different legacy. Although, ironically, he was a descendant of the pacifist al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib—not of his fire-brand martyr brother al-Ḥusayn, whose descendant is the now pacifist Ja‘far—to him and to his sons, Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah and Ibrāhīm, fell the legacy of the latest of the Ḥusaynid revolutionary martyrs, their cousins: Zayd ibn ‘Alī Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, Ja‘far’s uncle, and his son Yaḥyā ibn Zayd. Contrary to the pacifist policies of his father and his brother, Zayd had eventually risen in revolt and was martyred, followed by his son Yaḥyā. The Zaydite dogma of an active ‘Faṭimid’ *Imāmate*, and Zayd’s policy of mandatory revolt, were elaborated and perpetuated by Ḥasanid revolutionaries. The first to pick up the claim and actively resume Zayd’s struggle on behalf of the descendants of Fāṭimah was ‘Abd Allāh al-Maḥḍ in the cause of his son, Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah. ‘Abd Allāh’s promotion of his son’s cause is reported to have started while the Umayyads were still reigning, and his efforts continued into the ‘Abbāsīd reigns of Abū al-‘Abbās and Abū Ja‘far, until armed revolt broke out, led by his sons, first Muḥammad and then Ibrāhīm. As the patriarch of the foremost and perhaps only ‘Alīd activist of the time, ‘Abd Allāh al-Maḥḍ can be expected to have accepted Abū Salamah’s invitation.

¹² Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 155.

Thus far the report is acceptable; and the fact that Abū Salamah sounded out more than one 'Alīd, from both the Ḥasanid and Ḥusaynid lines, and from both the pacifist and militant 'denominations', plays into the argument that he was not particularly a partisan of any one specific contender, line, or intra-'Alīd factionalism; rather he was reaching out, in search for *al-riḍā min Āl-Muḥammad* in the most logical pool of potential candidates. Even Ja'far's comment on Abū Salamah's endeavor, as reported by al-Jahshayārī, that "the people of Khurāsān are not Shī'ites, and Abū Salamah is deluded and [shall be] slain,"¹³ if it must be accepted, may be interpreted as a manifesto of his political analysis of the situation and his understanding of the real composition of the effective Khurāsānian base of the Revolution, together with its true motives and goals.

But the 'Abbāsīd interpolators did not miss such a golden opportunity; and an animated dramatic dialogue was fabricated between Ja'far and 'Abd Allāh, where only Ja'far's genealogical identity as an 'Alīd is preserved; but, beyond that, he is transformed into an unwitting 'Abbāsīd mouthpiece, confirming, in every utterance of his, the 'Abbāsīd claims of 'owning' the Organization, while 'Abd Allāh is depicted as a naive, gluttonous and opportunistic enthusiast, a mean donkey-rider who would not have any qualms about stealing the fruits of the efforts of others. Abū Salamah's messenger informed Ja'far that he was dispatched by Abū Salamah, and gave him the letter:

Ja'far said: 'What is [the connection between] me and Abū Salamah? Abū Salamah is someone else's partisan (*Shī'ah li-ghayrī*).' The messenger said: 'I am but a messenger; you read his letter and answer him as you see fit.' [Ja'far burnt the letter] and said to the messenger: 'Inform your master of what you have seen.' ... The messenger went to 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan and gave him the letter, so he kissed [or accepted (*qabbala, or qabila*)] it and read it and was overjoyed by it. On the next day ... 'Abd Allāh mounted a donkey to the house of ... Ja'far al-Ṣādiq ... [Ja'far] said: 'Oh, Abū Muḥammad! Something [of consequence must have] brought you!' ['Abd Allāh] said: 'Yes, it is too momentous to be described.' [Ja'far] said: 'What is it Oh Abū Muḥammad?' ['Abd Allāh] said: 'This is Abū Salamah's letter inviting me to what he [controls], our Shī'ah of the people of Khurāsān have come to him.' [Ja'far] said: 'Oh Abū Muḥammad! Since when were the people of Khurāsān partisans of yours (*shī'ah laka*)? Was it you who sent Abū Muslim to Khurāsān? Was it you who ordered him to don black [clothes]? And those who came to Iraq, was it you who was the reason they came, or who sent for them? And do you know anyone of them?' 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan argued with him until he said: 'Indeed, the [Revolutionaries] want my son Muḥammad because he is the *mahdī* of

¹³ Jahshayārī, p. 86.

this nation.’ Ja‘far said unto him: ‘By God, he is not the *mahdī* of this nation; and, if he draws his sword, he shall be slain.’ ‘Abd Allāh argued with him until he said: ‘By God, nothing but envy prevents you from [admitting] that.’ [Ja‘far] said: ‘By God, this is but sincere advice from me to you. Abū Salamah has written to me with [an invitation] similar to what he has written to you, but his messenger did not find with me what he found with you; and I burnt his letter before reading it.’ ‘Abd ‘Allāh left Ja‘far’s place in anger. Abū Salamah’s messenger did not reach him until al-Saffāḥ had been proclaimed.¹⁴

The last statement is perhaps one of the truest in the above account. Consultations, led by Abū Salamah, but conceivably much wider than reported, and aimed at implementing the doctrine of *al-riḍā*, were aborted. Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, whether or not he intended it, formulates the eventual outcome in an obliquely curt statement, a blend of the passive voice and a no less ambiguous active voice sentence, where the action and the agent of the action require further definition: “*thumma ghuliba Abū Salamah ‘alā ra’yih, wa-‘amalat al-da‘wah ‘amalahā, wa-būyī‘a al-Saffāḥ* (then Abū Salamah was prevailed over in his view, and the *da‘wah* performed [or, perpetrated] its act, and homage was paid to al-Saffāḥ).”¹⁵ What the ‘act’ exactly was, and what forces within the *da‘wah* brought about this outcome, Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā does not say; but other sources do.¹⁶

III. The ‘Abbāsīd Coup

III.1 *The Unfolding of the Drama According to the ‘Abbāsīd Riwāyah*

The outline of the plot is simple, and very naive. The generals accidentally found out Abū al-‘Abbās’ ‘detention’ place and immediately paid homage to him and proclaimed his accession. But the details and the drama, with its variations and personages, are intensely interesting and significant.

The five major players are: two *mawlās* from Abū al-‘Abbās’ entourage, and three generals from the Khurāsāniyyah who were encamped with Abū Salamah at Ḥammām A‘yan on the outskirts of Kūfah. They are, in order of appearance: Abū Ḥumayd Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ḥimyarī al-Marwrūdhī al-Ṭūsī al-Samarqandī (no. 272),

¹⁴ Mas‘ūdī, IV: pp. 97-8; cf. Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rikh* II: p. 349; Jahshayārī, p. 86; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, pp. 154-5.

¹⁵ Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 155.

¹⁶ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf* III, p. 139; Madā’inī in Tabarī, III: pp. 27-8; and Tabarī, III: pp. 34-7; Azdī, p. 121; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rikh*, II: pp. 345, 349; Mas‘ūdī, IV: pp. 98-9; Jahshayārī, pp. 86-7.

Sābiq al-Khwārizmī (no. 44), Abū al-Jahm ibn 'Aṭīyyah (no. 85), Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah (no. 26), and Mūsā ibn Ka'b (no. 292). Abū Ḥumayd is reported to have been an ethnic Arab only by Ibn al-Kalbī. Nothing much can be made from the confusion arising from giving him three different geographic affiliations. Later roles ascribed to him depict him as an 'Abbāsīd loyalist rather than as an Abū Muslimite. He was a veteran of the Organization and one of the seventy *du'āt*. Sābiq al-Khwārizmī, a black *mawlā*, had featured in some dubious roles: as the unbound *mawlā* of the captive Ibrāhīm al-Imām, the only witness to Ibrāhīm's *wasīyyah*, and the foremost confidant of Abū al-'Abbās in his planning to leave Ḥumaymah.¹⁷ If one is prone to seek conspiratorial signs in these mysterious coincidences and inexplicable situations, one is tempted to assume for Sābiq a role much greater than what the explicit texts allow. A straightforward hint, however, does seem to corroborate the suspicion that Sābiq was an Abū Muslim 'plant', or liaison, in the 'Abbāsīd household, perhaps with standing instructions as to what he should do in certain circumstances. Jahshayārī identifies him as a *ghulām*, a slave, whom they, i.e., the people of Khurāsān, had given to Ibrāhīm al-Imām as a gift.¹⁸ Abū al-Jahm, a *mawlā* of Bāhilah, was Abū Muslim's man, and his spy on Qaḥṭabah all through his campaign, and in the 'Abbāsīd court until Abū Ja'far reportedly killed him. Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah was a *mawlā* and a liaison between Ḥumaymah, where he was assigned to reside, and the Kūfan Organization. Mūsā was the highest-ranking general in the drama, an ethnic Arab, and one of the twelve *naq'ībs*. His specific ideological identity within the coalition, if not lacking, is very difficult to ascertain; and his political loyalties were always bland. He appears to have been willing to unquestioningly lend his distinguished services and celebrated veteran status to the party within the Organization who had the upper hand or the established legitimacy. It must be remembered that when Abū Salamah, two or three months before this episode, had asked Abū Muslim to send military support to Abū 'Awn, Mūsā was at Rayy with his forces. Abū Muslim ordered Mūsā to dispatch his son to Abū 'Awn, and himself to report to Abū Muslim at his Marw headquarters.¹⁹ Now, during these events, he was at the military camp of Ḥammām A'yan in Kūfah.

One day Abū Ḥumayd left the camp to the city, or specifically to Kunāsah.²⁰ By mere chance he came across a *ghulām* of the 'Abbāsīds,²¹

¹⁷ *Akhbār*, pp. 402-409-10; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 27, 34-5; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 123, 139; Azdī, p. 121; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 95, 98-9; Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 200-3.

¹⁸ Jahshayārī, pp. 86-7.

¹⁹ *Akhbār*, p. 378.

²⁰ Ṭabarī, III: p. 34; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 98-9; Jahshayārī, p. 86.

none other than Sābiq,²² and a suckling-brother of Abū al-‘Abbās’, namely Ṣālīḥ ibn al-Haytham,²³ one of their *mawālī* who had left Ḥumaymah with them. Abū Ḥumayd recognized them because he used to visit the *Imām*; or he recognized Sābiq because he was a slave they had given as a gift to the *Imām*. He enquired about the ‘Abbāsīd household. Abū Ḥumayd (and by extension the entire Khurāsāniyyah) had either known of Ibrāhīm’s demise, in which case his enquiry was about Abū al-‘Abbās, alias Ibn al-Ḥārithiyyah,²⁴ or he had not, in which case his enquiry was about Ibrāhīm himself, and Abū Ḥumayd, only then, learned of Ibrāhīm’s slaying and the succession of Abū al-‘Abbās to the *Imāmate*.²⁵ The description of the encounter ranges from the synoptic statements of al-Ya‘qūbī, Madā’inī, Azdī and al-Jahshayārī, to the more detailed recountings of Balādhurī and Ṭabarī, and culminates with the vivid dramatization of al-Mas‘ūdī:

[Abu Ḥumayd] asked [Sābiq] about Ibrāhīm al-Imām. [Sābiq] said: ‘Marwan [III] killed him in prison.’ Marwān, at the time, had been in Ḥarrān. Abū Ḥumayd said: ‘In whose favor is the *wasīyyah*?’ [Sābiq] said: ‘His brother, Abū al-‘Abbās.’ [Abū Ḥumayd] said: ‘And where is he?’ [Sābiq] said: ‘With you in Kūfah, he and his brother and a group of his uncles and members of his family.’ [Abū Ḥumayd] said: ‘Since when have they been here?’ Sābiq said: ‘Since two months’.²⁶

In the meantime, Abū al-‘Abbās had dispatched Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah to the military camp with a message. Ibrāhīm entered the camp in disguise and went directly to none other than Abū al-Jahm. He first asked him for a promise of security, which was granted. Then he told Abū al-Jahm that he was Abū al-‘Abbās’ messenger; he told him of the ‘Abbāsīd troop and their location, and that Abū al-‘Abbās had sent him to Abū Salamah asking for a hundred dīnārs to pay the camel-driver who had brought them to Kūfah, and that Abū Salamah had not sent the money.²⁷ Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah would now stay in the camp to join the next stage of the action, or, according to Madā’inī, he would at that stage make his first appearance in this episode.²⁸

²¹ Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 345, 349.

²² Madā’inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 27; and Ṭabarī, III: p. 34; Mas‘ūdī, IV: pp. 98-9; Jahshayārī, p. 86; Azdī, p. 121.

²³ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 139.

²⁴ Azdī, p. 121; cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 139; Madā’inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 345, 349.

²⁵ Ṭabarī, III: p. 35; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 99; cf. Jahshayārī, p. 87.

²⁶ Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 99; cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 139; Ṭabarī, III: p. 35.

²⁷ Ṭabarī, III: p. 35.

²⁸ Madā’inī in Ṭabarī, III: pp. 27-8.

Immediately concluding the chance encounter, Abū Ḥumayd went with Sābiq to Abū al-'Abbās,²⁹ or he asked Sābiq to take him there, and Sābiq, not wishing to disclose the 'Abbāsids' location without their permission, gave him an appointment for the morrow.³⁰ In all cases, Abū Ḥumayd went to Abū al-Jahm with his discovery—he either took Sābiq to him,³¹ or Sābiq and Ṣālih Ibn al-Haytham,³² or the news of his appointment with Sābiq,³³ or a first-hand report of his audience with Abū al-'Abbās.³⁴

Whichever it may have been, the ball was now with Abū al-Jahm, apparently Abū Ḥumayd's immediate operative superior in the official ranks and/or in the para-Organization circle of Abū Muslim loyalists. Now, Abū al-Jahm either went immediately to Abū al-'Abbās, accompanied by Abū Ḥumayd, Sābiq, and Ṣālih ibn al-Haytham,³⁵ or he dispatched Abū Ḥumayd with Sābiq to the 'Abbāsids,³⁶ or awaited Abū Ḥumayd's return from his appointment with Sābiq.³⁷ Abū Ḥumayd came back and brought with him Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah, who conveyed to Abū al-Jahm the location of their residence and their complaint against Abū Salamah.³⁸ Now, Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah was firmly on the scene, whether by Madā'inī's or Ṭabarī's account.

Mūsā, according to Ya'qūbī, Jahshayārī and Mas'ūdī, had been immediately informed of the discovery, along with Abū al-Jahm and a number of other officers.³⁹ But, according to Madā'inī and Ṭabarī,⁴⁰ the news was not relayed to him until Abū al-Jahm could apparently muster a good argument. Abū al-Jahm and Abū Ḥumayd then went to Mūsā with the enraging information about Abū Salamah's treachery, and with Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah as corroborator. Even then, Mūsā appears to have been hesitant; he moved with a considerable measure of deliberateness. He did not immediately storm to Abū al-'Abbās. He only ordered that two hundred dīnārs be sent to him, a sum which Abū al-Jahm gave to Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah. It took further action by Abū al-Jahm to persuade Mūsā to make the decisive move. He pressed the issue with Abū

²⁹ Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 345, 349; Jahshayārī, p. 86.

³⁰ Ṭabarī, III: p. 35; Azdī, p. 121; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 99.

³¹ Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 27.

³² Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 139.

³³ Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 99.

³⁴ Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 345, 349; Jahshayārī, p. 87.

³⁵ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 139.

³⁶ Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 27.

³⁷ Ṭabarī, III: p. 35-6.

³⁸ Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 27.

³⁹ Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 349; Jahshayārī, p. 87; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 99.

⁴⁰ Ṭabarī, III: pp. 28, 35.

Salamah, asking him about the *Imām*, and Abū Salamah stayed his course of denial.⁴¹ In the hitherto most strikingly open confrontation between Abū Salamah and the Khurāsāniyyah,

Abū al-Jahm said to Abū Salamah, after the news of Marwān ibn Muḥammad's slaying of the *Imām* had spread in the camp: 'If he is slain, then his brother Abū al-'Abbās is the caliph and the *Imām* after him.' Abū Salamah replied: 'O Abū al-Jahm! Prevent Abū Ḥumayd from entering Kūfah, for they are people of malice and false rumors'.⁴²

Abū al-Jahm went back to Mūsā with the further enraging news of Abū Salamah's obstinate denial.⁴³

The next night, Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah came back to the camp with a letter from Abū al-'Abbās to Abū al-Jahm and Mūsā; and this time he wandered with his news amongst the generals and the 'Shr'ah'.⁴⁴ Now, conceivably, Mūsā could not postpone matters any longer. He met in his house with the other generals, and they resolved to go to Abū al-'Abbās.⁴⁵ The next day they 'slipped away' from the camp to Kūfah, i.e., to Abū al-'Abbās; their leaders were, in order of seniority, Mūsā, Abū al-Jahm, and Abū Ḥumayd;⁴⁶ or, in another account, at the helm was the singular and ceremonial Mūsā.⁴⁷

There was now open mutiny in the camp. Abū Salamah learned of the riding party and enquired about them; he was told that they went to Kūfah on some business of theirs. When they came back, Abū Salamah sent for Abū al-Jahm and asked him: "Where have you been, O Abū al-Jahm?" Abū al-Jahm curtly replied: "I rode to my *Imām*."⁴⁸

The reports of the generals' meeting with Abū al-'Abbās, and of their paying homage to him, span the range from dignified and serene "greetings with the title of the caliphate,"⁴⁹ to the melodramatic crying and kissing of the *Imām* between the eyes and on his hands and feet.⁵⁰ But they are unanimous in that the generals did not know who, amongst the 'Abbāsids, Abū al-'Abbās was. Invariably they asked: "Who of you is Abū al-'Abbās," or 'the caliph', or 'the *Imām*'? But most interesting is the

⁴¹ Madā'ini in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28.

⁴² Ṭabarī, III: p. 35-6.

⁴³ Madā'ini in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28.

⁴⁴ Ṭabarī, III: p. 36.

⁴⁵ Ibid.; cf. Madā'ini in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28.

⁴⁶ Ṭabarī, III: p. 36.

⁴⁷ Mas'ūdi, IV: p. 99.

⁴⁸ Madā'ini in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28; and Ṭabarī, III: p. 36.

⁴⁹ Ṭabarī, III: pp. 28, 36-7; Ya'qubī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 345, 349; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 59; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336.

⁵⁰ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 139; Jahshayārī, p. 87; Ṭabarī, III: p. 35; Azdī, p. 121; Mas'ūdi, IV: p. 99.

wide reference to him as Ibn al-Ḥārithiyyah, his distinguishing name, the name by which he is referred to in the apocalyptic traditions, that which distinguished him from Abū Ja'far, his brother by another woman, who carried the same name, 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad.⁵¹

The generals took the necessary military measures to secure the temporary caliphal residence and to ensure that Abū Salamah would not be able to enter with a threatening company. Abū al-Jahm's explicit orders to Abū Ḥumayd were to execute Abū Salamah should he refuse to enter alone.⁵² Abū Salamah came in a hurry, saying: "You acted too soon; I hope it is all for the best."⁵³ Abū Ḥumayd obscenely insulted him, and Abū al-'Abbās magnanimously objected to the insult.⁵⁴ Abū Salamah apologized, trying to make his case by saying that he only wanted to "consolidate the matter for *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*;"⁵⁵ he knelt down towards the *qiblah*, and then kissed Abū al-'Abbās' hands and feet.⁵⁶ Abū al-'Abbās' act of forgiveness was one more opportunity to depict Abū Salamah's actual ideological position as a mere revisionist lapse; said Abū al-'Abbās:

We forgave you, O Abū Salamah! You [shall] not be reproached; your entitlement is greatly recognized by us; your [favorable] precedence in our realm is praiseworthy, and your lapse is forgiven. Go to your camp lest disorder befall it.⁵⁷

Madā'inī and Ṭabarī, however, do not relate such a dramatic encounter. In their accounts, Abū Salamah simply greeted Abū al-'Abbās by the title of the caliphate.⁵⁸

III.2 *Exposing the 'Abbāsīd Riwāyah and Reconstructing a Plausible Scenario*

This bewildering array of details (which cross, intersect and run parallel to one another, sometimes in contradiction, sometimes in complimentary constellations, and sometimes neither necessarily contradictory nor conceivably complementary) is a camouflage. Part of

⁵¹ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: p. 139; Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28; Jahshayārī, p. 87; Azdī, p. 121; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 345; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 59; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 146. And as Shaban correctly remarks: 'make no mistake', the caliph sought was the one of the two brothers who was born to the woman from the Banū al-Ḥārith, 'Ibn al-Ḥārithiyyah', (Shaban, *Islamic History II*, p. 2).

⁵² Ṭabarī, III: p. 36; cf. Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 28; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: pp. 139-40; Jahshayārī, p. 87.

⁵³ Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 345.

⁵⁴ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 140; Ṭabarī, III: p. 28-9.

⁵⁵ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 140.

⁵⁶ Jahshayārī, p. 87.

⁵⁷ Ibid.; cf. Azdī, p. 123.

⁵⁸ Ṭabarī, III: pp. 28, 36.

this confusion is intentional, and, yet, part of it may be owing to the nature of the impaired retentiveness of oral transmission. Very few of these variant details can be critically examined in order to be either accepted or rejected. The suggestion that Ibrāhīm's death was still unknown to the Khurāsāniyyah until they met Sābiq, and some of the conspicuous melodramatic exaggerations, may be pointed out as examples of such few details. And, even when such critical examination is possible, not much can be made out. The intentional part of this confusion is only a part of what undermines the veracity of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. But this is not to say that it was created *ex nihilo*. A great measure of truth about what actually happened is preserved in some of the logistics buried in this maze. However, trying to determine what really happened by sifting through this maze is like trying to pick the authentic trail from amongst innumerable pseudo-tracks left, on a wind-swept sandy terrain, by the haphazard wanderings of lost travelers and by the intentional misleads of obliterators. Impossible as it is, such an attempt is also not necessary; for, the general direction of events and the commanding landmarks are still extant, although submerged under the haze of a major falsehood. So pervasive was this falsehood that no measure of comparative historiographical examination can unearth the solid truth. Only by resorting to commonsense can the haze be dispelled and a semblance of reasonableness restored to the events of the period.

The rather unbelievable allegation of the chance encounter at Kunāsah ending Abū Salamah's conspiracy of detention, concealment, and denial, does not stand up to the simple question: was Abū Salamah a moron? If he meant to keep the news of the 'Abbāsīds' presence from the Khurāsāniyyah, how could he detain the princes and let loose their *mawālī* and messengers free to roam the Khurāsāniyyah infested Kūfah, bearing physical witness to the fact he so desperately tried to conceal, and carrying their masters' messages and news of their ordeal even to the heart of the military camp? A moron Abū Salamah was not; and the 'Abbāsīd mendacity proves so very transparent and naive. The very choice of Sābiq, with his amazing mobility when his masters happen to be detained, is indicatively reminiscent of his carrying Ibrāhīm's letter and bearing verbal witness in favor of al-Saffāh, under the glare of Marwān II's men. With the exposure of this falsehood, the whole 'Abbāsīd 'dressing' of the events of the period collapses.

There was no detention; nor was there a prolonged period of concealment and denial during which the 'doped' Khurāsāniyyah were helplessly waiting for Abū Salamah and innocently nagging him to produce for them their pre-anointed *Imām*. Nor did Abū Salamah enjoy an empty turf where he went about, under the unsuspecting gaze of the

Khurāsāniyyah, carrying out his conspiracies to transfer the fruit of their struggle to an *Imām* of his own choice, to the exclusion of the *Imām* in whose name they had launched their Revolution. Nor, in the final analysis, was Abū Salamah, whatever his endeavors may have been, at odds with the entire leadership structure of the Organization. That is to say, the coup perpetrators, who allegedly discovered and proclaimed al-Saffāḥ were the party which did not represent the historic Organization. The actual 'ingredients' of the situation were two trends represented by two wings: (1) the trend faithful to the established strategy of the historic Organization, i.e., keeping their options open until victory, then seeking a *rida*; and, (2), the secret and unsanctioned revisionist strategy—that of wresting final control and proclaiming a caliph who would fit into the designs of the power which had, only three years earlier, wrested decisive but only regional control of the Organization. The first trend was physically represented by Abū Salamah and others who were later either slain or silenced. The second trend was represented by Abū Muslim's men in Kūfah.

The eligible candidates, for whom the representatives of the first trend would naturally look, were mostly in the Ḥijāz, in al-Madīnah. And the 'Abbāsids alone were in Kūfah—their physical presence very much in sight, their appetite for the hunt very much honed, and their lure to Abū Muslim's wing very much vociferous, let alone its being sanctioned by Abū Muslim's standing instructions to his men. But the 'Abbāsids had nothing going for them except the will of Abū Muslim's wing, which, indeed, was backed by the necessary military power, but which also lacked the sufficient historical Revolutionary legitimacy.

Victory afforded both wings an open turf for the race. But, on the same open turf, two completely different agendas were competing: an unsuspecting open agenda, against a cunning hidden agenda.

Abū Salamah's agenda naturally required time and open consultations toward the building of a consensus. His communications with the 'Alīds of al-Madīnah must have been in full sight of the entire military leadership of the Khurāsāniyyah; and Abū Muslim's men must have given his efforts lip-service consent. The content of his communications could not have been an invitation to accept the office, whereby, if the first accepted, the remaining two would be excluded ... etc. This is too assuming and childishly unpolitic. Nor could it have been, as Shaban suggests, an offer of "the office of Amīr al-Mu'minīn on certain conditions."⁵⁹ Such multipartite negotiations could not, and,

⁵⁹ Shaban, *'Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 164.

even with our modern facilities today, cannot be conducted by correspondence. What if one or more of the invited candidates replied with conditional acceptance, or had some comments or enquiries? It, most probably, was an attempt by Abū Salamah to convene, in Kūfah, a *Shūrā* conclave where all the candidates would be present before the ‘electoral body’, i.e., before those who would seek informed satisfaction, on the basis of which they would chose a *riḍā*. Abū Salamah’s communications with the three ‘Alīds must have been mere invitations for them to be present in Kūfah for this purpose. Abū Salamah was not the conspiring party working in the dark; after all, what good would it do him to try to impose a caliph whose installation he could not ratify with the seal of necessary force!

The hidden agenda of Abū Muslim’s wing also required time to implement, but time of a different quality. Although they controlled the most effective military force, in terms of sheer numbers within the rank-and-file of the Khurāsāniyyah, and in terms of unity of purpose and solidarity in the ranks of the leaders of the close-knit clique which was aware of its distinct partisan identity, they did not command, in this capacity, the loyalties of the Kūfan, mainly ‘Alīd Shī‘ite public opinion; and they did not control the different perceptions amongst many sectors of the established *mawālī* veterans of the Organization; and, above all, they were not sure of the positions of the Arab contingents of the army and their senior Arab leaders. Negotiating this state of affairs required time, if not to secure control over all pertinent factors, then at least to shore up the situation within the army—enough to preclude a disastrous rift in the ranks. Unlike the open deliberations of Abū Salamah, their movements had to be in the dark. And, when the time came, their blow had to be administered swiftly, resolutely, irrevocably.

Mūsā ibn Ka‘b had been recalled from Rayy to Marw around two months before the decisive move—no doubt to be handled by Abū Muslim personally, by persuasion, coercion or other means. His cooperation must have been secured, for he was immediately sent to Kūfah. There, he was the highest ranking officer, and the most senior veteran present in the ranks, a leader whose Arab descent and celebrated stature as a *naqīb* qualified him to play the role of a statesman, thus lending respectability to the movement and counterbalancing Abū Salamah’s historical legitimacy and esteemed stature. Meanwhile, Abū al-Jahm must have been busy with Abū Ḥumayd and other members of their wing in recruiting other officers. The ‘Abbāsids themselves, especially through their own men, such as Sābiq, Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah and Ṣālih ibn al-Haytham, were probably directly involved in these

efforts, conceivably dispensing promises of future favors and prominent appointments in the regime-to-be, as indeed came to pass.

The absence from the field of military powers such as, especially, the majority of the Ṭayyi' contingent, and of Arab men of stature, such as al-Ḥasan and Ḥumayd, sons of Qaḥṭabah, may have made it all the easier for Abū Muslim's men to recruit some Ṭā'īd Arab celebrities and *mawālī*.⁶⁰ Other officers reported to have taken part in the final move may have also been members of the 'council' of leaders who met at Mūsā's house the night before. They were a mix of confirmed Abū Muslim loyalists,⁶¹ and other officers whose original loyalties cannot be ascertained and who were, therefore, either new recruits to the 'council' or originally Abū Muslim loyalists.⁶²

Thus, the eventful period did witness an extensive clandestine operation, but it was not Abū Salamah's. On the contrary, what was kept as a supremely guarded secret was not the 'Abbāsid presence and location, but rather the very early establishment of contact between them and Abū Muslim's men, and their joint efforts to secure a wide military coalition to support their move. With this simple and obvious readjustment of the later 'Abbasid dislocation of secretiveness, all the makings of an Abū Muslim-'Abbāsid coup become manifest, even in, or especially in, all the component accounts of the 'Abbāsid version. The rest of the jumbled details can be taken in any sequence, order or combination that may provide the most sensible and coherent process, but they would not be anything more than the remnants of the record of communications among the coup perpetrators.⁶³

⁶⁰ Such as: Abū Ghānim 'Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn Rib'ī (no.104), 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Uthmān (no.100), Salamah ibn Muḥammad and Salm *mawālī* Qaḥṭabah (nos.326 and 329, the two were probably the same person).

⁶¹ Such as: Abū Sharāḥīl (no.82), a non-Arab and the leader of the slaves contingent, Muḥammad ibn Ṣīl (no.275), a *mawālī* who was dispatched by Abū Muslim to Kūfah after it had been captured, 'Abd Allāh ibn Bassām (no.95), probably a member of the Bassām family, the *mawālī* of Naṣr ibn Sayyār who betrayed him, and uncle of Aḥlam ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Bassām (no.119), who claimed to have killed Qaḥṭabah, Ḥājib ibn Ṣaddān (no.163), probably a non-Arab, and Abū Muqātil al-Khurāsānī (no.74), probably a non-Arab.

⁶² As most probably was the case with the majority of them: Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥuṣayn al-'Abdī (no.271), Nahār ibn Ḥuṣayn al-Sa'dī (no.297), Abū Hurayrah Muḥammad ibn Farrūkh (no.259), a *mawālī*, Iṣḥāq ibn Ibrāhīm (no.209), Muḥammad ibn al-Hārith (no.260), Shabīb ibn Wāj al-Marwūdī (no.320), Sulaymān ibn al-Aswad (no.334), and Yūsuf ibn Muḥammad (no.370).

⁶³ It is interesting to note the striking parallelisms even with modern coups, complete with the unwitting respectable senior officer in the facade, the strong junior officer holding the reins in his shadow, and the other executive and field officers—members of the standard 'Revolutionary Command Council.'

Nor was it merely a superficial coup d'état involving a faction of the same ruling elite. It was a much more profound movement. Under the circumstances of Abū Muslim holding the overwhelming military edge, it was an inevitable extension, and the final triumph of the grass-roots Revolution within the Organization, which Abū Muslim had led three years earlier. Abū Salamah was swept away in the wake of the successful implementation of Abū Muslim's ideological revisionism—not the other way around.

It was also a premeditated and preconceived coup. Planning for the coup must have been the subject of continuous communications between Abū Muslim and Abū al-Jahm. It is probably not too far-fetched to suggest that a rough and general master plan had been drafted between Abū Muslim and Abū al-Jahm in Marw. Abū al-Jahm would have thus received his strategic standing instructions, on which he could only tactically improvise, even before he had marched with Qaḥṭabah. Shaban's suggestion that "the decision to nominate Abū al-'Abbās was taken on the spot by Abū al-Jahm,"⁶⁴ and that "Abū Muslim must have consented to this action because it was accomplished through the manipulation of his agent in Kūfah,"⁶⁵ cannot be accepted.⁶⁶ Abū al-Jahm, a *mawlā* of Bāhilah and a crony of Abū Muslim's, did not have a known intrinsic power base of his own. Neither could he have taken such a decision of his own accord; nor could such a momentous decision have been left by Abū Muslim to the discretion of his representative; nor did any of them have to. Certain guidelines must have existed, and, realistically, nothing precluded that.

Abū Muslim's relation-of-sorts with Ibrāhīm and the House of al-'Abbās readily points out the kind of standing instructions Abū al-Jahm must have received before leaving Khurāsān. As far as nominating Abū al-'Abbās specifically from amongst others in the House of al-'Abbās, this feat also could not have occurred without Abū Muslim's prior approval. It is more likely that Abū Muslim himself was responsible for

⁶⁴ Shaban, *Islamic History II*, p. 2.

⁶⁵ Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 165-6.

⁶⁶ Shaban demonstrates a profound understanding of the real meaning of the doctrine of *al-riḍā* as an 'important ideal of the Revolution,' and an appreciation of Abū Salamah's 'endeavoring to find *al-riḍā*.' Yet, he simply attributes the grave and strategic action which aborted Abū Salamah's efforts to superficial factors: '... the military leaders [in Kūfah], assured by their success, had no patience for the deliberations of the vastly experienced Abū Salamah. Their political experience was limited ... they decided ... to take matters into their own hands ...' (Shaban, *Islamic History II*, p. 1; cf. Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 165). Further obscuring the issue, Shaban inexplicably accepts the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* which claims an uninterrupted 'Abbāsīd leadership of the Organization since 98/716, under Muḥammad ibn 'Alī, up to 132/749, under Abū al-'Abbās (Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 150-3, 164)! See, Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 252-6.

the specific nomination. Ibrāhīm's likelier early death, in the course of 130-131/748-749, resolves any possible misgivings. But even if Ibrāhīm died as late as Muḥarram 132/August-September 749, it would still have allowed Abū al-Jahm enough time, around two to three months, to confer with Abū Muslim and to receive his specific instructions—the theatrics of Abū Ḥumayd's belated discovery of Ibrāhīm's death notwithstanding. Alternatively, nothing precludes the possibility that Mūsā ibn Ka'b brought Abū Muslim's instructions with him to Kūfah.

IV. *The Demise of the Organization*

IV.1 *In the Aftermath of the Coup: A Precarious Power-Sharing Arrangement*

Abū Salamah had held the reins of power, 'single-handedly', for two and a half months,⁶⁷ or probably a couple of weeks more. Except for the fact that Āl Muḥammad, whose *wazīr* he had been, had now been forcibly narrowed down to Āl al-'Abbās, the immediate aftermath of the coup brought no visible drastic changes to his public and official status. The coup perpetrators were, for the moment, content with having had their way regarding the installation of the new dynasty. Indeed, according to the principles to which all parties within the Organization still publicly adhered, Abū Salamah must have still enjoyed a good standing; at least, his opponents had nothing on him, i.e., nothing that could stand against him in a Revolutionary tribunal. In a 'court' of 'public opinion' in Kūfah, and within Arab and veteran contingents of the Khurāsāniyyah, had matters been immediately brought to a head, Abū Salamah would have probably been found to be the wronged party; and it appears that this was still the case up to the moment of his elimination. For the time being, the coup perpetrators appear to have decided that, since Abū Salamah himself made no waves, the most prudent course of action would be not to rock the boat, and to maintain a semblance of unity behind the new caliph.

Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā's assertion that Abū Salamah's pre-proclamation position had not been known to al-Saffāḥ until later, after he had confirmed Abū Salamah as his *wazīr*, cannot, obviously, be entertained.⁶⁸ Dīnawarī's unique tradition is also unacceptable. In consistency with his account of an amicable relation between the two parties, Dīnawarī depicts an absolute 'Abbāsīd confidence in Abū Salamah, and thus reports that Abū al-'Abbās, after consolidating his

⁶⁷ Jahshayārī, p. 87.

⁶⁸ Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 155.

power, appointed him as his *wazīr*, in charge of “everything beyond his door ... so that he used to carry out matters without consultation.”⁶⁹ It is also unlikely that Abū al-‘Abbās declared his forgiveness of the loser,⁷⁰ who was alleged to be visibly ‘despondent’ during the proclamation procession;⁷¹ for, at least publicly, there was nothing to forgive. The animated attempt by some sources, to fuse a great measure of sincerity into al-Saffāḥ’s declared forgiveness of Abū Salamah, is a complex but transparent attempt to instill the belief that Abū Salamah did wrong the lawful *Imām*, to prove the *Imām*’s magnanimity, and to exonerate him from the suspicion of complicity in an act which must have been seen, at least by some, as disgraceful. This same tradition, carried at variance in detail by these sources, inexplicably portrays al-Saffāḥ as being full of *schadenfreude* upon learning of Abū Salamah’s assassination, and, at the same time, describes his real disposition in an articulate, and more politically feasible statement: “[Abū Salamah] assumed the post of [al-Saffāḥ’s] *wazīr*, while [one or the other or both of them mutually] secreted in the heart a grudge (*wazara lahu wa-ḥi al-naḥs shay*).”⁷² The likelihood is that both men had a grudge against one another, but each had to swallow his grievance. An equilibrium of sorts still governed the situation; so much so that the tactical move of al-Saffāḥ to the military camp did not dislodge Abū Salamah from the distinguished quarters of command. In a further show of harmony, they shared the quarters.⁷³

Thus, Abū Salamah’s assumption of the post of *wazīr al-Saffāḥ* was on the surface a qualified continuation by inertia of his rather absolute designation as *wazīr Āl Muḥammad*, and, apparently, the old title was maintained. Although we possess no ‘job description’ of Abū Salamah’s office after al-Saffāḥ’s accession, his previous, almost absolute authority, is not likely to have been retained. Ibn A‘tham’s account of an inconsiderate and tyrannical Abū Salamah cannot be entertained.⁷⁴ The military coup leaders must have acquired, on behalf of Abū Muslim, considerable *de facto* powers. But no official distribution of jurisdiction was yet possible in the context of the situation which was still in a state of flux.

⁶⁹ Dīnawarī, p. 368.

⁷⁰ Azdī, p. 123; Jahshayārī, p. 87; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 115; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 196; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 7-8; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401.

⁷¹ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 140.

⁷² Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 7; cf. Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 115; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 196; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401.

⁷³ Ṭabarī, III: p. 37; Azdī, p. 124; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 100.

⁷⁴ Ibn A‘tham, VII: pp. 208-9.

On the surface, a complex tripartite equation of power sharing appears to have emerged. In reality it was not so complex.

(1) The first element of the equation was Abū Muslim and his protégés in Kūfah. In Khurāsān and the rest of the Persian territories, he enjoyed uncontested absolute mastery. His men in Kūfah were acquiring what powers they could readily and gradually amass from the disintegrating domain of Abū Salamah.

(2) The second element, the ostensibly still unviolated historical Revolutionary legitimacy represented by Abū Salamah, had definitely lost the battle. It would only be a matter of few months before the results of the silent battle would be physically translated into spilled blood.

(3) The third element was the hitherto unknown quantum of the new royal family. Potentially, they were the germ of the future antithesis which will emerge in the dialectics of the struggle for supreme power. But that still required years of 'fermentation' before the shattered Umayyad instruments of power, and the leaderless non-Abū Muslimate elements of the Khurāsāniyyah, would re-group and crystallize into a constellation that would provide a viable, independent power base. For the time being, the new dynasty had to content itself with the attainable spoils, but *only* in Iraq and, shortly later, in other western parts of the empire. The only attributes of sovereignty Abū al-'Abbās could exercise were some administrative and military appointments which he gave to family members, overriding or superseding some of Abū Salamah's earlier appointments.⁷⁵

When Abū al-'Abbās, instead of expecting or even demanding Abū Muslim's appearance in his court to pay him homage, sent him his brother Abū Ja'far to receive that homage on his behalf, at Abū Muslim's convenience, the latter treated Abū Ja'far with extreme disrespect. When Abū Ja'far complained to the caliph, this latter helplessly said: "What can be done about him? You know [what] his status [used to be] with the *Imām* [i.e. Muḥammad ibn 'Alī], and with Ibrāhīm. [Furthermore] he is the founder of the realm, and its support (*ṣāhib al-dawlah wa al-qā'im bi-'amrihā*)."⁷⁶ So much for the psychological dynamics of the relationship. But, when Abū al-'Abbās dared to transgress beyond his limits, into Abū Muslim's Persian territories, his appointee to Fars, his uncle 'Isā ibn 'Alī, was prevented from assuming his office.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 143; Ṭabarī, III: p. 37; Azdī, pp. 124-5; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 351; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 100; Khalīfah, II: pp. 424, 427; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma'ārif*, p. 372; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 482.

⁷⁶ Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 351.

⁷⁷ Ṭabarī, III: p. 71; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 343.

The territorial integrity of the realm was but a deceptive facade. The tradition attributing to Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī an early division of the anticipated territorial gains between Abū Salamah and Abū Muslim,⁷⁸ was now being effectively practiced, with the only difference being that the dynasty inherited Abū Salamah’s share. If there was any manifestation of any measure of integral sovereignty, it was the extent of Abū Muslim’s sharing with the ‘Abbāsids in their own share, through his men in Iraq, and directly through the psychological projection of his own formidable personal presence.

IV.2 *The Assassination of the Marginalized Loser*

That is why the suggestion of any active ‘Abbāsīd involvement in the episode of Abū Salamah’s assassination is highly doubtful. Abū Ja‘far’s statement, “we fear Abū Muslim more than we used to fear Ḥafṣ ibn Sulaymān,”⁷⁹ reflects the mood that must have prevailed within the dynasty. Deprived of a power base of their own, they must have felt insecure; and they must have felt that they were at the mercy of those who did have such power bases. The possibility of reshuffling alliances in the instable circumstances of immediate post-victory politics, and the not unthinkable scenario of such re-alignments taking place at their cost, must have instilled real fear in their hearts and prompted them to cautious and apprehensive inaction, especially where sensitive intra-Organization politics was concerned.

A momentous act such as the killing of Abū Salamah can not be attributed to al-Saffāḥ, as Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih does.⁸⁰ Even an ‘Abbāsīd initiative of proposing to Abū Muslim such a course of action is very remote. Some of the sources which carry this tradition ascribe to Dawūd ibn ‘Alī, or to someone else of their number, that he had alerted al-Saffāḥ to the possibility of Abū Muslim’s complicity with Abū Salamah. Abū Ja‘far related:

One of us said: ‘What do you know? Maybe, what Abū Salamah has done had been approved by Abū Muslim.’ None of us made an utterance. Then *Amīr al-Mu‘minīn* Abū al-‘Abbās said: ‘If that had been approved by Abū Muslim, we are in serious trouble, unless God should save us from it’.⁸¹

⁷⁸ *Akhbār*, p. 270.

⁷⁹ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 201.

⁸⁰ Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 482, V: p. 113.

⁸¹ Madā‘inī in Ṭabarī, III: p. 58; cf. Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, pp. 88, 154-7; Jahshayārī, p. 90; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, p. 155.

So frightened were they that Balādhuṛī and Madā'inī relate that, even after Abū Muslim had given them permission to execute Abū Salamah, they refrained and asked Abū Muslim to dispatch his own executioner.⁸²

As Abū Muslim could not have been the last to know of what had occurred during the tug-of-war for the nomination, the theatrics of the dialogue between Abū Ja'far and Abū Muslim cannot be taken seriously. Abū Ja'far informed Abū Muslim of Abū Salamah's role, "... then[Abū Muslim] said: 'Did Abū Salamah do it?' Abū Ja'far said: 'Yes, he did it.' Abū Muslim said: 'I shall protect you from him'.⁸³ Nor was Abū Muslim wanting in strategic insight, nor, perhaps, in personal vindictiveness.

Equally untenable, or even more so, is the tradition which ascribes to al-Saffāḥ an impassioned defense of Abū Salamah, on grounds of his precedence in the service of the *da'wah*, that his revisionism was merely a forgivable lapse, and that al-Saffāḥ was confident of his sincerity. When Abū Salamah was, nevertheless, murdered, Abū al-'Abbās was not loathe to express his *schadenfreude* by versifying:

*Ilā n-nāri fa-byadḥhab, wa-man kāna mithlahu
'alā ayyi shay'in fātānā minhu na'safu*

To hell let him go! What is there, in his likes,
which if we miss we should regret?⁸⁴

What is more likely to have happened is none of the above; it is scattered therein. Both parties, realizing their inability to resolve the untenable situation of cohabitation, had to settle into a sociable relationship. Abū Salamah was reportedly a nightly entertainment companion of al-Saffāḥ.⁸⁵ In the political context, both parties must have been impotently apprehensive, and anxiously expectant of the final verdict to be passed by the real power holders. When Abū Muslim's men reported to him, as should be expected, that Abū Salamah's elimination had become possible, or imperative, he signaled to the 'Abbāsids, and to whomever it may have concerned, in no uncertain

⁸² Balādhuṛī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: pp. 155-6; Ṭabarī III: p. 60; also, Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 352.

⁸³ Balādhuṛī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 155; cf. Madā'inī in Ṭabarī, III: pp. 59-60; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 60; an interesting and far more dramatic variation is in Ibn A'tham, VIII: pp. 207-9.

⁸⁴ Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 115-6; for variations on this tradition, cf. Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 7-8; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401; Ibn Khallikān confuses the two traditions in one account, II: p. 196; for other 'Abbāsīd expressions of gloating, cf. Jahshayārī, p. 90; Azdī, p. 145; Balādhuṛī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 155-7; in Dīnawarī's unique account, Abū Muslim, learning of Abū Salamah's favored position with al-Saffāḥ, took the initiative and ordered his executioner to drag Abū Salamah from al-Saffāḥ's court and kill him, p. 368.

⁸⁵ Ṭabarī, III: p. 59; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 116; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 195; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 70; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401.

terms, his displeasure with Abū Salamah, “because he infringed [on] and changed [his pledges] (*nakatha wa ghayyara wa baddala*).”⁸⁶

This must have coincided with Abū Muslim’s remark to Abū Salamah, in his comment on one of his letters, accusing him of hypocrisy,⁸⁷ and it must have immediately preceded al-Saffāh’s sudden and conspicuous estrangement with Abū Salamah before he changed his headquarters from the military camp at Ḥammān A‘yan, or al-Nukhaylah, to al-Hāshimiyah.⁸⁸

The reasons behind Abū al-‘Abbās’ relocation to al-Hāshimiyah may be too complex to simplify by relegating them to a tactical attempt to pre-absolve himself from complicity in the impending slaying; but seeking absolution is also too obvious not to be counted as one of the reasons. For, when the time came for implementing the plot, Abū al-‘Abbās, in a further and more explicit attempt to camouflage the conspiracy and his complicity, sent out an announcer to announce publicly that he had rehabilitated Abū Salamah and awarded him his caliphal presents. Abū Salamah resumed his nightly audience with the caliph, and shortly thereafter was *assassinated*, in the late hours of the night.⁸⁹

It was neither an official nor a public execution, nor did any of the regime cronies claim responsibility. It is significant that the allegation put in public currency was that the Khawārīj killed the hapless *wazīr*.⁹⁰ It is also significant that, of the enormous numbers of men Abū Muslim had in Kūfah, any of whom could have carried out the assassination, none was chosen. The task was not even left to Abū al-Jahm to handle. Instead, Abū Muslim personally entrusted the task to one of his otherwise inconspicuous men in Khurāsān, al-Marrār ibn Anas al-Ḍabbī (no. 245), with some assistants.⁹¹ The rationale was probably to avoid any potential association with any of the respectable ‘comrades’ of the slain, should anything have gone wrong. It is also significant that nothing further is known of al-Marrār’s own fate. It is tempting to speculate that, somehow, it was ensured that his momentous secret

⁸⁶ Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 115.

⁸⁷ Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: pp. 218-9.

⁸⁸ Ṭabarī, III: pp. 37, 59-60.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 59; cf. Jahshayārī, p. 90.

⁹⁰ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 15-6; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 59-60; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 196; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 8, 79; Dhahabī, *Tārkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401; Jahshayārī, p. 90.

⁹¹ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: pp. 155, 156; Ṭabarī, III: p. 60; Azdī, p. 145; Dīnawarī, p. 368; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārkh*, p. 352; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 8, 60; Dhahabī, *Tārkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 341; the unique report by Jahshayārī, that the well known Usayd ibn ‘Abd Allāh (no.353) was among the assassins is probably an error, p. 90.

would not be known first-hand, from him in person. Thicker camouflage was further ensured by giving the fallen Abū Salamah a respectable funeral. Prayers for his comfort were led by the caliph's brother, Yaḥyā ibn Muḥammad,⁹² and he was buried in the caliph's then current seat of government, al-Madīnah al-Hāshimiyyah.⁹³

Of course, the 'Abbāsids were happy. And although, pragmatically, there were good and objective political reasons for the atrocity, the personal dimension in Abū Muslim's motives cannot be ignored. The vindictive Abū Muslim, who was never known for the grace of forgiving any personal affront, probably never forgave Abū Salamah for having once been his master.

Abū Salamah stayed alive in the 'Abbāsīd realm for three or four months,⁹⁴ and was assassinated in Rajab, 132/February-March, 750,⁹⁵ only six months after a life-time struggle in the cause of *al-riḍā min Āl Muḥammad* had come to fruition, ironically, with the eventual imposition of the branch of Āl Muḥammad whose triumph necessitated his own undoing.

Although Abū al-Jahm gave the military commanders a glimpse of the real story,⁹⁶ the public at large, and probably the rank-and-file of the Khurāsāniyyah, had only the official version. But the irony was not lost on at least one poet—Sulaymān ibn Muhājir al-Bajāli poetized the verses which have become almost synonymous with the story of the assassination. Sardonicly, but obliquely, he mourned the fallen *wazīr* in a 'constipated' passion which tells of the untold treachery:

*Inna l-masā'ata qad tasurru wa-rubbamā
kāna s-surūru bi-mā karihta jadīrā
inna l-wazīra, wazīra Āli Muḥammadīn,*

⁹² Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashwāf III*, p. 156; Ṭabarī, III: p. 60; Azdī, p. 145.

⁹³ Ṭabarī, III: p. 60.

⁹⁴ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashwāf III*, p. 157.

⁹⁵ Jahshayārī, p. 90; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 196; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, pp. 8, 79; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401.

⁹⁶ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashwāf III*, p. 156.

awdā fa-man yashmāka kāna wazīrā

Verily, offense may delight; and, sometimes,
 that which you hate may be of delight worthy!
 Verily, the *wazīr*, *wazīr* Āl Muḥammad [I mean],
 has perished. May a *wazīr* be[come] he who hates you!⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Masʿūdī, IV: p. 116; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 196; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 79; cf. Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 401; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: p. 156; Ṭabarī, III: p. 60; Azdī, p. 145; Dīmawarī, p. 368; Yaʿqūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 353; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 8; Ibn al-Ṭīqīqā, pp. 156-7; Ibn Aʿtham, VIII: p. 209; Dārquṭnī, II: p. 905.

PART TWO

THE DEMOGRAPHIC BALANCE IN THE
REVOLUTIONARY PROVINCE

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CHAPTER SIX
CONVERSION IN THE PROVINCE

I. *Prelude*

The question of the predominant ethnic identity of the Organization will be undertaken in part three of this book. As will be shown there, the resulting figures do establish a decided non-Arab majority of 80 %.

But those figures do not reflect the demographic balance within the popular base of the coalition of the Revolutionary forces, *as differentiated from the Organization*. Those figures are too clinically insulated from the animated rhythm of the nameless masses who carried out the Revolution on the ground. To tune in to this rhythm, we must investigate the general demographic situation of the Muslims in Khurāsān. In this respect two questions arise: First, for the Iranians to have been a factor in the internal politics of the empire, that is, an active ingredient of the politically and militarily significant demographic balance, one would have to assume their conversion to Islam in substantial numbers, no matter how superficial or recent that conversion may have been. Did the Iranians convert in sufficient numbers, and when? The second question relates to the quantitative aspect of the Arab presence in Khurāsān, and whether it could have raised a quantum sufficient to field a substantial minority of the Revolutionaries—let alone the mainstay of the Revolution. The next chapter will deal with this question. Presently, we shall attempt to address the first question—the issue of conversion.

“Many new mosques arose and the heathen came over to Islam in great crowds,”¹ says Wellhausen. Dennett also speaks of ‘widespread conversion’, and asserts that “the rate of conversion was high.”² Frye emphatically states that “it was only during the time of Abū Muslim that Khurāsān became definitely converted to Islam.”³ Even Sharon, who, like the other revisionists, denies an overwhelming Iranian participation in the Revolution, recognizes “the great influx of converts to Islam.”⁴

¹ Wellhausen, p. 457.

² Dennett, *Conversion*, pp.128, 119.

³ Frye, p. 31.

⁴ Sharon, *Revolt*, p. 28.

Shaban holds exactly the opposite view. When the Revolution broke out in 129/747, he asserts, "Islam was not yet widespread even in Merv itself."⁵ In view of the overwhelming indications in the source material to the contrary, Shaban's assertion may be dismissed as an unfounded conjecture which he himself contradicts elsewhere.⁶ But Bulliet, in his quantitative study of conversion, finds for Shaban. He says of his own results:

[They] support the conclusions of recent investigators of the Abbasid revolution who have seen it as primarily an Arab movement, despite its origin in eastern Iran. The earlier idea that it represents a massive intrusion of Iranian influence into Muslim politics is impossible to sustain when it is realized that the population of Iran was only about 8 percent Muslim in 750 when the Abbasids came to power.⁷

The concept of trying to quantify the available historical data is, by itself, a thrilling novelty in historical Islamic studies.⁸ However, for complex methodological reasons, which I discussed elsewhere,⁹ Bulliet's methodology does not hold its own, his statistical results cannot be accepted, and his statement that his results support Shaban's conclusions is as baseless as Shaban's.

II. Conversion: Scope, Patterns and Instances

II.1 Early Conversion

Almost from the inception of their contact with the Arab Muslim conquerors, conversion to Islam had not been exactly a taboo for the Iranians. Almost instantaneous conversion occurred, and Iranian converts had their place in 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb's arrangements upon the institution of the *dīwān* ca. 15/636-637.¹⁰

Interesting cases of mass conversion during the early conquests are reported by Balādhurī. After the battle of Qādisiyyah in 14/635-636, four thousand of Rustam's soldiers, known as *Jund Shahānshāh*, converted and enrolled in the *dīwān*.¹¹ The Daylamites of Ḥiṣn Qazwīn "disdained

⁵ Shaban, *Abbasid Revolution*, p. xv, also p.115.

⁶ Describing the Sughdians' response to Ashras ibn 'Abd Allāh's attempt to convert them (see *infra*, p. 153), Shaban says: "The people accepted [Islam], apparently in great numbers." *Abbasid Revolution*, p. 111.

⁷ Bulliet, *Conversion*, pp. 43-4. In footnote no. 1, Bulliet refers to Shaban as the 'recent investigators'.

⁸ Indeed, the credit is due to Bulliet for the very idea of attempting this approach in part three of this book, albeit differently.

⁹ Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 268-72.

¹⁰ Ṭabarī, I: p. 2411, Balādhurī, *Futūh*, pp. 556, 560; Abū 'Ubayd, p. 247.

¹¹ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, p. 343.

[having] to pay the *jizyah*, poll tax, and proclaimed Islam,” and they came to be known as *Ḥamrā’ Daylam*.¹² Those known as the *Iṣbahāniyyūn* “were people who had converted to Islam and migrated to Baṣrah.”¹³ In 17/638-639, the *Asāwirah*, a military contingent of Iranian noblemen who had been in the vanguard of Yazdgird’s army, converted, and they did so on their own terms.¹⁴

When, around 30-31/650-652, ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Amir started the conquest (or reconquest?) of Khurāsān in earnest, one of his commanders, the illustrious ‘Abd Allāh ibn Khāzim, exacted, or probably accepted from Sarakhs the conversion to Islam of a hundred of its men as part of the peace treaty package.¹⁵ Another of Ibn ‘Amir’s commanders, the celebrated al-Aḥnaf ibn Qays, was marching at the head of a force of “four thousand Arabs and one thousand Muslim Iranians.”¹⁶

This early active participation by the converts in the wars of the empire, was only a humble beginning of a long and turbulent history of multi-faceted entanglement in its internal and external wars and politics, by ever growing numbers of ever vacillating converts from the Iranian masses and nobility alike. Events, within the Muslim polity, involving names and numbers of Iranian converts are splashed all over the history of Umayyad Khurāsān. Of course, names, especially recurrent and recognizable names, belong to established *mawālī* or convert princes and *dihqāns*: Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī, his son Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān, Thābit ibn Quṭbah, his brother Ḥurayth ibn Quṭbah, Abū al-Ṣaydā’, Nīzak, Ghūrak, Ṭughshādah, etc. And, of course, the numbers—thousands or tens of thousands—belong to the masses of nameless faces.

Four years after the second civil war had ended, in 77/696-697, Bukayr ibn Wishāh, the ex-governor of Khurāsān who had during the civil war wrested control over the province for the Umayyads, rose in rebellion against its current governor, Umayyah ibn ‘Abd Allāh. The established *mawālī* played a prominent role within the government ranks.¹⁷ But the primordial matter of which the Iranian religious landscape was made presented a different potential. Before he started his rebellion, one of his accomplices, ‘Attāb al-Laḳwah, had encouraged Bukayr, pointing out the huge potential for recruitment from the ranks

¹² Ibid., pp. 394-5.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 449-50.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 459-61; Tabarī, I: pp. 2551-6. Cf. Zakeri, index of technical terms (*asāwira*).

¹⁵ Balādhuṛī, *Futūḥ*, p. 501.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 503.

¹⁷ *Infra*.

of the non-Muslim Iranians of Marw; he had said to him: “I bring to your side, from the people Marw, as many as you want ... it would suffice to have an announcer announce: ‘whoever converts to Islam will be relieved of the *kharāj*’; then fifty thousand [willing] to perform the prayers would come to you.”¹⁸ We are not told whether Bukayr availed himself of the opportunity.

Shaban, analyzing Bukayr’s rebellion, refers his reader to Ṭabarī. He does not relate the story; and that is fine; except that he takes this specific element of the narrative and twists it. He says: “Bukayr made another move to rally the Iranians to his side by promising all converts remission from the *kharāj*.”¹⁹ The other move Bukayr made for the purpose, according to Shaban, was that, after having captured Thābit ibn Qutbah, a leader of the *mawālī*, “he let him go free, probably trying to appeal to his supporters.”²⁰ Actually, Ṭabarī reports a different reason. Bukayr was simply returning a previous favor.²¹ There is nothing intrinsically wrong in suggesting the probability which Shaban advances. But the problem is that Shaban combines a conjecture with a twisted reading of Ṭabarī’s text, which he pretends to accept at face value, to build up towards a central conclusion. He concludes that Bukayr’s failed revolt “made both the Arabs and the Iranians aware of the problems which might occur as a result of widespread conversion.”²² This means that widespread conversion had not started yet; and that both parties had sufficient reasons to resist it. Clearly, the insinuation is that, subsequently, both parties did something about it and succeeded.

Actually, if anything, ‘Attāb’s perception of the Iranians’ receptivity, at this relatively early stage, to the idea of conversion and the potentially associated benefits is the most important feature of this element of the story. The Arabs (as tax beneficiaries and as parties to inter-tribal and intra-Establishment strife, in which one party or the other might dread Iranian involvement) may have been made aware of the problems of conversion, whether at this or any other juncture (not that Arab parties to such strife ever refrained from welcoming Iranian involvement when it happened to be on their side). If the Iranians (as tax payers alienated from the benefits and the other trappings of belonging to the imperial structure) were made aware of anything related to the issue of conversion, at this juncture or even earlier, it must have been the benefits which ought to have been associated in their perceptions with

¹⁸ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1024 ff.

¹⁹ Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 47.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1026.

²² Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 47.

the issue. Whether in response to the official Establishment's occasional willingness to extend the benefits, or in rallying to Muslim activist movements which opposed the frequent withholding of these benefits by the Establishment, the subsequent history of the process of conversion would only confirm 'Attāb's perception.

II.2 *The House of Quṭbah and the Transoxanian Connection*

The *mawālī* who fought on the side of the government in Bukayr ibn Wishāh's rebellion were led by two brothers. Thābit and Ḥurayth, sons of Quṭbah, were *mawālīs* of Khuzā'ah.²³ Wellhausen refers to them as 'Iranian officers' in the Arab army,²⁴ but Shaban specifies a Sughdian origin.²⁵ Actually, we know nothing about their family origins, but Shaban's inference is corroborated by the brothers' activities and connections.

Thābit and Ḥurayth were two extremely consequential figures in the Umayyad history of Khurāsān during their lifetimes and, posthumously, in the history of the Organization and the Revolution. Their influence, the loyalty and devotion they commanded in Transoxania, and their role during their lifetimes are amply documented in the sources²⁶ and acknowledged in modern scholarship.²⁷ Their lasting legacy probably carried Transoxania for the Revolution through their constituency, which was led by their heir, al-'Alā' ibn Ḥurayth (no. 121). However, the 'dynastic' element in the story of the House of Quṭbah is completely overlooked in the sources;²⁸ for, even where the genealogical link is inadvertently recorded, the legacy is not invoked, and the role is severely under-reported.²⁹ With the exception of Blankinship,³⁰ modern

²³ Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 183, refers to Thābit as an 'Arab hero'. In the casual manner of the sources, Balādhurī (*Futūh*, p. 515) refers to the brothers as 'the Khuzā'ites'; and *Akhbār* (pp. 216, 219, 220) refers to Ḥurayth's son, al-'Alā', as 'al-Khuzā'ī'. However, Ṭabarī (II: pp. 1023-6, 1080) explicitly refers to them as *mawālīs* of the tribe.

²⁴ Wellhausen, pp. 424, 496.

²⁵ Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 58-61; cf. Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fī Khurāsān*,' pp. 316-8.

²⁶ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1023-1029, 1080-2, 1152-9; Balādhurī, *Futūh*, pp. 515-6; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 70, 83, 99-100.

²⁷ Wellhausen, pp. 424-6, 496; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 183-4; Gibb, *Conquests*, p. 26; Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 47, 55, 58-61; Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fī Khurāsān*,' pp. 148, 316, 320.

²⁸ Ṭabarī, IV: 1953, 1968; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 116; and Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 300; who, besides *Akhbār*, are the only ones amongst our sources to even mention al-'Alā', fail to establish the link. They cite his name only up to his father's first name, and neglect any tribal connection.

²⁹ *Akhbār*, p. 219, is the only source that establishes the link by citing al-'Alā''s full name: 'al-'Alā' ibn Ḥurayth ibn Quṭbah al-Khuzā'ī,' but its reports on his decisive activities in Transoxania, before and during the Revolution, are extremely down-scaled

scholarship has been oblivious of al-‘Alā’,³¹ of the legacy he represented, and of its natural extension into the exploits of the Organization.

What have been completely untapped are the elements in the episode of the House of Quṭbah which may shed some light on the issue of conversion, especially in Transoxania—the ‘lost continent’ in the history of the Revolution.³²

The status Thābit and Ḥurayth enjoyed amongst the population and the ruling dynasties in Transoxania went far beyond what their mercantile interests could have bought them. Ṭabarī expounds:

Thābit was beloved and influential amongst the Iranians (*al-‘Ajām*). They venerated him and used his name as a charm. If an Iranian wanted to give a pledge which he intended to fulfil, he would swear by Thābit’s life, and then would never breach [the pledge].³³

The fact that they had their own bodyguards (*shākiriyyah*)³⁴ would probably suggest that they came from a princely dynasty. But, above all, it is their ability to forge huge coalitions of geopolitical proportions and between unlikely parties that testifies to their real political heft.³⁵

(pp. 278, 337). Nothing is reported of his fortunes thereafter. This is not commensurate with the legacy and the constituency he represented, with his early subscription to the Organization (p. 202), with his prominent roles in the ‘general assembly’ (p. 215) and in the ‘staff meeting’ which decided where to proclaim the Revolution (p. 273), and with his almost single-handed leadership in delivering the entire territory beyond the Oxus (p. 278).

³⁰ Blankinship, ‘*al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ p. 318.

³¹ A failing which is understandable before the discovery of the *Akhbār* manuscript and its eventual publication in 1971.

³² Wellhausen excludes it from participation, p. 498; Gibb even puts the region in the ‘Umayyad camp, *Conquests*, p. 93. Even Daniel, who recognizes a mass rising of sorts, also declares Transoxania the most ‘openly and actively pro-Umayyad’, *Khurasan*, p. 86, cf. p. 58.

³³ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1152; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 183; Shaban, ‘*Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 59.

³⁴ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1082; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 183; Shaban, ‘*Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 58.

³⁵ When the brothers fell out with the governor of Khurāsān, al-Muhallab, in 82/701-702, they joined the Arab insurgent, Mūsā ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Khāzim, in his stronghold in Tirmidh (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1082). When, in 85/704-705, the new governor, Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab, confiscated their property, persecuted their families, and killed their half-brother, they escalated their insurgency and forged an alliance between Mūsā, Ṭarkhūn of Samarqand, al-Sabal of Khuttal, the people of Bukhārā and of Ṣāghāniyān, and Nīzak, the Hephthalite prince of Bādghīs in Ṭukhārīstān. They refrained from invading the seat of Arab power in Khurāsān proper, because the Arab insurgents were apprehensive that Thābit and Ḥarayth would take over Khurāsān. The coalition forces then dispersed after satisfying themselves with expelling the officials of the Arab government from the whole of Transoxania (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1152-4; cf. Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 515). Soon thereafter Thābit fell out with Mūsā (Ḥurayth, in the meantime, had been killed in battle), and left Tirmidh to Hashūrā (Khushwarāgh as Wellhausen corrects the reading, p. 425). ‘Many people, Arabs and Iranians joined him’ (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1156). Besieged by Mūsā, Thābit called on his allies, his natural constituency. Ṭarkhūn of

The brothers' ability to muster a force of 80,000 Iranians³⁶ and to command personal, and probably 'dynastic', loyalty is the legacy they bequeathed to their heir, al-'Alā'. These 80,000 were undoubtedly the forerunners of the masses in whose midst al-'Alā' was conducting his Revolutionary propaganda in Khwārizm, Āmul, Bukhārā and Sughdiana,³⁷ and whose receptivity to the *da'wah*, since probably the times of Khidāsh, qualified Transoxania to become one of the three regional field commands established by Bukayr ibn Māhān's measures to upgrade the Organizational structure, measures which were implemented by Abū Salamah in his 125-126/743-744 trip to Khurāsān. They were also the forerunners of the tens of thousands who, under al-'Alā's leadership and in the shadow of the Muslim Revolutionary Black Banners, swept Transoxania clean of Umayyad presence. The sources' disregard, or ignorance, of the glaring fact can partly be ascribed to the absence of the Arab element from the scene.

This emphasis on establishing this link needs not, however, be necessarily construed as an insinuation that the brothers' followers were all converts—although there is nothing to preclude the possibility that a great number of them could have been. It is mainly meant to invoke the entire Sughdian connection and to highlight the fact that, ever since it started on this large scale, the Sughdian—and other Iranian—entanglement in the internal affairs of Islam never stopped, from Thābit and Ḥurayth, through Khidāsh, to al-'Alā' and Abū Muslim.

This connection unfolded in a continuum of mercantile mutual interest, in which religion was not always a spiritual matter.³⁸ Especially

Samarqand came immediately. 'Then Sughdian reinforcements became numerous' (Balādhurī, *Futūh* p. 515). The people of Kish, Nasaf and Bukhārā joined the fray, and Thābit, now leading a force of eighty thousand, besieged Mūsā. Eventually, Thābit was assassinated. The story is told almost identically by Ṭabarī (II: pp. 1156-9) and Balādhurī (*Futūh*, pp. 515-6). It is also retold by Wellhausen, pp. 424-6; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 183-4; Gibb, *Conquests*, pp. 26-7; Shaban, *'Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 58-61.

³⁶ Indeed, there were some Arabs amongst them, as Ṭabarī explicitly says (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1156); but their number must have been negligible. Mūsā's forces, including the brothers' following before they forged the coalition, were only eight thousand (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1152).

³⁷ *'Nawāḥiḥ al-latī Kāna yaḏū fihā min Khwārizm wa Āmul wa min Bukhārā wa al-Sughd* (*Akhbār*, p. 218).

³⁸ Shaban correctly elicits the mercantile character of Sughdiana. In his analysis of the Quṭbah brothers' interests and their motives in supporting the Arab campaigns against their own native land, he stops short, however, from going all the way to draw the full conclusions (*'Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 48, 59). It is true that, as he points out, securing a treaty status for Sughdiana would exempt the region from the status of *dār al-ḥarb*, enemy territory, and, consequently, reduce the tariffs its merchants pay from 10% to 5%. But then, it would not exempt the country from paying tribute, and the non-Muslims from paying the *jizyah*. Moreover, even in cases of worst Arab practices, where conversion did not exempt the converts from the poll tax, it would have reduced the

from the Sughdian end, and especially after Qutaybah ibn Muslim's conquests, it was viewed as a question of convenience, a passport to the club of the exemptees, not a matter of ideological pride. The Arabs were not of one mind on the issue; even the government was not consistent; and there were also amongst the Arabs: the 'mercantilists', and the moralist ideologues. The interplay between these elements will mark the turbulent history of conversion, especially in Transoxania, with waves of mass conversion followed by mass apostasies.

In Transoxania, mass conversion and mass apostasies came to historiographical light with Qutaybah ibn Muslim's conquests, ca. 86-96/705-715. The pattern matched the tide and ebb of Arab military presence. It is true that eventually the net resultant was that Islam took strong roots, but this pattern remained the hallmark of the process in the area until well into the 'Abbāsīd era. Narshakhī sums it up:

The inhabitants of Bukhārā became Muslims, but each time after the Muslims withdrew they apostatized. Qutayba ibn Muslim converted them to Islam three times, but they (repeatedly) apostatized and became infidels. The fourth time he made war he seized the city and established Islam there after much difficulty. He instilled Islam in their hearts, and made (their religion) difficult for them in every way. They accepted Islam in appearance but in secret worshipped idols. Qutaybah thought it proper to order the people of Bukhārā to give one-half of their homes to the Arabs so that the Arabs might be with them and informed of their sentiments. Then they would be obliged to be Muslims. In this manner he made Islam prevail ... He built mosques and eradicated traces of unbelief and the precepts of the fire-worshippers ... He built a grand mosque and ordered the people to perform the Friday prayer there ... in the year 94/712-713 ... he had it proclaimed that 'Whosoever is present at the Friday prayer, I will give him two *dirhams*.' The people of Bukhārā, at the beginning of (their conversion to) Islam, during prayer, read the Qur'an in Persian ... When the Muslims increased, and the inclination of the people for Islam grew every day, (the worshippers) could not be contained in that mosque.³⁹

'Umar II (r. 99-101/717-720) whether out of piety or prudence, changed the course; instead of coercing and taxing, he preached and exempted. He is even reported to have extended remuneration to the converts, "*wa farāḍa li-man aslama.*"⁴⁰ "So people rushed to [embrace] Islam."⁴¹ When, out of fiscal considerations, his governor in Khurāsān

duty on their trade still further, to 2.5% (Abū 'Ubayd, pp. 530 ff). Clearly, the interest of the Qutbah brothers, and of those whom they represented, was in conversion rather than in exposing the land to conquest or to unfavorable treaties.

³⁹ Narshakhī -Frye, pp. 47-8, 49 (Narshakhī, pp. 73-4, 75).

⁴⁰ Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 524.

⁴¹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1354.

sounded him out on testing the converts for circumcision, 'Umar II replied with his famous statement: "God has sent Muḥammad, P.b.u.h., to preach not to circumcise."⁴²

'Umar II's experiment did not survive the passing of his short reign. Apostasies soon occurred, as we see from the Sughdian insurgencies that occupy Ṭabarī's chronicles of the following years.⁴³ Wellhausen articulated the conversion-apostasy dimension of the insurgencies of the Sughdians, who, he says: "merely because of the material advantages had embraced Islam ... There is no doubt that they forthwith defected from Islam."⁴⁴

In 110/729-730, the new governor, Ashras ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Sulamī took the initiative of summoning the Sughdians to convert to Islam. He commissioned for the ambitious operation Abū al-Ṣaydā' Ṣāliḥ ibn Ṭarīf (or Ṭurayf), a *mawlā*, who accepted the commission on the condition that respondents would be relieved of the poll tax. The Sughdians 'rushed' (*fa-sāra'a al-nās*) to embrace the religion; in Barthold's words: "the success of the mission exceeded all expectations."⁴⁵ Under the pressure of the *dihqāns* of Bukhārā and the prince of Samarqand, and realizing the grave fiscal repercussions, Ashras reneged on his promise of remitting the *jizyah*. Now, the converts apostatized (*fa-kafarat al-Sughd wa Bukhārā*), and called in the Turgesth.⁴⁶

In 123/740-741, in his attempt to repatriate the deserting Sughdians, Naṣr ibn Sayyār accepted all their conditions which were unacceptable to his compatriots. He managed to convince his people and the caliph Hishām. The conditions were all unusual, but the one that stands out as the most indicative for the present issue is the one that stipulates "that he would not punish those who had been Muslims and [subsequently] apostatized."⁴⁷

⁴² Ibid.; cf. Wellhausen, pp. 450-1; Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 188. On 'Umar II's fiscal policy, see Gibb, 'Fiscal rescript,' pp. 3-16, esp. 1, 15-16.

⁴³ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1418-32, 1439-49.

⁴⁴ Wellhausen, p. 463.

⁴⁵ Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 190.

⁴⁶ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1507-10; cf. Balādhūrī, *Futūḥ*, p. 526. Ṭabarī's text is one of the most important on the administration of Khurāsān. The above summary concentrates only on the elements of the story which highlight the mass conversion/mass apostasy pattern. Aside from their differences on technical points of taxation, with which the text is laden, modern scholars concur on noting these elements, albeit not explicitly as a pattern. Cf. Vloten, pp. 51-3; Wellhausen, pp. 456-8; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 189-90; Gibb, *Conquests*, pp. 69-70; Dūrī, 'Darā'ib,' pp. 75-87, esp. 84-5. Even Shaban recognizes the mass character of conversion in this instance, but he does not dwell on its implications, which happen to contradict his theory. He casually takes note that: 'the people accepted [Islam], apparently in great numbers.' *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 111.

⁴⁷ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1717-8; cf. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 192; Gibb, *Conquests*, pp. 92-93; Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 131; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' pp. 326-7.

II.3 Conversion South of the Oxus

South of the Oxus, in Lower Ṭukhāristān, but more so in Khurāsān proper, the process of conversion was much quieter, more gradual, but steadily growing ever since it had started with the early conquests. The figures which had been in the range of few thousands, grew into the range of tens of thousands.

Abū al-Ṣaydā', Ashras' delegate preacher to Transoxania in 110/729-730, had complained in 100/718-719 to 'Umar II: "Twenty thousand of the *mawālī* participate in the military campaigns without remuneration (*'aṭā'*) and without rations (*riḡq*); and a similar number of *dhimmī* converts pay the *kharāj*."⁴⁸ Of course, these numbers must be added to the seven thousand strong *mawālī* division in Qutaybah's army, who were led by Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī and who enjoyed full membership in the *dīwān*, complete with *'aṭā'* and *riḡq*.⁴⁹

In 116/734-735, the revolt of al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj and the Murji'ites, broke out. Al-Ḥārith started out from al-Nakhudh, (Andkhūy/Andakhud), with four thousand men. He swept through Fāryāb, Balkh, Jūzjān, Ṭālaqān and Marw al-Rūdh in Lower Ṭukhāristān, and arrived at Marw with sixty thousand men. With him were some horsemen of the Azd and Tamīm, and the *dihqāns* and princes of Jūzjān, Fāryāb, Ṭālaqān, Marw, 'and their likes'.⁵⁰ The poet al-Kumayt al-Asadī even put the number of the rebels at seventy thousand ("*fa-kayfa wa antumu sab'ūna alfan*").⁵¹

Who were the majority of this tremendous army? Shaban recognizes the presence of non-Arab (Hephthalite) armies amongst them, but he does not address the question of their religious affiliation at the time, nor does he acknowledge the implications of his acceptance of this huge number of non-Arabs in a Muslim revolt with religious and moralistic overtones.⁵² For, even if some were non-Muslims, a possibility which al-Ḥārith's later alliance with the non-Muslim Turgesh would suggest, a great many of them must have been native converts. This is corroborated by the Murji'ite character of the revolt and by al-Ḥārith's uncompromising puritan posturing.⁵³ Barthold identifies both factions in al-Ḥārith's army: "both the Muslims, especially the new converts, and the non-Muslims."⁵⁴ In any case, the rallying of non-Muslims around a

⁴⁸ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1354.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1291.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1566-9.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1575; Kumayt, I: p. 160.

⁵² Shaban, *Abbāsid Revolution*, pp. 118-9.

⁵³ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1570-2.

⁵⁴ Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 190-1.

revolt raising purely Muslim slogans could not have been a big deal. For the Murji'ites, at one stage of the evolution of their theology, a mere pronouncement of the faith was adequate—and that, if necessary, could, of course, be performed on the spot. A further development in the theology of the Murji'ah made the issue even less relevant. In terms of Jahm ibn Ṣafwān's doctrine of faith (*īmān*), one could be considered as a believer if one harbored the faith in one's heart—thus, even the mere pronouncement of the faith became unnecessary.⁵⁵ If the call to *al-riḍā*, albeit 'clanishly' unqualified, the hoisting of the Black Banners, and encouraging conversion were three similarities between this Murji'ite revolt and the Organization, they were not the only ones. There can be no illusion of a significant Arab presence in al-Ḥārith's forces. The figure is too huge for the limited Arab presence in the province to sustain.⁵⁶ And, anyway, when "the *dihqāns* went home," al-Ḥārith's forces were reduced to "around three thousand."⁵⁷

Naṣr ibn Sayyār, returning from his first Transoxanian campaign as governor in 121/738-739, announced his celebrated fiscal reforms. Among other arrangements, Mada'inī reports, he decreed that Muslims who were being made to pay the *jizyah*, poll tax, would be henceforth exempted. Thirty thousand such maltreated Muslims came forth in Marw alone. Eighty thousand non-Muslims had been favored by illegally exempting them from the *jizyah*. The situation thus rectified, and all other measures (separating the *jizyah* from the *kharāj*, and allocating the tribute, *al-waẓīfah*) implemented, Marw alone netted for the Umayyads one hundred thousand [?!], in addition to the *kharāj*.⁵⁸

We do not know whether this amount represented the *jizyah* alone, or that and the *waẓīfah*; and the currency is not cited, although we may assume it was *dirhams*, as Dennett did.⁵⁹ But, to keep our estimations on the conservative side, we shall assume the least favorable to the case for a higher number of converts which Naṣr's reforms must have produced. Of course, it is sheer folly to claim that this is at all computable. But the exercise is illuminating. If the entire amount came only from the *jizyah* revenues, and if it were in *dīnārs* rather than *dirhams*, at four *dīnars* per capita, that would leave from the eighty thousand non-Muslims, who had been illegally exempted, only twenty five thousand non-Muslim *jizyah* payers, and would betoken the eventual conversion of fifty five

⁵⁵ See Agha, 'Murji'a,' pp. 20-5; also, *infra*, pp. 163-4.

⁵⁶ See the following chapter.

⁵⁷ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1572. Cf. Gibb, *Conquests*, p. 77; Shaban 'Abbāsīd Revolution, p. 119. On al-Ḥārith's revolt, see also, Wellhausen, pp. 464-8.

⁵⁸ Mada'inī, in Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1688-9.

⁵⁹ Dennett, *Conversion*, p. 124.

thousand men before the days of the Umayyads were over. If the currency was *dirhams*, as it must have been, the number of *jizyah* payers, at the highest rate of fifty *dirhams* per capita, would have been two thousand men, and at the lowest rate of twelve *dirhams*, the number would have been around eight thousand five hundred men. These figures would betoken seventy eight thousand or seventy one thousand five hundred converts consecutively.⁶⁰ But even if the rate were at an unheard of two *dirhams* per capita, this would mean fifty thousand *jizyah* payers, and still a substantial number of thirty thousand converts. The point is not that we subscribe to any of the above figures; it is rather that, to the thirty thousand old converts whom Naṣr exempted, a new wave of converts, who were enticed by the reforms, must be added. To appreciate the overall magnitude of the process of Islamicization, quanta of older converts and established *mawālī*, who had already been exempt, must also be conceptualized.

Any quantitative conclusions that might derive from Madā'īnī's account of Naṣr's reforms must naturally be limited to the demographic situation in Marw. As far as the scope and patterns of conversion, the implications of this account to the rest of the province cannot be ignored, and, while they are almost impossible to gauge, they are as impossible to misconstrue. Nor did any, but one, of the modern scholars who paid attention to these reforms⁶¹ fail to recognize that they were designed to address the grievances of multitudes of *non-Arabs* who had converted to Islam. Shaban elected to construe the reforms as having been "intended to remove the grievances of Arab Settlers."⁶² Neither Madā'īnī's phraseology nor commonsense lend themselves to Shaban's exotic reading.⁶³ The only fact in this regard extractable from Madā'īnī's text remains as plain as the author of the text intended it to be—there did exist a large number of converts whose grievances Naṣr addressed.

⁶⁰ For the per capita *jizyah* rates, see Abū 'Ubayd, pp. 44-6. Even though his figures go back to 'Umar I's reign—a century earlier than the period in question—and apply only to Iraq and Syria, their token validity for Khurāsān may be asserted. Khurāsān had been a 'tribute' conquest, as the sources and modern scholars unanimously agree. In all events, none of these rates has to be correct to prove the point of this exercise, which is primarily meant to establish a conceptual result.

⁶¹ Gibb, *Conquests*, pp. 90-3; cf. Vloten, pp. 136-8; Wellhausen, pp. 477-82; Dennett, *Conversion*, pp. 124-8; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 192; Dūrī, '*Dawā'ib*,' pp. 86-7; Blankinship, *Jihād State*, p. 183.

⁶² Shaban, '*Abbāsid Revolution*,' pp. 117, 129, 156.

⁶³ For an analysis of Madā'īnī's text, and a refutation of Shaban's reading of it, see Agha, '*Agents*,' pp. 286-90.

III. *The 'Converters'*

But why would the exclusive, pragmatic Establishment attempt to convert the Iranian masses to Islam, and thus make an already aggravated situation worse? In theory, more Muslims meant less tax-payers and more claimants for equality and a share in the exclusive club. The *dihqāns* of Bukhārā eloquently put it to Ashras: "From whom will you collect the *kharāj* when all the people have become Arabs?"⁶⁴ That is, not only Muslims, but, theoretically, and now under Ashras' proposal also practically, fully entitled. Resisting demands would create more trouble, and granting them would create more claimants. So, why did Qutaybah force the Sughdians? Why did 'Umar II and Ashras 'seduce' them? And why did Naṣr embrace their cause and declare himself their 'giver' (*māniḥ*) as opposed to, and naturally more capable of delivering than, Bahrāmsīs, Ishbadād ibn Jarjūr and 'Aqībah, the 'givers' to the Magians, Christians, and Jews who do not convert?⁶⁵ There can be no single answer to all four situations. Even in any one of them, the motives of the policy-maker cannot be attributed to a single factor. It must have been the Establishment responding, in each case, to a whole set of factors.

Qutaybah may have been trying to establish roots for the first real Arab presence in an area which hitherto had merely been a *maghẓā*, an across-the-border field for seasonal campaigns. Keen to establish it as a secure and stable part of Arab territory in order to serve as a launching pad for further *maghāzī* beyond it, Qutaybah may have reckoned, in his lightening fashion, that the quickest and surest way was to absorb the local population into the imperial structure by converting them, as a step towards transforming them into partners in the enterprise which promised to yield yet more gains. If so, this brilliant disciple of the imperial school of al-Ḥijjāj's must have decided that his mentor's policies were suitable for the situation in the heart of the empire, but not for the frontiers. His plans didn't work out quite as he envisaged. They produced the very results which al-Ḥijjāj's policies were designed to abort. His conquests, and the measures he took to secure them, started a far reaching chain-reaction; in Wellhausen's words:

Certainly the strong buttress of Arabism and Islam in Sogdiana which [Qutaybah] had founded, especially Samarqand and Bukhārā, were maintained, and the process of Islamization continued there, but from

⁶⁴ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1508.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1688.

that very fact there unexpectedly appeared for the rule of the Arabs a new mischief which grew and consumed everything around it.⁶⁶

Of course, Qutaybah was not around either to see or to deal with the unintended consequences of his actions. That was left to his successors.

‘Umar II may have been hopelessly too pious for a statesman; or he may have been a prudently fair reformer—in Gibb’s words:

The crisis in the fortunes of the Arab state and of the dynasty which coincided with his succession (and which may have been the reason for his nomination by Sulaymān) called for urgent measures of reform. Under the influence of the developing religious thought, he attempted to meet this demand by reversing the policy of putting the state and its interests first, which had been initiated by his predecessors. He was, therefore, primarily interested in the religious aspects of reform, but these were bound up with the political effort to prevent the imminent breakdown of the Islamic state by (i) maintaining the unity of the Arabs; (ii) removing the grievances of the *mawālī*; and (iii) reconciling political life with the claims of religion.⁶⁷

Ashras may have “tried to appease the ever restless Soghd,”⁶⁸ or he may have “had to deal with the Turgesh threat;” therefore, “He first had to secure his position with the Soghdians.”⁶⁹ And Naṣr may have been far-sighted, Machiavellian, or fair.

But, in addition to any combinations of the above motives and any others, there had been one thread permeating the period which witnessed all official attempts at luring converts by reforms. That was the presence, and the growing influence, of two active competitors to the Establishment in the business of dealing with the natives, both: those converted and disaffected, and those who might yet convert in hope. These converts, the actual and the potential, were the people who represented Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī’s own alleged hope for the *da‘wah*: “They have always been trampled upon, humiliated and oppressed; and they have always suppressed their anger and held out hope for change.”⁷⁰ The Establishment, in the periods intervening between ‘Umar II’s rescripts and Ashras’ delusive gesture, and between the latter and Naṣr’s reforms, had inadvertently and unwittingly ceded the turf to these two competitors. And all three reformist attempts represent but two brief and ineffective awakenings, and a third which arrived too late.

⁶⁶ Wellhausen, p. 450.

⁶⁷ Gibb, ‘Rescript,’ p. 1.

⁶⁸ Wellhausen, p. 456.

⁶⁹ Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 110.

⁷⁰ *Infra*, p. 193.

Neither the Organization nor the Murji'ites, the two active competitors, limited the preaching of their political agendas to the already converted. To these they simply doled out their appealing political programmes without having to bother about the arduous task of religious conversion. To the unconverted, they had to sell the religion too. Attractive as their political agendas were, they still belonged to the realm of hope, for the realization of which battle still had to be made. To attract the masses, the religion of the powerful had to be sweetened, or at least to be made less stringent. Both the clandestine Organization and the open Murji'ites loosened up their theology. The Murji'ites scaled down the conversion requirements. The Organization was permissive of residual native religious elements alien to Islam but dear to the hearts of the Iranians.

By the time Asad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Qasrī's first governorship of Khurāsān ended, in 109/727-728, Khidāsh had already been active in Khurāsān. When Asad, during his second governorship, killed Khidāsh in 118/736-737, it was in Āmul, at the crossing to Transoxania, according to Madā'inī.⁷¹ This would suggest that Khidāsh's personal activities had extended to the area—not to mention the activities of the popular *dā'ī*, al-'Alā' ibn Hurayth ibn Quṭbah. Gibb recognizes the strength of the "Shī'ite and 'Abbāsīd propaganda" during Asad's first term, and contends that it "found a fertile field among the Muslim converts in Khurāsān and Lower Ṭukhāristān."⁷² (Gibb's exclusion of Transoxania is not warranted.) When Ashras succeeded Asad in 109/727-728, he must have encountered this situation, which, during Asad's term, had been "actively combated by the administration."⁷³ Ashras probably decided on a different course of action—competing for the potential converts, especially in Transoxania. And what better way to counter the lethal Organization than enlisting the cooperation of the still benign competitor. His choice of the Murji'ite Abū al-Ṣaydā' could not have been an accident.

The genesis and early evolution and ramifications of Irjā' as a doctrine, and of the Murji'ah as a religio-political movement, though pertinent, need not detain us here.⁷⁴ Suffice is to note that it was in Khurāsān and Transoxania of the Umayyad era that the Murji'ah

⁷¹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1589.

⁷² Gibb, *Conquests*, p. 68.

⁷³ *Ibid.* Asad was very strict in combating the Organization; during his two terms he killed and persecuted a number of its activists; see Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1488, 1491-2, 1501-3, 1586-9.

⁷⁴ For these aspects of the Murji'ah in the Umayyad period, and for full substantiation, of much of the following, see Agha, 'Murji'a.'

evolved into an organized movement; that it was the promotion of conversion and defending the cause of the converts that represented the highlights of their activities, especially in the province; and that it was primarily in response to the needs and aspirations of the converts that their theological doctrine evolved and branched. Their theology and their political activities concordantly and progressively addressed the potential converts by allurements, and the already converted by championing their cause.

The centerpiece of their activist theology was their definition/s of *īmān* (faith, or belief), and the peculiar regressive relation which their dynamic theology progressively established between *īmān* and *‘amal*⁷⁵ (works, practice; i.e., fulfilling the precepts of Islam, failing to do so, and/or committing any sin short of polytheism). For rudimentary and pre-organized Irjā’, the issue was simple and restricted to the debate over the eschatological status of sinner rulers—whether their sins, paramount amongst which is *jawr* (oppression), disqualify them as *mu’minūn* (believers). A very strong hint of serious disengagement between *īmān* and *‘amal* was latent in the positions which some Murji’ites took at this first phase of the evolution of Murji’ism.⁷⁶ But the issue was still one of the Establishment, reflecting “on the status of the ... rulers, not the ordinary ... Muslims, [and it was intended] to disengage the question of the conduct of the rulers from the duty of obedience to them under the mandate of preserving the *jamā‘a*.”⁷⁷ It was still an ‘aristocratic’ issue.

It was with the evolution of the Murji’ah into the next stage of their history—as an organized movement, primarily as agents of conversion—that the issue was ‘democratized’.⁷⁸ Theology—more accurately, theologizing—went hand in hand with political activism,

⁷⁵ They produced all kinds of hair-splitting definitions that infest the works of the heresiographers. Shahrastānī (I: pp. 222-34) accounts for five subdivisions of what he calls the pure Murji’ah; Baghdādī accounts also for five subdivisions, four of which overlap with four of Shahrastānī’s (*Fīraq*, pp. 190-5); Ash’arī classified them in accordance with their views on twenty issues: on the definition of *īmān* they branch into twelve different subdivisions, on the definition of *kufr* into seven different subdivisions (I: pp. 197-215); Ibn Ḥazm simplifies the maze and classifies them into three subdivisions (*Fīṣal*, II: pp. 106-7, III: pp. 137-8). The major criteria of distinction are minute differences in their definition of *īmān* and *kufr*, but they all agree, according to all heresiographers, on the exclusion of works from the definition of *īmān*. Most of this hair-splitting belongs to a period outside the time frame of our discussion.

⁷⁶ See ‘Awn ibn ‘Abd Allāh’s verses in: Jāhiz, *Bayān*, I: pp. 328-9; Ibn Qutaybah, *Mā‘ārif*, pp. 250-1; Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, p. 91; and in my translation, along with a discussion of the verses, Agha, ‘Murji’a,’ pp. 27, 12-3, and n. 37. See also *Sīrat Sālim* (Sālim, esp. par. IX, pp. 24-5).

⁷⁷ Agha, ‘Murji’a,’ p. 12.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-1.

which gradually escalated from missionary preaching and championing the cause of the converts to militant activity on their behalf. The question of whether their theology was adapted to suit the interests of their actual and their courted constituencies, as I contend,⁷⁹ or whether their activities on behalf of these constituencies were inspired by their “thesis that the status of faith depended on the mere confession of belief to the exclusion of works,”⁸⁰ as Madelung contends, is academic—albeit intensely interesting. What really matters in this context is that they produced an activist theology in an interactive milieu, where both theory and application were singularly dedicated to luring more converts, and to championing the cause of those who do convert.

Taken together, the star witnesses to the nature of this era of Murji’ism (i.e., the last three decades of the Umayyad period, which also coincide with the lifetime of the Organization) represent an opportune sample of the Murji’ite theological and activist forces working in synchronization to promote and protect conversion.

Abū Ḥanīfah al-Nu‘mān (ca. 80-150/699-767), the celebrated jurist-prudent cum theologian, and the students of the Ḥanafīte tradition, theologized to the benefit of the converts.⁸¹ Abū Ḥanīfah himself supplied with a letter of introduction to the caliphal court in Damascus the two emissaries whom al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj sent in 126/744 to secure a caliphal pardon.⁸² There is also an account that “reports Abū Ḥanīfah trying to cool down the hot-headedness of Ibrāhīm b. Maymūn al-Ṣā’igh, lecturing him on the fundamentals of organized action, and warning him against the perils of individual action.”⁸³

Abū al-Ṣayda’ Ṣāliḥ ibn Ṭurayf has already been encountered pleading, at ‘Umar II’s court, the cause of the *mawālī* and the converts

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-2.

⁸⁰ Madelung, ‘Early Murji’a,’ p. 33.

⁸¹ Democratizing the theology of disengagement between *īmān* and ‘*amal*, Abū Ḥanīfah (*al-‘Ālim wa al-Muta’allim*, p. 76) allows for all Muslims, not only the rulers, to enjoy this disengagement. For him (*ibid.*, pp. 67, 76), *īmān* is worshipping God without associating a partner with him, *kufr* is only polytheism, short of which nothing is *kufr*. The hope in God’s forgiveness, however, does not exclude accountability to Him—though not to other creatures who, by definition, have no right to excommunicate believers on the basis of their actions, or lack thereof (*ibid.*, pp. 69, 79; Abū Ḥanīfah, *al-Fiqh al-Akbar II*, art. 14, pp. 192-3; *idem*, *Waṣīyyah*, art. 25, p. 130). This is because *īmān* is the knowledge of God in ones heart, the knowledge of revelation in its generality, and the verbal profession of this knowledge, but neither is sufficient by itself (Abū Ḥanīfah, *al-‘Ālim wa al-Muta’allim*, pp. 35, 52-6; *al-Fiqh al-Akbar II*, art. 18, p. 194; *Waṣīyyah*, art. 1, p. 125; Ash‘arī, I: pp. 202-4; Ibn Ḥazm, *Fīṣal*, III: p. 137). And, works, though not part of *īmān*, are the canons and precepts of belief (Abū Ḥanīfah, *al-‘Ālim wa al-Muta’allim*, pp. 47-50). See also Agha, ‘Murji’a,’ the chart on p. 38, and the key to the chart on p. 36-7.

⁸² Ṭabarī, II: p. 1867; Madelung, ‘Early Murji’a,’ p. 34.

⁸³ Agha, ‘Murji’a,’ p. 24; Ibn Abī al-Wafā, I: pp. 49-50.

(100/718-719), and, later, leading Ashras' commission to convert the Sughdians (110/729-730).⁸⁴ Ashras soon reneged on his promise to relieve the converts from the *jizyah*; he was counseled to test them for "circumcision, performance of the divine precepts, proper Islam, and recital of [at least] a *sūrah* of the Qur'an." Now, Abū al-Ṣaydā', along with his comrades, sided with the converts and tried to resist the measure by force, but were suppressed and taken prisoners. Prominent amongst the group was Thābit ibn Ka'b, better known as Thābit Quṭnah, the poet-warrior.⁸⁵ This was the first sign of Murji'ite militancy on behalf of the converts in the province itself. "During Yazīd b. al-Muhallab's insurgency [101/719-720], a certain Abū Ru'bah al-Murji' is said to have joined battle in the rebellious ranks as chief of a Murji'ite contingent (*'alā ra's ṭā'ifa min al-Murji'a*),⁸⁶ This is the first indisputable appearance of an organized group of Murji'ites, and it took place in Iraq. But the Khurāsānite connection is manifest in Yazīd's status as an ex-governor of the province who, as a tribal chief also, enjoyed considerable following there. The Khurāsānite Murji'ites were also represented, at least symbolically, by the prominent presence of the essential Murji'ite figure, the poet-warrior Thābit Quṭnah."⁸⁷

Thābit Quṭnah was an element of the Murji'ite continuum not only through his active participation in the above events; he was, above all, a mouthpiece of the movement. His well known poem on Irjā' reflects the Murji'ites' active involvement in the politics of the period, and articulates many of their basic tenets.⁸⁸

With the prolonged insurgency (ca. 116-128/735-746) of al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj,⁸⁹ dubbed by Madelung as the "great revolt of the Murji'a,"⁹⁰ there dawned a revolutionary new phase of Murji'sm, which took their

⁸⁴ Supra, pp. 153-4; see also Agha, 'Murji'a,' pp. 19-20.

⁸⁵ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1507-10; cf. Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 526. For Abū al-Ṣaydā's comrades, see also Agha, 'Murji'a,' section v. of the list of Murji'ite personages, pp. 31-2.

⁸⁶ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1400.

⁸⁷ Agha, 'Murji'a,' p. 19; see Iṣfahānī, *Aghānī*, XIV: p. 262.

⁸⁸ For Thābit Quṭnah's poem, see Aghānī, XIV: pp. 254-5. This poem must have been composed before (the poet's death in) 110/729-730, probably during his involvement in Abū al-Ṣaydā's movement, earlier in the same year, or, even earlier. Nallino's contention, that the poem belongs to the second half of the first century, is unlikely (Nallino, p. 254). Athamina ('Early Murji'a,' p. 126 n. 87) dates the poem to the years before Ibn al-Ash'ath's revolt; this is even more unlikely. The gloom of the opening of the poem suggests it was much closer to the poet's last years, i.e., before or around 110. See my translation of the poem, and a discussion of it, Agha, 'Murji'a,' pp. 26-7, 20-1 and the chart on p. 38.

⁸⁹ This insurgency is extensively reported in Ṭabarī, in the annals of the years 116-119, 121, 126-128, but see specifically II: pp. 1566-86, 1589-91, 1599, 1601, 1603-13, 1689, 1692-5, 1867-9, 1888-90, 1917-35, 1970; cf. Agha, 'Murji'a,' pp. 22-4.

⁹⁰ Madelung, 'Early Murji'a,' p. 33.

benign activism and benevolent theology to a much higher plateau of extreme militancy and 'lax' theology, to the benefit of a wider constituency of non-Muslims and potential converts. A number of the notable Murji'ite comrades of Abū al-Ṣaydā', and other Murji'ites, did participate in this revolt,⁹¹ but the most consequential figure, probably second only to al-Ḥārith himself, was his propagandist, the theologian cum politician Jahm ibn Ṣafwān.⁹²

Whereas for Abū Ḥanīfa's brand of *ijā'* it was sufficient to restrict the definition of *īmān* to the knowledge of God coupled with the verbal profession of this knowledge,⁹³ this definition was one ingredient too many for Jahm, who contended that *īmān* is only the knowledge of God in one's heart; profession is, like works, excluded from *īmān*.⁹⁴ The difference is only natural, since the two definitions were serving two different causes and two different constituencies. Abū Ḥanīfa's constituency comprised converts who were presumed to be sincere—or at least potentially so; they could be won over, the assumption was, if the requirements of faith were not too stringent for them. If they were ready to convert and profess, they should be awarded the same legal status enjoyed by all other *mu'minūn*. If they do not know Arabic, have never heard of Makka, and never had trouble eating pork, their knowledge of the revelation in a general non-specific fashion should be adequate to redeem them, even though an ignorant *mu'min* of their number might think the Ka'ba of the Qur'ān is a Ka'ba located elsewhere.⁹⁵ On the other hand, al-Ḥārith's constituency, for whose benefit Jahm was theologizing, comprised recruits and political allies from the infidels who had no pretensions to Islam—not even by insincere verbal profession. A theological cover was needed to justify collaboration with adherents of a non-Muslim confession, and to provide for equality in status in the ranks of the religiously heterogeneous allies.⁹⁶

It is of the essence to realize that it was not the nature of *īmān* in the Eyes of God which truly preoccupied this 'super nova' of the late Umayyad period. Fundamentally, the 'launching pad' of their theology was the postponement (*ijā'*) of such matters to the Day of Reckoning.⁹⁷ It was the status of the *mu'min* (the believer; read: the convert) in this world, within the community of the *mu'minūn* (read: full-fledged citizens), that the Murji'ah of the late Umayyad period were concerned about. To lure the potential converts and to protect those who convert, the Murji'ites

⁹¹ See Agha, 'Murji'a,' the list of Murjite personages, especially sections v-vi.d, pp. 31-3.

⁹² Cf. Tabarī, II: p. 1918-20, 1924.

⁹³ Ibn Ḥazm, *Fīṣal*, II: p. 106; Ash'arī, I: pp. 202-3.

⁹⁴ Ibn Ḥazm, *Fīṣal*, II: p. 106, III: p. 137; Ash'arī, I: pp. 205, 313.

⁹⁵ Ash'arī, I: pp. 203-4.

⁹⁶ Agha, 'Murji'a,' pp. 24-5.

⁹⁷ See Agha, 'Murji'a,' p. 1.

theologized, poeticized, advocated, resorted to civil disobedience, and ultimately went into armed revolt.

Be that as it may, “the less militant Murji’ites were lured away from al-Ḥārith[’s camp] by Naṣr [ibn Sayyār’s reformist] gestures;⁹⁸ the more militant [amongst them] had to wait a little longer until [their] alliance [with al-Ḥārith] disintegrated, when al-Ḥārith lost the tribal military balance to [the chief of the Azd, Alī ibn Juday’] al-Kirmānī.^{99”}¹⁰⁰ Even though the eventual end of the Murji’ah was military defeat, political ‘atrophy’, and theological marginalization, their vital role in converting the Iranians to Islam, and in politically empowering them, mandates a question: how did they fare with Abū Muslim and the Revolution of the converts?

Madelung says that al-Ḥārith’s death left the Murji’ites ‘in disarray’ just before the Revolution.¹⁰¹ That may very well have been the case. But Madelung’s conclusions about the relationship between them and the Revolution do not appear to be as plausible. He says:

The chronicles are silent about the relationship between Abū Muslim and the Khurāsānian Murji’a. There is, however, some scant evidence in the biographical sources of a serious clash in the year 131/748-9 leading to the execution of at least two leading Murji’ite moderates in Marw ... Yazīd (b. Abī Sa’īd) al-Naḥwī ... [and] Ibrāhīm b. Maymūn al-Ṣā’igh al-Marwazī ... The reports about the two executions by Abū Muslim provide preciously little information. It can only be assumed that the two incidents were related. The concrete issues and motives remain obscure. So much is evident, however, that Abū Muslim failed to rally the Murji’a to the ‘Abbāsīd war on the discredited Umayyad regime and that he considered them as dangerous enough to kill two of their real or potential leaders.¹⁰²

The immediate reasons for the executions, given by the biographers and noted by Madelung,¹⁰³ are that each of the two executed leaders had instructed Abū Muslim “to do what is proper,” and Ibrāhīm al-Ṣā’igh especially used rough language with him.

Actually, the conclusion Madelung sees as the only evident one, i.e., “that Abū Muslim failed to rally the Murji’a,” is the least likely. Ibn Sa’d’s account, which Madelung does not mention, is very informative. He says that Ibrāhīm ibn Maymūn al-Ṣā’igh and Muḥammad ibn

⁹⁸ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1918, 1919, 1928.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, II: pp. 1931, 1934.

¹⁰⁰ Agha, ‘Murji’a,’ p. 24.

¹⁰¹ Madelung, ‘Early Murji’a,’ p. 35.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 36.

¹⁰³ Ibn Ḥajar, XI: p. 332; Ibn Abī al-Wafā, I: pp. 49-50.

Thābit al-'Abdī¹⁰⁴ were friends of Abū Muslim's in Khurāsān, and they used to associate with him and listen to his words, before he declared the Revolution. Only after Abū Muslim attained victory and settled into his role as master of Khurāsān, did he send a spy to fetch them for their sentiments towards him. Muḥammad ibn Thābit proved benign, Ibrāhīm endorsed the execution of Abū Muslim. So, Abū Muslim rewarded the first by an appointment and killed the other.¹⁰⁵

The point is that Ibrāhīm ibn Maymūn and, most probably, also Yazīd al-Naḥwī, Abū Muslim's other Murjī'ite victim, together with what and whom they represented, were on good terms (read this as being in coalition) with Abū Muslim, from at least 128/745-746, if not before, till some time before their execution. This is at least a period of four years of coalescing, years which are the crucial period of recruitment, preparation, waging the Revolution, purging Khurāsān of Umayyad presence, and gaining control of the province by, and supposedly for, the Revolutionary coalition. Then, the year 131/748-749, the year of the execution, must have been the time Abū Muslim started his internal purge within the ranks of the victorious coalition, in order to attain the supreme and singular control which he attained.

It is not strange that Abū Muslim killed these two allies. It would probably have been strange and requiring explanation had he not done so. The ruthlessness which Abū Muslim exhibited only after victory could not have sat well with the hot-headed Ibn Maymūn. But even if the pious man had kept his quiet, why would Abū Muslim spare a rival-ally? He had already killed, or would soon kill, some of the most celebrated *nuqabā'* of his own mother Organization, and he would continue the liquidation of all the wings which made up the Revolutionary federation. The episode of Sharīk ibn Shaykh al-Mahrī is a case in point.¹⁰⁶

There can be no doubt that the Murjī'ites, as an organized movement, had, in some degree, joined efforts with Abū Muslim to make the Revolution's triumph possible. Their popular constituency, the masses they helped convert and whose cause they had championed for over thirty years, could not have melted away, nor could they have sided with the Umayyads; they must have played a role in the enterprise. Now decapitated, the exposed movement could wither away as a political

¹⁰⁴ Both are considered, on the strength of Ibn Sa'd's account, as Organization members and are listed in the prosopographical appendix under Nos.206 and 277 consecutively. In view of the coalitive nature of the Organization, this inclusion does not contradict Ibn Maymūn's Murjī'ite affiliation.

¹⁰⁵ Ibn Sa'd, VII: p. 370.

¹⁰⁶ Supra, pp. 81-2.

organization, return to theology, and leave politics to the more cunning and powerful. Their popular base could either sulk or, more naturally, identify with the victor, who, anyway, was only a rival champion of their very cause.

IV. Conversion—A Trojan Horse

Shaban excluded, modern scholars are almost concordant in regarding the three official attempts by the Establishment at fiscal reform¹⁰⁷ as addressing an abusive situation, the victims of which were the native Iranian population. Van Vloten condemns the Arab conquerors for blind oppression. Wellhausen tries to understand the internal mechanisms of the Arab Establishment and, more neutrally than his predecessor, elicits the natural dynamics of the relation between the conquered and the conqueror, and the impact which the structure of the conquerors' society had on the relation. Dennett exonerates the Arabs and rejects the 'economic interpretation' of the Revolution. Wellhausen does implicate the Iranian aristocracy in the economic oppression of their own ethnic brethren, but Dennett singles them out for the iniquity; he says: "The *mawālī* ... were exploited by people of their own race, not by the Arabs."¹⁰⁸ Shaban anchors his argument in the 'economic interpretation', but he contends that a substantial cross section of the Arabs in the province shared in suffering the abuses of the system, and he, hence, assigns to them the major role in the Revolution.

Stereotyping the Iranian aristocracy as tax-collectors, as the instigators of oppression and/or its instruments, or as the natural allies of the foreign masters of the land, who were constantly against the economic interests of their misery-stricken compatriots, is as narrow a view as stereotyping the Arabs as booty-hungry and greedy economic exploiters.

Either as a prelude, or as an epilogue to Ashras' failed experiment, it is very interesting to note, the same momentous indignities were first inflicted on the *dahāqīn* and the 'notables of the Iranians.'¹⁰⁹ Ṭabarī's

¹⁰⁷ 'Umar II's, Ashras' and Naṣr's.

¹⁰⁸ Dennett, *Conversion*, p. 128; for Dennett's critique of Wellhausen, and his views on Khurāsān, pp. 116-28.

¹⁰⁹ Balādūrī's synoptic account (*Futūh*, p. 526), much less useful for other purposes, but much clearer on this part of the story, clearly states the sequence of Ashras' moves: (1) 'Ashras increased the tributes demanded from Transoxania, and despised the *dahāqīn*;' (2) 'he summoned the people of Transoxania to Islam, and ordered that the converts be exempted of *jizyah*;' (3) people 'rushed to embrace Islam, and the revenue, *kharāj*, went into deficit;' (4) then, when Ashras realized the repercussions of his measures, he opted for peaceful measures (*ra'ā al-musālamah*). Ṭabarī's account (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1508-10),

chronicles are filled with accounts of the conquered populations fighting, along with their princes, on the side of the Arabs, and on the side of the Turgesh, and on both sides in the same battle. "Iranians fought on both sides," says Wellhausen.¹¹⁰ Fire-brand princes were exiled; fire-brand princes fought the conqueror, then turned docile; and docile princes were deposed in favor of new fire-brands, who in their turn fought, made humiliating peace treaties, changed alliances, deserted—along with their population—their lands, and so on. All along, religion had been used as an instrument of attraction and repulsion, inclusion and exclusion, a means of identification and a means of differentiation. Economy was the tangible dimension in the struggle. It is wrong to single out a certain cast for the villain's role. And it is wrong to single out any one dimension of the total sum of human activity for a monolithic interpretation of cataclysmic changes in the course of history.

Historians are not in the business of convicting or exonerating the powers of the past. This was a struggle between defined forces, and it had its dynamics, some of which, it may be said, are natural. The struggling forces tried to adapt and to mold their actions to respond to changing circumstances. The Umayyad Establishment, the highest expression of Arab domination, tried to cope, thrice. And, through it all, the vanquished, i.e., both the native aristocracy and the populace, now in concord and then in discord, were trying to cope by orienting their reactions to adapt, as best as they could, to changing approaches by the victor, and to make use of opportunities wherever they occurred.

Through it all, there had been a sense of 'we' and 'them'; sometimes it was narrowly localized, and at others it swept the land. But, while always expressing itself through the most tangible dimension of the conflict, i.e., the fiscal issue as manipulated by the masters and their cronies, it had almost always transcended this dimension by realizing that the ultimate master was the 'other'.¹¹¹

Religion is only one component of peoples' awareness of their distinct collectivities. It may even be argued that, depending on temperament,

while much more useful on other details, is hopelessly confused on the sequence of the conflict: (1) Ashras takes the initiative; (2) the *dahāqīn* alert him to the consequences; (3) when he, finally, sees the light; (4) the first to suffer were the *dahāqīn* themselves.

¹¹⁰ Wellhausen, p. 472.

¹¹¹ Gibb brilliantly articulates the issue. He says: 'It is generally assumed that the hostility of Ghūrak [the prince of Samarqand] was due to the serious fall in revenue which would result [from Ashras' initiative]. Though this was doubtless the plea put forward and accepted by Ashras it can scarcely have been the true issue. Ghūrak's aim was not to maintain himself on good terms with the Arab governors but to recover his independence.' *Conquests*, p. 69. Cf. Dennett, *Conversion*, p. 127; Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 190; Dūrī, 'Darā'ib,' p. 85.

outlook, geographical environment, and countless other factors, religion might be—to some individuals and groups—less than the most important such component. Race, language, culture, shared history, native territory, normative experiences, and other factors might, severally or combined, take precedence. At the early stages of adopting a new religion—especially a religion not indigenously bred, and mostly adopted out of convenience—it is difficult to envisage it as the most defining element in the collective and individual awareness of the converted of their own collective particularism. Real religious zealots are only exceptions.

Collective particularism, awareness thereof, and collective action in accordance therewith are not peculiar to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even though the concept of the nation state and the term nationalism may be modern phenomena, the basic dynamics and principles of differentiation and identification in human societies remain the same. The fact that van Vloten and Wellhausen wrote in an era that witnessed the rise of national ideologies in Europe is no reason to assume that their highlighting of the Iranian element in the Revolution was the outcome of projecting the modern situation on the Umayyad scene.¹¹²

The native demographic scene in Khurāsān proper, Ṭukhārīstān, and Transoxania—the vital Central Asian territory where the crucial events of the period occurred—was rather complex and varied. Arabic sources mainly speak of *ʿAjām* or *Furs* and of *Turk*. More specific references, to *Hayātilah*, *Khuttal* and *Sughd*, exist; but, beyond the names, very little is said about who these people were; and sometimes the name of the geographic territory, even without the antecedent *ahl*, is used as the ethnic label of its inhabitants—Ṣaghāniyān, Bukhārā, Farghānah, Ushrūsanah. Of the religions of the area, the sources speak mainly of *Majūs*, and of *Naṣārā* and *Yahūd*. Of languages, nothing much is said about any beyond the *Fārisiyyah*, and, to a lesser extent, the *Turkiyyah*. Thanks to the Muslim geographers, we are much better informed about the highly mixed economies and the efficient transportation infrastructure.

Modern scholarship is more specific. It does draw heavily on Islamic sources. Aided by findings of modern archaeology and numismatics, and by a wider access to the histories of the pre-Islamic societies of the area,

¹¹² Sharon contends: 'It seems that influenced by the 19th century surge of national ideology, Wellhausen superimposed the European political situation of his time on the Islamic medieval scene,' *Black Banners*, p. 232; cf. Lassner, *Shaping*, p. 3; and Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 60; Omar, *Abbāsīd Caliphate*, p. 57, duly credits B. Lewis for the idea.

and the relevant histories of areas which did not become part of *dār al-Islām*, modern studies produce a more specific and coherent, though not essentially different, demographic profile.¹¹³

So, obviously, even if the modern concept of nationalism were applicable to the situation twelve centuries ago, it would certainly not be monolithically applicable to this landscape of assorted races, languages, religions, economies and political sovereignties. But, it must also be noted that this variety applies mainly to Transoxania, much less so to the parts of Khurāsān between the Murghāb and the Oxus rivers, and even less to Sāsānid Khurāsān proper, west of the Murghāb. Even east of the Murghāb and north of the Oxus, the ethnic varieties are traced back to either Indo-European, i.e., Iranian, or to Turkic stocks, with Iranian preponderance in the ethnic, religious and linguistic varieties, especially where direct Arab rule applied.

Despite this preponderance of Iranian cultural elements, no attempt is made here to assert the existence of a cohesive Persian national identity at the time. It may have existed in the form of pride in the Sāsānid past, preservation of the Persian language and resistance to Arabization, adherence to Zoroastrianism in its different forms and the transposition of some of its elements into Islam by converts, or in the form of an amalgamation of all these and other elements; but it may also have not existed. This needs not be the contention. A more elemental principle of differentiation and aggregation was incessantly and progressively at work. Probably the first principle of collective awareness is the principle that operates through negation. The 'we' is demarcated by the 'other'. The more different, defined and threatening the 'other' is, the more sharply crystallized the collective self-awareness grows, and the lower the lowest common denominator becomes. Elements of divisiveness within a territorial, linguistic, religious or ethnic expanse, can become, upon the arrival of the 'other', elements of unity. It is, of course, never an amebic unity that obtains on either side. As the Iranians had their own variety, likewise the Arabs had their own factious tribes.

The Arabs were not an abstract notion. They were a concrete power organized within, represented, governed and driven by the Umayyad Arab Establishment. They had their violent intra-Establishment quarrels. Some of them were excluded from the Establishment. And the

¹¹³ For the geography and demography of the territories in question, see: Wellhausen, pp. 430-4; Le Strange, chapters XXVII-XXXIII, pp. 382-473; Barthold, *Geography*, chapters I-III, V, pp. 6-63, 87-111; idem, *Turkestan*, chapter I, pp. 64-180, and pp. 180-2; Gibb, *Conquests*, pp. 1-11; Shaban, *Abbasid Revolution*, pp. 1-15; idem, Shaban, 'Khurāsān,' pp. 479-490.

Establishment incorporated some non-Arabs, mainly Iranians in the eastern part of the empire. The Umayyad Arab Establishment was, as thus, one of the 'two' antagonists whose demise was the concluding act of the Revolution. It is the contention here that the Establishment¹¹⁴ did not simply self-destruct—the rift in its ranks notwithstanding. Rather, there existed an alien antagonist, whose intrinsic interest it was to destroy it. This antagonist was the Iranian subjects. To the question of whether they did form any cohesive force by the time, this book answers affirmatively. Like the Arabs, by the time they were empowered and activated into action, the Iranians were no longer as fragmented as they probably had been.

The temporary cohabitation between the conquering Establishment and the conquered masses was never transformed into permanent symbiosis. In an ideal world, the process of mutual acculturation could probably have been brought to success by Arab converters and Iranian converts working together in harmony. As it were, this process was derailed by imperial imperatives and the failure of the Umayyad Establishment to faithfully and steadily invest in the egalitarianism provided for in Islam, and by the escalating process of Iranian self-awareness. The Iranians were taught and then they learnt that, by adopting Islam, they should earn the right and the enabling claim to neutralize the Establishment's superior edge. The thrust to encourage people to convert to Islam was, thus, largely abandoned by the standard bearers of Islam and was decidedly left to the antagonist.

The resulting mass conversion should not be viewed as spontaneous or haphazard. The Iranian uprising was streamlined and conducted within the frame-work of Islam, in whose moralistic, egalitarian and inclusive aspects the Iranian activists and intellectuals, like a cunning Odysseus, found the natural and appropriate weapon to wield against the worldly Establishment which claimed to represent Islam. The Trojan horse was planted right at the heart of the historic paradox of Umayyad Islam. The natural thrust of the Arab conquerors to maintain the imperial Arab identity of Islam had always been meekly, but now forcefully, opposed by the thrust to internationalize the faith and its mundane institutions. The radical thrust to Persianize Islam (Abū

¹¹⁴ Even though it should be clear enough, I wish to stress the fact, especially in this context, that the 'Arab Establishment' is not synonymous with the 'Arab Empire' or 'Kingdom'. While the fall of the latter may be termed as 'self-destruction', because its nemesis were segments of its own subjects, the same cannot be said of the Establishment. The agents of destruction who brought the about undoing of the Establishment were forces alien to the Establishment—forces which the Establishment alienated, excluded, and oppressed for decades.

Muslimiyyah, Khurramiyyah, Mubayyidah, Rāwandiyyah ... etc.) was eventually tempered by the equalization of the religion, its eventual sectarianization, and the preservation of the linguistic and other properties of the two most important racial groups of early Islam.

The Iranians, like the Arabs, were not an abstract notion. They were a concrete power mobilized, educated, regimented, directed and launched by the Organization. They had their violent intra-Organization quarrels. Some of them were excluded from the Organization. And the Organization incorporated some Arabs. Though the polarization was not complete, it was clear, substantial, and decisive. The Organization as a whole was pitted against the Establishment as a whole—each represented diametrically opposed interests, beneficiaries, constituents, and fighters for the cause. One lost and one won.

The organized preaching efforts of the Murji'ites were only a poor antecedent to the efforts of the Organization. Khidāsh's indiscriminate and massive attraction of Iranians—whose conversion, no matter how superficial, was a prerequisite to their joining the Organization—and the organized and repeated attempts by the Sughdians at negotiating collective conversion, and their subsequent apostasies, were only miniature mirror images of the massive conversion over which Abū Muslim presided,¹¹⁵ and of the massive apostasies of Sinbādh, Ustādhsīs, al-Muqanna', and others, which followed Abū Muslim's execution.

While the Murji'ite brand of Islam offered the Iranian converts the hope for social and economic emancipation within the Arab Establishment, Abū Muslim's brand touched the collective 'we' dimension by offering the hope for existential emancipation within a completely new structure—deracialized as a minimum target, Iranianized in the optimum. On top of that, he was backed by the awe instilled by an Organizational structure, nurtured and well-prepared—one which was careful not to show its hand prematurely.

When Abū Muslim happened on the scene, it was time to collect the dividends of the Bukayrist investment, and to multiply the stakes in view

¹¹⁵ There can scarcely be any doubt about Abū Muslim's extensive converting activities. He must have been the agent behind the conversion of his close associate Sinbādh (no.342) who apostatized soon after Abū Muslim's slaying. Other lieutenants of Abū Muslim's appear to have kept their Iranian first names, such as Shahrām (no.334). Whatever the truth about Bih Afīrd (or Bihāfarīd, or Māhfarwardīn), (see Frye, p. 30; Daniel, *Khurasan*, pp. 90-2) may be, Ibn al-Nadīm's account that he had converted to Islam at the hands of the two *dā'īs* despatched by Abū Muslim, Shabīb ibn Wāj (no.333), and 'Abd Allāh ibn Sa'īd (no. 98) does invoke the widespread activity across the land. See Ibn al-Nadīm, p. 407. Frye interprets the expression *Kāfir-Kūbāt* as the name of a group of Abū Muslim followers, who 'may have used clubs to convert the infidels, as their name implied.' (p. 31); cf. Dīnawarī, pp. 360, 363.

of the rift in the Arab ranks. Whatever the yields of previous efforts to convert the natives were, they must have been dwarfed by what the mere potential of the situation must have yielded. Hopeful masses must have flocked in geometric progression to the ranks of the increasingly belligerent, and then emboldened, and then empowered and sure-footed movement.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE ARABS IN THE PROVINCE

I. *Revolutionary 'Aptitude'— A Question of Motives and Intentions*

On the other side of the ethnic balance were the Arabs, with their petty and grave tribal schisms. Wellhausen ably reviewed this aspect of the Arab presence in the province, so it needs not detain us.¹ Even Wellhausen's critics, who reject the tribal dimension of his interpretation, inadvertently revert to it.²

It must, however, be stressed that, insofar as the tribally based *dūwān al-jund* represented the pillar of the Establishment, the greatest majority of the upheavals which occurred within the Arab tribal structure in Khurāsān were not anti-Establishment. Even the pro-Zubayrid, anti-Umayyad dynastic tones of Ibn Khāzim's Qaysite insurgency expressed themselves in wresting control of the province in favor of an Arab tribal group and in the name of yet another Arab dynasty. The insurgency of his son, Mūsā, grave and enduring though it was, contained itself, or was contained, in Tirmidh and the vicinity; and Mūsā refrained from making any attempt against the seat of Arab power south of the Oxus, even when he had the opportunity. The less self-restrained al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj, who led the least tribal—at least in the first phase of his crusade—and the most radical of these upheavals, was openly anti-Umayyad, and ostensibly a cosmopolitan egalitarianist. Under duress, however, he showed his true colors. Even his dynastic animosity to the Umayyads vanished when he was granted the pardon he sought from the similarly 'pious' usurper (Umayyad caliph) in Damascus, the very city he had claimed he was destined to dismantle brick by brick. Then his thrust disintegrated in the same tribal pit in which it had grown. When the consequences of the third civil war, in Syria, Jazīrah, and Iraq, spilled into the province, the Azd, under al-Kirmānī, rose against the Muḍarite provincial government of Naṣr ibn Sayyār. Until their eleventh hour alliance with Abū Muslim, they had never expressed a

¹ Mainly by streamlining Ṭabarī's accounts. Wellhausen, chapter VIII, pp. 397-49.

² Shaban accuses F. Omar of 'reverting to Wellhausen's position,' but then he himself couldn't avoid the all-pervasive trap, because it is Ṭabarī's rather than Wellhausen's; Shaban, *Abbāsid Revolution*, xv, cf. pp. 42-4, 51, 56.

genuine moralistic or social concern,³ and they had disowned neither the Umayyad dynasty nor the Arab tribal base of the *dīwānized* Establishment.

Aside from a minority within the Arab ranks, who—unlike al-Ḥārith—may be labelled as militant and true Murji'ites, or as partisans of one leaning or the other within the proto-Shī'ite spectrum, and aside from the alien Khārījites led by Shaybān ibn Salamah, there was no genuine anti-Establishment sentiment amongst the Arabs of Khurāsān. Most of the province's upheavals prior to the Revolution may be broadly termed, in today's language, as violent 'loyal opposition'. This is not because life under the Umayyad regime was utopian, but rather because the Khurāsānite Arabs were actual beneficiaries.

Rarely, if ever, has morality been an instantaneous driving force of history. Cumulatively, over centuries, it does provide the human race with inspiration and corrective measures; but it does not, by itself, launch Revolutions. The French Revolution, possibly the greatest moral inspiration of modern times, was also, but primarily, driven by hunger, misery, oppression, discrimination, and a host of other mundane forces. It was only when the hungry and the oppressed (etc.) were empowered that the revolution broke out, allowing posterity, eventually, to see the ideals of the 'Philosophes' embodied. Van Vloten understood this principle and misused it. Wellhausen made a spectacular presentation of how it works. Shaban capitalized on the same principle, but he committed two grave errors. The first is his singling out of the socio-economic dimension as the sole driving force behind the Revolution. The second is a reversed adaptation of the van Vloten—Wellhausen interpretation. He created, specially for the occasion, a class of 'Arab settlers' who, he alleges, shared with the Iranians in their misery, but who, unlike the Iranians, possessed what it took to prepare and launch the Revolution (being Muslims and trained fighters) and to sweep the entire territory of Khurāsān and the rest of the Umayyad realm, right up to victory, with only a total of fifteen thousand settlers.⁴

³ When al-Kirmānī claimed that he rose in the cause of the Book of God, Qaḥṭabah reportedly commented: 'if he were truthful, I would have supported him with a thousand horsemen.' Ṭabarī, II: p. 1930.

⁴ Actually, this is the crux of Shaban's theory, and it does not stand to examination. See Agha, 'Battle of the Pass.'

II. *Revolutionary Ability*—
A Question of Quanta

Whatever the motives of the Arab participants may have been, the question of their quantum remains paramount. For the question to be properly appreciated, the Arab Revolutionary quantum must be seen in perspective, i.e., within the context of the overall Revolutionary quantum. The term 'quantum' is used here to emphasize the reservation with which most of the lump sum figures given by the sources are viewed here (and to distinguish the methodology from that used in part three of this book, which rests on 'exact' numbers and percentages). But such figures, where available, are important indicators of what the real figures may have been. Thus, the demonstrable indicators, along with the quantitative data supplied by the sources in the form of somewhat questionable lump sum figures, may be molded together to provide us with a general indicator of an imprecise, yet conceptually perceivable, quantity, which is characterized here as 'quantum'.

The overall Revolutionary quantum was demonstrably momentarily huge. For the present purpose, the figures which *Akhbār* supplies regarding the Revolutionary forces standing simultaneously on two geographical sites are vital.⁵ In Šafar, 131/October, 748, approximately five months after he had launched his campaign, Qaḥṭabah entered Rayy without resistance.⁶ In Rayy he had his original forces counted, those who had come with him from the peoples of Nasā, Abīward, Jurjān and Marw al-Rūdh. They were thirty thousand men.⁷ Additionally, Abū Muslim had reinforced him with ten thousand troops under eleven commanding officers.⁸ Then, Abū Muslim himself advanced from Marw to Nīshāpūr at the head of a force of forty thousand men.⁹ That is a neat sum of eighty thousand standing troops.

This figure does not include the numerous large and small advance expeditions which Qaḥṭabah had fielded in various directions before he took count of his troops, and who were still on the field when he did.¹⁰ It

⁵ If these figures are to be questioned, it must be noted that the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah* tends to minimize the numbers of the 'inspired' Revolutionary forces and to maximize those of the demoralized Umayyad forces.

⁶ *Akhbār*, p. 334.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Abū 'Awn with *ahl* Jurjān to Dastabā; Qaḥṭabah's son, al-Ḥasan, with *ahl* Marw al-Rūdh to Hamadhān and on to Nahāwand; two thousand men extra reinforcement to al-

does not include the forces which Mālik ibn al-Haytham led to Sijistān to oust the Syrians,¹¹ and which later joined the rest of the Khurāsāniyyah in the siege of Wāsiṭ.¹² It does not include whatever forces Abū Muslim must have assigned to or actually left in the east, especially in Ṭukhārīstān, under Abū Dāwūd, who, as pre-planned, killed ‘Uthmān ibn al-Kirmānī in Balkh on the same day Abū Muslim killed ‘Uthmān’s brother, ‘Alī, in Nīshāpūr.¹³ Nor does it include whatever forces he had left in Marw to control the Azd when they learned of the double atrocity in Balkh and Nīshāpūr. *Akhbār* pointedly remarks that Abū Muslim intentionally took ‘Alī ibn al-Kirmānī with him to Nīshāpūr so that he could kill him away from his people in Marw.¹⁴ Therefore, and most notably, this figure of eighty thousand does not include the Azd, whose *Khums* numbered ten thousand warriors in Qutayabah’s days.¹⁵ If they, or any portion of their number, are to be added to the Arab Revolutionary quantum, they must also be added to this overall quantum.

Therefore, we must be looking at a six-figure-strong standing Revolutionary army—the overflowing ranks of the local militias in the districts excluded.¹⁶

Is it possible then that the quantum of anti-Umayyad Arabs could have reached proportions sufficient to make it the backbone of such a mammoth force, and the determinant of its ethnic character? And, more fundamentally, was the fountain source of Arab participation, i.e., the entire Arab presence in the province, large enough to support even a substantial minority of such a quantum?

Hasan; four thousand men with al-‘Akkī to Qumm; a contingent under two commanding officers to reinforce al-‘Akkī—probably around two thousand men, if each commanding officer’s detachment was around one thousand, as may be construed from Abū Muslim’s despatch of ten thousand men under eleven C.O.s, and from several other instances; ‘Amr ibn Ḥafṣ to Iṣbahān; and ‘Amir ibn Ismā‘īl in charge of troops manning the garrisons and roads between Rayy and Hamadhān. *Ibid.*, pp. 335-9.

¹¹ Khalīfah, p. 439; Ya‘qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 285.

¹² Ṭabarī, II: pp. 364-6.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1998-2000.

¹⁴ *Akhbār*, p. 337.

¹⁵ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1289.

¹⁶ Shaban asserts: ‘In less than a month and a half the number of Abū Muslim’s army rose to 7,000’ (*Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 158). The figure is indeed reported in Ṭabarī as the number of men present with Abū Muslim in his trench at Mākhuwān, in Marw; Ṭabarī (II: pp. 1967-9). Shaban chose to ignore the fact, which emerges from a careful examination of Abū Muslim’s strategy that the major bulk of the Revolutionary forces were not in Marw at the time.

III. *Arab Immigration to Khurāsān*

III.1 *Khurāsān's Particularism as an Outpost of Arab Settlement*

A major difference between Khurāsān (and, slightly to a lesser extent, Egypt and North Africa), on the one hand, and Syria and Iraq, on the other hand, is that the proximity of the latter to the Peninsula permitted the existence in their territory and on its fringes of semi-settled and settled forms of 'civilian' Arab communities, centuries before Islam. After Islam and the conquests, some of these communities joined the Establishment and enlisted in the *dūwān*; others persisted in their *A'rābiyyah* or Christianity, and were joined by more *A'rāb*, thus sustaining an early and uninterrupted civilian Arab presence in the conquered lands, even if only on the margins of the Establishment. This was never the case in Khurāsān. The Arab conquerors in Khurāsān were only that—conquerors, *muqātilah*, members of the *dūwān*, constituents of the middle to upper tiers of the imperial structure. Khurāsān did not witness any significant civilian Arab migration during the Umayyad period. Hence, for a sizable lower tier to have emerged within the Arab sphere in Khurāsān, from which a credible anti-Establishment movement could potentially issue, a massive wave of desertion or expulsion from the *dūwān* would have had to have occurred. This is a fact which Shaban understood only too well; and that is why he unsuccessfully endeavored to forcibly 'mid-wife' the 'birth' of his 'Arab settlers' society from this very institution.¹⁷

III.2 *Building up and Maintaining a Stable Demographic Balance*

It appears that, before Ziyād ibn Abī Sufyān's governorship of Iraq and the East, no serious Arab settlement occurred in Khurāsān. During the campaigning season, the *muqātilah* of Baṣrah, whose colony Khurāsān was, used to invade the territories which had not yet capitulated. Towards the closing of the season, they used to return to their base and leave in Khurāsān a garrison of four thousand men.¹⁸ In the year 45/665-666, Ziyād divided the province into four quarters and appointed to each a sub-governor. Umayr ibn Aḥmar al-Yashkurī, the sub-governor of Marw, was, according to Balādhurī, "the first to settle

¹⁷ See, Agha, 'Battle of the Pass.'

¹⁸ Ṭabarī, I: p. 2906.

the Arabs in Marw.”¹⁹ The real significance of Balādhurī’s statement cannot be ascertained,²⁰ but Umayr’s measure does not appear to have exceeded an intra-province logistical restationing of men already there.

The first substantial and full-fledged Arab settlement of Khurāsān occurred in the year 51/671-672, i.e., around twenty years after its conquest was consolidated by ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Amīr, and eighty years before the eradication of Arab supremacy in the Iranian territories. Ṭabarī reports the move twice, on Madā’inī’s authority.²¹ The second transmission is synoptic and short on details, and it leaves the impression that the Arab settlers, accompanied by their families, initiated the move.²² This belies the most important feature of Arab migration to, and settlement in, Khurāsān—namely, that it was a controlled activity.

This is amply clear in Ṭabarī’s first transmission on Madā’inī’s authority²³ and in Balādhurī’s account.²⁴ And it establishes the fact that deciding the volume, composition, frequency and nature of migrating waves to the province was a function of central policy, not an attribute of spontaneous tribal spreading. Scant and sketchy as it is, further information in the sources on subsequent waves never contradict this fact. If anything, where this information does lend itself to inferential reading, it corroborates the fact. In its negative aspect, i.e., its dissociation from spontaneous tribal spreading, the fact is perfectly compatible with the physical and psychological remoteness of Khurāsān. In the Umayyad era, Khurāsān was never transformed into a part of the Arab psycho-geographical continuum.²⁵

¹⁹ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, p. 506. Madā’inī reports Ziyād’s arrangements, but makes no mention of Umayr’s measure (Ṭabarī, II: p. 79).

²⁰ Cf. ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*, pp. 36-83, esp. p. 37.

²¹ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 81, 155-6.

²² *‘Janaqala al-nās ‘iyālātihim ilā Khurāsān wa-waṭanūhā* (people moved their families to Khurāsān and they settled it), *Ibid.*, pp. 156.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 81, where it clearly states that Ziyād ‘sent’ these settlers to the province.

²⁴ Balādhurī, *Futūh*, p. 507, where it clearly states that Ziyād ‘transferred’ these settlers to the province with their families.

²⁵ Although there have been attempts to portray the first forays into nearby Sāsānid territory as incidental and spontaneous booty-seeking binges (e.g. Glubb, pp. 124-5, 131; Shaban, *Islamic History I*, pp. 24, 27), it may be argued that even those early attempts were deliberate and planned enterprises. This is, however, beyond the scope of this study. When it comes to negotiating the farther east, twenty years thereafter and beyond, the question of deliberateness, intent, and even tight control, takes on a more affirmative tenor. A combination of factors governed, and restricted to a standard required level, Arab migration to Khurāsān: (1) Physical remoteness—a natural dis-continuum and an inherent repellent; (2) The close finiteness of Arab human resources—naturally restrictive; (3) The almost bottomless pits of more proximate immigration environments, warmer and more hospitable—optionally exclusive; (4) The fine Umayyad sense of strategic tribal balances—affirmatively regulatory (consider Mu‘āwiyah’s brilliant, albeit ultimately destructive, preclusion of the Qays from Syria and his easing of their

multitudes into al-Jazīrah, Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 211); (5) On the other hand, there was the lure of abundant and sustained sources of booty—a strong but measured attraction, sobered by the previous repellants.

All these factors combined could only facilitate Umayyad choices, whichever they may have been in any given circumstance. By stepping on the right pedals of encouragement, discouragement, enjoining or prohibiting, the Umayyad authorities could almost always favorably influence, and even control the individual and clannish migration decisions such as to produce the required results. If al-Ḥakam ibn ‘Amr al-Ghifārī met with difficulties in trying to raise an expeditionary force in 45/665-666, as Shaban suggests, it must have been so because the repellent factors were not diluted enough. If, as Shaban also suggests, he was able to assemble the required force only in 47/667-668, then it must have been so because it took the authorities so long to assemble sufficient factors of persuasion and an adequate number of the persuaded (Shaban, *‘Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 30-1; cf. Ṭabarī, II: pp. 80-1, 84). When, in 77/696-697, ‘Abd al-Malik conscripted reinforcements to Umayyah ibn ‘Abd Allāh in Khurāsān, the conscripts took to hiring substitutes to fill in for them (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1029).

The lure of Khurāsān was not so overwhelming as to create a stampede, but the repellants were nothing that the authorities could not handle when the situation so required. Perhaps the best symbolic episode is the agonizing deliberation and self-searching which Ṣilah ibn Ashyam al-‘Adawī had to endure in his endeavor to reach a decision on whether or not to join Salm ibn Ziyād’s expedition (Ṭabarī, II: p. 393). But for psychological significations, nothing outweighs poetry. The ‘epic’ of the Arabs’ incursion into the eastern depths of Iranian territory is not the exclusive domain of history. While historical patterns, substantiated by historical instances, must be sought, the human dimension must not be overlooked. Especially Yāqūt, in his geographical dictionary, and particularly in the Khurāsānian entries, illuminated through juxtaposition heaps of gems of poetry, glowing fiercely and tenderly with echoes of the bedouins’ experience with remote Khurāsān. From Nahār ibn Tawsi’ah’s obsession with the alien cold:

*habbat shamālan kharīqan asqaṭat warāqan
wa-sfarra bi-lqā’i bā’da l-khudrati sh-shūḥu
fa-rhal hudūta wa-lā taj’al ghanīmatanā
thaljan tuṣaffiquhu bi-t-Tirmidhi r-rīḥu*

(A piercing northerly wind has blown and caused leaves to fall;
And, after greenery, wormwood in the plain has turned yellowish;
So move away, may thou be rightly guided, and make not our booty
the snow, which in Tirmidh the wind flaps.)

to Mālik ibn al-Rayb’s heart-rending self-elegy:

*la-‘amrī la’īn ghālat Khurāsānu hāmatī
la-qad kuntu ‘an bābay Khurāsāna nā’iyā
a-lam taranī bi’tu d-dālālata bi-l-hudā
wa-‘asbaḥtu fī jayshi Bni ‘Affāna ghāzīyā
wa-lammā tarā’at ‘inda Marwīn manīyyatī
wa-halla bi-hā suqmī wa-hānat wafāliyyā
aqūlu li-ashābi r-fā’ūnī fa-inmanī
yaqarru bi-‘aynī in Suhaylan badā liyyā*

(Upon my life! why! should Khurāsān destroy my soul,
verily I was, from the two gates of Khurāsān, aloof.
Have you not seen me purchase error for right,
and in Ibn ‘Affān’s army become a warrior?
And when at Marw my fate loomed,
and, there, my ailment alighted, and my death arrived,
To my companions I say: ‘Lift me up; verily,
it would delight my eye if Canopus shows itself to me.’)

Ṭabarī's two transmissions of Madā'inī's account combined, and Balādhurī's account, also agree on the following details of this momentous and epoch-making leap into effective colonization of Khurāsān:(1) The expedition was presided over by al-Rabī' ibn Ziyād al-Ḥārithī, a Baṣran of the Banū al-Ḥārith of the Yamanite tribe of Madhḥij.(2) The expedition numbered fifty thousand warriors.(3) The warriors were accompanied by their families. (4) The warriors were drawn from both garrison cities: Baṣrah and Kūfah.

Balādhurī's account contributes two factors which are absent in Ṭabarī's but which are not necessarily undermined by this absence. One factor is Balādhurī's statement that al-Rabī' settled these warriors "below the river (*dūna al-nahr*)," i.e., south and south-east of the Oxus. This poses no problem, and it is merely an obtainment of the fact that no serious Arab presence took root in Transoxania before Qutaybah's governorship of the province. Therefore, Khurāsān proper and lower Ṭukhārīstān are to be viewed as the earlier Arab domiciles in the province.

The other factor, unique to Balādhurī's account, is that it specifically mentions two of the Prophet's companions from the Banū Aslam of Khuzā'ah as having migrated with this wave. Both, Buraydah ibn al-Ḥuṣayb al-Aslamī and Abū Barzah 'Abd Allāh ibn Naḍlah al-Aslamī, apparently stayed in Khurāsān until, according to Balādhurī, they died in Marw. Buraydah's case is not subject to contention.²⁶ Abū Barzah's case is not so straightforward. While his immigration to Khurāsān is not contested, his final settlement there is.²⁷ It is true that these two men

the east comes through with Yazīd ibn Mufarrigh as a vast, remote, impersonal and featureless cemetery—an embodiment of universal death in anonymity:

Kam bi-l-Jurūmi wa-arḍi-l-Hīndi min qadamin

wa-min sarābīli qatlā laylatuhum qubūrū

bi-Qunduhāra wa-man tuktab maniyyatuhu

bi-Qunduhāra yurajjam dūnahu-l-khabaru

(How numerous! In the Hot Lands and in the Land of India, limbs
and the armour of the slain! Would that they were buried!

In Qunduhār [it came to pass]; and he whose death is destined to be
in Qunduhār, news of him will be but surmise.)

(Yāqūt, consecutively, Tirmidh, Khurāsān, Marw, Qunduhār = II: pp. 26, 353, V: p. 115, IV: p. 403).

²⁶ There seems to be unanimous agreement that he established a celebrated line of descendants in Marw, and that he died there (Ibn Sa'd, VII: p. 365; Kalābādhi, I: p. 122; Ibn Manjūyah, I: p. 97; Rāzī, II: p. 424). A number of his *mawālī* are also encountered amongst the Revolutionaries.

²⁷ Even Abū Barzah's name is subject to different citations: 'Abd Allāh ibn Naḍlah or Naḍlah ibn 'Abd Allāh or ibn 'Ubayd; his offspring were in Baṣrah, and he died either in Marw or in Baṣrah (Ibn Sa'd, VII: p. 366; Kalābādhi, II: p. 754; Ibn Manjūyah, II: p. 295; Rāzī, VIII: p. 499). Moreover, Abū Barzah is encountered in the year 61/680, ten

were specifically mentioned “because they were companions of the Prophet.”²⁸ Actually, not much should be drawn from these two individual cases. Shaban, however, does tend to infer from them patterns and quanta of tribal settlement.²⁹ In this precarious light, it may also be suggested that some of these settlers may have returned to their original *amṣār*.

While both Balādhurī and Madā’inī agree that the fifty thousand warriors were drawn from both Baṣrah and Kūfah, Madā’inī alone mentions that the two *miṣrs* were equally tapped—twenty five thousand from each.³⁰ Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad al-‘Alī, rather convincingly though not conclusively, argues against Madā’inī’s ratio, postulating that the ratio was more likely to have been forty thousand from Baṣrah and ten thousand from Kūfah.³¹ It is true that the Kūfāns were, in 96/714-715, a minority of seven thousand warriors to the forty thousand Baṣrans in the province.³² But it is also true that when Hishām, in 113/731-732, sent reinforcements to al-Junayd ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, it was once again at a ratio vindicating Madā’inī’s—ten thousand men from each of the two *miṣrs*.³³ It may well have been that the initial despatch was twenty five thousand from each *miṣr*, but that, in normal course, the Kūfān ranks were depleted by death, martyrdom, withdrawals and returning to Kūfah, without ever being replenished before Hishām’s reinforcements were sent.

The issue is very important because it bears directly on other vital issues. Although formally Khurāsān was a Baṣran conquest and, consequently, a Baṣran responsibility and privilege, it must not be forgotten that both Baṣrah and Kūfah were subject to one and the same central authority during much of the Umayyad period. No matter how much emphasis we allow ourselves to place on the decentralized nature of supreme Umayyad authority, we must not forget that the powerful Ziyād was virtually the absolute viceroy of the entire East—Baṣrah, Kūfah, Khurāsān and all their colonies and subcolonies. A strong sovereign like Hishām could and did override provincial will. These strong men were never particularly sensitive to general Iraqī interests, or to the special micro-interests of any of the two *miṣrs* within Iraq.

years after he had immigrated to Khurāsān, in Syria in Yazīd I’s court, when the head of the slain al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī was brought to him (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 283, 383).

²⁸ Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 33.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-4, 157.

³⁰ Ṭabarī, II: p. 81.

³¹ ‘Alī, *Tanzīmāt*, p. 44 n.1; *idem*, ‘*Istīlān*,’ p. 38. Wellhausen accepts Madā’inī’s distribution at face value, p. 415.

³² Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 520; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1291.

³³ Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 527; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1545.

Therefore, whenever the strategic imperial imperatives had to be addressed, they were never reluctant to override the regional interests, especially the Iraqi. It appears that such situations emerged whenever huge infusions of man-power were required for the remote territories. In addition to the two aforementioned situations, we have at least one more to corroborate the pattern. Jurjān, Dāhistān and Ṭabaristān were technically Kūfan territories.³⁴ But, when Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab invaded them in 98/716-717, his one hundred thousand or one hundred twenty thousand—strong army was a ‘coalition’ from *ahl* al-Shām, Kūfah, Baṣrah, Jazīrah and Khurāsān.³⁵

When Ziyād resolved to consolidate the Arab rule in Khurāsān, the Baṣran human resources available on site and adequately trained may have been insufficient to raise the force envisioned necessary while keeping the *miṣr* adequately manned. Whether the Baṣrans were unhappy to have the Kūfans share with them the yields of their territory, or the Kūfans were coerced into an unwelcome participation in shouldering a share of the Baṣran remote military burdens, we do not know. What we know is that Ziyād had to pool the resources of both *miṣrs*, at whatever ratio, to be able to meet the demands of his strategic objective. This anticipates the all-important issue of the progressively dwindling reserves of Arab human resources in the light of the *A‘rāb’s* aversion to enlisting in the *ḍiwān*, and the ever growing demands and strains which the continuous expansion and the relentless war consumption placed on these resources.³⁶

The cited size of Ziyād’s despatch fits the emerging stable average quantum of Arab *muqātilah* in Khurāsān. Whenever an estimation is possible, it will be found to hover around the forty to fifty thousand mark, which was apparently adequate and sustainable by self-

³⁴ For a discussion of the conquest rights of the two *miṣrs*, see Blankinship, *Jihād State*, p. 61 ff.

³⁵ Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 413, 412; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1318.

³⁶ An analysis of some available figures might be instructive. During ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib’s reign, enrolment in the Baṣran *ḍiwān* was sixty thousand warriors (Ṭabarī, I: p. 3370). During Ziyād’s tenure, a momentous drive to implement the most generous measures of inclusion occurred. Subtracting, from the above sixty thousand, the Khurāsān expedition of twenty five thousand, or forty thousand, leaves between twenty thousand and thirty five thousand *muqātilah* in Baṣrah. Then, we are told that the *ḍiwān’s* enrolment in this *miṣr* during Ziyād’s days was eighty thousand (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 429) or seventy thousand (Ṭabarī, II: p. 433). This means that he enlisted, most probably in his last two years in office, 51-53/671-673, between thirty five thousand and sixty thousand new men. In another account, when Ziyād took charge in Baṣrah, the *muqātilah* were forty thousand, and he raised their number to eighty thousand (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf IV A*, pp.190, 203). Factoring in the Baṣran force which he sent to Khurāsān, his addition to the *ḍiwān*, according to this account, would be between sixty five thousand and eighty thousand men.

replenishment in normal circumstances. Wavelets, or, more accurately, small detachments accompanied new governors appointed to the province from the outside.³⁷ But these detachments hardly affected the overall picture, and, most likely, they accompanied their man back to their base at the end of his tenure. Routine deaths and moderate war casualties may be assumed to have been replenished through the virtually automatic succession of a warrior's son to his deceased father's slot in the *dīwān*.³⁸ Of course, periods of hyper-activity and extraordinary expansion called for additional temporary reinforcements.³⁹ And cataclysmic losses, which severely eroded the average level of the province's military power, were compensated by permanent reinforcements, local enlistment from amongst non-*dīwānized* members of the families of the *muqātilah*, from Establishment *mawālī*, and, probably, by a measured encouragement of (and a controlled lifting of the regular controls on) mass migration.⁴⁰

To be sure, except for Ibn al-Muhallab's unusual army, and except for the folksy arithmetic which we find in Ibn A'tham's aggregate figures and in Ibn 'Irs' poetry,⁴¹ all other figures pertaining to the numbers of

³⁷ In 56/675-676, Sa'īd ibn 'Uthmān was accompanied by al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufrah, presumably in a detachment of Azdites, and Mālik ibn al-Rayb in a band of *A'rāb* robbers (Ṭabarī, II: p. 178); in 61/680-681, Salm ibn Ziyād was authorized to raise a contingent of two thousand or six thousand Baṣrans to accompany him (Ibid., p. 393); in 111/729-730, al-Junayd ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Murrī was accompanied by five hundred of his kinsmen (Ibid., II: p. 1527; Ibn A'tham, VIII: p. 100; cf. 'Alī, *Istīlān*, pp. 38-9).

³⁸ Cf. 'Alī, *Tanzīmāt*, pp. 162-3.

³⁹ Al-Hajjāj sent an army to Qutaybah at the zenith of his unprecedented expansion, in 95/713-714 (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1267). Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab's huge army which conquered Jurjān (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 413; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1318) was not destined for Khurāsān. On the contrary, Yazīd tapped the Khurāsānite army for the exploit. Indeed, as is mentioned in Bukayr ibn Māhān's biography and activities, supra, chapter one, a community of the Kūfan tribe of Musliyah, and of the Azd, did settle Jurjān. The bulk of the Syrian, Jazīran and Iraqī divisions must have been repatriated.

⁴⁰ Consider Hishām's measures in the wake of the Battle of the Pass, which Shaban tried to reverse (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1545-6; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 527; cf. Agha, 'Battle of the Pass'). The tribal struggle under 'Abd Allāh ibn Khāzīm, during the second civil war, between Qays and Bakr first, and then between Qays and Tamīm (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 490 ff., 594 ff.) took a staggering toll on the human resources of all three tribal groups, especially Bakr. Ibn Khāzīm reportedly killed eight thousand Bakrites in one single battle at Harāt (Ibid., p. 496). The resulting imbalance was apparently redressed by a double measure. In 77/696-697, 'Abd al-Malik despatched an army, (Ibid., p. 1029). In 78/697-698, the Azdite chieftain al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufrah was appointed to Khurāsān (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 514; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1033-5). Wellhausen concludes, justifiably, that al-Muhallab 'brought with him his tribe' (p. 427 and n.2).

⁴¹ The staggering losses of the Arabs in the Battle of the Pass, in 112 or 113/the summer of 730 or 731, (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1532, 1553) involved mainly the Samarqand garrison led by Sawrah ibn al-Ḥurr. Ṭabarī puts the garrison, which was almost completely annihilated, at twelve thousand men (Ibid., pp. 1540-6). Shaban's favorite,

Arab *muqātilah* of the *dīwān* in the province will always be found to be comfortably within or edging to approximate the fifty thousand standard mark.⁴² This mark was, rather symbolically, dedicated by al-Mujashshir ibn Muzāhim al-Sulamī's ominous cautioning to al-Junayd prior to the 'Battle of the Pass'. Said al-Mujashshir: "The governor of Khurāsān never crosses the River [Oxus] with less than 50,000 [men]."⁴³ Therefore, the most notable and direct count of the Arab *muqātilah* in Khurāsān appears to be vindicated. Actually, the record has the appearance of, and probably was, an official extract from the *dīwān*:

At the time [i.e., in 96/714-715], there had been of the *muqātilah* in Khurāsān: from *ahl* al-Baṣrah: nine thousand of *ahl* al-ʿĀliyah, seven thousand of Bakr, whose chief was al-Ḥuḍayn ibn al-Mundhir, ten thousand of Tamīm, whose chief was Dirār ibn Ḥuṣayn al-Ḍabbī, four thousand of ʿAbd al-Qays, whose chief was ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUlwān, and ten thousand of the Azd, whose chief was ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥawdhān; and of *ahl* al-Kūfah: seven thousand, whose chief was Jahm ibn Zuḥar or ʿUbayd Allah ibn ʿAlī; and the *mawālī* were seven thousand, whose chief was Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī.⁴⁴

That is a total *dīwān* enrolment of fifty four thousand, seven thousand of whom were *mawālī*. Of the forty thousand Arabs, forty thousand were from the *akhmās* of Baṣrah, and seven thousand from the mostly Yamanite tribes of Kūfah. This would work out roughly to 40% Muḍar confederates, 36% Yaman confederates, and 24% Rabīʿah confederates.

Ibn Aʿtham, puts the figure at twenty thousand, none of whom escaped (VIII: p. 103). Unreliable as the figures may be, and allowing for poetic exaggeration, the poetry which Ṭabarī cites reflects the magnitude of the loss. Ibn ʿIrs al-ʿAbdī said: '*Khamṣina alfan qutūlū dayʿatan* = fifty thousand were killed in vain' (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1559). In his attempt to twist 'Hishām's organizations' to his purposes, Shaban engages in a dubious arithmetic, selectively combining figures from Ibn Aʿtham and from Ṭabarī, to inflate the number of the *muqātilah* in Marw, and to depress their number in Samarqand (*ʿAbbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 115-6; see Agha, 'Battle of the Pass,' esp. pp. 347-52).

⁴² ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ziyād, in 54/673-4, crossed the Oxus with an army of twenty four thousand men (Balādthurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 507). Singling out the Yamanites of the province, Asad ibn ʿAbd Allāh, in 109/727-728, boasted the support of twelve thousand swords (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1498). Allowing for the *mawālī* division of the *dīwān*, at around seven thousand, and for Transoxanian levies, which reached, in Qutaybah's and in Naṣr's tenures, around twenty thousand (Ibid., II: pp. 1291, 1256, 1690), even Ibn Aʿtham's aggregates can be accommodated. Of course, the reference by the poet al-Kumayt ibn Zayd to the 'seventy thousand' supporters of al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj is synonymous to Madāʿinī's reference to his sixty thousand such supporters, who swelled into this figure only after the *dahāqīn* of Ṭukhārīstān, with their men, joined his nucleus force of four thousand apparently Arab warriors (Ibid., II: pp. 1575, 1567).

⁴³ Ibid., p. 1291. Of course, the figure must be understood to include the official *mawālī* division and the native levies.

⁴⁴ Ibid., III: p. 568; cf. Balādthurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 520; and partially, Ibn Aʿtham, VII: p. 268.

Based on these figures, some modern scholars have attempted to assess the overall size of the Arab population in the province—military and civilian. Educated assessments obtained with figures ranging between two hundred thousand and a quarter of a million.⁴⁵ I undertook my own probe of the issue,⁴⁶ applying modern principles of population studies to data gleaned from the classical sources and subjected to a strict comparative approach to modern and medieval demographic balances and trends of positive/negative growth. My computations show that the overall Arab population in Khurāsān during the Umayyad era “could not have been less than 115,000, nor could they have exceeded 175,000.”⁴⁷

III.3 *The Geographical Dispersion of the Arabs in Khurāsān—A Military Archipelago*

Unlike in Baṣrah and Kūfah, and other *amṣār*, where the Arab *muqātilah* were compactly stationed, the Khurāsānite Arabs were dispersed across the landscape, their military punch deployed over few major centers and in remote and isolated garrison stations, *masāliḥ*. In the campaigning season, they used to assemble in Marw, coming from “Nīshāpūr, Abīward, Sarakhs and Harāt.”⁴⁸ Outside the season, and outside the main military centers, they were thinly spread to the limit—⁴⁹ little more than contingents of police forces when it came to contesting their locations with an organized and purposeful adversary. Al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj had proven it across Ṭukhāristān, before Abū Muslim fatally proved it all over the province.

The settlement of specific tribes in specific localities are sometimes explicitly reported. Certain tribal preponderance in certain areas is also

⁴⁵ Wellhausen, at a ratio of four family members to each warrior, computes that ‘the total number of the Arabs in Khurāsān can hardly have amounted to more than 200,000’ (p. 427, n.3). Obviously, he left out the Kūfāns and based his calculations on the forty thousand Baṣran *muqātilah*. ‘Alī makes up for the oversight by effectively rounding Wellhausen’s calculations to reach 250,000 (*‘Istīlān*, p. 40). Sharon dutifully takes Wellhausen to task on the missing seven thousand Kūfāns and their twenty eight thousand obtaining family members, to the effect of adding thirty five thousand to the total, and to conclude, ‘with great reservation, that the total Arab population in Khurāsān at the zenith of the Umayyad period could not have exceeded a quarter of a million.’ (*Black Banners*, pp. 65-6). There is also a strident and unconvincing attempt by ‘Aṭwān to double the number to half a million (*al-Shi‘r al-‘Arabī bi-Khurāsān*, pp. 62-3).

⁴⁶ Agha, ‘Arab population,’ esp. pp. 217-29.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

⁴⁸ Thus during Qutaybah’s time, Ṭabarī, II: p. 1207.

⁴⁹ Ya‘qūbī, undoubtedly describing the situation during his time, in the 3rd/9th century, attests to the presence ‘in all the cities of Khurāsān ... except Ushrūsānah, [of] Arabs from Muḍar, Rabī‘ah, and all the Yamanite tribes’ (*Buldān*, p. 294). But references pertaining to the period are abundant.

occasionally stated. On the whole, however, any attempt at charting the geographical deployment of the Arab tribes in Khurāsān must rely heavily on inference. The data in the sources are sketchy, scattered, confused and overlapping. Outside the two singular cases, where Bakr was predominant in the south, especially Qūhistān,⁵⁰ and where Qays was predominant in Nīshāpūr,⁵¹ the other areas were tribally mixed. Especially in Marw, in Ṭukhāristān and mainly in Balkh, and in Transoxania, almost every one of the great tribal alliances enjoyed a comparatively significant presence. The following ‘Chart showing Arab Deployment in Khurāsān’⁵² is, at best, a sketchy depiction. For the present purpose, more important than the tribal distribution in this chart is the geographical spread itself, which covers the entire territory, and the last vertical column in the grid, which demonstrates a general, tribally unspecified, Arab presence in the respective locality. The chart is essentially based on inferences made from the sources by al-‘Alī and Blankinship.⁵³ Further direct inferences from the sources are also made by us.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 499.

⁵¹ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1929; cf. Wellhausen, p. 413.

⁵² Figure no.1. Sharon produced an unsubstantiated map of the ‘distribution of Arab tribes in Khurāsān’, *Black Banners*, p. 59.

⁵³ ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ pp. 42, 48-51, 54-5, 65-77; Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 66, 68, 72, 85, 94, 110, 116, 144, 167, 202, 213, 220, 223, 228, 233, 237, 239, 308, 322, 329, 339, 343, 346, 363.

⁵⁴ Such inferences, and our direct verification of ‘Alī’s and Blankinship’s inferences are referred to herebelow opposite the coordinates of the respective square in the grid in figure no1 p. 189. Where no such reference is made, the inference remains supported only by the authority of the above scholars. The letter-numeral combinations between brackets herebelow refer to the grid in Figure No.1: (a.2) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1930; Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ p. 85. (a.12) *Ibid.*, p. 94; ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ p. 67. (a.19) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 2473-5; ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ p. 75. (a.20) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1921-2; Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 85, 94; ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ p. 75. (a.21) Yāqut, II: p. 385. (a.22) Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 72, 94. (a.23) *Ibid.*, p. 72. (a.25) Narshakhī, p. 80; Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ p. 94. (a.26) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1251; ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ pp. 55, 72. (a.32) Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 94, 110. (a.33) Ya‘qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 294; Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ p. 72. (b.12) Ya‘qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 279; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1026, 1579; *Akhbār*, p. 311; ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ p. 68; Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 116, 167. (b.13) Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 116, 167, 144, 239. (b.14) *Ibid.*, p. 116. (b.15) *Ibid.*, p. 116. (b.16) *Ibid.* (b.17) *Ibid.* (b.19) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-6; ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ p. 75. (b.20) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-6; ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ p. 75; Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 116, 167. (b.21) Yāqut, II: p. 385. (b.22) Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 66, 68. (b.24) Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ p. 68. (b.25) Narshakhī, p. 80. (b.26) ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ p. 72. (b.32) Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 116, 167. (b.33) Ya‘qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 294. (c.6) *Akhbār*, pp. 295, 329, 32; Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 220, 223, 228. (c.7) Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 499. (c.8) ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ p. 51. (c.9) Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ p. 223; ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ p. 51. (c.10) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 491-2; *Akhbār*, p. 309; ‘Alī, *‘Istīlān*,’ pp. 49-50; Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ pp. 144, 202, 223, 228, 237, 239. (c.11) Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ p. 202. (c.12) Naṣr ibn Sayyār’s poetry: *‘abliḡ Rabī ata fī Marw ...’* (c.13) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1603. (c.19) *Ibid.*, pp. 1473-6; Blankinship, *‘al-‘Arab fī*

IV. *The Arab Revolutionary Quantum*

Any presumed Arab participation in the Revolution must have come from the ranks of the fifty thousand warriors. The rest of the Arab population (according to my figures a balance of sixty five thousand to hundred twenty five thousand dependents) must obviously have comprised non-combatant and effectively non-politicized women and children.⁵⁵

Khurāsān, p. 233; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 50, 75. (c.20) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-6; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab *fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 213, 233; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 75. (c.21) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1604. (c.22) Blankinship, 'al-'Arab *fi Khurāsān*,' p. 213. (c.25) Narshakhī, p. 80. (c.33) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 294. (d.1) *Akhbār*, p. 224. (d.5) *Ibid.*, p. 218. (d.12) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 279; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1604. (d.19) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-6; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 75. (d.20) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-6; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 75. (d.21) Yāqūt, II: p. 385; Muqaddasī, p. 303. (e.4) *Akhbār*, p. 218; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab *fi Khurāsān*,' pp. 308, 322. (e.12) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1951-4, 183; *Akhbār*, pp. 274-6; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 68; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab *fi Khurāsān*,' p. 308. (f.3) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 277; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab *fi Khurāsān*,' p. 339. (f.12) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1026; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 67. (f.26) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1421; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 72. (f.32) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1422. (g.1) *Ibid.*, pp. 2003-5. (g.4) *Akhbār*, p. 218; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab *fi Khurāsān*,' p. 329. (g.5) *Akhbār*, p. 218; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab *fi Khurāsān*,' p. 329. (g.12) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1579; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 67-8. (g.25) Narshakhī, p. 80; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab *fi Khurāsān*,' p. 363. (g.26) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1252; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab *fi Khurāsān*,' p. 363. (g.33) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 294. (h.2) *Ibid.*, p. 278; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1207; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 74. (h.3) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 277. (h.4) *Akhbār*, pp. 284, 289; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1951. (h.5) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1207; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 74. (h.6) Ṭabarī, III: p. 536; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 74. (h.8) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 380; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 51. (h.9) 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 51. (h.10) Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1207, 1529; Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 280; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 50. (h.12) Ṭabarī, II: p. 1028; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 65-9. (h.13) *Akhbār*, pp. 284, 289. (h.15) Ṭabarī, IV: p. 37; *Akhbār*, pp. 284, 289. (h.17) Ṭabarī, IV: pp. 48-9. (h.18) Ṭabarī, IV: p. 64; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 77. (h.19) Ṭabarī, IV: pp. 16-7; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 74-6. (h.20) Ṭabarī, IV: pp. 16-7; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 61, 73-6. (h.21) 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 77. (h.24) Ṭabarī, IV: p. 16; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 75. (h.25) Narshakhī, pp. 73, 80; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 74. (h.26) Ṭabarī, III: pp. 551-2, 596; Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 518-9; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 70-3. (h.27) Ṭabarī, III: p. 615. (h.28) Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 529; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 70. (h.29) Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 529; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 70, etc. (h.30) *Akhbār*, pp. 284, 289; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' p. 74. (h.31) *Akhbār*, p. 289. (h.32) Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 529; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1421; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 69-73. (h.33) Ya'qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 294; 'Alī, 'Istīlān,' pp. 42, 48; Blankinship, 'al-'Arab *fi Khurāsān*,' p. 339.

⁵⁵ This would also be true, even within the framework of Wellhausen's ratio, if the assumption is correct that Wellhausen, resting his ratio on an exaggerated demographic balance of dependency, considered the warriors to comprise the entire male adult Arab population of the province, in which case the balance would be two hundred thousand politically neutralized dependants. If, however, the assumption is that the ratio of four to each warrior subsumes the presence of a certain quantum of male adults outside the *d ūwān*, Wellhausen did not suggest it. While such an explanation may clear Wellhausen's ratio from the charge of exaggeration beyond all reasonable demographic trends, it would brand it with arbitrariness and a counter productive lack of specificity and the absence of an explanation of the source of such a 'non-*d ūwānized*' presence. It also provides no clues as to how to apportion the two hundred thousand to categories of dependents and able bodied males.

Yet, this is precisely what Sharon appears to have taken for granted: the existence of an 'Arab civilian population', practically isolated from the *muqātilah*, in separate 'permanent settlements', and apparently demographically whole, i.e., age-sex balanced,

It is readily obvious that, even if the entire Arab *muqātilah* force were pro-Revolution, it would not have amounted, in the utmost, to more than 50% of the Revolutionary quantum of six figures, which, as we have already seen, obtains from *Akhbār*'s data. Of course, this was not the case—and not simply because it is self-evidently untenable. A review of the available data on the deployment of the Khurāsānite Arab force at the time would reveal that its bulk was fighting the Establishment's battle. Much of this information may not be statistically accurate yet it is demonstrably indicative.

It must be sufficient here to try to trace, broadly, the whereabouts and, where possible, the numbers of the Khurāsānite Arab forces who were, simultaneously but on different battle fields, fighting the Establishment's battle at any one given time bracket. The best, and probably the only such time bracket for which we possess some quantitative information, is the period shortly following the fall of Marw, when the scattered Arab forces had the chance, or actually were forced to regroup. It was around Sha'bān, 130/April-May, 748; the deployment of the government forces looked roughly as follows: (1) Thirty thousand fighters, with Tamīm ibn Naṣr ibn Sayyār and al-Nābī ibn Suwayd al-'Ijlī, defending Ṭūs against Qaḥṭabah's onslaught. Of course, they lost.⁵⁶ (2) Ten thousand men of Qays and other Umayyad

enough to provide the incubating environment for the *da'wah*, 'among the Urban population by local Arab leaders and *mawālī* of Arab tribes who were neither warriors nor directly involved in the armed conflicts,' i.e., intra-tribal conflicts (*Black Banners*, p. 69, see also pp. 65-71). The example Sharon chooses in order to illustrate his point is most unfortunate. Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, although he was not involved in the internal tribal strife, and as thus proves a part of Sharon's point (*Black Banners*, p. 69 n.57), is, nevertheless, explicitly reported to have been himself a member of the *duwān*, as were his father, his brother Jābir, (or Hārithah), and, most likely, the rest of his adult male family members (*Akhbār*, p. 199; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1480, 1595, 1601). This fact undermines the more relevant and consequential aspect of Sharon's characterization of these leaders as having been 'neither warriors ...' He does not attempt to further explain the source and the principle of differentiation from the warriors' 'society', which this 'Arab civilian population' attained.

By comparison, Shaban, brilliantly aware of the dilemma of postulating an Arab character of a revolution that occurred in a demographic milieu which was devoid of a quantitatively convincing extra-Establishment civilian Arab presence, at least valiantly, if stridently, tried to 'prospect' for some socio-economic factors which may form a *raison d'être* for such a 'necessary' presence. It is precisely this realization, of the necessity of explaining the anomaly of a 'non-*duwānized*' Arab presence in remote Khurāsān, which singles out Shaban's attempt from the rest of similar attempts—mainly from Sharon's and Omar's. If he failed to make a good case, it is because he tried to prove the existence of a non-existent. Ironically, by putting up the best conceived argument for the 'cause' of the 'revisionists' and yet failing to support it, Shaban succeeds only in confirming that the post-Dennett 'school' has no case. See, Agha, 'Battle of the Pass.'

⁵⁶ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1201. *Akhbār*, pp. 321, 323-4, cites no numbers.

		Muḍar		Rabīrah	Yaman			Arabs in General			
		Qays	Khindīṭ-Tamm		Azd	Khuzārah	Ṭayyī?			Other	
											a
Western Territory	Jurjān	Jurjān				*		*	*	1	
	Nishapur Quarter	Abrashahr	*						*	*	2
		Tūs						*		*	3
		Nasā					*		*	*	4
		Abīward				*			*	*	5
		Sarakhs			*					*	6
Southern Khurāsān	Qūhīstān	Qūhīstān			*				*	7	
	Harāt Quarter	Būshanj			*				*	8	
		Bādghāhīs			*				*	9	
		Harāt			*				*	10	
		The Area in General			*				*	11	
Central	Marw	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	12	
	Marw al-Rūdh		*	*				*	*	13	
Tūkhārīstān/Eastern Khurāsān	Balkh Quarter	Jūzjān		*					*	14	
		Ṭālaqān		*					*	15	
		Fāryāb		*					*	16	
		Andakhūd (Nukhadh)		*					*	17	
		Shubūrquān							*	18	
		Barīquān	*	*	*	*			*	19	
		Balkh	*	*	*	*			*	20	
		Khulm	*	*	*	*			*	21	
		Tūkhārīstān	*	*	*				*	22	
Transoxania	Tirmīdh	*						*	*	23	
	Ṣaghāniyān	*	*					*	*	24	
	Bukhārā	*	*	*			*	*	*	25	
	Samarqand	*	*			*	*	*	*	26	
	Sughd (general)				*			*	*	27	
	Shāsh							*	*	28	
	Farghānah							*	*	29	
	Āmul							*	*	30	
	Zamm							*	*	31	
	Transoxania (general)	*	*			*	*	*	*	32	
Passim	*	*	*				*	*	33		

Figure No. 1
Arab Deployment in Khurāsān

supporters in Naṣr's camp at Mūrūshk, outside Nīshāpūr, and fleeing further west, at the time of the battle for Tūs.⁵⁷ (3) Roughly at the same time, the battle around and for Balkh was raging. Government forces comprised Arabs and Iranians. The Iranians were, reportedly, the princes of Ṭukhāristān and Transoxania. Whoever they were, both the Iranians and the Arabs were led by the *mawlā* veteran of the Establishment, Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān al-Nabaṭī.⁵⁸ The Arab forces must have comprised the garrisons of Tirmidh and Barūqān, in addition to the remnants of the Transoxania and Ṭukhāristān garrisons who were overwhelmed by the orchestrated rising, then ran away and re-assembled at Tirmidh—a complete Arab profile of the Muḍar, Rabī'ah, and Yaman, combined. No figures are cited. But, a figure of ten thousand warriors in these areas should be fairly conservative.⁵⁹

The above rough deployment comes to a total of about fifty thousand men. Not all were Arabs, of course. A rough arbitrary net adjustment of ten thousand men, to account for loyal *mawālī* and other dissident Iranians, would leave around forty thousand Khurāsānite Arabs fighting for the Establishment.

If only these forty thousand men were the only Arabs still loyal to the Umayyad Establishment, it would leave the balance of ten thousand Arabs who failed to make the last stand for their own ethnic cause. This balance must account for the already fallen, for the neutral, for those who had paid allegiance to Abū Muslim only after the fall of Marw,⁶⁰ for the Azdite followers of Ibn al-Kirmānī, who only belatedly allied themselves to Abū Muslim, and for the hard core ideologues who were the established Arab members of the Organization.

The figure ten thousand conveniently fits the 'standard' number of the *Khums* of the Azd, which included other Yamanite Baṣran tribes, but not the Kūfan tribes which may reasonably be considered to have supplied the majority of the hard core Organization Arab constituents.

Of course, none of the above categories, or of any others, may be assumed to have been in its entirety on one side or the other. Some of the '*mawālī* of the Establishment' were definitely on the government side, so were the majority of Muḍar, or, at least, of Muḍarite Qays. The bulk

⁵⁷ *Akhbār*, pp. 324-5.

⁵⁸ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1997-8.

⁵⁹ Judging by the number of Sawrah ibn al-Hurr's garrison at Samarqand, which numbered twelve thousand during the *yawm al-Shi'b*, and taking into consideration that Ṭukhāristān was rather intensively garrisoned, (unknown numbers in, e.g., Jazzah, Shubārqaṅ, Khulm, Ṭalaqaṅ, Jūzjān, Fāryāb; *Akhbār*, pp. 284, 289; cf. Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-5, 1605; Yāqūt, *Buldān*, II: p. 385; Blankinship, '*al-ʿArab fī Khurāsān*,' p. 116).

⁶⁰ *Akhbār*, pp. 307, 315-6, 318.

of the Rabrāh wing of the anti-Naṣr alliance had actually reverted to a pro-Establishment position. And, the majority of the main stream of the ‘*dīwānized*’ Arabs had repeatedly tried to patch up their differences. Although the attempts were not opportunely successful, the mere fact that they did occur when they did accentuates the general ethnic character of the Revolution-versus-Establishment divide.⁶¹

While the majority of the Azd alliance may not be considered authentic Revolutionaries, it is likely that many of the Kūfan Khurāsānites were. Therefore, while most figures are viewed as imprecise, it is probably not grossly inaccurate to accept, after corresponding adjustments on both sides, the figure ten thousand as conceptually fairly indicative of the Arab quantum of the anti-Naṣr forces. This would include non-Revolutionary Azdites as well as the original authentic Organization constituents. For lack of information pointing to a better informed allocation, we may suggest a 50-50 split of these ten thousand between authentic Revolutionaries and Ibn al-Kirmānī followers. This would result in 20% of the total Arab warriors having been a mix of ideologically motivated anti-Establishment enthusiasts, and unwittingly anti-government spoilers who ended up being instrumental in bringing about the destruction of their own Establishment, and, eventually, that of their own clannish leadership. That is a 10% authentic Arab participation. But, even if the vital distinction between authentic Revolutionaries and unwitting tribal spoilers is to be celinquished, the maximum Arab participation could not have exceeded 20% of the overall Arab military capability in the province. Within the framework of the entire Revolutionary quantum, this is a quantity of about less than 10%. Prior to the stand-off at Marw, which marked the Azd-Abū Muslim alliance, and after the liquidation of the two sons of al-Kirmānī, it would probably work out to a range of between 5% of the Revolutionary forces and a negligible percentage of the vengeful and empowered Persian multitudes.

Even the highest and most liberal estimation of Arab participation cannot bring its ratio at the level of the popular base even remotely close to its 20% ratio at the leadership level, as reflected in the statistical data discussed in part three below. This is not an anomaly. It is in keeping with two major considerations that governed the composition of the Organization and the nature of the historiographical coverage of its activities. First, politically and structurally, the principle of equitable representation was almost never applied in the ‘machinations’ of the

⁶¹ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1964-5, 1969, 1997-9; *Akhhār*, pp. 275-6, 288-90, 294-6 ff.

clandestine structure. There had always been overriding, politically and organizationally sound reasons to involve more Arabs at the top. However, except for the brief two-year interval between the execution of Khidāsh and the restoration of Kūfan control, when Sulaymān ibn Kathīr became the de facto leader of the Khurāsān Chapter, never had an Arab been the first man. Second, the nature of the historiographical coverage of the Umayyad era largely reflects the imperial tribal structure of the Establishment and the society. Naturally, Arabs, and perhaps to a lesser extent their *mawālī*, enjoyed higher profiles than the extra-Establishment converts. They were more likely to come to the attention of reporters and historians. That is why the reporting on the Arab members is more frequent and abundant. And that is why they crop up in the historical reports in numbers too many to reflect their actual size in the Organization, and, much more so, in the Revolution.

The composition of the Organization's leadership apparatus is the subject of part three herebelow. Staying now with the animated rhythm of the nameless masses, we shall turn to the prime-grade textual material that, better than any other tool, imparts a contemporaneous sense of the period.

CHAPTER EIGHT

LITERARY TEXTS AS DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS

I. *Traditions and Other Texts Quoted Verbatim*

When, allegedly, the ‘Abbāsīd Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī gave his directives to his missionaries, he instructed them to avoid the other *amṣār* and imperial centers and to concentrate on Khurāsān. In no uncertain demographic terms, he expounded his strategic reasons:

But go for Khurāsān. For, it is there that the great multitudes and manifest tenacity abound; where there are wholesome breasts and empty hearts, [hearts] not portioned out to [diverse] inclinations, not distributed among [different] creeds, not occupied by any sectarian beliefs, nor corrupted by inequity. They don’t have today the ardour of the Arabs, nor do they harbour anything like the partisanship which bonds followers to their masters, or like the alliances of the tribes and the tribal solidarity (*aṣabiyyah*) of the clans. They have always been trampled upon, humiliated and oppressed; and they have always suppressed their anger and held out hope for change. Furthermore, they are soldiers with enormous bodies and ‘hulks’, shoulders, withers, heads, beards, moustaches and voices, and velarized vernaculars which emerge from strange bellies.¹

In a similar tradition, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ‘prophesied’:

God forbade but that our partisans should be the people of Khurāsān (*ahl Khurāsān*); we shall never triumph except through them, and they shall never triumph except through us. It shall come to pass that, from Khurāsān, seventy thousand [wielders of] unsheathed swords will emerge, their hearts [as solid] as iron, their names [mere] agnomen (*al-Kunā*), and their pedigrees [mere] village affiliations; they let their hairs grow as long as those of the *ghouls*.²

Improbable as it is, Sharon reads the above as a description of Arabs. Actually, these texts are either completely useless, or, if anything is to be inferred from them, it may well be that they refer to tigers or

¹ *Akhbār*, pp. 206-7; almost identical text in Ibn Qutaybah, *‘Uyūn al-Akhbār*, I: pp. 204-5; partial or with variations in: Balādhuri, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: p. 81; Maqdisi, IV: p. 59; Yāqūt, II: p. 352; Jāhīz, *Manāqib*, I: pp.16, 18; Ibn al-Faḳīh, p.315; Muqaddasī, pp.293-4; cf. Sharon, *Black Banners*, pp. 51-2, n. 3.

² Yāqūt, II: p. 353; cf. *Akhbār*, pp. 305-6; Ibn al-Faḳīh, p. 315; cf. Sharon, *Black Banners*, p. 67 and n. 50.

crocodiles—but definitely not to Arabs, and most certainly not to the intensely tribalized Arabs of Khurāsān.³ Van Vloten recognized the description for what it was meant—a characterization of the Aryan natives of the region.⁴ So did al-Jāhīz and al-Muqaddasī.⁵

The fact of the matter is that these two traditions betray two hallmarks of the ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. The first is, of course, that Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī had nothing to do with them. Like others, these traditions were cast in the form of prophecies and attributed to him, to glorify him, and to impose his presence on a theatre of events with which he had nothing to do. The second is that, as with some other similar fabrications, the later ‘Abbāsīd propaganda machine, author of these traditions, sought, where sustainable, to smuggle their interpolations into the basically true texture of events. Especially in the specific case of the above two traditions, the real author/s were dealing with an ideal situation. When they authored their *Imām*’s divinations, the sweeping movement had already occurred under the full glare of the contemporary world and its historians, and the true identity of the Revolutionaries, ‘the black devils’ in Isidori Hispalensis’ expression,⁶ was no longer a secret; it could not be easily tampered with. Nor did they need to tamper with it. The fact that the overwhelming majority of the Khurāsāniyyah were actually native Khurāsānites did not pose any problem to the ‘Abbāsīd interpolators. On the contrary, one may even be tempted to date these, and some of the similarly pro-Persian or anti-Arab traditions,⁷ to the civil war, when the Persianized propaganda machine of al-Ma’mūn could use such traditions to fuel the Persian enmity toward the mainly Arab supporters of al-Amīn.

Thus, the only chore with which the interpolators were left was to incorporate Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī into a veracious situation. Simple! Make him prophesy the whole situation, complete with the unmistakably accurate and detailed depiction of the ethnic properties

³ Sharon, *Black Banners*, pp. 52-4. For a detailed discussion of Sharon’s contention, see Agha, ‘Agents,’ pp. 354-8.

⁴ Vloten, p. 44.

⁵ Jāhīz made it clear who Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī is supposed to have meant by his description. The ‘spokesman’ for the Khurāsānite Persians in al-Jāhīz’s text said: ‘And it is us who ... Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī mentioned when he wanted to despatch the *du’āt* ... and we are people endowed with enormous bodies and hulks, hair, withers and huge shoulders.’ *Manāqib*, pp. 16, 18. Muqaddasī explicitly construes the text as a depiction of the natives of Khurāsān (p. 293).

⁶ Wellhausen, p. 533.

⁷ Such as the allegation that Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī, or his son Ibrāhīm, ordered Abū Muslim to kill every Arab who had attained a five spans-of-the-hand height. Tabarī, II: pp. 1937, 1974; *Akhhār*, p. 392; Azdī, pp. 65, 107; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: pp. 476, 479; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 59; Ibn al-Athār, IV: pp. 295, 304.

and the socio-economic situation and the non-sectarian partisanships of his 'promised' partisans. It would tally with the witnessed facts of the era which had unfolded some decades earlier—glory to the demi-prophet! It would also secure him a presence on the theatre of events. Naive as this may sound, it was in keeping with the general character of the 'Abbāsīd *riwāyah*. And so it came to pass.

The preceding are not the only direct textual testimony to the non-Arab character of the Revolution, and of the Organization which prepared for and spearheaded it. Scores of texts, of prime or lesser value, are strewn all over the Arabic sources, all of which attest to the overwhelming non-Arab, and precisely Persian character of the movement. We shall consider a few more, starting the less decisive.

Al-Jāhīz insightfully characterized the realms of the two Arab dynasties: "... the descendants of al-'Abbās ... their realm is Khurāsānite Iranian, and the realm of Banū Marwān was bedouin Arab (*walad al-'Abbās ... dawlatuhum 'Ajamiyyah Khurāsāniyyah, wa dawlat Banī Marwān 'Arabiyyah A'rābiyyah*)."⁸ Commenting on the final outcome of the struggle, a disappointed Dhahabī says: "we rejoiced that [the reins of power] passed to their, [the Prophet's family], hands ... nay, it was a tyrant Khurāsānian Persian regime that which arrived, *bal atat dawlah A'jamiyyah Khurāsāniyyah jabbārah*."⁹

Of course, advancing in support of our argument these and similar texts, which revolve around characterizing the emerging regime rather than the movement which brought it into existence, is open to this very criticism: No one contests the eventual Persian influence in the 'Abbāsīd realm, the controversy is around the ethnic character of the forces which installed it. True. But this gives rise to the question: how was it possible for the influential Persian elements to extend their influence beyond the cultural and political spheres into the military establishment, which is the last bastion an 'existing' power, ethnic or otherwise, would peaceably surrender? How did they come to control the military, and comprise its backbone, if they were not the undisputed victors? If the Arabs made up the main bulk of the victorious forces, how come they were so soon discarded from its ranks, as phrased by Suyūfī: "Historians said: in the realm of Banū al-'Abbās ... the name of the Arabs was dropped from the *dūwān*."¹⁰ Does it make sense to assume that the 'Abbāsīd realm emerged as a result of a struggle between Arabs and Arabs, in which Arabs defeated Arabs, then both Arabs, the victor and

⁸ Jāhīz, *Bayān*, III: p. 366.

⁹ Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 58.

¹⁰ Suyūfī, p. 258.

the vanquished, lost all military clout? How could the partisans of the *da'wah*, so soon and without a fight, lose the *dawlah*? Of course, one may say, this is not a decisive argument.

In his alleged directive to Abū 'Ikrimah, Muḥammad ibn 'Alī reportedly said: "... and recruit abundantly from amongst the Iranians, for they are the constituents of our cause, and by them God shall support it (*wa istakthir min al-A'ajim fa-innahum ahl da'watina wa bi-him yu'ayyiduhā Allāh*).” Similarly, Abū Muslim reportedly admitted that the *Imām* had instructed him to: “gather the Iranians around me and to favor them (*wa [-an] ajma'a ilayya al-'Ajam wa akhtaṣṣahum*).” Hence, comments the pro-'Abbāsīd anonymous compiler, “the Iranians, and many from the Yaman and the Rab'ah, flocked to the *da'wah*, comprising true believers or avengers who hoped to achieve revenge.”¹¹ Thus, the protagonists of the Revolution, participants and reporters alike, provide ammunition to the thrust of the present argument.

The antagonists also provide similar supporting evidence. Utterances in this class of sample direct texts are attributed to Naṣr ibn Sayyār or someone in his entourage.¹² According to *Akhbār*, when 'Īsā ibn A'yan, a *naqīb* and the spokesman for a Revolutionary delegation, invoked the *sunnah* of the Prophet, Salm ibn Aḥwaz, Naṣr's chief of police, answered him to his face: “As for what you said of the *sunnah* of the Prophet, what relation do you have with it? We are more entitled to him than you are. We are the Arabs and the sons of Arabs, and you are coarse infidels (*'ulūj*) and worshippers of cats.”¹³ The insulting tone and intention are obvious. But, even if we were to concede that the last phrase of Salm's retortion is merely a misrepresentation of the enemy's beliefs and a tool of the propaganda war, would lying about his ethnic identity serve the purpose, especially when the statement is addressed to an enemy delegation rather than the public, for the sympathies of which a propaganda war was waged?

Naṣr himself pursued the same themes with the religious leaders of public opinion. Referring to a worship practice, which could well have been a residue from the Manichean background of some of the converts, he said: “These wearers of black (*Musawwidah*), they preach a creed other than ours, they have declared a religious norm other than ours, they are not from the people of our *Qiblah*, they worship cats and they

¹¹ *Akhbār*, pp. 204, 285; cf. Ṭabarī, II: p. 1937.

¹² Despite their inherent power, these texts are voluntarily relegated to this lower class of testimony, simply because Naṣr himself provides the ultimate textual piece, which will be analyzed below.

¹³ *Akhbār*, p. 287.

worship heads.”¹⁴ We need not contend the possible charge that this statement is a misrepresentation. One certainly can misrepresent the beliefs of ones adversaries. Beliefs are naturally invisible and are susceptible to false charges. The social and ethnic properties of an adversary are visible. They cannot be as easily misrepresented. Honorable people may be slandered; in the swearing match, respectable people may be turned into the refuse of society; but Arabs or Iranians could not be ‘accused’ of being other than what they were. Saïd Naşr: “... they are gentiles, incognitos, slaves, and the refuse of the Arabs and the *mawālī* (*‘ulūj wa aghām wa ‘abūd wa suqqāṭ al-‘Arab wa al-mawālī*).”¹⁵

If Naşr did try to sell even his ‘distortion’ of such visible demographic features to contemporaneous eye witnesses, who coexisted with the ‘victims’ of the ‘distortion’ in the same geographical space, it is inconceivable that he would have tried the same with one of the major players, who must have been amply informed of the demographics of the theatre. In a despatch to ‘Alī ibn al-Kirmānī, which *Akhbār* quotes verbatim, Naşr invoked the common Arab solidarity to appeal to Ibn al-Kirmānī’s ethnic sentiment, in a bid to rally him against the common ethnic enemy; said Naşr:

The war between us has been [fuelled by tribal] chauvinism; during that, we had [a tendency] to spare one another, in view of the harmony of the Arabs. Now sprang in our midst those whose intention is to eliminate us all. You have learnt of what these people inflicted on Nasā, Ṭālaqān, Marw al-Rūdh, Āmul and Zamm; and of how little they spare the inviolability of the Arabs.¹⁶

What had been inflicted on Nasā, Ṭālaqān ... etc., or actually on the Arab communities and garrisons in these locations, were ‘atrocities’ even Abū Muslim did not bother to deny.¹⁷

The demographic aspects of Naşr and his party’s depiction of the Revolutionaries, and their charges against them, including the recruitment of slaves, were never challenged by Abū Muslim and his party. When Abū Muslim staged his propagandist extravaganza in the Mākhuwān trench, it was intensively and specifically pointed to counter Naşr’s charges regarding the beliefs of the Revolutionaries. No effort whatsoever was made to address Naşr’s ethnic portrayals.¹⁸ Of course,

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 290, cf. editor’s note no.1.

¹⁵ Ibid. In corroboration of Naşr’s charge regarding the slaves, see Abū Muslim’s organized efforts to recruit them, Ibid., pp. 280-1.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 289.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 284. On the indications of widespread atrocities against the Arabs across Khurāsān and Transoxania, see Agha, ‘Abū Muslim,’ p. 344, n. 62 and 63.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 290-2; also 282.

there was no point, and, more importantly, no interest, in trying to deny the obvious. On the contrary, it was no accusation to tell non-Arabs that they were just that—non-Arabs. Therefore, it never called for a denial.

A pivotal phrase in some of these texts is the Arabic construct ‘*ahl Khurāsān*’, literally meaning ‘the people of Khurāsān’. Admittedly, this phrase can be ambiguous. ‘*Ahl*’ in Arabic does not necessarily always mean the native population; it can also mean the people who populate the place, regardless of their geographic or ethnic origins. Indeed, the phrase, as Sharon contends, frequently appears in the sources indicating the Arab military garrisons manning the *amṣār*. But it is also frequently used to indicate the natives of the region. Actually, it always rests within the context to decide which is meant. Sharon insists on reading the term exclusively as a reference to the Arabs; he says: “The term ‘*Ahl Khurāsān*’ indicated only the *Arab tribesmen* of the province and not its inhabitants in general. Similarly the terms ‘*Ahl al-shām*’ and ‘*Ahl al-ʿIrāq*’.”¹⁹ He could not have been more wrong. Here is a clear example of contextual ‘shades’. Balādhurī reports that, when Dāwūd ibn ʿAlī, al-Saffāh’s uncle, took the podium on the day al-Saffāh was proclaimed, “he mentioned the Arabs and noted their slowness [in responding to the *dāʿwah*], and he praised *ahl Khurāsān*.” Dāwūd also said, verbatim: “The Arabs have unanimously agreed to deny our rights and to support the oppressor Umayyads; until God provided for us, with this army of *ahl Khurāsān*, who answered our call and mobilized to support us.”²⁰ How can one construe synonymity in such a razor sharp context of antonyms so closely juxtaposed!

There can be no doubt that, at least in as far as the integrity of our source material is respected, the phrase ‘*ahl Khurāsān*’ (and, by extension, Khurāsāniyyah), in the Revolutionary context, did not betoken the Arabs of Khurāsān. Nowhere is this better attested than in Qaḥṭabah’s speech to his troops, as he tried to lift up their morale when they confronted the better equipped Umayyad army of Nubātah ibn Ḥanzalah in Jurjān. While it is very important to note the moralist cosmopolitan egalitarianism of an idealist Arab Muslim, which abundantly gushes forth from this piece uniquely attributed to an Arab, it is even more vital—for our present purpose—to note the neat unambiguous demographics pinpointed through its language. The term ‘*ahl Khurāsān*’, which Qaḥṭabah used to address his troops, unequivocally means the Iranian non-Arab natives of the land. And Qaḥṭabah’s daring reference to the original ownership of the land forcefully tables a

¹⁹ Sharon, *Black Banners*, p. 67, n. 51.

²⁰ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 140, 141.

selectively forgotten issue. In the heat of scholarly ‘revisionist’ tendencies, which reject the ascription of ‘nationalistic’ self-definition to medieval communities, the territorial dimension was all but forgotten. If the veracity of this piece could be established beyond any doubt, there should be no need for anything further to establish the ethnic identity of the effective majority of the Revolutionaries. This not being the case, the literal implications of the language, at least earlier than Sharon’s specimen, must not be neglected. Said Qaḥṭabah:

O people of Khurāsān, (*yā ahla Khurāsān*), these lands belonged to your forefathers. They used to be given victory over their enemies in view of their fairness and good conduct, until they changed [that] and oppressed [people]. Then God, glorified may He be, brought down His wrath upon them, so He tore out their dominion and set on them the nation which was the most despicable to them on earth; they overpowered them over their own land, took their women, and enslaved their children. All through that, they [the new nation = the Arabs] reigned justly, fulfilled pledges and supported the oppressed. Then they changed [that] and did injustice in [their] rule, and intimidated the pious of the descendants of the Prophet of God. So God set you on them, to take revenge from them through you, that their punishment be [especially] harsher since you are seeking revenge from them.²¹

The tune of the times, and the indicativeness of specific events—how they bear on the present demographic issue—may have already been incidentally discussed, sporadically, and in a topically localized manner. However, certain powerful utterances within the contexts of such events may be worth specific attention. Such utterances are rather objective—in the sense that, even when attributed to a member of one or the other of the warring factions, they are not derisive, but instruments of strategic and tactical analysis and evaluation of the demographic situation, designed for the benefit of that faction. They concur on a sharp polarization in the definition and demarcation of the antagonists: The Arabs versus the *Musawwidah*; and examples are not in short supply.²²

²¹ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 2004-5. Cf. Sharon, *Revolt*, pp. 187-8, where he futilely argues against the veracity of ascribing the piece to Qaḥṭabah.

²² (a) ‘Aqīl ibn Ma‘qīl al-Laythī, a relative of Naṣr’s and a prominent member of his staff, advised him to refrain from attacking the *Musawwidah* in their sanctuary amongst the Khuzā‘ah. His rationale clearly distinguishes between the *Musawwidah* on the one hand and the Yaman and Rab‘ah on the other. Said ‘Aqīl: ‘I am afraid that that [i.e., violating the Yaman’s tribal sanctity], might push them to enter into what the *qawm* [the Revolutionaries] have entered into and to don black as they have ... How worthless the power of these [*Musawwidah*] would be if the Rab‘ah and the Yaman would refrain from supporting them!’ (*Akhhbār*, p. 275). Their power would be ‘worthless’, that is, in Marw.

(b) Abū Muslim maneuvered to spoil the truce which the warring Arab tribes had managed to forge; and, when the ‘accord between the Arabs collapsed,’ Abū Muslim managed to position himself as an arbitrator between Muḍar on the one hand, and

II. *The Crucial Literary Specimen*

We shall now turn to a different type of texts. Some prime-grade literary material bear direct, contemporaneous, and specific witness to the real ethnic compositions of the adversaries. This material belongs to the preserved part of the body of correspondence exchanged between Naṣr ibn Sayyār, in his own pen, and Marwān II, in his secretary's pen; or addressed by Naṣr to the governor of Iraq, Yazīd ibn 'Umar ibn Hubayrah, or to his own compatriot Khurāsānite Arab tribesmen. This body comprises mostly poetry and artistic prose.

II.1. *'Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn Yaḥyā's Letters*

Marwān II's end of the correspondence was written, on his behalf, by his secretary, the celebrated stylist 'Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn Yaḥyā al-Kātib. As such, it acquires the rare quality of belonging to the archetypes of a genus of *belles-lettres*; and, at the same time, it comes close to earning the documentary value of archival materials which, unfortunately, do not exist from the period. As far as is known to this writer, since *Akhbār al-Dawlah al-'Abbāsīyah* was discovered and then published, no exciting new material that so directly bears on the subject controversy has been uncovered. That is, until 1988, when Iḥsān 'Abbās published his work on 'Abd al-Ḥamīd.

Of specific relevance to the present issue are two of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's epistles, and some of 'Abbās' comments. Epistle no.38 in 'Abbās' sequence²³ comprises only the previously known remaining last part of

Rabī'ah and Yaman on the other. As a result, he succeeded in fanning the flames of discord even further, and secured for himself a breathing space, so 'he ordered the Shī'ah to build houses and prepare for the winter, since God had spared them the concord of the Arabs, and caused them [the Arabs] to slip, through [Abū Muslim's] offices, into discord.' (Abū al-Khaṭṭāb, in Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1985-6)

(c) Abū al-Maylā, Yaḥyā ibn Nu'aym, a thoroughly tribal politician and a notable of Rabī'ah, was sharply aware of the ethnic dimension of the Revolution. Urging his kinsmen and his Yamanite allies to conclude a truce with Naṣr, he drew in sharp lines the true portrait of the demographic divides; he warned his people: 'Choose: either you perish before Muḍar, or Muḍar before you ... This man, [Abū Muslim], has appeared just a month ago, and [already] his army has grown as big as yours.' (Madā'inī, in Ṭabarī, II: p. 1966). And when these and similar efforts met with temporary success, and later collapsed, historians described the demographically shifting alliances in no less ethnically slanted language. Abū al-Khaṭṭāb: 'Then the tribesmen from Muḍar, Rabī'ah and Qaḥṭān agreed to stop fighting and to join forces to fight Abū Muslim,' (in Ṭabarī, II: p. 1969). Ṭabarī himself: 'They unanimously agreed, the Muḍarites, Yamanites and Raba'ites, along with those Iranians, *al-A'ajim*, with them, to fight the *Musawwidah*' (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1998). Madā'inī: '... Naṣr saw what was brought on him [at the hands of] the Yamanites, the Raba'ites and the Iranians, *al-'Ajam*,' (in Ṭabarī, II: p. 1993-4).

²³ 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, p. 289.

an epistle, the remainder of which is lost. It clearly addresses the Arab Umayyad constituency, and the Arabs at large, urging them to withstand the onslaught of the Iranians, '*al-fi'ah al-A'jamiyyah*.' Aside from the emotionally charged accusations painting the Revolutionaries as religious renegades, the objective elements in this epistle are worth noting: (1) the evolution of the news about the Revolution, from hearsay to manifest action, (2) the emergence of the Revolutionaries from a clandestine phase into the open, and from discord to concord, (3) their march west, and (4) their ethnic identity. This is almost faithful broad outline of the history of the Organization as depicted in the first five chapters of this book: utmost secrecy, through the iron curtains of which only rumors trickled to Marwān II's ears; the emergence of the Organization into the open after Abū Muslim won the internal struggle with Sulaymān (concord after discord); the overwhelming sweep by the masses of the Iranian territory (proliferation after constraint); Qaḥṭabah's march west from *dār al-'Ajam* to Arab territory; and a positive identification of the ethnic character of the Revolutionaries (*al-fi'ah al-A'jamiyyah*). The following is a translation of this extant passage:

Now then, it had been relayed to you [first] as hearsay, then [you witnessed it as] a scandalous act—the concord of these renegades after their discord, the clear manifestation of their secret after ambiguity, and the proliferation of their deception and delusion in the land after it had been constrained. Here they are, they left Khurāsān, the prime of the world and the abode of the Iranians (*dār al-'Ajam*) behind them, and came after your territory, to fight you over it, and to budge you away from it by the two armies of falsification and of the sword. For the fear of God you must defend your religion; and for fear of shame you must beware that your worldly possessions be wrested from you. Uphold your allegiance to those who relied on you, and do not enable the hand of the Iranian race to hold the reins of the Arab realm (*wa-lā tumkinū nāṣiyat al-dawlah al-'Arabiyyah min yad al-fi'ah al-A'jamiyyah*). Stand firm until this deluge clears away and this intoxication comes to sobriety. For, the flood shall dry up, and the 'sign of the night' shall be 'blotted out'.²⁴

More important is epistle no.8 in the sequence.²⁵ It is one of the fourteen hitherto unpublished and unknown. As such it is precious new material of great corroborative value. Interestingly, although—or, more accurately, because—it adds nothing new to the voluminous information we already have, its most precious addition is itself—its mere existence. It cements the pre-revisionist conventional wisdom. This epistle is a lengthy letter written, on behalf of Marwān II, to Naṣr ibn

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 198-201.

Sayyār on the subject of the Revolution, and is dated to the year 128/745-746. Although the letter is full of defamatory language, of the type that both parties could, and, with colorfully different slantings, did use against one another, it is also rife with objective demographic indicators and historical references. Even some specific articulations of the defamatory language are laden with such demographic pointers. The following is a translation of some relevant passages:

The cropping up of this sprout (*al-nābitah*) in the land of Khurāsān [has been an instrument with which] God intended to humiliate those ungrateful for His grace ... [It sprouted at the hands of] an evil man to whom evil men rallied. When he saw the Arabs preoccupied with themselves, he took the opportunity of their being engrossed in their hostilities towards each other, and that they neglected to address the most pressing of their concerns. When he grew stronger and more resourceful ... and his [tentacles] spread in evil, he slandered the Book (the Qur'ān) by falsehood, and the Prophet by propagandizing for his descendants, [a ploy] with which to entice the feeble-minded of evil men, while branding, [by such propaganda], branding the pious predecessors with injustice ... He manumits slaves, recruits the wicked, honors the languid and the obscure, and twists the rule of the Religion, disparaging it [in the process] ... He proceeds gently and approaches things with a friendly attitude, masking what he [really] wants to proclaim, until such a time as he is empowered to achieve [his true objective, i.e.,] obliterating the traces of the Religion...

Do not, [you Naṣr and your men], abandon resoluteness [simply] because they have gained the upper hand over you, or because of their numerousness and your fewness; for it is because you had started the confrontation with negligence that they grew numerous and prospered. Your meekness is indeed more potent than the might of their multitude, for God's hand is [with] rightness, and rightness is worthier of you and you are closer to it, and God is more wrathful with them; so assail them [aided] by the intensity of God's wrath, seeking to glorify what they belittled. Had it not been for their allurements of the people, and their [attempts] to appease and reassure them about him, [i.e., the never-named Abū Muslim], and for the people's hope in him, [i.e., their taking the bait], they, [i.e., the Revolutionaries], would have exhibited varieties of godlessness, gross slanders, grave selfishness, and pursuit of atrocities, what with the living would have wished to have been dead. Therefore, resort to perseverance, earning [the capacity for] it by your good faith. Remember what their recent experience comprises: the worship of fire and idols ...

They feigned Islam while ignorant of it; and beseeched you in its name while themselves abandoning it; and they fought you over it, while they fall short of its demands. With your knowledge of it you are worthier of defending it ... You and your fathers are the consenters to its having been revealed, and the fighters over its interpretation. They are the renouncers

of its totality; and the twisters of [the meanings of the specifics of] what they accepted [out of that totality].²⁶

Naturally, the letter represents the official Umayyad line. But the real issue is whether this fact discredits it, and, if so, to what extent. ‘Abbās puts it well when he says that the letter

... uncovers many aspects which historical research may support or may differ with ... It represents an ‘official’ point of view, which, by itself, is not a drawback. What matters is: to what extent does it represent the historical reality, and to what extent may some of the information contained in it be deemed as ‘propaganda’?²⁷

He reviews the letter in detail and provides an illuminating commentary.²⁸ To the possible charge: “it may be said that this letter actually aimed at distorting reality because it resorted to evoking Arab racism in the name of religion,” his answer is: “but how would it have been possible for this letter to have been read to the pro-Umayyad Arabs of Khurāsān, and for them to believe it, if the Revolutionaries were Arabs like themselves?”²⁹ ‘Abbās places the letter firmly within the context of the modern scholarly controversy over the ethnic identity of the Revolutionaries. He refutes some of the arguments of the post-Wellhausen revisionists,³⁰ and accords the letter the prominent position, in the context, which it deserves. Says he:

Some of the contents of this epistle bring historical research back to a theory which van Vloten had presented, and which Wellhausen subsequently elaborated—namely, that those who supported the ‘Abbāsīd *Dā‘wah* were the *mawālī* class, driven by Persian (Iranian) nationalist feelings ... This epistle restores to van Vloten’s and Wellhausen’s theory its weight and supports it when it states that those who followed Abū Muslim were ‘recent worshippers of fire and idols,’ that is, they were of Persian stock.³¹

But then ‘Abbās attaches a qualifier to the extent to which this letter supports the classical theory. He says:

However, that theory, [i.e., Wellhausen’s], requires some modification in the light of this letter. For, these Persians, who supported Abū Muslim, did not revolt motivated by nationalist Iranian feelings. They rather

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ ‘Abbās, p. 89.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 87-92.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 91. We shall echo this same defense in establishing the basic credibility of Naṣr ibn Sayyar’s *bā‘iyah* poem, *infra*.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 91-2.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 90, 91.

‘proclaimed³² Islam while ignorant of it; and beseeched you in its name while themselves abandoning it; and they fought you over it, while they fall short of its demands;’ that is, Islam itself was their slogan.³³

‘Abbās is clearly focusing on the question of motivation, which is, in part, and at least in this context, an issue of the inner human soul—an issue of intention arising from belief. He accepts van Vloten’s and Wellhausen’s identification of the ethnic identity of the Revolutionaries, and that ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s letter supports it. But to the question of why these Iranians revolted, ‘Abbās construes that the letter gives an answer different from theirs. He emphatically negates the nationalist motivation, but stops short of affirming the religious one, by relegating it to having been a slogan (*shī‘ār*). It is not clear, however, why ‘Abbās interprets ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s text as negating a basically nationalist motivation when the text strikes the reader as being explicitly clear on this point.³⁴

Actually, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd did not accuse Abū Muslim and his followers of innocent ignorance of Islam. He accused them of abusing its slogans as a camouflage, “to entice people” and “until such a time as he is empowered” to uncover his true intentions and “obliterate the traces of the Religion ... They are the renouncers of its totality, and the twisters” of the bits and pieces of it which they accepted. Frye argues for the authenticity of Abū Muslim’s Islamic faith: “His Umayyad enemies had every opportunity to call him a rebel against Islam, or to denounce him as a heretic, but such is not the case.”³⁵ Of course, when Frye wrote this, in 1947, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s letter was not uncovered yet. Nor was *Akhbār al-Dawlah al-‘Abbāsiyyah*, where Salm ibn Aḥwaz is quoted referring to Abū Muslim as a Mazdakite.³⁶ But Naṣr ibn Sayyār’s resounding accusations were available to Frye.

It is our position, however, that attempting to determine the true inner beliefs of individuals—let alone collectivities—and then to advance such determinations as decisive historiographical tools of investigation is superfluous, redundant, and utterly useless. This is not to say that true beliefs are not powerful motivators, or that they are not intensely interesting, and that, if demonstrable, they are not

³² Note the intentional discrepancy between my two differing translations of the verb ‘*idda‘aw*. I rendered it ‘feigned’ in my lengthy quote above, because this is what I believe ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd intended. Here, where ‘Abbās uses the quote as a direct part of his argument, the obvious thrust of this argument mandates ‘proclaimed’ or, at most, ‘claimed’.

³³ ‘Abbās, p. 91.

³⁴ Clearly so, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd, p. 200; also in letter no.38, p. 289.

³⁵ Frye, p. 30.

³⁶ *Akhbār*, p. 287.

illuminating, and even indicative. It is simply that we hold that such beliefs are not ascertainable, therefore they cannot be employed as prime tools of investigation. Our primary concern here is: who said what about whom; what demographic indicators can be elucidated from such statements; and, to what extent can we extract objective information from clearly defamatory language?

Despite the fact that ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd expressly targeted the Iranians (*al-fiʿah al-ʿjamiyyah*) with his accusations, the nature of the accusations, and the highly charged defamatory language suggest that he was zeroing in on a specific cross-section of the Revolutionary constituency—a cross-section susceptible, in the eyes of his contemporary audience, to such accusations, regardless of whether they were true or false.

Who were the constituents of this cross-section? The Umayyads and their party could not have flaunted these accusations in the face of any Arab. It would have been idiotically meaningless, and antagonizing to those whom they tried to attract, to accuse Qaḥṭabah, for instance,³⁷ of having been a “recent worshipper of fire and idols.” They could hardly have done it even to the old *mawālī*, deep-rooted in Islam and well-entrenched in the institution of *walāʾ*, to which ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd himself most probably belonged.³⁸ At least Naṣr exempted this class of Muslim Iranians from similar accusations.³⁹ This leaves the rest of the conquered population as the potential pool from which this cross-section was singled out. The obvious distinguishing mark which separated this cross-section from the vast pool to which it belonged was its ‘recent’ conversion to Islam.

Umayyad proponents like ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd rested their characterization of their adversaries on three interconnected, situationally objective demographic qualities, all of which arise from the conversion phenomenon: (1) ethnically, the rebels were Iranians; (2) religiously, they were recent converts to Islam; (3) quantitatively, they were numerous—enormously so, that they substantially outnumbered the finite and relatively small community of both Arabs and established *mawālī* whose Islam had been old. To these descriptive qualities,

³⁷ Or, for that matter, even an incognito Arab such as, say, a certain Yūsuf ibn ‘Aqīl ibn Ḥassān ibn ... ibn ... of Ṭayyī? (no.387).

³⁸ See ‘Abbās, pp. 25-6.

³⁹ People such as, say, the house of Aʿyan, whose *walāʾ* to the Prophet’s companion, Buraydah ibn al-Ḥuṣayb, must have been around seven to eight decades old belong to this class. Although, in a tense face-to-face confrontation with the senior amongst the Aʿyans, ʿIsā (no.210), Naṣr’s men were undiplomatically ‘religiously’ and racially hostile (*Akhbār*, p. 287), this could hardly have been the public Umayyad stance. In the same confrontation, Naṣr was displeased with his men’s stance. His poetry, as shall shortly be demonstrated, almost equates the ‘genuine *mawālī*’ with the Arabs in his context.

Umayyad proponents added a fourth: the inflammatory judgemental charge that the conversion of these recent converts was not sincere, and that their brand of Islam was twisted.

That the converts were Iranians cannot be a point of contention,⁴⁰ regardless of how numerous they were, or of the time of their conversion. If there is any defamation, it can only be in the unascertainable judgemental charge of insincerity, and in the language used to make it. But there is a situational demographic dimension to the question; and it cannot be ignored. This is best evoked by Madelung's remark: "Islam required from its early Persian converts an almost total break with their own religious traditions."⁴¹ Is this humanly possible, and did the converts actually oblige? But, before attending to this contentious question, we shall visit one more text.

II.2 *Naṣr ibn Sayyār's Bā'iyyah Poem*

The paramount literary piece dating back to the period is not a new discovery. It had always been available to modern scholars. Naṣr ibn Sayyār's *bā'iyyah* poem unquestionably depicts, or, more objectively put, formulates Naṣr's depiction of Abū Muslim's following. If it is accepted as a descriptively objective demographic portrait, as it should, there would be no doubt about the Iranian identity of the Revolution. Nallino recognized the unique historical value of Naṣr's extant poetry.⁴² But other modern scholars did not give the *bā'iyyah* poem its full historical due.⁴³

That said, however, the same hypothetical charges that may be levelled against 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's objectivity may also be used to discredit Naṣr's. And the same defense also may be used to support the credibility of Naṣr's poem. More specifically, and moreover, three types of evidence support one another, presenting Naṣr's *bā'iyyah* as the single most important key to the whole issue of the demographic composition of the Revolutionary constituency. In the order they will be discussed, not in the order of their degree of validity or importance, these are: (1) evidence pertaining to Naṣr's character and to precedents of his poetic

⁴⁰ There were no more Arab candidates for conversion, not in Khurāsān anyway.

⁴¹ Madelung, 'Mazdakism,' p. 1.

⁴² Nallino, pp. 260-2.

⁴³ Wellhausen, Daniel, Omar, and Sharon mention the poem. Wellhausen redeems it with a qualifier, but he does not emphasize its most important distinction between two types of Iranians (pp. 534-6). Daniel construes the distinction as depicting 'the rebels as *mawālī* of no account' (*Khurasan*, p. 70 n. 152). Omar and Sharon treat the poem as a mix of propaganda and partial truth in its reference to the tribal strife, but both also fail to detect the vital demographic distinction between two types of Iranians (*Abbāsīd Caliphate*, pp. 98-9 and n. 253; *Revolt*, p. 63 ff.).

addresses to previous adversaries; (2) circumstantial and internal evidence that pertain to the poem itself; and, (3) numerical objective data, garnered from the sources, quite aside from the *bā'yyah's* influence, but gauged and analyzed under its potent 'tutelage'.

Naṣr ibn Sayyār was a veteran of tribal in-fighting, and a veteran imperial frontier warrior. In both capacities he paradoxically demonstrated a fire-brand reckless rashness, and even before he became the ultimate statesman in Khurāsān, a measure of statesmanship and prudence. When he did become governor of the province, or probably after he had spent sometime squaring scores with old tribal adversaries, he was almost completely transformed—in his golden years—into a tribal healer on the internal Arab front, a reformer on the inter-racial internal Islamic front, and a prudent pacifist on the frontiers. A character much more humanly credible than scores of the one-dimensional characters met across the sources, Naṣr ibn Sayyār is worthy of an independent study yet to be attempted. It may be said that he had to feign an accommodating stance after he, his party, and the entire Establishment had been squeezed on all fronts. It may be advanced, however, albeit cautiously, that this fighter character belies this rationale and tends to support a vision of a matured Naṣr. Even in his triumphant days, he had exhibited far-sightedness, tolerance and statesmanship.⁴⁴

But of course, as a poet, Naṣr did use poetry for propaganda purposes. Some of his poetry, however, smacks of a distinct flavor peculiar to a unique genre known in the literary heritage of the Arabs as *al-Munṣifāt* (the equitable poems/verses). Drenched in adversity, neither abandoning his cause nor attempting to appease his adversary, a poet of this mind set refrains from distorting his antagonists' image, and does not shy away from singing their praises. Moreover, such a poet serenely admits that both parties are equal and that they equally succumb to the same tragic state of affairs, as did Naṣr in these two unique verses of his:

We, and this tribe of the Yaman, we both claim,
 when it is boasting time, equally venerable [notables].
 We owe them a lot of blood,
 and they owe us blood and old feud.⁴⁵

This is not to say that Naṣr was not a master of adversity. In fact, the greater majority of the little that survived from his poetry is consumed in alerting the central government to the dangers of the brewing

⁴⁴ Consider his reforms, and his treaty with the Sughdians, Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 286-90.

⁴⁵ Naṣr ibn Sayyār, p. 27.

Revolution, or in slandering one adversary or another. In this poetry, some of the most important events of the time are recorded;⁴⁶ and there is no trace of falsification. True, it is full of boasting—but about ‘credits’ objectively due to him; and it is rife with scorn—but always against a clearly named and well defined adversary, whose identity Naṣr never tried to falsify.

The most pertinent precedent is probably Naṣr’s versification against al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj and the Murji’ites. The poem⁴⁷ is clearly a propaganda ploy; but all through the scorn and the religious rallying and provocation, the demographic identities of the enemy coalition are clearly stated and in agreement with the historical records. He did not deny the presence of Arabs in the movement; on the contrary, he confirmed it by urging his audience to kill them:

Kill those in our ranks who support them and who adhere to them,
deem them infidels and condemn them.

The charge that they were “people who do not [perform] the prayers (*qawmin lā yuṣallūnā*),” although incorrectly generalized to all of them, was nevertheless true of the new converts who were the mainstay of the Murji’ite movement in Khurāsān.⁴⁸ Naṣr did not fabricate the alliance between the movement and polytheism, i.e., the non-Muslim Turgesh, which is attested in the profuse reports in the sources. Even his inflamed charge that the Murji’ites themselves were polytheists is an oblique charge of sorts. He does not conceal the fact that he was angrily branding them with guilt by association, rather than by initiation. He makes that syllogistically clear:

Your *irjā’* hitched you together with polytheism in [one] bond,
you are, therefore, polytheists as well as Murji’ites
May God thrust deep in graves none but you,
for, your religion is with polytheism associated.

⁴⁶ The iner-tribal fighting at al-Barūqān in 106 /724-725 (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1473-7; Naṣr ibn Sayyār, p. 36); The Battle of the Pass in 113/731-732 (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1533 ff., especially 1545, 1553-7; Naṣr ibn Sayyār, pp. 32-3); The Murji’ite revolt under the banners of al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj and in alliance with the non-Muslim Turgesh, starting in 116/734-735 (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1565 ff. and passim, especially 1574-6; Naṣr ibn Sayyār, pp. 47-9); The killing of al-Ḥārith ibn Surayj in 128/745-746 (Ṭabarī II: p. 1917 ff., especially 1935; Naṣr ibn Sayyār underscores the tribal repercussions of al-Ḥārith’s movement, p. 39); Naṣr takes credit for the 129/746-747 killing of al-Kirmānī (Naṣr ibn Sayyār, p. 34; cf. Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1975-6); Most of the rest are impassioned warnings to the central government (Naṣr ibn Sayyār, pp. 30, 31, 38, 40-1).

⁴⁷ Naṣr ibn Sayyār, pp. 47-9; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1574-6; see also my own translation of selections from this poem, Agha, ‘Murji’a,’ pp. 28-9.

⁴⁸ See e.g. Abū al-Ṣayda’s episode with the new converts in 110/729-730, Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1507-10; Agha, ‘Murji’a,’ p. 19, and passim.

It is not so often that an adversary can be as objective in depicting the religious identity of his adversary.

The subject poem, the *bā'yyah*, is much shorter than the above on crude language and scorn, and much longer on demographic situational objectivity. Following is the poem, and a translation thereof:

- (1) *abliḡ Rabī'ata fī Marwīn wa ikhwatahā*
an yaḡhḡabū qabla an lā yanfa'a l-ḡhaḡabu
- (2) *wa-l-yanṣubū l-ḡarba inna l-ḡawma qad naṣabū*
ḡarban yuḡarraqu fī ḡafātihā l-ḡatabu
- (3) *mā bālukum tulḡihūna l-ḡarba baynakumu*
ka'anna aḡla l-ḡijā 'an fī'likum ḡhuyubu
- (4) *wa tatrūkūna 'aduwwan qad aḡallakumu*
mimman ta'ashshaba lā dīnun wa-lā ḡasabu
- (5) *laysū ilā 'Arabīn minnā fa-na'rifahum*
wa-lā ṣamīmi l-mawālī in humu nusibū
- (6) *ḡawman yaḡdīnuna dīnan mā samī'tu biḡi*
'ami r-Rasūli wa-lā jā'at biḡi l-Kutubu
- (7) *fa-man yakun sā'itī 'an aṣli dīnihumu*
fa-'inna dīnahumu an tuḡtala l-'Arabu

- (1) Let Rabī'ah in Marw, and its sister [tribes] know:
They should grow indignant before indignation turns futile;
- (2) and let them wage war; for the [other] people have waged
a war, the edges of whose fire are with firewood incessantly fed.
- (3) [Lo!] What is it with you, kindling war amongst yourselves
—as though men of prudence are of your doings unawares—
- 4) while you fail to engage an enemy closing in on you.
A motly mix they are: of religion and noble descent deprived:
- (5) tracing their lineages—such as to enable us to recognize them—they
are found to belong neither to any of our Arab [tribes], nor to the
genuine *mawālī*;
- (6) they adhere to a religion of which I never heard—
neither attributed to the Prophet, nor transmitted in the holy
scriptures.
- (7) Behold! Thou enquiring from me about the fundamentals of their
religion:
Verily, their religion is that Arabs must be slain!⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Naṣr ibn Sayyār, pp. 28-9. The poem, with variations in completeness, arrangement and some words and expressions, in: Dīnawarī, p. 360; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Aṣhrāf III*: pp. 132-3; *Akḡbār*, pp. 313-4; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: pp. 478-9; Ibn A'tham, VIII: pp. 161-3; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 304. Dūrī provides a comparative *takhrīj* of the poem in his editorial notes to *Akḡbār*, and to Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Aṣhrāf III*. The most interesting variations, from a demographic and historiographical points of view, are *Akḡbār*'s alteration of the second hemistich of verse 4, and its complete omission of verses 5 through 7, i.e., the demographically significant verses. At the same time, *Akḡbār* ascribes to al-'Akkī (no.287) verses in direct retaliation to the ones it omits from Naṣr's poem (*Akḡbār*, p. 314). Another interesting variation is the expression 'ṣarīḡa mawālin'

What ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd said in his elaborate prose Naṣr crystallizes more effectively and clearly in his compact verses. The demarcation between the two camps, and the fact that the protagonist (the Establishment’s unwittingly divided constituency) were the Arab tribesmen (i.e., *‘Rabīʿah wa ikhwatahā’* in Marw) are established in the first three verses. Then Naṣr elicits the demographic identity of the antagonists (the anonymous *al-qawm*) through a smooth, logically sequenced process of identification by elimination. In the second hemistich of verse 4, he establishes the three demographic criteria of identification: social recognizability and ethnic and religious identities; and he divests the Revolutionaries of any positive measure on all three counts: “*mimman ta’ashshaba lā dīnun wa-lā ḥasabu.*” Clearly, the three criteria are interconnected, with recognizability being the common positive trait of which the antagonist is deprived.

The recognizable pedigree, or ethnic lineage, belongs only to the Arabs and their social protégés, the established genuine *mawālī*. In the context of the Establishment, in whose name Naṣr was toiling and to whom the audience he hoped to lure belonged, this was true. Naṣr, in verse 5, finds the Revolutionaries to have been lacking both connections. They were not Arabs; therefore, they must have been Iranians. But they were not Iranians who had been admitted, through the *walā’* institution, into the imperial structure; therefore they must have been the rest of the Iranians. May be not all of the rest of the Iranians, we may add, since it is only natural not to expect that the entire population was involved. To Naṣr, however, it may have appeared to have been the case. These were, to Naṣr, the “motley mix (*man ta’ashshaba*),” to ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd, “the languid and the obscure (*ahl al-khumūl*),” and, to us, in this book, the recent or the immediate Iranian converts, or simply ‘the converts’, whose conversion was their passport into the Organization and Revolutionary politics.

The recognizable religion belongs only to the Muslims, and to the Christians and the Jews—a proposition acceptable in the context. In verse 6, Naṣr finds the Revolutionaries to belong to none of the above: not to Islam, the religion he received “attributed to the Prophet (*‘ani r-Rasūli*),” nor to any of the religions of *ahl al-kitāb*, the religions which had been “transmitted in the holy scriptures (*jā’at bihi-l kutubu*).” This leaves only the adherents to indigenous Iranian Magian denominations: Manichaean, Zoroastrian and Mazdakist. Of course, not all such adherents. To Naṣr, the array and the proximities must have been as

instead of *‘ṣamīmī l-mawālī’*, in Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III* and Ibn al-Athīr. See also Ibn A’tḥam’s interesting addition of two last verses which, however, ring as unauthentic.

bewildering as they are to some of us today—myself included. However, the Revolutionaries’ religion, which he characterizes as one “of which I never heard— ... attributed to the Prophet ... (*dīnan mā samī‘tu bihi ‘ani r-Rasūli ...*)” is of the same brand which ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd fathomed as a result of their ‘recent’ conversion from “the worship of fire and idols (*mā hum bihi ḥadīthū ‘ahd min ‘ibādat al-nīrān wa al-awthān*);” it is also the same thing which the heresiographers, Madelung, and others, refer to as Khurramdīniyyah, Khurramiyyah, or Islamicized neo-Mazdakism, as will presently be advanced.

In view of the reports he was receiving about the Revolutionary atrocities against the Arabs in “Nasā, Ṭālaqān, Marw al-Rūdh, Āmul and Zamm,”⁵⁰ Naṣr’s 7th verse may be excused for its out-of-character logical rashness. One must not, however, dismiss the verse as blatant propaganda. The exaggeration of the appalled governor-poet retains an invaluable first-hand contemporaneous expression of how it felt, to a proponent of the Arab Establishment, to face the human flood of the Iranian Revolution.⁵¹

With its geometric symmetry and precision, its contemporaneousness, and its documentary quality, Naṣr’s demographic map of the Revolution stands out as the best frame of reference available from the period. It is a standard yardstick with clearly marked criteria for any pertinent demographic survey of the subject. It establishes the three Ethnic and Ethnic/Socio-Religious categories of the Criteria of Identity: the Arabs, the *mawālī*, and the converts. It also establishes the degree of acquired social recognition as an indicator of ethnic origin. By this it inspired the designing of the Criteria of Visibility and Recognition,⁵² as will be expounded in part three of this book.

The poem also gives its own readings, gauged against its own criteria. The Revolutionaries (all of them in the language of poetry, which is not very hospitable to exceptions and allocations of majorities and minorities) were neither the Arabs nor the genuine *mawālī*.⁵³ They were

⁵⁰ *Akhhār*, p. 289.

⁵¹ Cf. Agha, ‘Abū Muslim,’ p. 344, n. 62.

⁵² For these terms and criteria, see chapter nine.

⁵³ Naṣr’s own *ṣamīm al-mawālī*, however, had a nasty surprise for him down the road. The sons and grandsons of the house of Bassām, established *mawālī* of Naṣr’s tribe, the Banū Layth of Kinānah, turned up in the Revolutionary camp: ‘Abd Allāh ibn Bassām, ‘Ubayd Allāh ibn Bassām, and the nephews Aḥlam ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Bassām and Bassām ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Bassām (nos.95, 359, 119 and 144 consecutively). ‘Abd Allāh (or ‘Ubayd Allāh, probably the same person?) especially was very close to Naṣr, he was his chief body guard (Ṭabaṙī, II: pp. 1723-4, 1846, 1859, 1923). He had been with the Organization since Bukayr’s days, and he warned Bukayr of a move by Naṣr’s men to arrest him (*Akhhār*, p. 233). When he discovered the family’s treachery, Naṣr invoked God’s wrath on them: ‘Oh God, I had conferred favors on the house of Bassām, but they

Iranian peasants superficially converted to Islam for the purpose. They were an incognito mix unrecognizable to the tribally structured base and pillars of the Establishment which comprised ethnic Arabs and their well-known Iranian affiliates. The religious cocktail they mixed was also unrecognizable, but their motivation was—to slaughter the Arabs. Dilute this poetic exaggeration and you might come up with the real one: destroying Arab supremacy, even at the cost of a measured compromise of the Iranian religious heritage, i.e., by adopting and adapting the conquerors' religion.

This clearly sounds like 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, and to the minute details. But Naṣr's poem had been known to scholars, and therefore, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's recently discovered letter provides extra corroboration. Theoretically, both testimonies may be true or false. But they are there; and they speak for the classical school, loud and clear. It is the burden of the revisionists to tackle them heads on, and to disprove them. First, the *bā'iyah* ought not to have been dodged; and now both, it and 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's letter, must not be dismissed.

III. *An Iranian Para-Islamic Revolutionary Continuum*

Naṣr ibn Sayyār's poem, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's letters, and the other textual material discussed earlier, establish the parameter of the remainder of the demographic issue, adequately define the points of contention, and clearly state their own positions on each. It may be valid to question these positions, but it is not valid to dismiss them off-handedly as propaganda. These points of contention are:

- (1) How recent was the conversion of the cross-section targeted by the Umayyad characterizations?
- (2) How numerous were they?
- (3) Did they all flock to Abū Muslim; and, aside from their absolute size, what proportion of Abū Muslim's forces did they provide?
- (4) Did they carry with them any old baggage from their previous denominations, thus, advertently or inadvertently, giving their pro-Umayyad adversaries the innocent impression of their infidelity, or the viciously manipulated excuse to attack them?

The first three questions have already been discussed,⁵⁴ and will be quantitatively addressed in part three of this book. The findings have proven, and will further prove the basic accuracy of the above textual

had denied me. Oh God, make them taste the heat of the sword' (Dārquṭnī, IV: p. 2205).

⁵⁴ See chapter six above.

materials. A major conclusion follows from these findings, namely, that the modification to Wellhausen's theory, which 'Abbās advocates should not be concerned with the motivations of the Revolutionaries. An important modification is indeed called for; namely, that it was not the integrated *mawālī*, in the strict legal and social sense of the word, who constituted the backbone of Abū Muslim's forces. It was those recent converts, the social, religious, economic and racial 'outcasts'—never accepted in the imperial structure of the Umayyad Establishment—who rose *en masse*, simultaneously and across the length and breadth of Khurāsān.⁵⁵

In fairness to Wellhausen's thesis, it must be said that the modification is primarily a question of proportions. Strictly speaking, Wellhausen speaks of the Revolutionaries as being "Abbāsīd Shī'ites, mostly Iranian [who] had gathered under Abū Muslim's black standard;"⁵⁶ and he ascribes "the final ruin of the Umayyads" to "a rising of the Shī'ite Iranians in Khurāsān;"⁵⁷ and he does distinguish between "the *Mawālī* ... [and] the new converts."⁵⁸ His most direct demographic description of the Revolutionaries admits to a minority of Arabs, and a majority of Iranians comprising both peasants, i.e., converts, and *Mawālī*. Says he: "The majority of [Abū Muslim's] adherents consisted of Iranian peasants and of the *Mawālī* of the villages of Marw, but there were Arabs amongst them also who mostly occupied leading positions. The connecting element was the religion, the sect."⁵⁹ He did not specify a majority within the majority; nor did most of the materials accessible to him prompt him to be that specific. Our suggested modification does.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Cf. supra, chapter three; Agha, 'Abū Muslim,' pp. 340-1, and passim; Dīnawarī, pp. 359-60; *Akhbār*, pp. 278, 284, 289, 293, 297.

⁵⁶ Wellhausen, p. 489.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 397.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 463.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 532.

⁶⁰ Responsible for inflating this issue are a number of factors: (a) Wellhausen's neglect to carry the distinction to the required lengths; (b) Despite his recognition of the financial maltreatment to which the Sughdian converts had been subjected (p. 463 f.), and rather than harping on the theme, Wellhausen focuses, all through, on the maltreatment of the *mawālī*, to the point of exaggeration. Actually, the 'genuine *mawālī*', to borrow Naṣr ibn Sayyār's phrase (*ṣamīm al-mawālī*) were comparatively privileged; whence Crone's suggestion of a modification of sorts to Wellhausen's thesis. She accurately ascribes to Wellhausen, as well as to Dennett and Gibb, a misplaced association of the '*mawālī* with fiscal disabilities,' and, again correctly, she suggests that 'the conventional picture applies only to a special type of convert' (Crone, 'Mawālā,' p. 878.b). But by specifying this type as 'the fugitive peasant,' she excludes all other stay-put peasant 'converts', or she converts the entire 'convert' peasantry to fugitives; (c) The inadvertent loose usage of the term *mawālī* in secondary literature, which drew on, or which summarized or commented on

The last of the above four questions has to do with the possible fusion (in the ‘religion’ of the cross-section of Revolutionaries targeted by above accusations) of beliefs and practices drawn from their recent Iranian denominations with Islamic beliefs. Specific charges of sustained worship of ‘cats and heads’ (*al sanānīr wa al-ruʿūs*), and of rejecting the totality of the revelation and accepting selectively certain specifics and twisting their meaning, in addition to general charges of recent and conceivably sustained ‘worship of fire and idols,’ and believing in a non-scriptural religion, resonate throughout contemporaneous textual evidence. Their close forerunners, those who had been converted at the hands of the Murjiʿites, and who, in most probability, joined the ranks, had also been described as “people who do not pray.”⁶¹ Historians and heresiographers added to the list: the belief in transmigration, sexual licentiousness, genealogical mobility in transferring the *Imāmate* (or even divine personification) to Iranian *Imāms* and prophets—not least of whom were Khidāsh, Abū Muslim himself, his daughter Fāṭimah and her son Muṭahhar.⁶²

An in-depth examination of the religious elements of this purported fusion of Islamic and Iranian beliefs is beyond the scope of this book. Here is a brief review of the issue.

Some modern Arab scholars paid intense attention to the issue, from a perspective which may have been influenced by the modern tensions between Arab and Persian nationalisms.⁶³ Quite aside from modern Arab projections, and contrary to ‘Abbās’ distinction of sorts between nationalistic motivations and proclaiming Islam as a slogan, Madelung recognized the inseparability of the two. Says Madelung:

... the eighth and ninth centuries witnessed a number of popular revolutionary movements in Iran which overtly mixed Persian and Islamic religious beliefs and motives. The generic name most often applied to these movements in the sources is Khurramīyya or Khurramīyya ... The Khurramīyya represented Persian national sentiments looking forward to a restoration of Persian sovereign rule in contrast to the universalist religious tendencies of Manichaeism.⁶⁴

Wellhausen. This literature fails to reflect the distinction between the two socio-religious classes of ‘Muslim’ Iranians; even if only to the extent Wellhausen himself did.

⁶¹ Naṣr ibn Sayyār’s poem on the Murjiʿah, verse 10, in Ṭabarī, II: 1576, and in my translation, Agha, ‘Murjiʿa,’ p. 28.

⁶² Madelung, ‘Mazdakism’; idem, ‘Khurramīyya’; supra, chapter one.

⁶³ See e.g. Dūrī, *Shuʿūbiyyah*; Haddārah, esp. pp. 203-280 and passim; Dūrī, *al-Harakāt al-Haddāmah*.

⁶⁴ Madelung, ‘Mazdakism,’ pp. 1, 2. Although beyond our scope, Madelung’s distinction between Mazdakism-Khurramīyyah, on the one hand, and Manichaeism, on the other hand, is of intense interest to the scholar of ‘Abbāsīd studies. It would appear

Preceding and succeeding Abū Muslim and his followers, the almost uninterrupted string of Iranian rebels, apostate-‘heretics’ and heresies depicted in the Islamic sources—both historical and heresiographical—is bewildering: from the pre-Abū Muslim Khidāsh⁶⁵ to the ‘ready-trigger’ Sinbādh (no.342) through Rizām ibn Sābiq (no.321), Ishāq al-Turk (no.217), Barāz (no.141), Ustādhsīs, and al-Muqanna‘ al-Khurāsānī Hāshim ibn Ḥakīm (no.181). Except for Ustādhsīs, whose personal name was not connected to Abū Muslim, and the connection of whose rising to “the memory of Abū Muslim” is debatable,⁶⁶ all the others came straight from the ranks of Abū Muslim’s followers and generals. The string culminated with the famous revolt of Bābak, in Adharbayjān, starting in 201/816-817, outside the time frame with which we are concerned.⁶⁷ The array of ‘heresies’ associated with these movements, to which, in Madelung’s words, “the generic name most often applied ... in the sources is Khurramdīniyya or Khurramiyya,”⁶⁸ includes: Rāwandīyyah, Muslimīyyah or Abū Muslimīyyah, Rizāmīyyah, Faṭīmīyyah,⁶⁹ Kūdakiyyah, Sunbādhiyyah, Mazdakiyyah, Mubayyidāh,⁷⁰ and, of course, the earlier Khidāshiyyah and the later Muḥammīrah of Bābak.⁷¹

Does this betoken a continuum of ‘Islamicized’ Iranian populist Mazdakism: starting with Khidāsh but defeated, triumphing at the hands of Abū Muslim, and rising in disappointment and indignation at the set back it received by the elimination of its hero? Or is Khidāsh to

that al-Manṣūr’s early crackdown on the Rāwandīyyah, Abū Muslimīyyah ... etc. had targeted nationalist Khurramī militant activists; while his son al-Mahdī’s crackdown on the *zanādiqah*, and the sequel confrontation between the Mu‘tazilites and the dualists, targeted the intellectually-oriented Manichaean streak of the Persian culture. Both streaks, however, survived both caliphs.

⁶⁵ Supra, chapter one.

⁶⁶ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 133 n. 56.

⁶⁷ Ṭabarī, III: p. 1015, and passim.

⁶⁸ Madelung, ‘Mazdakism,’ p. 1.

⁶⁹ After Abū Muslim’s daughter, not the Prophet’s.

⁷⁰ Followers of al-Muqanna‘, to be distinguished from the pro-Umayyad rebels who rose with Abū al-Ward in Qinnasrīn, in 132/750, and others, all of whom were also referred to as *Mubayyidāh*. See Ṭabarī, III: pp. 52-9.

⁷¹ On these risings and heresies, see e.g.: Ṭabarī, III: passim; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: pp. 246, 229; Khalīfah, II: pp. 442-3, 453, 469; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 368; Mas‘ūdī, IV: pp. 144-5; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 359-60, X: pp. 5, 14, 358-60; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 71; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 357, V: p. 52, 58-9, 136; Ibn al-Nadīm, pp. 405-8; Narshakhī, pp. 24, 94-104; Azdī, p. 244; Ibn Khallikān, III: pp. 263-5; Shahrastānī, I: pp. 247-9, 288-9, II: p. 87; Baghdādī, *Firaq*, pp. 251-2, 255; Nawbakhtī, pp. 54, 57, 67-73; Ibn Ḥazm, *Fīṣal*, p. 28; Ash‘arī, I: pp. 21-2; Qummī, pp. 44, 64-5, 69-70, 186; Nāshī, pp. 31-6, 38, 42. Cf. Madelung, ‘Khurramiyya;’ idem, ‘Mazdakism,’ he reviewed these movements in a condensed manner; so did Daniel (*Khurasan*, pp.125-156). Both, but Daniel especially, drew on G.H. Sadighi’s *Les Mouvements religieux iraniens au II^e et au III^e siècle de l’Hégire*, Paris, 1938.

be viewed as a dissident pro-‘Alīd Shī‘ite, Abū Muslim as a devout Muslim dedicated to a special brand of pure Islamic Shī‘ism, who fought in the cause of egalitarian Islam and an Arab dynasty at the helm of an Organization led and overwhelmingly manned by other Arab partisans, and the post-Abū Muslim Khurramī movements as sudden sprouts of Iranian wrath, unconnected to the preceding events? Or, were Abū Muslim and his followers a mere interruption of the continuum, over which Iranian grass-roots populism and aspirations simply vaulted, to spring up in the immediate aftermath of his elimination, more vigorous and militant than ever?

Engrossed with a passion to demonstrate the sincerity of Abū Muslim’s personal faith, and that his movement “was in no sense an anti-Islamic movement,”⁷² Frye unequivocally establishes the Iranian ethnic identity of the majority of the Revolutionaries, but rejects the accusation that they were heretics. Says he:

While heretics supported him, and infidels may have, there is no evidence that the latter flocked to his standard in large numbers, for Abū Muslim was quite strict, and especially would not tolerate apostasy.⁷³

The examples Frye uses to support his statement, namely, Abū Muslim’s execution of Bukhār Khudāh and Bih Afrīd for alleged apostasy, may, more convincingly, be attributed to more mundane reasons of political expediency. And one may take issue with the assertion of Abū Muslim’s ‘strict’ religious standards. Even ‘revisionist’ scholars admit that he, or the *da‘wah* in general, did tolerate, and perhaps even indulge ‘heretics’. However, we shall not dwell on these issues. What matters, from our point of view, is the extent to which the religious issue serves as an identifier of the ethnic background of the majority of the Revolutionaries. To this extent, Frye comes clean on the right side of the argument:

... it was only during the time of Abū Muslim that Khurāsān became definitely converted to Islām ... The call for a religious crusade against the Umayyads probably had little effect on the Arab tribes in Khurāsān, it seems to have had an effect on the new Iranian converts ... Arabs would not provide the bulk of the fighting force ... the Iranian Muslims were far more constant and reliable ... [they] became the backbone and mainstay of Abū Muslim’s forces.⁷⁴

⁷² Frye, p. 31.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 32, 33.

However, to Frye, “the series of [subsequent] heresies and revolts ... are another matter.”⁷⁵ The question of a continuum is not among his concerns.

A continuum of sorts is, however, recognized by Daniel. He cites Sa‘d al-Qummī:

who notes that whereas the Rizāmiyya could be traced back to the Kaysāniyya (and thus had a very early connection with the ‘Abbāsīd movement?), the Abū Muslimiyyah were originally Magians (whom Abū Muslim had brought into the movement?) and formed the nucleus of what became the Khurramiyya.⁷⁶

Daniel recognizes not only that these “sects originated from the same groups which had supported Khidāsh, Ibn Mu‘āwiyah and other radicals;”⁷⁷ he also contends that Abū Muslim, during his life time, was their effective master or manipulator, as well as their symbol after his death:

... the *ghulāt* were active in Khurāsān long before Abū Muslim’s murder. Their relations with him were ambivalent; they were tolerated or encouraged as long as they were useful, but they were repressed if they threatened to get out of control. They were present in the revolutionary army and could appear anywhere the Khurāsāni *jund* went ... some of them were closely associated with the *dā‘wa*, others had been co-opted into the ‘Abbāsīd movement.⁷⁸

To Madelung, the existence of an established and deep-rooted continuum appears to be taken for granted. He smoothly goes right into the heart of both the religious and the ethnic issues, dedicating what ought to be the obvious. Says Madelung:

[Mazdakism] required a movement of a similar revolutionary and syncretistic nature to bring about the fusion of Iranian dualist and Islamic elements apparent in the Khurramiyya. Such a movement arose in the Kaysāniyya ... The beginnings of the involvement of the Khurramiyya with the Kaysāniyya can probably be dated to the time of Abū Ḥāshim, the son of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya ... who ... set up a secret missionary organization ... known as the Hāshimiyya ... That some of his followers had been recruited among the Khurramiyya is indicated by the prominent role they soon began to play in both major branches into which the Hāshimiyyah split ... Among the branch supporting ‘Abd Allāh b. Mu‘āwiyah ... an extremist Shī‘ite, gnostic doctrine was taught by a certain ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Ḥarb (or al-Ḥarīth), who is described as the son of a *zindīq*, i.e., a dualist heretic ... according to the heresiographers, ‘Abd

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 38.

⁷⁶ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 131; Qummī, pp. 64-5.

⁷⁷ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 131.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 130, 131.

Allāh b. Ḥarb's doctrine also spread among the factions of the Khurramdīniyya ... In the other branch of the Hāshimiyya, which supported the imāmate of the 'Abbāsīd Muḥammad b. 'Alī, the *dā'i* nicknamed Khidāsh, who was active in the regions of Nīshāpūr and Marw around 111-118/729-736 is accused of having taught the religion of the Khurramiyya ... pseudo-Nāshī' ... identifies the Khurramiyya of Khurāsān with the Khidāshiyya ... The widest allegiance among the Khurramiyya all over Iran and Transoxiana was, however, gained by Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī ... The widespread and fervent popular backing of Abū Muslim in Iran which is reflected in the religious allegiance of the Khurramiyya is a significant factor in the success of the 'Abbāsīd revolution and must be stressed in view of recent interpretations which see the Revolution as essentially Arab. While the revolutionary army was led by Khurāsānian Arabs, it had the backing of the Persian populace, Muslim and non-Muslim. The Umayyad armies might not have collapsed so quickly if they had not been operating in enemy country ... There is no need to pursue the history of the Khurramiyya and their revolts here.⁷⁹

The lengthy quotation affords an authoritative statement clearly blending the present religious issue with one of the two major theses which this book attempts to advance. The continuum of Islamism as fused with Iranian religious 'nationalism' (or what I wish to term as an Iranian para-Islamic revolutionary continuum) is nowhere more succinctly expressed. How this quotation, almost effortlessly, leads to the corroboration of a predominantly Iranian ethnic identity of the Revolution, is as compatible with the heresiographical literature as Wellhausen's sound conclusions are with the historical, and both with contemporaneous textual materials.

Thanks to a crackdown by the Umayyad authorities, not to the Bukayrist leadership in Kūfah, the Iranian movement under Khidāsh—not particularly subordinate to the mother Organization controlled by the *mawālī*—had been temporarily quelled. Bukayr did come back to Khurāsān to gather the pieces. Indeed, he reconstructed a bruised body. Certainly, he did not resurrect a dead corpse. He lent his Organizational genius and a form of Islamic legitimacy to a jinni whom neither he nor his successor would ever be able to squeeze back into its bottle. When Abū Muslim showed up, he did not have to fight for the leadership of a movement naturally growing in his direction. With hardly a jolt, it fell into his hands like a ripe fruit ready to part company with its mother branch. The question of an uninterrupted continuum of 'Islamicized neo-Mazdakism,' or Khurramiyyah, as indicated by Madelung, seems to us a foregone conclusion.

⁷⁹ Madelung, 'Mazdakism,' pp. 7-8, 9.

In unison with the above and similar textual attestations, the pre-revisionist conventional wisdom attained its most mature formulation within the thesis advanced by Julius Wellhausen, which, in the words of a post-revisionist scholar, “became the standard interpretation of early Islamic history and dominated the secondary literature for more than fifty years.”⁸⁰ In Khurāsān, the cradle of the Revolution, its launching pad, and the source of its continued sustenance, the numbers, i.e., the masses, were Iranian; the land was Iranian; the language, culture, the oppressed, the conquered, the just cause (by Islamic, if not by Arab-Muslim, standards), the historical depth, and the natural beneficiaries of a revolution, were all Iranian. These facts of life and of history, coupled with textual testimonies, factual indications, and the absence of serious source material to the contrary, gave the conclusion that the overriding ethnic character of the Revolution was Iranian its overpowering character of unavailability and irrefutability. It flowed naturally, almost effortlessly, from the specifics and from the totality of the source material which (although it kept growing since Wellhausen) only adds further illuminating details and supporting evidence to the momentous repertoire that validates his view of the basic demographics of the Revolution. The revisionist legacy primarily rests on linguistic distortions and selective manipulations of isolated factors, mostly taken out of context, misconstrued and generalized to permeate the interpretation of the entire history of the period. With minor, or even major modifications regarding some demographic specifics, Wellhausen’s basic demographics of the Revolution still hold true. The Revolution was Iranian. It was nourished and bred within a populist Iranian para-Islamic continuum.

The following quantitative part of this book draws on the yardstick of criteria established in the *bā’iyyah*. The data is garnered independently. The results match, producing essentially the same collective profile. An incidental aspect of the outcome is an unqualified vindication of Naṣr’s representation and of the contemporaneous textual material.

⁸⁰ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 60, n.3.

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PART THREE

A COLLECTIVE PROFILE OF THE
ORGANIZATION—A QUANTITATIVE STUDY

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FOREWORD

The following chapters in this part three are an attempt to establish quantitatively a collective profile of the Organization. The first of these five chapters, chapter nine, is dedicated to expounding the methodology. In the remaining four chapters (ten through thirteen), the various aspects of the collective profile of the Organization are established through extensive analyses of the collected prosopographical data as codified, streamlined, and quantified for the purpose. The processes and instruments of codification, streamlining, and quantification will be discussed presently. For now, the relevant remaining components of this book comprise the following: (1) The prosopographical data, formulated in a readable (rather than codified) form, are presented in the first appendix, entitled "Prosopographical Appendix". (2) A huge number of statistical tables (the main instruments of quantification which, as will be shown presently, do not appear in this book) have been computed to quantify certain concepts and perspectives. The indexes of these tables capsule these concepts and perspectives, and are reproduced in the second appendix, entitled "Special Appendix". (3) A number of special terms and phrases have been coined, which might not impart articulate significations on their own. These are defined in chapter nine, and are listed, along with the page numbers where their definitions occur, in a glossary entitled "Glossary of Terms Defined".

To the best of my judgment, these five chapters, along with the above-described appended materials, represent a whole and self-contained text for both the general and the specialized reader. The processes and instruments of codification, streamlining, and quantification are left out. They comprise extensive unreadable, codified, and numerical materials, unfit in size and format for a book. In as much as they were the indispensable base of the whole exercise, they are not a mandatory reading for those who seek to understand their results.

Doctors and students of the field who might want to verify the validity and accuracy of the conclusions and findings of this exercise, must, however, have access to this omitted material. To provide this access, footnotes to the following chapters refer the interested reader to

the locations in my unpublished thesis (Agha, “Agents”) where these materials can be accessed.¹ These materials comprise the following:

A. Processes and instruments of codification and streamlining:

(1) The prosopographical data codified in the Membership Tabulations;²

(2) A “Mock-up of the Tabulations—companion to the following key”;³

(3) “Key to reading the Membership Tabulations”;⁴

B. Instruments of quantification, which are the end statistical results on which the forthcoming analytical chapters are based. These comprise extensive computational tables, the raw elements of which are drawn from the Membership Tabulations. They are divided into three series, each of which is prefaced by an indispensable index entitled “Index of Statistical Tables”. These tables are:

(1) Tables of Series I: numerical studies of the various aspects of the Kūfah Chapter of the Organization;⁵

(2) Tables of Series II: numerical studies of the various aspects of the Khurāsān Chapter of the Organization;⁶

(3) Tables of Series III: numerical studies of the various aspects of the Organization as a whole, combining both Chapters.⁷

For scholars who would want to verify my forthcoming references to these tables, the indexes are a must reading; while the tables themselves can be consulted at will. For scholars, as well as for the interested general readers, these indexes are also a helpful instrument, which further establishes the concepts informing the analysis, and the criteria of measurement. Therefore, I think it is not such an outlandish idea to include in this book a special appendix containing a reproduction of these indexes with page numbers referring to an alien pagination—that

¹ The Thesis is accessible. Further, colleagues seriously bent on an exercise of verification are welcome to contact the author.

² Agha, ‘Agents,’ pp. 509-19.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 543-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 546-69.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 571-2 for the index; pp. 573-654 for the tables.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 655-7 for the index; pp. 658-755 for the tables.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 756-7 for the index; pp. 758-817 for the tables.

of the unpublished thesis (Agha, “Agents”). This appendix is entitled “Special Appendix”.

CHAPTER NINE

THE DATA—COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY

I. *The Statistical Base—The Historiographical Base*

In the absence of archival records, quantifiable data had to be drawn from the only extant source—the historical literature. Towards that end a standardized historiographical base of twenty-some medieval Arabic sources was established, which then yielded the henceforth standardized statistical base of four hundred and one members of the Organization. These sources divide into two main classes: (1) basic sources consisting of three works, and (2) supporting sources consisting of twenty works.

The three basic sources are the richest in details and names. They are (in order of importance) *Akhbār al-Dawlah al-'Abbāsiyyah*, Ṭabarī's *Tārīkh*, and the third volume of Balādhurī's *Ansāb al-Ashrāf*. Of the total 401 names yielded through this exercise, *Akhbār* lists 263 names of which 138 are not found in the other two. Its net unique contribution to the lists stands at 131 names which are not found in any of the other sources whether basic or supporting. Ṭabarī lists 244 names, of which 106 do not appear in the other two basic sources, and his unique contribution stands at 66 names found in none of the other sources. Balādhurī lists 94 names, of which 4 are not found in the other two basic sources, his unique contribution consists of 3 names not found in any of the other sources. The total contribution of these three sources is 391 names. Their unique combined contribution stands at 200 names not found in the supporting sources. Of the 401 names, this leaves 191 common to both classes, leaving only 10 names, a mere 2.5%, as the net unique contribution of the second class.¹

The supporting sources subdivide into two groups: (a) specifically genealogical, and (b) broadly historical.

The genealogical sources give detailed information on the tribal lineages of some of the best known members, thereby assisting in their classification as ethnic Arabs. These sources must, however, be used with caution. For one thing, they do not necessarily list every ethnic

¹ For the individual and combined contributions of all 23 sources, see figure no.2, p. 227.




Figure No. 2
The Sources' Contributions to the Statistical Base

Arab who was a member of the Organization or who participated in the Revolution. And they are not uniformly or equally reliable. Ibn al-Kalbī, in particular, the earliest among these genealogists (204/819-820), was noted for his pervasive fabrications. Belonging to an Arab lineage was a desirable status symbol, and it is probable that some of the members of the *Abnā'* Establishment 'bought' 'manufactured' lineages. In addition to Ibn al-Kalbī's *Jamharat al-Nasab*, and *Nasab Ma'add*, two other sources have been chosen, namely, Ibn Ḥazm's *Jamharat Ansāb al-'Arab*, and Ibn Durayd's *al-Ishtiqāq*. From the total membership, only 52 names were mentioned in one or more of these four works. In both his works, Ibn al-Kalbī is responsible for 26 not mentioned in the other two. Ibn Ḥazm is responsible for only two who happen to be the sons of two well-known Arab *naqībs*, while Ibn Durayd is responsible for only one, a well-known Arab Revolutionary. A comparison between the sparing Ibn Durayd and the moderately reserved Ibn Ḥazm, on the one hand, and the plentiful Ibn al-Kalbī on the other, shows a disproportionate tendency on the latter's part towards a greater measure of inclusion of individuals whose purported ethnic Arab origin is attested nowhere else.

Despite the above reservations, these genealogies are (for the most part) accepted here as an instrument of inclusion in the Group considered to belong to confirmed ethnic Arab origins. Only 3 specific cases from Ibn al-Kalbī's listings are excluded, for specific reasons.² The remaining 49 cases, including the remaining 23 of Ibn al-Kalbī's, are accepted for three reasons. The first is that there are other indications to corroborate the presumption of an ethnic Arab origin in a number of cases. Secondly, in many cases it is futile to contest the genealogical assertions—there is no evidence to disprove them. Thirdly, it lends more credibility to my final conclusions. For, as we shall see, even with the inclusions of Ibn al-Kalbī, doubtful as these may be, the predominance of non-Arabs in the Organization remains very clear. The case is so strong as to absorb the surplus.

The broadly historical sources include general histories, histories of specific cities and their districts, biographical dictionaries, works that combine some or all of these, and works of literature. Some of these sources are mandatory for any study of the period. These include Khalīfah's *Tārīkh*, Ya'qūbī's *Tārīkh*, Dīnawārī's *al-Akhbār al-Ṭūwāl* and Mas'ūdī's *Murūj al-Dhahab*. Ibn al-Athīr's *al-Kāmil*, despite his almost total reliance on Ṭabarī, has useful inclusions not found in the latter. For biographical data, Dhahabī's *Siyar* is a reliable late source; his *Tārīkh al-Islām* provides even wider coverage, informed with biographical

² Nos.287, 318, 370, in the Prosopographical Appendix. See *infra* pp. 248-9.

accounts; and Ibn Khallikān's *Wafayāt* is indispensable. Another very rich source is Ibn Qutaybah's *al-Ma'ārif*, which traverses an impressive number of areas of human endeavour. Another obvious choice is Ibn 'Abd Rabbih's *al-'Iqd al-Farīd*, essentially a literary work but also richly informative as a historical one.

Reference to Jāhiz's *Manāqib al-Turk*, Azdī's *Tārīkh al-Mawṣil* and Ibn Ḥabīb's *al-Muḥabbar* as pertinent sources is owed to Dūrī's editorial notes in his edition of *Akhbār*, where he ascertains the name forms of some members of the Organization, especially the *nuqabā'*.

One may, of course, endlessly add more sources to these twenty-some. However, the informed contention here is that not many more names would crop up; and that, no matter how many new names may crop up (and some will), their number would not be sufficient, within the present scheme, to alter substantially the analyses and the conclusions.³

It is self evident that the sources must have reported on the higher profile members rather than the rank-and-file. While not every single one of the four hundred and one names can be considered a leading figure, it is obvious that the majority do belong to the different ranks of the leadership of the Organization.

This statistical base is, therefore, neither a random sample nor a select representative cross-section. It is clear from the beginning that the type of conclusions usually drawn from such samples and applied to an entire population cannot be applied to this statistical base. This does not mean that conclusions cannot be drawn. It means that their validity and limitations must be rationally (and reasonably) established in many cases on the merits of the case itself.

This is a rough and boring terrain that must be explored. Behind every mound, there may be an interesting fact, or a pointer to something similar.

³ Detractors may charge that the 'net was not cast' widely enough. Some actually did, citing the notable omission of Sim'ānī's *Ansāb*. On the purely absolute theoretical level, this is certainly a legitimate criticism. Practically, short of designating Sim'ānī's as one of the basic sources which were probed to the letter (an exercise commendable outside, and over and above, this accomplished context), not much more can be gleaned from it. Coaxing this specific source (in the same way its sister genealogical sources were coaxed) I did collect some materials which only confirm my above contention. The results are too insignificant to affect the forthcoming analyses or to alter their conclusions. What applies to Sim'ānī's *Ansāb* would most probably apply to all other known sources. This is not to say that my findings and conclusions here are definitive—far from it. It is only to say that an honest description of the exercise and its limitations must provide a well defined launching pad for further research—be it additive, corrective, or revisionist.

II. *Methodology*

The overriding feature of this methodology is that, in the ground-work phase, the prosopographical information on the Organization of the members, deposited here in the Prosopographical Appendix, were codified and deposited as symbolic data in the main instrument of the quantitative exercise, the Membership Tabulations. This was the first step towards quantifying our knowledge of the subject. The Tabulations themselves became then the main source of authentication. This, in a way, provided a cumulative body of knowledge, which, once established, could be manipulated from various angles and in the light of a variety of correlations and formations.

Not all the data deposited in the Tabulations are, however, pure objective facts which are bibliographically attestable. Data which are extracted in the light of some criteria improvised by myself, or which are established as a result of my giving weight to certain considerations, will be discussed, presently or in the following chapters. Other tables and graphic figures are vehicles for data retrieved from the Membership Tabulations, regrouped and computed in a variety of methods, in order to quantify our information and place it within certain contexts.

II.1 *Regional Organizational Perimeters*

A quantitative approach, by definition, can be applied only to a known quantity. The 'known quantity' in this book comprises the monitored 401 members of the Organization who, we assume, comprise the greatest majority of the historiographically noted membership. Objectively and historically, these must be distributed over two Regional centers. These two centers, severally, and then in concert, are referred to as the following three Regional Organizational Perimeters: (1) The Kūfah Chapter which encompasses all members who are deemed to have belonged to the Kūfan Center, a total of 61 members. (2) The Khurāsān Chapter which encompasses all members who are deemed to have belonged to the Khurāsān 'branch', a total of 340 members. (3) The Organization encompasses the entire membership of both Chapters combined; a total of 401 members; or as the context clearly mandates.

Actually, in certain contexts, the terms Organization and Chapter may be used interchangeably where the context does not allow for misunderstanding. More substantively, the usage may reflect objective historical considerations. In such cases the distinction may be redundant, since the subject Chapter would have itself been the entire

Organization in the circumstances. There is no sense, for example, in statistically or analytically involving the Kūfah Chapter when studying the Organization's performance in the Khurāsāniyyah's march westward, or in the Revolutionary eruption in Khurāsān, etc. Nor is there sense in involving the Khurāsān Chapter when studying the formative roots and the early evolution of the Organization.

II.2 *Perspectives, Measured Groups and Criteria of Measurement*

Whichever Regional Organizational Perimeter may happen to be the subject of a current probe, it will be a complex hub which comprises different Groups. Such Groups may be classified, sub-classified and reclassified, from different angles and Perspectives, and may be Measured against different Criteria and sub-Criteria. And again, a Group which may have been classified and defined from a certain Perspective will automatically break into distinct cross-sections in accordance with a Criterion which may be further applied to it. These cross-sections, to which a certain same Criterion applies, will in turn, if the Perspective is changed, form an independent Group, Measurable by the Criteria which the new Perspective mandates or offers. Thus, the 'principle of unity', so to speak, which is the base of the formation of Groups from a certain Perspective, may itself become the 'property' or 'fact', so to speak, which defines a Criterion. The opposite is also true.⁴ The combinations are nearly infinite, and can be made finite only through imposing discretionary limits which may be subjected only to the perceived requirements of the analysis. It is therefore futile to try to draw a clear-cut line between Criteria and Measured Groups. The sequence in which the following definitions are listed does not reflect a Criteria/Groups distinction; it better fits into a sequence of shifting Perspectives.

II.3 *Definitions*

The following definitions are indexed in the appended Glossary of Terms Defined.

⁴ For example, if the Perspective is Ethnic, we may want to look at one of the two Ethnic Groups (the Arabs or the non-Arabs) as the Measured Group, then measure (by a number of Methods of Measurement) its share in the leadership structure of the Organization; the Criteria here will be the Group's participation in the board of the 12 *naqībs*, the *du'āt* lists, etc. If, on the other hand, the Perspective is structural, we may want to look at the board of the 12 *naqībs* as the Measured Group, then measure (by the same Methods of Measurement) its Ethnic composition; the Criteria here will be the Arab Ethnic Origin and the non-Arab Ethnic origin of the constituents of the Group.

a. *Criterion/Rank/Phase:*

But for linguistic awkwardness, by itself, the term Criterion would have sufficed for the purpose. In a quantitative sense, all three terms refer to standards of measurement in terms of which the entire Organization, or groups within it, are measured or depicted. Because the study spans the entire scope of the Organization's 'existence', there are criteria of 'being' and criteria of historical participation. More specifically, there are Criteria of Identity, Criteria of Visibility and Recognition, Ranks in the Leadership Structure, and Phases of Revolutionary Action. As far as the essence of a Criterion's function goes, all three terms refer to the same thing looked at from different perspectives—now the measure, now the measured.

b. *Group:*

The term generally refers to a group of the known members of the Organization who share a certain defining demographic property: ethnic, tribal, social, religious, etc. It may be qualified, as in a Tribal Group, or used by itself. But it is also used to refer to Groups who share a less fundamental and more incidental property, like being participants in the same Phase of Action, or occupants of the same leadership Rank, or conformers to the same Criterion of, say, Name Recognition. Such Groups would comprise members who belong to different demographic Groups, yet, when their own demographic or other Criterial composition is the focus of the probe, they do split and they form Groups independent in their own right. Therefore, in numerous contexts, the term Measured Group would be employed to denote its obvious meaning: the Group subject of the current quantitative examination.

c. *Criteria of Identity:*

These comprise the known and inferred demographic characteristics of the members: Tribal, Ethnic, and Ethnic/Socio-Religious.

d. *Tribe/Tribal Group/Great Tribal Alliances:*

These terms indicate the vintage Arab social structures of a nucleus tribe, different levels of tribal groupings, and the three great tribal confederations: Muḍar, Rabī'ah and Yaman. For imperatives of the quantitative exercise, the distinction within the Muḍar alliance between its two great branches: Qays and Khindif, was maintained in the Membership Tabulations and the Statistical Tables which, together, formed the backbone of the quantitative exercise. Though analytically not paramount, this distinction may sometimes be instrumental in special references to issues where these distinctions within this alliance

may be of political or analytical consequence. The fact that Muḍar mainly preserved its political integrity in this historical context is, however, reflected in the fact that, in the following analytical chapters and accompanying tables, its integrity as a Measured Tribal Group is also maintained. Actually, the terms Tribe and Tribal Group are extremely lucid. The true signification depends on the pre-set frame of reference in every single instance—that is, on how far down or up the ladder of the standard genealogical scheme one goes. The level on this ladder, at which the scholar must decide to focus in a certain instance, is not always discretionary. Sometimes, indeed in most cases, it must be determined by the scholar's understanding and interpretation of the historical circumstances surrounding the instance, and the contemporaneous perceptions of the role-players. This is a very complex issue.⁵ But in all cases, it is historiographically sinful to overlook the fact that belonging to, or carrying the tag name of a Tribal Group, does not betoken an Arab Ethnic identity.

e. *Tribally Unidentified*:

This is a term which refers to all members of whose tribal affiliations nothing could be traced. Of course, such affiliations could very well have been non-existent—which is the likelihood in the majority, of such cases. Prompted by the fact that, anyway, attachment to a tribal name was but a social indicator, devoid of ethnic connotations, the Tribally Unidentified are here treated as a Tribal Group in their own right.

f. *Ethnic Group*:

This term simply refers to two groups: Arabs and non-Arabs. Theoretically, the non-Arabs may have been predominantly either Iranian or Turkic, with a preponderance of the first. Specificity is rarely possible, and therefore, the further distinction is abandoned—it being understood that, by-and-large, non-Arab means Iranian. In the Membership Tabulations five formal distinctions were maintained in the Ethnicity field (field 14). This was meant to preserve scholarly referential viability. Ultimately, I maintain that my evaluations would stand to verification.⁶ Therefore, those members thought to be most likely Arabs, or most likely non-Arabs, have been liberated in the analysis from this limbo of surmise, and they were treated as being one or the other: either Arabs or non-Arabs. Those whose ethnicity could not be determined are collectively treated as non-Arabs.

⁵ See Agha and Khalidi.

⁶ See chapter ten below.

g. *Ethnic/Socio-Religious Groups:*

This term addresses a vital and extremely consequential further distinction within the non-Arab Ethnic Group: (1) those non-Arab Muslims who found refuge under a tribal umbrella in the tribally structured society of the conqueror; and (2) those who did not. The two Groups are characterized as:

h. *Mawālī:*

Non-Arabs affiliated to the name of an Arab Tribal Group.

i. *Converts:*

Members of the Organization who, by virtue of their membership in this intra-Islamic association, must be considered Muslims. They did not have, since their conversion, either the time or the means to enable them to affiliate themselves to the name of an Arab tribe; so they were left out in the social cold—tribally unaffiliated; and, perforce, under the present reasoning, they must coincide with the similarly characterized Group, i.e., Tribally Unidentified = Converts. They must have been relatively—and, in certain numerous cases, absolutely—recent converts to the religion of the privileged conqueror. They must have come from the ranks of the legally free but politically and socially subjugated *dhimmīs*. Thus, the two major demographic perspectives—the tribal and the ethnic—overlap, but only partially. It is commonly inconceivable that a *mawālī* firmly positioned in his affiliation to his adoptive tribe would be tribally identified. Therefore, it is reasonably safe to assume that the following formula is substantially valid. While all Arab members are tribally identified, not all tribally identified members were Arabs. Bibliographical attestations of the phenomenon abound. Therefore, the balance of the tribally identified members, after deducting the Arab members, must be considered *Mawālī*. By the same token, Tribally Unidentified members, or at least their substantial majority, could only have been non-Arabs, who could not manage to forge a connection to the Arab social, i.e., tribal structure.

j. *Criteria of Visibility and Recognition:*

These are Criteria which I devised to gauge the degrees of individual, social and historiographical eminence or obscurity of the individual members. They include:

k. *Name Recognition:*

This is a scheme of grading improvised to gauge the degree of identification which the sum of the available elements of a member's name imparts—how much of his social, ethnic and tribal identity it reflects.

l. *Extra-Organization Historiographical Recognition, (E.O.H.R.):*

This is a scheme of grading improvised to gauge the degree of the sources' recognition of the member's personal and familial background outside the context of the Organization and the Revolution—effectively, his pre-Revolutionary background.

m. *Intra-Organization Historiographical Recognition, (I.O.H.R.):*

This is a scheme of grading improvised to gauge the degree of the sources' recognition of the member's presence and activities within the context of the Organization and the Revolution.

There remain three categories of Criteria, which are more historically descriptive. These have to do with the straightforward reporting of the participation of the members in the overt activities and in the structures of the clandestine Organization, and in the phased unfolding of the Revolution. They are:

n. *Criteria of (Ranks in) the Leadership Structures.*

o. *Criteria/Phases of Revolutionary Action.*

p. *Criteria of Equitability Between Contributions and Fortunes.*

II.4. *Methods of Measurement*

The raw data were directly retrieved from the Membership Tabulations, and are, therefore, considered as 'Raw Data Given', these are:

a. *Arithmetical element no.1, Absolute Revolutionary Size of a Measured Group:*

This is the number of known Organization members who belong to the Measured Group.⁷

b. *Arithmetical element no.2, Absolute Revolutionary Size of the Organization (or of the Chapter to which the quantitative analysis is restricted):*

This is the total number of known members of the Organization or the Chapter.⁸

c. *Arithmetical element no.3, Absolute Representation Size of a Measured Group:*

This is the number of members from amongst the Group's known Organization members, i.e., the cross-section of the Group's Absolute Revolutionary Size to whom a certain Criterion applies, on whom a

⁷ For example, the Banū Umru' al-Qays had 9 known members in the Khurāsān Chapter, and in the entire Organization; Khuzā'ah had 33, Ṭayyī' had 21, and the Azd had 19 (+3) in Kūfah.

⁸ The Kūfah Chapter numbered 61 known members, the Khurāsān Chapter 340, and the entire Organization 401.

certain Rank was conferred, or who participated in a certain Phase of Revolutionary Action.⁹

d. *Arithmetical element no.4, Absolute Criterial Size:*

This is the total number of the known Organization members, or Chapter members, who comprise the entire cross-section to whom the Criterion in question applies, on whom the Rank was conferred, or who participated in the Phase.¹⁰

These four elements of Raw Data Given can be viewed, manipulated and processed in a great number of ways, to produce a huge variety of correlations and comparisons. The most meaningful, though, are five arithmetical elements which may serve the analytical purposes of this study. These are the following Data Computed:

e. *Arithmetical element no.5, Relative Revolutionary Size of the Measured Group:*

This is the Absolute Revolutionary Size of the Group compared to the Absolute Revolutionary Size of the Chapter, or of the Organization,¹¹ and is expressed in percentage points.¹²

f. *Arithmetical element no.6, Relative Representation Size of the Measured Group:*

This is the Group's Absolute Representation Size in a Criterion, Rank, or Phase, compared to the Absolute Criterial Size of the same, and is expressed in percentage points.¹³

g. *Arithmetical element no.7, Representation Ratio of the Measured Group:*

This is a measure of equitability between the Group's overall contribution to the Revolutionary effort and its share in the specific

⁹ For example, the Banū Umru' al-Qays had 3 *naqībs*, Khuzā'ah had 5, Tayyi' had 1, and the Azd had none. Their Absolute Representation Sizes in the *naqīb* Rank were: 3, 5, 1, and zero, respectively.

¹⁰ For example, the entire board of *nuqabā'* comprised 12 *naqībs*. This Rank applied only to the Khurāsān Chapter, therefore 12 is the Absolute Criterial Size of the Rank within that Chapter, and also within the entire Organization.

¹¹ As the case in point may be or may require.

¹² That is: (element 1) ÷ (element 2) x 100 = (element 5). Following up on the four examples given in the previous notes, the Relative Revolutionary Sizes of the four tribes are:

Umru' al-Qays:	$9 \div 340 \times 100 = 2.65\%$
Khuzā'ah :	$33 \div 340 \times 100 = 9.71\%$
Tayyi' :	$21 \div 340 \times 100 = 6.18\%$
Azd :	$19 \div 340 \times 100 = 5.59\%$

¹³ That is: (element 3) ÷ (element 4) x 100 = (element 6). Following up on the four examples given in the previous notes, the Relative Representation Sizes of the four tribes in the *naqīb* Rank are:

Umru' al-Qays :	$3 \div 12 \times 100 = 25\%$
Khuzā'ah :	$5 \div 12 \times 100 = 41.67\%$
Tayyi' :	$1 \div 12 \times 100 = 8.33\%$
Azd :	$0 \div 12 \times 100 = 0\%$

Phase of Action, Rank of Leadership, or the Criterial cross-section which may happen to be the case in point. Mathematically, therefore, it is the most telling gauge of a Group's specific standing. It is the Relative Representation Size of a Group in a Criterion, Rank, or Phase, compared to the Group's Relative Revolutionary Size. The Ratio gauges whether the Group was equitably represented (if the Ratio is 1:1), over-represented (if the Ratio is more than 1), or under-represented (if the Ratio is below 1).¹⁴

h. Arithmetical element no.8, Relative Involvement of the Measured Group:

This is the Absolute Representation Size of a Group in a Criterion, Rank, or Phase, compared to the Group's Absolute Revolutionary Size, and is expressed in percentage points. It shows what percentage of the Group were 'involved' in the Criterion, Rank, or Phase.¹⁵

i. Arithmetical element no.9, Relative Criterial Size:

This is where the entire Chapter or Organization,¹⁶ rather than the Group to whom the Criterion applies, is the Measured Group. This element may also be referred to as the Relative Involvement of the Chapter or the Organization in the Criterion. This is the Absolute Criterial Size compared to the Absolute Revolutionary Size of the Chapter or the Organization.¹⁷

j. Arithmetical/Ordinal element no.10, Comparative Standing of the Measured Group:

This is the ordinal token ranking of the Measured Group which it earns within the Organization/Chapter in accordance with the Method of Measurement employed in a certain instance.¹⁸

¹⁴ That is: (element 6) ÷ (element 5) = (element 7); or: (element 8) ÷ (element 9) = (element 7). Following up on the same previous examples, the Representation Ratios of the four tribes in the *naqib* Rank are:

Umrū' al-Qays:	25% ÷ 2.65% = 9.43	or	:	33.33% ÷ 3.53% = 9.43
Khuzā'ah	: 41.67% ÷ 9.71% = 4.29	or	:	15.15% ÷ 3.53% = 4.29
Tayyī'	: 8.33% ÷ 6.18% = 1.35	or	:	4.76% ÷ 3.53% = 1.35
Azd	: 0% ÷ 5.59% = 0	or	:	0% ÷ 3.53% = 0

¹⁵ That is: (element 3) ÷ (element 1) x 100 = (element 8). Following up on the same previous examples, the Relative Involvements of the four tribes in the *naqib* Rank are:

Umrū' al-Qays:	3 ÷ 9 x 100 = 33.3%
Khuzā'ah	: 5 ÷ 33 x 100 = 15.5%
Tayyī'	: 1 ÷ 21 x 100 = 4.76%
Azd	: 0 ÷ 19 x 100 = 0%

¹⁶ As the case in point may be or may require.

¹⁷ That is: (element 4) ÷ (element 2) x 100 = (element 9). Following up on the example of *nuqabā'*, the Relative Criterial Size of this Rank, which applies only within the Khurāsān Chapter, is: 12 ÷ 340 x 100 = 3.53%.

¹⁸ For example, Khuzā'ah has a 33 Absolute Revolutionary Size, a 9.71% Relative Revolutionary Size, and the 1st Comparative Standing among all Tribes in accordance

The above methods of measurement were applied to the raw data to produce the Statistical Tables which are the end statistical product on which the analyses in the following chapters are based. These tables will not appear in this book; but, as already mentioned, extensive references to them will be made in the following analytical chapters.

with this Method of Measurement; Umru' al-Qays has respectively 9, 2.65%, and the lowest Comparative Standing (or next to the lowest, depending on how far down the genealogical structure we go). Now, if we look at the statistical performance of each of these two tribes from two other statistical Perspectives, some anomalous revelations will occur. Applying a different Method of Measurement, namely the Relative Representation Size, will illustrate this. Within the board of *nuqabā'*, the tiny Umru' al-Qays overtakes all other Tribes and Tribal Groups and scores a Comparative Standing second only to the mighty Khuzā'ah. Conversely, applying the Representation Ratio as the Method of Measurement will yield a staggering result. At 4.29:1 according to this Method of Measurement, the mighty Khuzā'ah comes, in Comparative Standing, a distant second to the tiny Umru' al-Qays at 9.43:1—more than double Khuzā'ah's Ratio. This certainly provides food for thought.

CHAPTER TEN

A COLLECTIVE PROFILE (I): ETHNIC IDENTITY

In his *bā'iyah* poem, Naṣr ibn Sayyār established the inseparability, in his tribal world, between the Criteria of Identity and the Criteria of Visibility and Recognition.¹ The correlation between these two sets of Criteria is understandable, since obscurity cannot be envisaged as an indicator of belonging to the militarily-administered and tribally-structured finite and localized society of the Arabs in Khurāsān, and their relatively visible Iranian affiliates, the *mawālī*. Thus, broadly speaking, a very obscure character is much more likely to have been neither an Arab nor a *mawālī*. Naṣr contended that the majority of the Revolutionaries were incognitos, and, therefore, neither Arabs nor *mawālī*. The question now is, to what extent do our figures vindicate Naṣr's contention, at least as strictly applicable and limited to our statistical base? Before we deal with this question, however, some comments must be made regarding the validity of the specific criteria, and of the derivation of the conclusions sought from them.

It must first be stated that the data are not all strictly raw factual data garnered from the sources. In the instances where a scheme or a system of gauging the raw data is improvised, our interference is obvious and declared. This said, however, it must be stressed that the data thus gauged is itself purely raw. The improvised schemes are expounded, and even-handedness is eagerly targeted. What might look like an anomaly is the fact that the 'grades' given as results of these systems are entered as measurable raw data, side by side with the unprocessed ones. The possible drawbacks from this juxtaposition are automatically precluded by the fact that these gauging systems are singled out for special justifications by the author, and for scrutiny by the potential critic.

¹ Criteria of Identity compromise: Ethnicity (codified, in Agha, 'Agents,' in field no.14 of the Membership Tabulations, pp. 509-19, and elucidated, p. 551), and Tribal Identity (fields 12 and 13, pp. 509-19, elucidated, p. 550). Criteria of Visibility and Recognition compromise: E.O.H.R. (field 17, pp. 509-19, elucidated, pp. 552-3), and I.O.H.R. (field Kf.55 = Kn.61, pp. 509-19, elucidated, p. 569). The two groups are straddled by: Name (fields 2-10, pp. 509-19, elucidated, pp. 548-9) and N.R. (field 11, pp. 509-19, elucidated, pp. 549-50); however, formally and in the Statistical Tables, N.R. is treated as belonging to the second group, i.e., Criteria of Visibility and Recognition.

The first two such instances are organically related, and are the most important. They bear directly on determining the ethnic origins of the 401 members. It is the most important issue; and the present treatment of this issue could be, potentially, the most precarious aspect of the entire exercise.

The sources reported, in unison or at variance, the ethnic origins of 152 members. They are 63 Arabs and 89 non-Arabs. This leaves 249 members, a Relative Revolutionary Size of 62% of undetermined ethnic stock. In the absence of further specific labeling in the sources, there are three theoretically possible tracks.

The first track is to declare the quantitative approach inadequate, for lack of complete or sufficient data. This would leave the turf exclusively open to rhetorical arguments, and far less dependable inferential work. It will be the gravitational pull of, either Naṣr ibn Sayyār, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn Yaḥyā and Wellhausen, or that of the revisionist school, which will dominate the process of opinion-forming vis-à-vis the controversy.

The second possible track is to short-circuit the quantitative probe, accept the attested count of 89 non-Arabs to 63 Arabs, a ratio of 1.4:1, extend the ratio to the rest of the known statistical base, and, from that, work out any possible further implications to the larger issue. This would fall too short of a more realistic ratio. No matter how eagerly a revisionist supporter tries to manipulate the bulk of the raw data, such a ratio is not sustainable.

The third possible track is to probe, within the available raw data, for clues and indicators which, by themselves and in correlations, may provide determinants, or, at least, factors of preponderance, to the probe. But, do such clues exist? Yes, of course. And, they are a lot more indicative, and less prone to clever hypothesizing, than the isolated fragments of evidence, on the twisted interpretation of which the polemic approach seeks to rest its rhetorical arguments.

It is this third track for which this study opts. The process of generating inferential and ‘evaluatory’ data is unavoidable, but it will be kept as close to the raw base of inference as possible. The first ‘mine’ prospected for the desired clues is the one most attendant to a member’s historiographical existence—the member’s name.

I. *What’s in a Name?*

The nomenclature, provided it is mined properly, has a lot to offer. No rush for the first gleam of golden yellow can redeem it; nor should impatient exasperation doom it as a false mine.

The revisionists rushed for the most false of all the ‘veins’ in the mine—the tribal *nisbah* element of the name. Noting that the affiliations Tamīmī, Khuzā‘ī, Azdī, etc. appear as parts of the names of a majority of the *nuqabā’* and *du‘at*, they hastened to conclude that they were Arabs, and that therefore the predominant ethnic identity of the movement was Arab.² In addition to the fact that the second conclusion does not necessarily follow from the first, the first conclusion itself is based on a wrong premise.

Realizing the revisionists error, Daniel notes the “discrepancies among the sources concerning the proper form of a name and whether an individual was an Arab, a *mawlā* or an Iranian.”³ He reviews some of the elements that usually comprise a name, each in isolation; and, in apparent exasperation, he paints this potentially rich ‘mine’ as infested with discrepancies. His “chief conclusion ... : No one group, racial or otherwise, dominated the *dā‘wa*.”⁴

Iḥsān ‘Abbās hits the right chord: “Saying that ‘someone’ (*fulān*) is a Khuzā‘īte or a Tamīmīte does not necessarily mean that he is an Arab; the sources often neglect, in such cases, to add the term ‘through clientage’ (*bi-al-walā’*).”⁵ Actually, the presence of the tribal *nisbah* in an individual’s name is decisive in only one respect. It identifies the individual as having a connection to the tribe; it does not, by itself, specify whether the connection is a blood connection (*ṣalībatan, minhum, min anfusihim*, etc.), or a social, initially military or administrative connection of clientage, (*mulḥaq bihīm, mulṣaq, mawlāhum*, etc.). In the terminology used in this book, this *nisbah*, therefore, distinguishes between the Arabs and *mawālī*, on the one hand, and the converts, on the other. Its absence means the individual had no known connection to an Arab tribe. The tribal *nisbah* is a social qualifier; it is not necessarily an ethnic identifier.⁶

² Omar, *‘Abbāsīd Caliphate*, pp. 71-2; Shaban, *‘Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 151-2; Sharon, *Black Banners*, p. 193 ff.

³ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 34.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 36, cf. pp. 34-5.

⁵ ‘Abbās, p. 91, n. 1.

⁶ To illustrate the point, consider the interesting episode about the real ethnic origin of the famous *faqīh* Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī. Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān, a cousin of al-Saffāh and al-Manṣūr, ‘asked about Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī, whether he was an Arab or a *mawlā*? They, [the questioned], disagreed on the matter. So he summoned the prefects of the Nakha‘ [tribe]. They brought their *ḏiwān*; in the *ḏiwān*, he, [Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī], was found to be a *mawlā*.’ (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 95). This is not to say that this Ibrāhīm was really a *mawlā*; for, Balādhurī immediately reports another account which asserts that he was an Arab. The point is that, despite his celebrity status and the fact that the *nisbah* (al-Nakha‘ī) was so organically a part of his name that, by itself, it uniquely referred to him in the relevant literature; this was not enough to decisively identify his ethnic origin. Similar cases abound in the sources.

To that extent, many of the discrepancies to which Daniel refers may be dispelled. Except for the single disagreement on the ethnic origin of the *naqīb* Sulaymān ibn Kathīr ... al-Khuzā'ī (no.350),⁷ and probably few other insignificant cases, the others are not really irresolvable.

Some perceived discrepancies may be attributed to the scholars' misunderstanding of the texts. Daniel and Omar⁸ misunderstood Jāḥiẓ. Daniel thought that Jāḥiẓ gave two separate lists of the *nuqabā'*, one comprising only Arabs and ascribed to the anti-*shu'ūbīs*, and the other comprising only *mawālī* and ascribed to the *shu'ūbīs*.⁹ An ostensibly slight misunderstanding of the nuance of the language and of Jāḥiẓ's style makes all the difference. What Jāḥiẓ actually did was present one incomplete list of the *nuqabā'* read from two ends. The pro-Arab spokesman cites only the seven Arab *naqībs*; the pro-*mawālī* spokesman mentions only three of the five *mawālī naqībs*. That is as far as citing names went. In a flare of enthusiasm, the Khurāsānite, who, in Jāḥiẓ's text, represents the Iranians, i.e., neither the Arabs nor the *mawālī*, claims all twelve *naqībs* and seventy *dā'īs*.¹⁰

How Omar construed that "according to Jāḥiẓ and Azdī, all the twelve *Naqībs* were Arab," and Arab Yamanites at that, is a puzzlement.¹¹ He compounds this by affirming that "Ibn Ḥabīb maintains that there were only two Mawālī among the twelve 'Abbāsīd *Naqībs*."¹² Actually, Ibn Ḥabīb lists thirteen, not twelve, *naqībs*, eleven of whom carry a tribal *nisbah* without further specification, one carries no identification at all, and one is identified as *mawālā* Khuzā'ah.¹³ He does not say that any specified number of them were *mawālī*. Azdī¹⁴ lists eleven *naqībs*; he identifies nine of them by the tribal *nisbah* only, one by a tribal *nisbah* and by *walā'*, and refrains from identifying the eleventh.

Taking all the above lists, in addition to *Akhbār's*, Balādhurī's list and his alternatives, Ṭabarī's two lists, and the partial list that may be compiled from Ibn Ḥazm;¹⁵ none of the perceived discrepancies is a contradiction—save for the single case in Balādhurī concerning Sulaymān ibn Kathīr. That is to say, viewed in the light of 'Abbās'

⁷ Balādhurī says: '*mawālā* Khuzā'ah ... and it is also said: of their authentic pedigree (*wa yuqāl min anfusihim*)', *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁸ And David Ayalon as quoted by Sharon, *Black Banners*, p. 232.

⁹ Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 34.

¹⁰ *Manāqīb*, pp. 22, 24, 14.

¹¹ Omar, *'Abbāsīd Caliphate*, p. 72.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹³ Ibn Ḥabīb, p.465.

¹⁴ Azdī, p. 26. Omar's reference is to Azdī's *Tārīkh al-Duwal al-Munqaṭ'ah*, a manuscript not available to us.

¹⁵ *Akhbār*, pp. 216-7; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 115-6; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1988; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, pp. 214, 236, 242, 319, 404.

pointing out the usual inadvertent omissions by some sources of the *walā'* identifier, there are no discrepancies that bear on the ethnic origins of the *nuqabā'*. A *naqīb* who is explicitly identified as an Arab, by one source, is nowhere identified as a *mawālā* by another. The opposite is also true. The perceived discrepancies emanate from the fact that all five *mawālī* of the twelve *naqībs* are listed in some sources with only the tribal *nisbah*, while other sources make up for the omission.

In all these cases, and in the greatest majority of other members' names—that is, where the information does exist—the sources must be viewed as complementary. A combined approach to the issue will, perhaps astonishingly, result with cumulative, rather than conflicting, information towards the construction of the fullest possible forms of the names of the Organization members.

This is how the members' names are constructed here. In an attempt to preserve, to the extent possible, a genuine feel of the identifying significance of a name as it was probably used during the life time of its bearer, the use of the *nisbah* elements¹⁶ was limited to cases where such elements were listed in the earlier sources. Even though the tribe, occupation and/or the geographical origin or domicile of a certain member may be known, and even if a later source did use one or more of these affiliations as an element of the member's name; this was not enough to include the said element in the name as listed in the Membership Tabulations. It cannot, in such cases, be considered to be a part of his identity, as characterized by his name as it was probably used by his contemporaries, or, at least, by sources closer to his times.¹⁷

On the other hand, a tribal connection is inferred from a tribal *nisbah*, even if the *nisbah* is mentioned only in a late source. This is so because, even together, they are not viewed as ethnic determinants. All what can be construed from such a *nisbah* is the existence of a connection to the tribe. Whether it is a blood relation or a *walā'* (clientage) must be ascertained, where ascertainable, by other criteria.

The available elements of a name are treated as a possible auxiliary key to the identity of its bearer as it may have been perceived by his

¹⁶ In Agha, 'Agents', fields 7, 8 and 9 of the Membership Tabulations, pp. 509-19, and elucidated, p. 548.

¹⁷ For example, Yāqūt (d.622/1225) asserts that Bukayr ibn Māhān (no.15), came from the village of Hurmuzfarrah, and refers to him as al-Hurmuzfarahī (Yāqūt, V: p. 403); so does the earlier Sam'ānī (d.562/1167), V: p. 635. No earlier source used this *nisbah* to refer to Bukayr. This *nisbah*, in Bukayr's case, is therefore, not recognized here. Likewise, a geographical *nisbah* was not automatically used to infer from it the geographical location to which a member may have belonged. In the few cases where such an inference may have been made, other reasons would have prompted the inference.

contemporaries—best judged, in the absence of better leads, by the earlier sources' scheme of reference.

The order in which the elements of the name were listed in the Tabulations does not conform to the conventional order, where the *kunyah* is usually the first element to be inscribed. Although in some cases it was used as a *nom de guerre*, defining the member's identity within the Revolutionary circles, and at the same time obscuring it or actually reflecting its genuine obscurity to the outside world, or probably because of that; the *kunyah* cannot be considered as uniformly being an intimate part of the name, identifying its bearer within the context of the wider social setting. In a number of cases, the *kunyah* was the only or the most significant of the few known elements of the name. In some other cases, most prominently Abū 'Ikrimah's (no.61), the same person carried two *kunyahs* to blur his identity before the authorities. It was, therefore, relegated in this exercise to the last position.

The logic behind the employed sequence is that the elements closer to the personal identity came first, followed by elements which define the other dimensions of social identity, then the *kunyah* (not infrequently used by its bearers as an instrument of disguise).

In many cases, essential elements of the name are missing; computer sorting gave precedence to an empty space over letters of the alphabet; hence, these incomplete names cluster at the beginning.¹⁸ Thus, each of the resulting names (in the Membership Tabulations, in Agha, "Agents", and in the Prosopographical Appendix) is, by and large, constructed block by block from the fullest information available—within the prescribed historiographical parameter of this quantitative study. It is this totality of the name, not any one isolated element of it, that may be reasonably tapped for indications of ethnic identity.

The number of possible constellations that may emerge from the chaotic presence of some of the nine elements of a name and the absence of others is staggering. A scheme to streamline them into manageable categories had to be improvised, thus the Criteria of Name Recognition.

¹⁸ Therefore, the entire alphabetical system is rendered mechanically useless. To spot the entry on a member (whether in the appended Prosopographical listings, or in the Membership Tabulations in Agha, 'Agents'), the searching reader will have to resort to the general index. Alternatively, he would be looking for that entry under its serial number.

II. *Name Recognition*

These Criteria possess has also the potential to gauge the degrees of contemporaneous *cum* historiographical social recognizability or obscurity. But it is the direct ethnic dimension that is primarily behind devising the scheme. This is the first instance of interference by the author, and this interference is restricted to two aspects. The first is the grouping of the possible constellations into eight logical and coherent categories. The second is determining the values attached to this classification.

Because of the primarily tribal structure of the Arab society, especially in Khurāsān, and because of the special significance of the ethnic dimension in the controversial demographic composition of the Organization; the highest merits in grading these names are given to the ancestral lineage and the tribal affiliation elements of the name. The highest grade, grade 1, goes to the most complete and recognizable names, the lowest, grade 8, to the most incomplete and obscure names.¹⁹ Obviously, a full Arab lineage gives us no choice but to determine the Arab stock of the bearer. The presence of a tribal affiliation is, by itself, indecisive, since the bearer could be a *mawlā*. Its absence from the lists, while not an absolute proof that the bearer of the name is a non-Arab, is, nevertheless a predominating factor.

It comes as no surprise how poorly the Organization, as a collective, scores on the higher grades, and how richly it does on the lower. Consecutively, on the grades from 1 to 8, the Relative Criterial Sizes are:

For the Kūfah Chapter	8.2%, 1.64%, 3.28%, 18.03%, 16.39%, 0%, 18.03%, 34.43%
For the Khurāsān Chapter	16.18%, 1.76%, 3.24%, 20.59%, 9.71%, 0.29%, 27.65%, 20.59%
For the Organization	14.96%, 1.75%, 3.24%, 20.20%, 10.72%, 0.25%, 26.18%, 22.70%

If the imaginary curve resulting from these figures is too illogical and erratic, it is because the classification into 8 grades is rather too hair-splittingly theoretical. For example, grades 2, 3 and 6 apply only to a handful of members. The hair-splitting is rather an extra precautionary

¹⁹ The scheme is fully elucidated in the exposition of field 11, Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 549-50.

measure to safeguard, to the extent possible, an impartial weighing of indications of ethnicity.

When it comes to using the scheme as a Criterion of Visibility and Recognition, broader lines are drawn, and a more logical grouping of the above eight grades is employed, creating three broad categories of: high (grades 1 and 2 combined), medium (grades 3 and 4 combined), and low (grades 5 through 8) Name Recognition Criteria. According to this balanced scheme, the scores become as follows:

For the Kūfah Chapter	9.84%, 21.31%, 68.85%
For the Khurāsān Chapter	17.94%, 23.82%, 58.24%
For the Organization	16.71%, 23.44%, 59.85%

The imaginary curve resulting from these figures is in perfect unison with the other curves which result from the two other Criteria of Visibility and Recognition. All of these curves escalate from low levels of high recognizability to high levels of obscurity, as shall be demonstrated. The differential between the two Chapters of the Organization is also in unison with the higher Relative Criterial Size of the non-Arab Group in the Kūfah Chapter.²⁰

III. *The Ethnic Composition of the Organization*²¹

From the combined individual profiles, and through clear indications and direct statements in the sources; the ethnic origins of 152 out of the 401 members are attested: 63, i.e., 15.71%, are found to have been ethnic Arabs;²² and 89, i.e., 22.19%, non-Arabs.²³

Had it not been for the fact that the ethnic identity of the Revolution, and the Organization, was the major point of contention; it would have been within the limits of an acceptable margin of error to assert, without further ado, that the remaining 249 members were all non-Arabs. This

²⁰ For statistical details of how the Name Recognition Criteria apply to the various demographic groups, ethnic and tribal, see Agha, 'Agents,' for Kūfah, tables I.B.1-I.B.3, pp. 593-8; for Khurāsān, tables II.B.1-II.B.3, pp. 678-83; for the Organization, tables III.B.1-III.B.3, pp. 778-83.

²¹ Codified in Agha, 'Agents,' in field 14, pp. 509-19, and elucidated, p. 551. For the following statistics on this issue, see *ibid.*, for the Kūfah Chapter, tables I.A.1-A.10, pp. 573-92; for the Khurāsān Chapter, tables II.A.1-A.10, pp. 658-77; for the Organization, tables III.A.1-A.10, pp. 758-77.

²² 5 in Kūfah, 8.2% of the Chapter's strength; and 58 in Khurāsān, 17.06% of the Chapter's strength.

²³ 23 in Kūfah, 37.7% of the Chapter's strength; and 66 in Khurāsān, 19.41% of the Chapter's strength.

would have been too contentious; and, therefore, a case-by-case appraisal of the 249 members who fall below this line of attested ethnicity was undertaken.

To maintain objectivity, the appraisal process went through four distinct conceptual and concrete steps. First, I determined who of these members should be deemed Arab, and who should be considered non-Arab. Of course, not all cases can be positively weighed. Second, cases which cannot be positively determined were formally posted as undetermined. Third, the assumption here is that Arabs, who are historiographically reported as taking part in political activities, could have rarely been tribal incognitos—because, even today, a tribal society does have its humble classes, but it houses no incognitos. All those members of undetermined ethnicity must, therefore, have been non-Arabs. Fourth, for the purposes of the remainder of this study, the outcome of the appraisal process was combined with the attested cases. We shall be looking at statistics of Arabs and non-Arabs, without further reference to the distinctions between the methods of determination. For the benefit of the potential critic, these distinctions are, however, maintained in the Membership Tabulations, and analyzed and computed in the Statistical Tables.²⁴

In considering the individual cases, general guidelines had to be drawn up, but without losing sight of the specifics. Some guidelines are procedurally exclusionary; that is, they automatically put the case outside consideration for a judgment in favor of determining either an Arab or a non-Arab ethnic origin. Others are inclusionary, in the sense that they spot indications which help formulate a judgment in favor of asserting either one.

The first of these guidelines is to look for a tribal connection. While its presence does not necessarily betoken Arab stock, its absence disqualifies the case from consideration for inclusion in the Ethnic Arab Group. It may be argued that the absence of such a reference, in the limited historiographical base of this survey, does not mean it is not mentioned elsewhere. Theoretically, this is true; but, while the chances for such further findings are slim on the individual level; their overall statistical impact on the collective level would be negligible.

Once the fact of the absence of a tribal connection is accepted as a historiographical starting point, it is very difficult to dispute its

²⁴ As codified in field 14 (Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 509-19), and elucidated (p. 551): '1' and '3' stand for attested Arabs and non-Arabs consecutively, '2' and '4' stand for those determined to have been thus, and '*' stands for those undetermined. tables A.1-A.8, of each of the series I (Kūfah, *ibid.*, pp. 573-88), II (Khurāsān, *ibid.*, pp. 658-73), and III (Organization, *ibid.*, pp. 758-73), compute the distinct as well as the combined results.

significance as an indicator. It simply means that nobody knew the fellow. Even excluding the genealogical literature, historical records—at least until the end of the Umayyad period—is laden with the specific Arab tribal nomenclature; so much so that even the names of the *mawālī* were predominantly listed complete with the identification tags of their adoptive Arab tribes. It is not easily conceivable that an Arab individual be mentioned, especially if repeatedly, but also in isolation, without his tribal identification capping his name, or somehow otherwise established, unless he is too well-known for that.

Another exclusionary guideline is the presence of a full lineage connecting the individual to tribal ancestors. Such cases cannot be considered non-Arab, despite the not unusual genealogical fabrications. Three specific pseudo-cases were, however, treated differently: Quraysh ibn Shaqīq al-Sulamī (no.318), ‘Uthmān ibn Nahīk ibn Wahn al-‘Akkī (no.370), and the celebrated general Muqātil ibn Ḥakīm ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-‘Akkī (no.287). All three were mentioned as Arabs only by Ibn al-Kalbī, each being deficiently traced to a specific sub-tribe of their respective tribes. The problem is that the chain of lineage is broken, in the first case immediately after the father, and in the second and third cases immediately after the grandfather.²⁵ Not that, if the lineages had been complete, they would have necessarily presented authentic cases; but they would have had to be at least acceptable under the declared guidelines of the present appraisal. Especially with Ibn al-Kalbī being the only source claiming genealogical connections for these cases, but not going the extra step of making up for the missing links of the chains; these cases become even more suspicious. But this is not all. Mazyad ibn Shaqīq al-Sulamī (no.259), Quraysh’s brother, and supposedly a Muḍarite, was the harshest against Muḍar in Abū Muslim’s arbitration between them and the Yaman. It is his specific language, (referring to Muḍar in the third person, and to the group to which he belonged in the first person), that makes it untenable to genealogically connect him to Muḍar.²⁶ He must have been a *mawālā* of the tribe whose name he carried, the Muḍarite Banū Sulaym; and, what applies to him must apply to his full, or at least paternal, brother. ‘Uthmān ibn Nahīk, when ordered to murder Yazīd ibn ‘Umar ibn Hubayrah, asked to be relieved of the task, and for a good reason. He said: “let an Arab kill him.”²⁷

²⁵ Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*. (Caskel), I: p. 123, II: p. 471; I: p. 219, II: p. 579, I: p. 219, II: p. 431.

²⁶ He said: ‘Muḍar are the murderers of the Prophet’s family ... our bloods are on their necks (on their hands—*dimā’unā fī a’nāqihim*), and our possessions are in their hands,’ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1986.

²⁷ Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashwāf III*, p. 153.

Obviously, he was not one. Nor were his two brothers, ʿĪsā (no.212), and ʿUmar (no.365). The case of Muqātil ibn Ḥakīm al-ʿAkkī is not as straightforward. There are no additional signs which positively preclude his having been an Arab. But there are no signs that indicate he was. Attributing Arabic poetry to him,²⁸ and to others about him,²⁹ cannot be taken for such signs.³⁰ In fact, the entire episode of these ʿAkkīs (Muqātil and the three Nahik brothers) provokes suspicion. Al-Manṣūr would later arrange a marriage of six sons of two of them to the six daughters of a third.³¹ The fact that Ibn al-Kalbī is the only source to provide these *Abnāʾ* with their short circuited Arab lineages only strengthens the suspicion of an organized operation of genealogical fabrication.

A contextual situation providing a sign of a paternal link to a known Arab relation,³² something in the individual's pre-Revolutionary background indicating tribal prominence or recognizability,³³ and, in one case, a very unusual Arabic father's name,³⁴ prompted the inclusion of the individual in the Group considered most likely to have been of Arab stock.

In addition to contextual situations which may point to a more likely non-Arab stock,³⁵ the name combination is the major guide. While Iranian and Turkic elements in the combination should point to a non-Arab origin, they are not the only elements which are relied upon. The mere fact that a name comprises Arabic elements, even if up to the grandfather, is not a predominating token of Arab descent.³⁶

Moreover, to acquire a two or even three-generation Arabic name, complete with a *kunya*, and perhaps also a tribal *nisbah*, a non-Arab did not have to be the descendant of converts. Even recent converts could change their names and the names of their fathers, or have them changed by their patrons. We need not go beyond ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muslim Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī, who may also be called al-Murādī.³⁷

²⁸ *Akhbār*, pp. 314, 347-8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 346.

³⁰ The well-known poets Ziyād al-Aʿjam and Abū al-ʿAṭāʾ al-Sindī could not even pronounce the language properly.

³¹ Ṭabarī, III: p. 420.

³² For example, nos.310, 230, 303, 99.

³³ For example, nos 319, 322.

³⁴ Bishr ibn al-Furāfiṣah al-ʿAbdī, (no.14).

³⁵ See e.g. above cases of the ʿAkkīs and the Sulamīs.

³⁶ Consider some high-profile, confirmed non-Arab *mawālī*, such as the *naqīb* Ṭalḥah ibn Zurayq ibn Asʿad al-Khuzāʾī (no.351); his brother Muṣʿab, ancestor of the Ṭāhirids (no.298); Khālīd ibn Kathīr ibn Abī al-ʿAwrāʾ al-Tamīmī Abū al-Mughīrah (no.238); one of the purported killers of Qaḥṭabah, Aḥlam ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Bassām (no.119); his brother Bassām ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Bassām (no.144).

³⁷ At least according to one account, see *Akhbār*, p. 265.

A grandson, his father, and perhaps grandfather, could also convert together and have their names changed in one package. Abū Muslim's campaign of converting cum recruiting of the Iranian masses must have facilitated the process.

These, however, are not by themselves decisive factors. A comprehensive approach requires the appraisal of the full combination. Therefore, the Name Recognition scheme is the yardstick. However, because it is also necessary not to lose sight of the specifics, the scheme could not be applied indiscriminately across the board. But, by and large, it remains valid.

Utterly obscure names, mostly with only one or two elements, were all deemed to be non-Arab. Of this category, only seven names carried a tribal *nisbah* in addition to only one other name element. They all belong to the lowest Name Recognition grade 8. As it were, all 91 names assigned to this grade are determined to have been non-Arab. Twenty-seven of them are attested non-Arabs, and the balance, 64, are deemed to have been so. These are the likes of Abū Sharāḥīl, Ibrāhīm Abū Zayd, Abū Turāb, Mas'adah al-Ṭā'ī, Muslim al-Arghadī, Šubayḥ al-Aqṭa' Abū Hāshim, etc.³⁸

Beginning with Name Recognition grade 7, the second lowest, and working our way up, the appraisal gets less certain and more difficult to maintain an objective handle on. Although names assigned to this grade look more wholesome than those in the previous one, comprising only a personal name and a father's name, they are almost as obscure. Despite this fact, in most cases, only positive signs are taken to facilitate any positive determination. From the 105 names assigned to this Group, 1 is accepted as an attested Arab,³⁹ and 1 is determined to have been so;⁴⁰ twelve are attested non-Arabs and twenty one are determined to have been non-Arabs by virtue of certain clues.⁴¹ And, for lack of positive

³⁸ Nos.82, 84, 202, 302, 343.

³⁹ 'Amr ibn Ḥassān (no.128). Actually this figure is mentioned only once (*Akhbār*, p. 222), as one of the *Du'āt*. Ṭabarī mentions a certain 'Amr ibn Ḥassān al-Ṭā'ī who participated in the Qaṣr al-Bāhili battle, in 102/720-721, (*Ṭabarī*, II: p. 1422). Ibn al-Kalbī mentions the same name in a genealogical line parallel to that of Qaḥṭabah's (*Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 257, II: p. 175). We opted to consider the name as belonging to the same Arab individual.

⁴⁰ Mas'ūd ibn 'Ilāj (no.258). Ṭabarī identifies him as '*raḡul min Bakr ibn Wā'il*,' the tone sounds like it means: an Arab of this tribe, but of no further consequence, (*Ṭabarī*, III: p. 15).

⁴¹ Some such clues are: the father's name being only the patronymic derived from the subject's name, e.g. 'Ayyāsh ibn Abī 'Ayyāsh (no.13); Kinship to a known non-Arab, e.g., al-Ḥasan ibn Ḥamzah (no.22), Bukayr's nephew, his sister's son. Of course, it may be assumed that Bukayr's sister may have been married to an Arab called Ḥamzah. But then, Ḥamzah who? An obscure name, with such a clue, could have hardly belonged to an Arab. Another clue is where the father's name is clearly non-Arab, e.g., al-Ḥasan ibn

clues, the 70 remaining obscure names in this grade are relegated to the formal category of the undetermined.

In grade 6, where the first name is missing, there is only one name, Ibn Zurayq ibn Shawdhab al-Shaybānī (no.89). His ethnicity could not be determined.

What distinguishes the names in the highest grade of the low Name Recognition Group, i.e., grade 5, from the obscure ones in grade 7, is the existence of additional, but genealogically insignificant elements. That is, a grandfather's name and a tribal connection would be still jointly missing. The additional elements may, therefore, be any combination of: *laqab* (nickname), *Kunyah* (allusive name), geographical, and or occupational *nisbah*. In such a genealogically shallow combination, when there is a major defining element, and it happens to be geographical or occupational or similarly incidental, the overriding connotation, especially in the context of a tribal society, is that the specific individual's distinguishing identification, which best betokens his contemporaneous recognizability, was just that—incidental. These are determined to have been non-Arab.⁴² Of the 43 names in this grade, 13 are attested non-Arabs, 17 are determined to have been non-Arabs, and 13 are relegated to the undetermined.

The lowest of the two medium grades, i.e., grade 4, is the first on the lower end of the scheme to show a tribal connection.⁴³ With a personal name, a patronymic and this *nisbah*, the names look rather complete. In modern, or even in late 'Abbāsid Arabic nomenclature, this combination is sufficient. For it to indicate Arab ethnicity in the context of Umayyad nomenclature, other elements, or some supporting clues, must be present. Of the 81 names in this grade, 5 are attested Arabs, 14 non-Arabs; 5 are determined to have been Arabs, 2 non-Arabs;⁴⁴ and 55 are undetermined.

The highest of the two medium grades, i.e., grade 3, is the first on the lower end of the scheme to show an ancestral name beyond the father's, but only up to the immediate grandfather. A tribal *nisbah* is not used by

Mākhanbadh (no.177), Asad ibn al-Marzubān (no.131) Ziyād ibn Farrūkh. Certain clues derived from the individuals' backgrounds, and, combined with the obscurity of the name, would strongly point to a non-Arab origin. Such are the cases of Abū Muslim's companions in the professional quarter of *al-Qaṣṣarūn* (fullers or bleachers) in Kūfah, Mūsā ibn Yazīd and 'Uthmān ibn 'Īsā (nos.41, 48).

⁴² For example, Yaḳīn ibn Mūsā al-Abzārī (no.51); 'Īsā ibn Ibrāhīm al-Sarrāj (no.29); Muḥriz ibn Ibrāhīm al-Jūbānī (no.280), 'Abd al-Ghaffār ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Ṭalaqānī (no.103).

⁴³ Except for the 7 names in grade 8, where the tribal *nisbah* was only one of two elements in extremely obscure combinations.

⁴⁴ The Sulamī brothers (nos.259, 318) discussed above.

any of the earlier sources as an element in these names, but a tribal connection may be otherwise established. The 13 names comprising this grade are distributed as follows: 1 attested Arab, 8 attested non-Arabs, 2 determined to have been Arabs, 1 determined to have been non-Arab, and 1 undetermined.

Grade 2 is superior to grade 3 only in that the tribal *nisbah* is used by the earlier sources as an integral part of the name combination, but any ancestry beyond the immediate grandfather is still lacking. It is significant that 4 of the 7 names in this grade are attested non-Arabs.⁴⁵ The remaining 3 are: 1 determined to have been an Arab,⁴⁶ 1 determined to have been non-Arab,⁴⁷ and 1 undetermined.⁴⁸

Grade 1 features the optimum combination of an Arab name, complete with a long ancestral line, which, credibly or incredibly, reaches, in most cases, the grand tribal patriarch. As would be expected, the overwhelming majority in this grade are Arabs: 56 attested and 2 determined to have been so. The only 2 in this grade who are not Arabs are confirmed Iranian *mawlās*.⁴⁹

The following table sums up the outcome of the first step of the appraisal process, along with the application of the fourth step to it:⁵⁰

⁴⁵ The case of Salamah ibn Bujayr ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Muslī (no.45) may be debatable. He was the first chief of the Organization in Kūfah, and the son of a certain 'Abd Allāh ibn Bujayr, who had been with al-Mukhtār, and who was noted for his bravado when the bitter end came. Being so noted, yet surrounded with obscurity otherwise, tip the balance in favor of considering him one of the *mawālī* who rallied around al-Mukhtār (cf. *Akhbār*, p. 183; Tabarī, II: pp. 738, 740-1; Ibn A'tham, VII: p. 198, and supra, pp. 5-6). Not so contentious, however, are the cases of 'Uthmān ibn Nahīk ibn Wahb al-'Akkī and his brother 'Isā (nos. 370, 212) discussed above; and al-'Alā' ibn Hurayth ibn Quṭbah al-Khuzā'ī (no.121) son and nephew of the celebrated Sughdian *mawlās* Hurayth and Thābit. (cf. Tabarī, II: pp. 1026-7, 1080-2, 1152-61, 1953, 1967; *Akhbār*, pp. 202, 216, 219-20, 273, 278, 337; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 116; cf. Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, pp. 58-61 and passim; Blankinship, *'al-'Arab fi Khurāsān*, pp. 316-8, supra, pp. 143-7).

⁴⁶ Al-Junayd ibn Khālid ibn Huraym al-Taḡhlībī (no.230).

⁴⁷ Muqātil ibn Ḥakīm ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-'Akkī (no.287) discussed above.

⁴⁸ Tamīm ibn 'Umar ibn 'Abbād al-Tamīmī (no.352).

⁴⁹ Muṣ'ab ibn Zurayq ibn As'ad ibn Rādūyah (or Zādūyah or Māhān) al-Khuzā'ī, and his brother, the *naqīb*, Ṭalḥah (nos. 398, 351).

⁵⁰ For tribal breakdown and calculations of Relative Sizes, see in Agha, 'Agents,' for row (1) of this chart, tables A.1 of the series I, II and III, pp. 573-4, 658-9, 758-9; for row (2), tables A.2 of all three series, pp. 575-6, 660-1, 760-1; for row (1+2), tables A.3 of the three series, pp. 577-8, 662-3, 762-3; for row (3), tables A.4 of the three series, pp. 579-80, 664-5, 764-5; for row (4), tables A.5 of the three series, pp. 581-2, 666-7, 766-7; and for row (3+4), tables A.6 of the three series, pp. 583-4, 668-9, 768-9.

Sr. No.	Ethnic Group	Kūfah Chapter	Khurāsān Chapter	The Organization
(1)	Attested Arabs	5	58	63
(2)	Most likely Arabs	1	10	11
(1+2)	Total Arabs	6	68	74
(3)	Attested non-Arabs	23	66	89
(4)	Most likely non-Arabs	21	76	97
(3+4)	First sub-total of non-Arabs	44	142	186

The application of the third step to the outcome of the second step, i.e., adding the number of the members of undetermined ethnicity to the grand total of members attested to have been non-Arabs or deemed to have been so, may be more contentious.⁵¹ Therefore, a further probe of the outcome of the second step may be required in order to gauge its tenability and the impact of any perceived margins of error on the totality of this quantitative study.

The absence of reasonably acceptable positive clues leaves 141 members in the Undetermined Ethnicity Group. Of these, some do have tribal connections, either attested in their name combinations, or otherwise inferred. The difficulty arises when one tries to accommodate the revisionists' indiscriminate acceptance of a tribal connection as an indication of Arab ethnicity. As a matter of principle, this snag could simply be disregarded—at least in the light of the foregoing arguments. Procedurally, however, the revisionists' contention must be addressed on its face value.

The breakdown of this class is as follows:⁵²

Sr. No.	Tribal Connection	Kūfah Chapter	Khurāsān Chapter	The Organization
1	Undetermined ethnicity, tribally identified or connected	8	53	61
2	Undetermined ethnicity, tribally unidentified and unconnected	3	77	80
3	Undetermined ethnicity, total	11	130	141

⁵¹ The reference is to the four conceptual steps in the appraisal process, hereabove.

⁵² For tribal breakdown, and calculations of Relative Sizes, see: tables A.7 of all three series: I, II and III, in Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 585-6, 670-1, 770-1.

The tribally unidentified and unconnected cross-section (row 2 above) offers no theoretical conflict with the revisionists' contention. Its 80 members may, therefore, be added to the first sub-total of non-Arabs already computed.

The contention would then center around the cross-section of the 61 tribally connected but ethnically undetermined members (row 1 above). This may be addressed on three levels.

The first level is purely hypothetical. If, for the sake of argument, we consider all 61 members to have been Arabs, this would bring the numbers to 266 non-Arabs and 135 Arabs; i.e., 66.33% to 33.67% i.e., 2:1. This is as close as the ratio of non-Arabs to Arabs can get; and yet, the non-Arabs would still enjoy a two-thirds majority. Of course, the very premise of this hypothesis is completely incompatible with the logic of this study.

The second level is a statistical compromise. It still would be incompatible with the basis of this study, but it is not statistically unusual. In the attested categories, the tribally identified non-Arabs are 74,⁵³ and the Arabs are 63.⁵⁴ This is a ratio of 1.17:1. If this is to be considered an acceptable average, applying it to the present contentious cross-section would yield 33 non-Arabs and 28 Arabs. Under this compromise, the grand totals would be 299 non-Arabs and 102 Arabs; i.e., 74.56% to 25.44% i.e., a ratio of 3:1. The non-Arabs would still enjoy a three-quarters majority.

The two previous exercises are meant only for the benefit of the potential skeptic, and to establish the improbable highest differentials which would constitute the limits of the margin of error to which this appraisal process might be susceptible.

The third level is where the present study conforms to its fundamental principles. An Arab tribal affiliation does not betoken an ethnic Arab identity, unless it is so proven. Therefore, appreciating the absence of any positive signs to the contrary, this study incorporates all the members, whose ethnic origins could not be determined, whether or not they are tribally-identified, into the non-Arab Group. Thus, the final ethnic breakdown, as recognized in the remainder of this study, is as follows:⁵⁵

⁵³ Computed in table III. A.4, *ibid.*, pp. 764-5.

⁵⁴ Computed in table III. A.1, *ibid.*, pp. 758-9.

⁵⁵ For tribal breakdown and calculations of Relative Sizes, see *ibid.*, tables A.3 and A.8 of the three series: I, II and III, pp. 577-8, 587-8; 662-3, 672-3; 762-3, 772-3.

		Kūfah Chapter	Khurāsān Chapter	The Organization
(1+2)	Total Arabs	6=(9.84%)	68=(20%)	74=(18.45%)
(3+4+*)	Total non- Arabs	55=(90.16%)	272=(80%)	327=(81.55%)
(1+2+3+4+*)	Total membership	61=(100%)	340=(100%)	401=(100%)

Henceforth, no references will be made to the previous procedural distinctions.

IV. *The Non-Arabs: Mawālī and Converts*

A different type of distinction, however, is one of great consequence. It has already been pointed out, and it will remain with us throughout this quantitative part of this book. This is the distinction, within the non-Arab Group, between the *mawālī* and the non-*mawālī*, who are referred to here as converts. The principle underlying this distinction is simple. All non-Arabs who are tribally-identified are *mawālī*. All non-Arabs who, despite their conversion to Islam, were not accommodated in the tribal structure of the Umayyad Establishment are simply converts. With this ethnic/socio-religious dimension super-imposed on the demographic profile of the Organization, the final panorama appears as follows:⁵⁶

Ethnic/Socio- Religious Groups	Kūfah Chapter	Khurāsān Chapter	The Organization
Arabs	6=(9.84%)	68=(20%)	74=(18.45%)
Non-Arab <i>Mawālī</i>	33=(54.10%)	117=(34.41%)	50=(37.41%)
Non-Arab Converts	22=(36.06%)	155=(45.59%)	177=(44.14%)
Total	61=(100%)	340=(100%)	401=(100%)

It is intensely interesting to note the relative and the absolute preponderance of the *mawālī* in the Kūfah Chapter. It is compatible with the fact that, since Bukayr had left his conservative impression on this Chapter, it did not witness a mass wave of grass-roots recruits who

⁵⁶ For tribal breakdown and calculations of Relative Sizes, see *ibid.*, tables A.3, A.9 and A.10 of all three series: I, II and III, pp. 577-8, 589-92; 662-3, 674-7; 762-3, 774-7.

might have altered its class composition. In Khurāsān, the situation is reversed. It is the converts, not the *mawālī*, who were the majority in the ranks of the Chapter, with a margin of 25.59% over the Arabs, and a margin of 11.18% over the *mawālī*.

But these figures must not be taken as reflections of equally unchanging ratios in the demographic compositions of the two Chapters. The historical dimension must be taken into consideration. The above figures represent a static demographic profile which is a cumulative product of a scan that spans almost three decades of organized Revolutionary activity. Snapshots that would freeze statistically-measured demographic profiles of the Organization as it may have been at any given stages of its historical evolution may not be invariably feasible, but certain such glimpses are possible.

If the monolithic history of the Kūfan Chapter allowed for a sustained preponderance of the *mawālī* and dominance of Bukayrism; the turbulent history of the Khurāsān Chapter, and the accompanying changing dynamics of its appeal to the different demographic groups, forced an upheaval in its Ethnic/Socio-Religious composition. Twice in Khurāsān, a shift in the focus of the movement, from Shī'itic religio-political to Iranian socio-nationalistic, begat a metamorphosis in the demographic composition of the adherents.

It has already been advanced that, perceptually, this study holds that the Khidāsh years were a severe disruption of Bukayrism in Khurāsān. Rhetorically, it can easily be argued that the *mawālī* held sway in the pre-Khidāsh Chapter in Khurāsān, lost it during the Khidāsh years, and regained it, albeit with a slimmer margin, when Bukayr regained control of the Chapter in 120/737-738. Despite the devastating blow delivered by the authorities, and the damage control exercised by Bukayr's formal structuring, Khidāshism was not completely eradicated. When Abū Muslim resurrected a wiser and more cunning strain of Khidāshism, old Khidāshists flocked back to the ranks, and new recruits from recent, and, more importantly, instantaneous, converts swelled their numbers in the Revolutionary tidal eruption.

But can the rhetorical arguments be statistically substantiated? Except for the Khidāsh years themselves, where we have a virtual historiographical black hole, the figures do tend to corroborate the perceptual thesis.

From the reports on the earlier years, while the Khurāsān Chapter was being established, 21 names are gleaned of individuals from the province who featured in some covert role—mainly around Bukayr's

founding activities.⁵⁷ Of these, 9, i.e., 42.86%, were Arabs, 11, i.e., 52.38%, were *mawālī*, and only 1, i.e., 4.76%, was a convert, a certain Mūsā ibn Mūsā al-Jurjānī (no.294).⁵⁸ It is interesting to note the near proximity between the *mawālī* and the Arabs, during this early stage, which was dominated by a Shī'itic religio-political focus. Converts were all but non-existent in the ranks.

The Khidāsh period itself cannot be gauged. But, almost immediately in its wake, the general assembly was convened, and Bukayr's structuring was enforced. Two sets of figures, which will be presently analyzed, and a more detailed examination of the leadership structures themselves, which will be conducted later, unmistakably demonstrate the interplay between the de facto demographic situation, laden with Khidāshist residue, and Bukayr's balancing act. The demographic composition of the leadership structures created by Bukayr must be viewed as both: reflecting this situation and expressing Bukayr's willful policy as to how it should be managed.

The clandestine activity, during the period surrounding and following the assembly, features 46 members.⁵⁹ Of those, 11 have already appeared in the pre-assembly period discussed above. The 35 new names are distributed as follows: 7 Arabs, i.e., 20% of the set, 16 *mawālī*, i.e., 45.71%, and 12 converts, i.e., 34.29%. While the gap between the *mawālī* and the Arabs was widening substantially, the converts were closing the gap between themselves and the *mawālī*, before eventually overtaking them.⁶⁰

The sheer numbers with which Bukayr populated the leadership structures do roughly reflect this emerging demographic balance. But the hierarchical allocations are of a different order of policy and intent. *Akhhbār*'s various lists of these organizational ranks yield a total of 148 names.⁶¹ These are distributed as follows: 35 Arabs, i.e., 23.65%, 62 *mawālī*, i.e., 41.89%, and 51 converts, i.e., 34.46%.⁶²

This is a fairly equitable representation in the light of the demographic situation surrounding the assembly—although it slightly

⁵⁷ These are codified in field 18 of the Khurāsān Membership Tabulations, *ibid.*, pp. 511-9; and p. 558 for the elucidation of the coding system.

⁵⁸ See table II.E.1, *ibid.*, pp. 732-3.

⁵⁹ These are codified in field 26 of the Khurāsān Membership Tabulations, *ibid.*, pp. 511-9; and p. 560 for the elucidation of the coding system.

⁶⁰ See table II.E.2, *ibid.*, pp. 734-5.

⁶¹ *Akhhbār*'s six lists are codified in fields 19, 21-25 of the Khurāsān Membership Tabulations, *ibid.*, pp. 511-9 for the fields, and pp. 558-60 for the exposition. Some names appear on more than one list. After deleting the repetitions, the net total comes to 148 names.

⁶² See table II.D.7 in *ibid.*, pp. 730-1.

favors the *mawālī* over the converts. But it is not equitable in terms of the final cumulative figures. While it involves 51.47% of all 68 Arab members in Khurāsān, and 52.99% of all 117 *mawālī*; it involves only 32.90% of all 155 converts.⁶³ More importantly, the converts were completely excluded from the higher echelons—not a single *naqīb* or vice *naqīb*. They heavily populated the lowest rank of *Du'āt al-Du'āt*: 23 of their numbers made up 62.16% of the rank's 37-member formation. This was vintage Bukayr prudence—trying to address and contain a demographic situation, within the Organization, which he could neither alienate nor allow to continue commandeering the Organization.

But then came the flood. With Abū Muslim's advent in Khurāsān, a flood of new names, which have never appeared before, start cropping up. One hundred and seventy-one such names appear in all—a full 50% of the 340 which make up the Chapter's lists. Of course, the large number is due, partly, to the emergence of the Organization from the clandestine stage, and partly to the intense Revolutionary activity of the period and the stronger historiographical interest and accessibility. It cannot all be ascribed to Abū Muslim's campaign of simultaneous converting and recruiting. At least 27 of the 171 names could not have been Abū Muslim recruits. These are mainly sons, brothers and other relatives of old Organization members. But the majority of the remaining 144 are certainly intriguing. They are distributed as follows: 17 Arabs, i.e., 11.81%, 34 *mawālī*, i.e., 23.61%, and 93 converts, a formidable 64.58%. What makes it more interesting is that these 93 new recruits make up a full 60% of the total cumulative number of the 155 convert members.⁶⁴ This could not have been a coincidence. The steadily climbing curve of the numbers and proportions of the converts may be abstracted from this consolidated comparative table:

	Converts	<i>Mawālī</i>	Arabs
Pre-structuring, (also pre-Khidāsh) Stage	4.76%	52.38%	42.86%
Post-structuring, (also post-Khidāsh) Stage	34.29%	45.71%	20%
The Leadership Structure	34.46%	41.89%	23.65%
With and post-Abū Muslim Advent	64.58%	23.61%	11.81%
Cumulative Final Profile	45.59%	34.41%	20%

⁶³ See the Relative Involvement column in table II.D.7 in *ibid.*, pp. 730-1.

⁶⁴ See table II.E.3 in *ibid.*, pp. 736-7.

Thus was the Organization numerically hijacked, for the second time within two decades. Had it not been, the Revolution would probably have not taken place when it did. Abū Muslim may have more than doubled the meager numbers of the historiographically recognized converts' names; but, was this about all? Do the above ratios, even at their highest for the converts and at their lowest for the *mawālī* and the Arabs, really reflect the true demographic balance in the composition of the Revolutionary forces on the ground?

It must be remembered that the statistical base of this study is neither a random sample nor a representative cross-section—whether vertical or horizontal. It is primarily the upper crust of the edifice, in which are reflected traits and balances which do not exist in the rank-and-file. The principle of equitable representation or contribution, besides its having been unfashionable and incompatible with the nature of a clandestine sectarian movement, was also intentionally and inadvertently sacrificed for machiavellian and other considerations.⁶⁵ The present statistical base is loaded with Bukayrist cadres. Uniquely Abū Muslimist cadres must be looked for in the post-Abū-Muslim-elimination rebellions, where the existence of tens of thousands of his followers is also reported.⁶⁶ Above all, it must be remembered that this statistical base is a cumulative product, its figures are tempered by cumulative averages. It does not

⁶⁵ See, for example, the *nuqabā'* of Umru' al-Qays, and the entire issue of leadership structures, *infra*, chapter 13. Another enlightening example of the almost completely inverted equitability is the comparative cases of Ṭayyī' and Khuzā'ah. In Absolute Revolutionary Size, Khuzā'ah's Comparative Standing is 1st amongst Tribal Groups—2nd only to the arbitrary listing of the Tribally-Unidentified as a Tribal Group; Ṭayyī' is 4th—or 5th when the Unidentified, i.e., the Converts, are thus included. In its participation in the open stage of the Revolution in Khurāsān, Khuzā'ah maintains its prominent Comparative Standing, and demonstrates a very high Relative Representation Size, at 20.62% of total participants, a very high Relative Involvement Size, at 60.61% of its own total strength, and an over-Representation Ratio of 2.12:1. In the same stage, Ṭayyī' slips to the lowest Comparative Standing, with the almost non-existent scores of (consecutively as Khuzā'ah's): 2.06%, 9.52% and an under-Representation Ratio of 0.33:1. See table I.I.E.8, *ibid.*, pp. 746-7. The situation is completely reversed in the participation in the March West. Khuzā'ah almost all but disappears, slipping to the lowest Comparative Standing, and scoring (in the same order as above): 4.35%, 15.15% and an under-Representation Ratio of 0.44:1. Ṭayyī' soars to highest prominence, occupying the 1st Comparative Standing in Relative Involvement, at 66.67% of its total strength, also 1st Comparative Standing in over-Representation Ratio, at 1.97:1, and 3rd only to the Converts and Tamīm in Absolute Representation Size, at 14 participants, 12.17%. See table I.I.E.12, *ibid.*, pp. 754-5. Almost all the Statistical Tables are rife with similar examples of the inequity of representation and participation.

⁶⁶ Balādhurī puts the number of those killed with Sinbādh (no.342) at 30,000; Ṭabarī and Mas'ūdī put the figure at 60,000. If these were only the fallen, how many were the rebels?! See: Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 247; Ṭabarī, III: p. 120; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 145; also, Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 360; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 71; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 357.

reflect the demographic balance at the historic Revolutionary moment and within the tidal wave which it unleashed.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

A COLLECTIVE PROFILE (II): VISIBILITY AND RECOGNITION

The criteria of Name Recognition have been discussed as a tool of determining ethnicity. But they also serve as a function of gauging the individual and collective Recognizability of the Revolutionaries. As such, the eight grades of completeness of a name have been combined in three categories, classifying the name bearers in three categories of Recognizability: high, medium, and low.

Now, two further groups of criteria are also devised by the author to gauge the raw data for Recognizability of the members. As yardsticks, both have been inspired by Naṣr's *bā'yyah* poem. While the results they yield are not different from the portrait Naṣr depicted of the Revolutionaries, I have tried to conduct an objective application to the situation as transmitted to us through the present Statistical base. As such, the exercise should be viewed as an independent corroboration of Naṣr's depiction.

These two further sets of criteria are historiographically-based. They range from relatively recognizable status of prominence to complete obscurity. One gauges the individual profiles within the context of Organizational and Revolutionary activities; this is termed as Intra-Organization Historiographical Recognition (henceforth I.O.H.R.). The other gauges the individual profiles outside this context; this is termed as Extra-Organization Historiographical Recognition (henceforth E.O.H.R.).

I. Intra-Organization Historiographical Recognition¹

Although the survey base comprises only the twenty-three sources, the assumption is that, historiographically, it is fairly representative. It is here contended that expanding this base will not change, to any significant extent, the inevitable conclusions which must be drawn from

¹ The statistical base for this criterion is codified in field Kf.55 = Kn.61 of the Membership Tabulations, in Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 509-19, and elucidated in p.569. For the statistical computations and tribal breakdown, see *ibid.*, tables B.9-13 of the series I, II, and III, for Kūfah, Khurāsān, and the whole Organization, consecutively, pp. 609-18, 694-703, 794-803.

the present results. Any additional number of likely sources will only add to the scores of the better known and more widely reported members. For those who scored only one appearance, i.e., a mere 4.35% on the present scale,² an unlikely additional appearance that may crop up from the survey of, say, seven more sources, will only improve this rate by an insignificant 2.31%, to 6.66%—which is still a very poor showing.

This presumably gauges the degree of recognition extended, so to speak, by Arab Islamic historiography, to these men, on their own turf, i.e., within the context of reporting on the Organization, the Revolution, and the era they helped bring about, when the originally obscure amongst them ought to have risen to relative visibility. It must be admitted that this is a posthumous criterion. But it must reflect a fair measure of the degree of public visibility they enjoyed during their lives.

The very few impressive scores are expected.³ Only 1 member scores appearances in 20 sources; and 2 members in 19, 18, 17, and 16 sources. Only 31 members, 7.7% of the known membership, score appearances in between 10 and 20 sources; that is a token Recognition of between 43.48% and 87%. The number of those who score a token Recognition of above 50% is only 18, i.e., 4.48% of the known membership.

Even if certain very important considerations were factored in, these degrees of Recognition would not change in any significant measure. As expected, the highest scores go to Qaḥṭabah (20 appearances), Abū Muslim and Sulaymān ibn Kathīr (19 appearances each). Abū Muslim, being outside Arab genealogies, is not expected to appear in the 4 genealogical sources; Qaḥṭabah's untimely demise and Sulaymān's early execution, which prevented them from taking part and thus appearing in the annals of the 'Abbāsīd regime, ensure their absence from some sources. The same applies to Abū Salamah, who scores 14 appearances, and in a greater measure, to Bukayr ibn Māhān, who scores 9 appearances, and, for a variety of reasons and to different degrees, to other celebrities who would otherwise merit 100% Recognition, or close to that. To provide for this differential, suppose all those who score 10 appearances and more attain 100% Recognition; we would still have only 7.7% of the known membership enjoying a high degree of Recognition.

² 100% being all 23 sources.

³ Figure no.3 (p. 263) shows the detailed scores. The percentage ratios worked out in the following discussion are an instrument of simplification and instant comparison. The term 'appearance' is used to indicate presence in a source, regardless of how intensive.




Figure No. 3
Individual I.O.H.R.

The highest brackets are entirely monopolized by the more active *naqībs*,⁴ and the military and administrative stars who went on to assert and deepen their presence in the new regime.⁵ The two *naqībs* especially known for their special and different plights, score moderately.⁶ This covers the seven Arab *naqībs*. The remaining five *naqībs* were *mawālī*. One was very little known except for his belonging to the Revolutionary family of the sons of A‘yan, and the other four, apparently confined themselves, or were confined, even after victory, to Khurāsān, and to relative inconsequence.⁷

At the other and more substantial end of the statistical spectrum, the poor scores carry no surprise. Two hundred and six members, 51.37% of the known membership, are mentioned each in only 1 source; that is a token Recognition of 4.34%. Three hundred members, 74.81% of the membership, are mentioned in no more than 3 sources, that is, a token Recognition of no more than 13%. The total number of appearances made by all 401 members is 1282 instances. Gauging the collective profile of the known membership against this criterion works out to an average of about 3.2 sources recognizing each member; that is an average token Recognition of 13.9%.

This is indeed a very poor score for the men who were instrumental in bringing about the greatest change in Islamic history, second only to the advent of Islam itself. What makes it all the more relevant is that their undeniable contribution was crowned by the creation of their own Establishment, and that the event crowning their endeavors took place in the full glare of conscious and purposeful historical reporting. Both factors were so much closer to the beginnings and the flourishing of recorded history than were the beginnings of Islam.

⁴ After Qaḥṭabah and Sulaymān, Mālik ibn al-Haytham scores 17 appearances; Abū Dāwūd Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm, 16 appearances; Mūsā ibn Ka‘b, 15 appearances.

⁵ Khāzīm ibn Khuzaymah scores 18 appearances; the celebrated sons of Qaḥṭabah, al-Ḥasan, 18, and Humayd, 17; the commander of the contingent which hunted down Marwān II, ‘Āmir ibn Ismā‘īl, 16; the renegade ‘Abd al-Jabbār ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān, 15; the eternal policeman *par excellence*, al-Musayyab ibn Zuhayr, 15, etc.

⁶ Lāhiz ibn Qurayz shows up in 11 appearances; his tribal compatriot, al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshi‘, in 10.

⁷ ‘Amr ibn A‘yan scores 5 appearances; his better known brother, ‘Īsā, 7; ‘Imrān ibn Ismā‘īl, Abū Muslim’s father-in-law, 9; Shibl ibn Ṭahmān, 7; the uncle of the later Ṭahirids, Ṭalḥah ibn Zurayq, 9.

II. *Extra-Organization Historiographical Recognition*⁸

This system of grading is quite independent from any degree of eminence a member may have attained within the ranks of the Organization, or in the annals of the general history of the Muslim polity if it accrued to him only as a result of his Revolutionary Status. Thus, a *naqīb* like the celebrated Mūsā ibn Ka'b ibn 'Uyaynah ... of Umru' al-Qays of Tamīm (no.292), for example, whose Arab lineage is reported up to his great tribal patriarch, merited the lowest, i.e., the negative grade, because neither he, nor any member of his family are encountered other than in the context of the Organization. The mighty Abū Muslim himself (no.57), the misleading wealth of legends shrouding his humble or noble origins notwithstanding, narrowly escaped the lowest grade 4 to grade 3, simply because he is encountered, at least once, brushing elbows with Kūfan revolutionary circles other than the Organization.⁹ Conversely, someone as Organizationally insignificant as 'Abd al-Salām ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Nu'aym ... al-Ghāmidī (no.8), merited grade 1. His father had been an ex-governor of Khurāsān, and 'Abd al-Salām himself, side by side with his father and brothers, took part in the battle of *yawm al-ʿaṭash*, the Day of Thirst, against the Turgesh, in 106/724-725.¹⁰

But belonging to a ruling family is not a mandatory criterion for high recognition. The chief of the Khurāsānian chapter before Abū Muslim, Sulaymān ibn Kathīr (no.350), and the formidable Qaḥṭabah ibn Shabīb (no.314), brought to their celebrity status in the Organization the highest grade of extra-Organization recognition. Sulaymān's father, who was a member of the elders of his tribe, *mashyakhat Khuzā'ah*, took part in one of the governor's raids in Khuttal, in 119/737, and was killed while Sulaymān himself was reported to have been enrolled in the *dūwān*, the main military administrative instrument of the ruling Establishment.¹¹ Qaḥṭabah's grandfather, Khālid ibn Ma'dān, had been a commander in 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib's armies, in 38/658-659, and he

⁸ The statistical base for this criterion is codified in field 17 of the Membership Tabulations, and it is elucidated in the Key, thereto, in Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 509-19, 522-3. For the statistical computations and tribal breakdown, see *ibid.*, tables B.4-8 of the series I, II, and III, for Kūfah, Khurāsān, and the whole Organization, consecutively, pp. 599-608, 684-93, 784-93.

⁹ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1620-1. The episode occurred in 119/737 presumably before he was introduced to the Organization.

¹⁰ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1480-1.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1595, 1601; *Akhbār*, p. 199.

appeared once again in a Baṣran contingent chasing the Khārijites, in 43/663-664.¹² Qaḥṭabah himself appears only once outside a direct Organization-related context, and this instance earns him grade 1 instead of grade 2. On the righteous pretences of al-Kirmānī, embroiled at the time in the bitter tribal cum political strife against Naṣr ibn Sayyār and his tribal cum governing faction, Qaḥṭabah is reported to have commented: “If he were true[ly sincere], I would have reinforced him with a thousand horse-riding [fighters].”¹³

If the above connections of Sulaymān and Qaḥṭabah betoken a semblance of high birth, I must hasten to say that the grading system according to the present criterion has nothing to do with any measure of aristocracy. The otherwise totally obscure Mu‘ādh ibn Muslim, and the better known Sabbā‘ ibn al-Nu‘mān (nos.262, 322), for example, earn a positive grade of Recognition, albeit only the lowest of the positive grades, grade 3; the first for having been known as a policeman in charge of some highway patrols;¹⁴ the latter for having played a role, a courageous one as it were, in a confrontation between the Muslim *muqātilah* and the Turgesh, in 110/729-730, and for apparently having been active in the tribal strife between Naṣr and al-Kirmānī.¹⁵ If anything at all were known about their families’ Extra-Organization background, both would have automatically merited grade 1.

If all the above indicates that some form of involvement with the Establishment is necessary to earn the member a positive grade, it does so because it is more or less true. But it is true only as far as the nature of the historiography at hand requires—it is not subject to what the formative intentions of this study aspire to find and use. Our sources concern themselves mainly with the politico-military history of the Establishment; and this is, in a sense, a shortcoming. However, the personages belonging to an organization such as this (purportedly operating within a tribal imperial context) would rarely appear in any context other than that of a role within the mainstream history of the Establishment, whether in a loyal or in an opposition role. That notwithstanding, whenever any such rare context did occur, it has been utilized. Of the background of Naṣr ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Khuzā‘ī (no.310), nothing is known besides his being the paternal nephew of

¹² Ṭabarī, I: pp. 3418-38, II: pp. 28-65. And therefore Qaḥṭabah must have originated from the Baṣran, not the Kūfān Ṭayyī. The misunderstanding is due to as erroneous reading of Ṭabarī’s accounts. See Sharon, ‘Qaḥṭaba,’ p. 446a; Blankinship, ‘*al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,’ p. 337; idem, ‘Tribal Factor,’ p. 591. Cf. Agha, ‘Qaḥṭabah’.

¹³ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1930.

¹⁴ *Akhbār*, p. 225.

¹⁵ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1524, 1858.

Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Marthad al-Khuzā‘ī, who had been in the service of the rebel Mūsā ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Khāzīm, in 85/704-705.¹⁶ For this extra-Organization appearance, which also happened to be an anti-government familial association, Naṣr ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd earned grade 2. Zuhayr ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥayyān ... al-Azdī (no.400) earned grade 1 for the rare combination of his being the father-in-law of the celebrated ‘Alīd revolutionary and martyr, Zayd ibn ‘Alī, and, of course, the father of the latter’s wife, who was killed in an infamously spectacular show of brutality by the governor of Iraq, Yūsuf ibn ‘Umar.¹⁷

This irremediable shortcoming is, however, more damaging to the abstract worthiness of the criterion, on the purely theoretical level, than it is to the empirical significance and validity of the conclusions drawn from its application. These men were, in a capital sense, political creatures. If they were to be well known in a public capacity, or noteworthy to any type of information sources, it is in a political context that they would more likely be encountered, and it is in sources on the politico-military history of the community that any records of their activities would be expected to be found. These sources did not restrict their information to the activities of Establishment officials, or members in the Establishment’s *muqātilah* corps. All kinds of personages appear in all kinds of contexts, albeit, somehow, the image of the Establishment always looms as ever-present. The incognito millions, the faceless masses of any era, who pass away leaving no individual traces in the records of their times, represent no issue. At no point in their lives would they have distinguished themselves to warrant a retracing of their previous records.

Even those few out of the four hundred and one members, who did distinguish themselves in the course of the Revolt, its aftermath, and the new realm, and who attained high profile spots as governors, leaders, rebels or founders of illustrious *Abnā’* ‘dynasties’, and thus earned their places in the literary, and other sources of variety, did not bring to their newly attained celebrity status news of their pre-Revolutionary past; at least, not in the limited number of sources surveyed for the purpose. It is not expected that a survey of more sources would yield such information in any measure adequate enough to alter the results of the present survey. If this is a limitation, then, for purposes of defining the parameters of statistical validity, it must be admitted that the findings of this study—at least as far as this criterion goes—are governed by this limitation, which we believe to be inconsequential.

¹⁶ Ibid., II: p. 1155.

¹⁷ Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, p. 485; cf. Ibn A‘tham, VIII: p. 123.

Therefore, if most of the known elite leadership of this huge and crucial mass movement do not appear except in the context of the movement which elevated them to a certain degree of visibility; then the issue of their visibility in the wider social context of the period is forcefully tabled, and certain conclusions must be drawn.


Although the criterion is, within the prescribed parameter, valid and significant in every individual case; it is much more so when the entire known membership is collectively gauged against its scale. Errors and oversights may have affected the grading of few individual cases. Providing for twenty such cases is already a generous estimate. This would make for a 5% error margin, and, if fully realized, would alter the general picture by only that much—far too short to affect the soundness of the general conclusions based on the results of the application of the criterion.

If the criterion is still deemed vulnerable to charges of implausibility, consider the following.¹⁸ When in an individual case like, for example, Abū Ḥamzah al-Jurabī (no.68), all the negatives cluster in his profile, and thus vindicate the negative grade he merits according to the present criterion; what else can be concluded other than the validity of the criterion, and that this specific profile must be classified in a category of total obscurity!¹⁹ If this is an extreme example, it is not one of a kind, nor one of a few. The validity and significance of this criterion would be even more readily appreciated, through analytical comparisons and correlations between the relevant criteria, as applied to the collective profile of the listed membership. The majority of those who merit lower grades according to this criterion will be found to score poorly in other indicatively related but independently devised and graded criteria.²⁰ The inescapable conclusion is that the results reflect a remarkable measure of the degree of social and personal recognizability these men possessed in the contemporary wider social surroundings.

¹⁸ One must keep in mind that all the Criteria employed in this study have been devised and applied independently from one another, except where one was devised to specifically gauge another, as in the case of Name Recognition, which has been devised to gauge the name combinations.


¹⁹ Whether read al-Jarabbī, al-Jurbī, or al-Jurabī (cf. Samʿānī, II: p. 39), he earns the lowest name recognition (grade 8); his ethnicity is undetermined; he is not placed in a known locality (unless we assume Jarabbah in Yaman), nor attached to a specific tribe (unless we assume Jurayb of Hudhayl); he merits the negative grade according to the present Criterion (grade 4). Moreover, even in the context of the Organization, he remained an incognito.

²⁰ See figures no.4, p. 269, and no.5, p. 270.




I.O.H.R

Data from Tables III.B.9-13



E.O.H.R. Grades

Data from Tables III.B.4-8



NAME RECOGNITION

Data from Tables III.B.1-3

Figure No. 4

Comparative Collective Recognizability of the Three Ethnic/Socio-Religious Groups




Figure No. 5
Comparative Collective Recognizability of the Two Ethnic Groups

The following table shows the collective Recognizability of the two Chapters and the entire Organization.²¹

Grades of Recognizability	Kūfah Chapter	Khurāsān Chapter	The Organization
Grade 1 (highest)	9.84%	2.06%	3.24%
Grade 2	1.64%	9.41%	8.23%
Grade 3	22.95%	4.41%	7.23%
Total positive Grades 1-3	34.43%	15.88%	18.70%
Negative Grade 4	65.57%	84.12%	81.30%
Total	100%	100%	100%

It is worth noting that the Kūfah Chapter scores higher Visibility than the Khurāsān Chapter. This is only to be expected, in view of the preponderance of *mawālī* over converts in its ranks. But it still scores only around a third positive Visibility, in view of the very small proportion of its Arab membership. The Kūfan score improved the poor overall score of the Organization, but only slightly over the dismal Khurāsānite tally. For, even if Kūfah had scored positively, the sheer size of the incognito Chapter in Khurāsān would have absorbed the margin without showing a reasonably healthy score. Although, when it comes to comparing these results with Naṣr's testimony, it is the Khurāsān Chapter which matters; it does not hurt the results of this appraisal to base the analysis on the slightly better score of the overall Organization. The margin in favor of Naṣr's objectivity is so overwhelming, and can well sustain the generosity.

III. *Internal Concordance of the Criteria*

The application of all three Criteria of Visibility and Recognition (N.R., I.O.H.R., and E.O.H.R.), separately and together, yields the same general results, and produces a concordance of evidence supporting the assertion that, ethnically, the Organization and the Revolution were predominately non-Arab. The intimate relation between 'social visibility' and ethnic identity, in the context of the Umayyad imperial

²¹ Data from tables B.4-8 of the series I, II, and III, for Kūfah, Khurāsān, and the whole Organization, consecutively, in Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 599-608, 684-93, 784-93.

structure, which Naṣr established in his poem, is only confirmed by these results.

If Naṣr's perceptual portrait of the movement could be depicted in a graph, it will be found in figure no.5; and his further distinction between the recognizable *ṣamīm al-mawālī*, and the alien converts who came from God knows where (*mimman ta'ashshaba lā dīnun wa lā ḥasabu*), is quantified in figure no.4.

In figure no.5, the curves representing the collective profile of the Organization and that of the non-Arabs run almost parallel, in all three graphs, from very low positive recognizability positions to sky-rocketing obscurity. The curve representing the Arabs behaves in exactly the opposite fashion, intersecting with the previous ones only on its way down to very low scores on obscurity.²² The same applies to figure no.4. But the distinction between the *mawālī* and the converts, which is introduced in this figure 4, produces the graphic illustration of the identity of the Group responsible for the dismal profile. The general tendency of the *mawālī* curve is to run higher (or very slightly lower) than the curve representing the collective profile on positive positions, and lower on positions of obscurity. The converts' curve behaves in the opposite direction.²³ The *mawālī* display a mediocre profile. The converts display a profile decidedly shrouded in obscurity.

Whether or not these results do justice to the constituent masses who made up the backbone of the Revolution, the self-evident answer must be affirmative. If the results were to demonstrate a leadership enjoying a high social profile, it would have been difficult to draw decisive conclusions regarding the recognizability of the base. But, if the results show, as they do, a collectively obscure leadership; it is rather absurd to postulate a more prominent base.

The only tenable conclusion is that the overwhelming majority of these Revolutionaries, moving from anonymous obscurity into the ranks of the Organization and the elevated platform of making history, remained in obscure anonymity. Faceless were they when they mobbed the ruling Establishment, and faceless they remained after their victory. For this is the lot of most of those who belong to the masses, even when they momentarily rise to the forefront of historic tidal waves. Upheavals do raise some of them aloft, as this Revolution indeed did. But it is also

²² All three curves behave in a slightly different fashion in the E.O.H.R. graph in figure no.5. The stringent criterion results with lower positive recognizability positions and higher obscurity positions; and the presence of the cumulative position results with a conceptual disruption.

²³ The anomaly seen in the first position of the I.O.H.R. graph is attributable to the singular case of Abū Muslim.

in the nature of upheavals, once the commotion settles, to nestle into the domains of established social patterns. Only select individuals and groups would have bought their newly acquired positions; the rest would be left where they came from.

Given the characteristic tendency of Arabic historiography to position individuals within tribal structures, whether the identification is indigenous or acquired, real or fictitious, the continued anonymity of this majority, especially where a tribal connection is missing, places them unequivocally outside the tribal structures and the *mawālī* establishment. Once again, Naṣr ibn Sayyār's contemporaneous poetic testimony is vindicated.

CHAPTER TWELVE

A COLLECTIVE PROFILE (III): TRIBAL STRUCTURE, GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION, AND OTHER FEATURES

I. *Tribal Structure*

No matter how the student of Umayyad studies views the bewildering variety of Arab tribal constellations, it cannot be denied that they were the single most important demographic factor in shaping the history—as well as the historiography—of the era. Historically speaking, the influential factor which people chose as the determinant of their identity must be taken seriously, regardless of whether it rests on fact or perception.¹ And, therefore, whether Khuzā'ah, for example, were actually Yamanites, or Muḍarites from Khindif,² is immaterial. What counts is that they conducted themselves, at least since the era of the Prophet had elapsed, as a Yamanite group.³

The way this tribal factor played out in the formation of the Organization, and in the course of the Revolution, is significant, even if riddled with old and modern misconceptions. It had always provided the foundation overpowering structure of the Umayyad Arab Establishment to which the *mawālī* associated themselves, and which the non-Muslims Iranians, as multitudes true to their identity, feared and abhorred and then eventually matured into discovering how to deal with it. The Organization had to address this tribal factor.

But, to what extent does the all-pervasive, combined medieval/modern myth of a predominantly-Yamanite-therefore-predominantly-Arab Revolution⁴ withstand the light of the present figures? It does not.

Three considerations must be kept in perspective while investigating the tribal face of the movement. First, that the famous directive allegedly given to Abū 'Ikrimah by Muḥammad ibn 'Alī, and later to Abū Muslim by Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad (namely, to favor the Yaman, lure Rabī'ah,

¹ See Agha and Khalidi.

² Ibn al-Kalbī vouches for the first case, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 196 ff; Ibn Ḥazm for the second, *Jamharah*, p. 480 and passim.

³ For this important tribe, see Kister.

⁴ See, e.g., Blankinship, 'Tribal Factor,' pp. 589, 596.

and beware or uproot Muḍar⁵ must be viewed, in the light of Abū Muslim's maneuvers, as primarily a tactical instrument of divide in order to prevail. Actually, he didn't even have to divide; he just had to make sure that the existing divisions would not be patched up.⁶ Singling out Muḍar for the villain's role is understood in view of the fact that they were the government party at the time. The second consideration is that, all through the Umayyad era, although politics were almost consistently tribal, tribal politics had rarely been consistent; except probably for the prominent cases of the Madhḥij—especially the Nakha' of Kūfah — and Khuzā'ah, notably in Khurāsān. The third consideration is the fact that tribalness and ethnicity are not congruent.⁷

There is no doubt that the Organization sprouted in a purely Yamanite tribal environment, specifically amongst the Banū Musliyah of the Nakha'.⁸ Seventy five percent of the twenty Founding Fathers were from the Yaman, and 25% were tribally unidentified. Fifty percent of them were from Madhḥij, and 35% from Musliyah alone.⁹ From Salamah ibn Bujayr to Abū Salamah al-Khallāl, all 5 chiefs of the Organization were Yamanites, and 4 of them from Musliyah. But all 5 chiefs were *mawālī*, and all the Founding Fathers were non-Arabs—75% of them *mawālī* of Yamanite tribes, and 25% converts. With the *mawālī*, the ethnic motive was probably stronger than the tribal one in forming their political allegiances.

This said, however, it must also be admitted that mapping the tribal profile of the Organization will demonstrate a Yamanite preponderance, but it will not show a Muḍarite insignificance sufficient to support Blankinship's assertion of "the inability of the revolution to cooperate with the Muḍar ... [and] that the Muḍar tribes found it impossible to participate in the revolution at all."¹⁰ It is actually Rab'rah who will demonstrate an insignificant presence, despite the alleged standing instructions to lure them. Muḍar, at 17.96% Relative Revolutionary Size, represents a sector larger than half of the Yaman presence, at 32.17%; and they comprise a significant 32.14% of the total tribally identified presence, to Yaman's 57.59%, and Rab'rah's 10.27%.¹¹

⁵ For variations of this tradition, see *Akhbār*, pp. 204, 284-5; Ṭabarī, II: 1937, 1985 – 6.

⁶ See Agha, 'Abū Muslim,' esp. pp. 341-3.

⁷ Cf. Agha and Khalidi.

⁸ *Akhbār*, p. 192.

⁹ See Agha, 'Agents,' table I. D.4, pp. 639-40.

¹⁰ Blankinship, 'Tribal factor,' p. 589, cf., p. 596 ff.

¹¹ This, and the attending analyses, are based on a number of instruments, as follows:

- (1) For the detailed tribal breakdown of the entire Organization, see figure no.6, p. 279.
- (2) The constant Absolute and Relative Revolutionary Sizes of Tribes and Tribal

Looking at the Khurāsān Chapter alone, Muḍar's score even improves at the expense of Yaman's, if only slightly: 19.12% Relative Revolutionary Size for Muḍar, to Yaman's 30%. One level lower on the Muḍar genealogical chain, Qays, the sworn enemy of the Revolution, provides 5% of the Chapter's strength, achieving effective parity with Rabī'ah at 5.29%. Rabī'ah's presence is sufficiently insignificant as to warrant refraining from breaking down, in the Statistical Tables, its presence over its component tribes.¹²

It is only in Kūfah that the imbalance is huge. Here, the imbalance is sufficiently consequential as to permit the addition of a tribal qualifier to the ethnic character of the formative stage of the Organization, and to the enduring identity of the Kūfan Chapter. Thus, instead of saying that it was the *mawālī* who had launched the enterprise and sustained it until the converts commandeered it, it may now be said that it was the *mawālī* of the Yaman who had done so. The Relative Revolutionary Sizes of the Yaman, Muḍar, and Rabī'ah, in Kūfah, are, consecutively: 44.26%, 11.48%, and 8.2%. These figures work out to 69.23%, 17.95%, and 12.82% of the total tribally identified presence in the Chapter. The same cannot be said of the entire Organization, and certainly not of the Khurāsān Chapter. The imbalance there is not as significant.

One of the elements that probably contributes to inflating the impact of the tribal imbalance on the Revolution is anachronistic. The Yaman did certainly achieve ascendancy later, in the 'Abbāsīd realm: 66.67% of the 21 founders of *Abnā'* dynasties were Yamanites, i.e., 10.85% of all Yamanite membership, compared to Muḍar's dismal 19.05% and 5.56% respectively. These scores of Muḍar's are even lower than those of the Yamanite Khuzā'ah alone: 23.81% and 15.15% respectively; and only equal to Ṭayyī's in Relative Representation at 19.05%, but far inferior to Ṭayyī's Relative Involvement at 19.05%. These figures signify an over-Representation Ratio of only 1.06 for Muḍar, compared to Yaman's 2.07, Khuzā'ah's 2.89, and Ṭayyī's 3.63.¹³ But this is true only of the 'Abbāsīd era, and it does not reflect on the Revolutionary period. Of those who made their first appearances after Abū Muslim

Groups, classified according to specified demographic perspectives, are computed in the first five columns of every table in Series I (for Kūfah), Series II (for Khurāsān), and Series III (for the whole Organization), Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 573-817. (3) For the application of the different Criteria to the tribal breakdown, consult the Special Appendix, herebelow, under the relevant Regional Perimeter. (4) For specific applications of the Ethnic/Socio-Religious Criterion to the three groups, the Arabs, the *Mawālī*, and the Converts, see, Agha, 'Agents,' respectively, tables A.3, A.9 and A.10, of all three series I, II, and III, pp. 577-8, 589-92, 662-3, 674-7, 762-3, 774-7.

¹² The Rabī'ah alliance is, however, divided into its component tribes in figure no.6.

¹³ See Agha, 'Agents,' table III. C.2, pp. 806-7.

took control of the Khurāsān Chapter, and who may be broadly termed as Abū Muslim recruits; 15.97% were Yamanites, and 13.19% were Muḍarites; that is 22.55% of all Yamanites, and 29.23% of all Muḍarites.¹⁴ Abū Muslim loyalists were 19.48% Yamanites and 27.27% Muḍarites; that is only 14.71% of all Yamanites, but a peculiar 32.31% of all Muḍarites.¹⁵ And, of those who served in prominent military and administrative capacities in the Revolutionary and government apparatus, in the period following the capture of Kūfah, when Abū Muslim was still the dominant force; 33.64% were Yamanites, and 24.30% were Muḍarites. More significant is the realization that these figures express an employment of only 27.91% of the first, but of a significantly higher 36.11% of the latter.¹⁶

Even more conspicuous is the case which Blankinship tries to make. The betrayal of Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad's identity to Marwān II is, in his, attributable to Muḍarite tribal factors and to the execution of the Muḍarite *naqīb*, Lāhiz ibn Qurayz, and other Muḍarite leaders. He emphasizes these executions by Abū Muslim, and the "mutual distrust and antipathy that developed between the Muḍar and the revolutionary movement." And he focuses on the misunderstanding between Abū Muslim and the two other Muḍarite *naqībs*, Mūsā ibn Ka'b and al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshī'.¹⁷

The issue of Ibrāhīm's death has already been discussed. The execution of the 24 lieutenants of Naṣr ibn Sayyār's¹⁸ is not an issue. The only 9 amongst them, whose names are cited, were 5 Muḍarites and 4 from Rabī'ah. We do not know whether the rest were all Muḍarites, although it may be expected that the majority of them were. But what we do know is that the known 9 were 3 *mawālī* and 6 ethnic Arabs, and that they were high-ranking officials of Naṣr's government. If any such considerations played any part in Abū Muslim's decisions to execute actual or suspected opponents, it would have been predominantly the ethnic rather than the tribal considerations. Of the two confirmed executions within the *naqībs*, the two were Arabs: the Muḍarite Lāhiz and the Yamanite Sulaymān ibn Kathīr. Above all, Abū Muslim probably did not kill the ethnic or the tribal Lāhiz or Sulaymān inasmuch as, in his campaign to intimidate and paralyse the Bukayrit structure, he killed the troublesome *naqīb* Lāhiz and the chief *naqīb* Sulaymān. As far as ethnicity and tribalness go, Abū Muslim's 8 high

¹⁴ See *ibid.*, table II. E.3, pp. 736-7.

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, table II. C.4, pp. 710-11.

¹⁶ See *ibid.*, table III. C.3, pp. 808-9.

¹⁷ Blankinship, 'Tribal factor,' pp. 598 ff.

¹⁸ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1989, 1995.

profile victims from amongst the members were 50% Arabs and 50% non-Arabs. Of these, 77.78% were Yamanites, and only 11.11% from Muḍar.¹⁹ By comparison, al-Manṣūr's 14 similar victims were 37.5% Arabs, 62.50% non-Arabs; with 18.75% coming from the Yaman, and 37.50% being Muḍarites.²⁰ Of course, both avengers killed other countless numbers.

Below the level of the three great alliances on the genealogical ladder (Yaman, Rabī'ah, and Muḍar), the tribal structures of the two Chapters part company to a substantial degree. This fact should bring to attention the marked difference in my choices of highlighting certain tribal constellations. These choices are in concordance with the mandates of quantitative relevance. Thus, some constellations which appear in the Statistical Tables for one of the Chapters don't appear in the other. Combining both Chapters brings to relevance some groups and assigns others to insignificance.²¹ The results of the exercise are compatible with most of the generally accepted conclusions of modern research on the general regional tribal demography in Kūfah, Baṣrah, and Khurāsān.²² But, while these results are in accord with some generally accepted concepts about the tribal demography of the Revolution such as Ṭā'īd and Khuḏā'ite prominence, they also provide some unexpected insights.

While the sheer size of Tamīm's participation (8.48% Relative Revolutionary Size) is a surprise in as far as it slightly tops Khuḏā'h's 8.23%, and substantially overtakes Ṭayyī's 5.24%, and the Azd's 5.49%; one must not hasten to conclusions. The star quality of some tribal Revolutionary celebrities goes a long way towards explaining the high profile attained by some quantitatively insignificant tribal contributions such as that of Umru' al-Qays, Nahshal and 'Akk, at the consecutive Revolutionary Sizes of 2.24%, 1.75%, and 1.5%.²³

No matter how the tribal profile of the Organization is viewed—from a regional perspective, or from perspectives up or down the genealogical ladder—the result will be the same: a preponderance of the tribally-

¹⁹ See Agha, 'Agents,' table III. C.5, pp. 812-3.

²⁰ See *ibid.*, table III. C.6, pp. 814-5.

²¹ Thus computed in the typical sections (first 5 rows) of all of the statistical tables of Series I, II, and III, *ibid.*, pp. 573-817.

²² Cf. Wellhausen; Massignon; 'Alī, *Tanzīmāt*; *idem*, *'Istīlān*'; *idem*, *'Imtidād*'; Blankinship, *'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān*'.

²³ In Agha, 'Agents,' 'Akk does not feature in the Statistical Tables, and Umru' al-Qays and Nahshal appear only in Series II, i.e., the Khurāsān Statistical Tables. Above figures are computed on the basis of 401 Absolute Revolutionary Size of the whole Organization. 'Akk, which includes Ṣuḥār, contributes 6 members, and thus the percentage 1.5%. See figure no.6, p. 279.

affiliated non-Arabs, namely the *mawālī*. Consider the following composite table,²⁴ (figure no.7). This table shows only the specific sizes of the two ethnic groups within each of the tribal groupings cited. Therefore, they chart the contours of the ethnic character of the group's Revolutionary participation, regardless of the sheer size of its total participation, and of the sheer size of its contribution to the overall sizes of the two ethnic groups. As such, the table illustrates the huge difference in the ethno-tribal character between the two Chapters. In Kūfah the small Muḍarite contribution shows a 100% non-Arab face; the major Yamanite contribution shows an overwhelmingly non-Arab character at 88.89%; the presence of the 'Ijlite house of Ma'qil colors the tiny Raba'ite participation with a more pronounced Arab color. In Khurāsān, and, consequently, in the overall Organization, the high imbalance is partially redressed, to bring the ethnic features of tribal participation to approximately two thirds non-Arab and one third Arab. As always, it must be remembered that this is not the overall ethnic balance. When the non-tribally affiliated non-Arabs, i.e. the converts, are included the overall ethnic balance will be radically altered.

On the lower levels of the genealogical scale, it is interesting to note the following. The mainstay of the Arab Establishment, the Muḍarite mammoth Qays, displays almost a pure non-Arab character, (100% in Kūfah, and around 83% in Khurāsān and the Organization). The same applies to the tribes of Mudrikah, which comprise Quraysh and its cousins, notably Kinānah — a straight 100% non-Arab face through the Regional Perimeters. But almost the same preponderance also applies, albeit for different reasons, to the thoroughly Shī'ite Madhhij, its Musliyah, and the sundry Yaman tribes, who comprise mostly Kūfan tribes. It also applies, although a trifle more moderately, to the mercantile Khuzā'ah — 70% non-Arab to 30% Arab.

The preponderance of the *mawālī*, whether in the ranks of the Muḍar or the Yaman Revolutionaries, requires no further explanation, since the reasons are already subsumed in the general preponderance of non-Arabs, which permeated the structure of the Organization and the ranks of its masses. However, the phenomenon of numerous *mawālī* in the Yamanite Revolutionary ranks is further explained by their numerous numbers in the ranks of the Yamanite tribes per se. The Yaman and the *mawālī* were much more mutually attractive to one another than were

²⁴ Data gleaned from column 9, i.e., Relative Involvement Size, in tables A.3 and A.9, of the three Series I, II and III, in Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 577-8, 589 - 90, 662-3, 674 - 5, 762-3, 774-5.

	The Kūfah Chapter		The Khurasān Chapter		The Organization	
	<i>Maccāilī</i>	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Maccāilī</i>	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Maccāilī</i>	<i>Arabs</i>
Yaman (100%)	88.89%	11.11%	62.75%	37.25%	68.22%	31.78%
Muḍar (100%)	100.00%	0.00%	63.08%	36.25%	66.67%	33.33%
Rabʿah (100%)	40.00%	60.00%	66.67%	33.33%	60.87%	39.13%
Total of the Tribally Identified (100%)	84.62%	15.38%	63.24%	36.76%	66.96%	33.04%
Qays (100%)	100.00%	0.00%	82.35%	17.65%	83.33%	16.67%
Mudrikah (100%)	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%
Nabshal (100%)	does not exist		28.57%	71.43%	will not change	
Ummu'al-Qays (100%)	does not exist		0.00%	100.00%	will not change	
Tamīm (100%)	100.00%	0.00%	41.94%	58.06%	47.06%	52.94%
Khuẓā'ah (100%)	does not exist		69.70%	30.30%	will not change	
Tayyī' (100%)	does not exist		52.38%	47.62%	will not change	
Azd (100%)	33.33%	66.67%	36.84%	63.16%	36.36%	63.64%
Musiyah (100%)	100.00%	0.00%	included in Sundry Yaman		included in Madhijj	
Madhijj (100%)	94.12%	5.88%	included in Sundry Yaman		84.62%	15.38%
Sundry Yaman Tribes (100%)	None		79.31%	20.69%	83.33%	16.67%

Figure No. 7
Distribution of the Tribally Identified Members Between *Maccāilī* and Arabs

the *mawālī* and the more thoroughly bedouin Muḍar. Be it the mercantilism of Khuzā'ah, or the egalitarianism of the Yamanite Kūfah tribes, the above figures serve to confirm the phenomenon.

The anomaly is where a tribe's participation displays a preponderance of the Arab element, or even where it shows parity. Such are the cases of the Azd, Tamīm and Ṭayyi'. The Azd situation (two thirds Arab and one third *mawālī*) may be partially explained by the simultaneity of the Revolution and the Kirmānī tribal Arab rebellion. The general Tamīm situation is definitely attributable to the Nahshal and Umru' al-Qays factor. For, without these two sub-tribes, the profile of the balance of Tamīmite contribution is 73.33% non-Arab to 26.67% Arab in Khurāsān, and, in Kūfah, where neither of these two sub-tribes exist, it is 100% non-Arab.

The Nahshal case may be partially explained in view of the long-standing mercantile interests of the house of Shu'bah ibn Ḍahīr in Sughdiana.²⁵ The small Nahshalite contingent of 7 Revolutionaries comprised two of the sons of Shu'bah, 'Abd Allāh and al-Haytham (nos. 99, 185), the military star Khāzim ibn Khuzaymah, his Persian half brother Ismā'il, his son Khuzaymah, his cousin Naḍlah ibn Nu'aym, and a *mawlā* of his, who went by the name of Bassām (nos. 243, 220, 246, 303, 143). So, this was apparently a family affair, a family with intensive Iranian connections. It must be noted that the Tamīm of Marw al-Rūdh did not endorse Khāzim's rising, and they tried to resist him.²⁶ Therefore, who did actually capture Marw al-Rūdh for Abū Muslim under Khāzim's leadership? And who really comprised the elite military division, known as *ahl Marw al-Rūdh* and as *al-Marw rūdhīyyah*, which starred in the march on Kūfah and thereafter? The question hardly requires an answer.

Stranger yet is the Umru' al-Qays participation. To be sure, it is also very small, only 9 members, who make up no more than 2.65% of the entire Revolutionary size—100% of them Arabs. At that, they monopolized 25% of the *naqīb* ranks. While we have no indication of the tribe's size in Khurāsān, there are no signs of a possible sizable participation by its rank and file in the Revolution—certainly not sufficient to warrant the position it occupied at the helm of the Bukayrit Organization. Blankinship argues for an inferior status of the tribe within the Tamīm confederacy, for a late arrival in Khurāsān, a Kūfan origin, and a sizable presence in the Revolutionary ranks. Maybe so; but even though Blankinship still finds their share in the leadership

²⁵ Blankinship, '*al-'Arab fī Khurāsān*,' pp. 148-150.

²⁶ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1959.

disproportionate, he ventures a most unconvincing explanation by assuming that: "the Muḍarite wing of the Revolutionaries was so weak that they did not find other than these three to represent Muḍar."²⁷ But why did Muḍar have to be represented in 75% of its share by Arabs, when Rabʿah and the Yaman were represented by a 50%-50% ratio? Moreover, Umru' al-Qays represents only 13.85% of Muḍarite participation, and there was no shortage of tribal, military and administrative Revolutionary stars amongst the Muḍarites, Arabs and *mawālī*. Why not Abū al-Jahm ibn 'Atiyyah (no.85), or Bassām ibn Ibrāhīm (no.144), or al-Musayyab ibn Zuhayr (no.300), or the ancestor of the Aghlabids, al-Aghlab ibn Sālim (no.117), or the star of all Muḍarite stars, Khāzim ibn Khuzaymah (no.243)!

Ṭayyi's contribution is split almost equally, with a slight non-Arab majority, and it is largely attributable to a familial factor. Of its 10 Arabs, 90% are from Qaḥṭabah's sub-tribe, Nabhān; 50% are Qaḥṭabah's immediate family: himself (no.314), three sons, al-Ḥasan, Ḥumayd and Yazīd (nos. 178, 198, 386), and his cousin 'Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn Ribī (no.104). All, except Yazīd, were celebrities in their own right. Even of Ṭayyi's *mawālī* Revolutionaries, 4 were Qaḥṭabah's personal *mawālī*: Salm, Khabrān, Māhān ibn Bakht, and Yasār (nos. 329, 233, 251, 380). The personal factor in Qaḥṭabah's case is conspicuous, although it probably cannot be singled out as the most important. Predicting his eminent victory, he reportedly lamented: "but I fear I might die before I take my revenge (*wa lākinnī akhāf an amūt qabla an aḅluḡ tha'rī*)."²⁸

As should be expected, the kinship factor is higher amongst the Arabs than amongst the *mawālī*, and higher amongst the latter than amongst the converts. Fifty-one point thirty five percent (51.35%) of the Arab participants had amongst themselves a blood or a marriage relation; amongst the *mawālī* the percentage is 28.21%, and amongst the converts only 5.81%. Nahshal holds the prime score at 85.71%, the Azd scores 63.16%. Ṭayyi's rather poor score of 23.81% is offset by the fact that it is not an amalgam of a number of relations, but one single solid relation within the same house.²⁹ This is important because it correlates with the higher grades of Recognizability, generating what may be called the 'historiographical star-quality syndrome.' The more relatives involved, the closer the members would be brought to historiographical light; and

²⁷ Blankinship, 'al-'Arab fī Khurāsān,' pp. 171-3, quote from p. 173; cf. idem, 'Tribal factor,' pp. 597-8.

²⁸ Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 480.

²⁹ For computations of Kinsmen involvement, see Agha, 'Agents,' tables C.1 of the three series, pp. 619-20, 704-5, 804-5.

the more shining the Revolutionary star, the more of his involved relatives would come to attention. This is also true of the four brothers of the Azdite house of ‘Abd al-Rḥmān ibn Zayd, congregating around their star brother ‘Abd al-Jabbār (nos. 105, and 103, 361, 382). The tiny ‘Akk owes its high profile to the stardom of two of the three sons of Nahīk, ‘Īsā and ‘Uthman, and their unknown brother, ‘Umar (nos. 212, 370, and 365), and to the legendary general Muqātil ibn Ḥakīm (no.287), who came to be known as al-‘Akkī *par excellence*. All were non-Arab ‘Akkites. So were the five non-Arab Khuzā’ite sons of A‘yan: the two *naqībs* ‘Īsā and ‘Amr, and Budayl, Marwān and Umayyah (nos. 210, 127, 147, 256, 368), who, had it not been for Bukayr’s prudence, would not have been overshadowed by Sulaymān ibn Kathīr. The main point of these observations is that they expose the inflation of the relative participation of those to whom the syndrome applies. These are primarily the Arabs. The *mawālī* come in a distant second.

The foregoing is a study in the ethnic character of the different tribal contributions. The sheer size of what these tribes contributed to the total Arabs and to the total *mawālī* of the Revolution is illustrated in the composite table³⁰ in figure no.8.

II. *Geographical Distribution*

To the Khurāsān listings are assigned all members who were specifically mentioned as belonging to the province, and, for obvious reasons, all those who were only mentioned in the sources as participants in the March West without specifying their regional identity. But a number of the Revolutionaries, who had made no appearance anywhere before their roles in Kūfah after its fall, are also assigned to the Khurāsān listings; mostly due to their unmistakable attachment to the military ranks of the victorious army, the Khurāsāniyyah.

Khurāsān, as a Regional Organizational Perimeter, is not to be strictly understood to represent only the administrative province proper. The term here acquires more of an Organizational rather than a geographic signification. It notably includes—besides Transoxania and the provincial territory east of Nīshāpūr—Jurjān and the rest of the Persian territories, which were Organizationally attached to the regional headquarters at Marw. The territories south of the Province of Khurāsān, i.e., Qūhistān, Sijistān, Makrān and Kirmān, were logically,

³⁰ Data gleaned from column 7, the Relative Representation Size, in tables A.3 and A. 9 of the three series, *ibid.*, pp. 577-8, 589-90; 662-3, 674-5; 762-3, 774-5.

	The Kūfah Chapter		The Khirāsān Chapter		The Organization	
	<i>Maawālī</i>	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Maawālī</i>	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Maawālī</i>	<i>Arabs</i>
Yaman (100%)	72.73%	50.00%	54.70%	55.88%	58.67%	55.41%
Mudār (100%)	21.21%	0.00%	35.04%	35.30%	32.00%	32.43%
Rabā'ah (100%)	6.06%	50.00%	10.26%	8.82%	9.33%	12.16%
Total of the Tribally Identified (100%)	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Qays (100%)	3.03%	0.00%	11.97%	4.41%	10.00%	4.05%
Mudrikah (100%)	9.09%	0.00%	6.84%	0.00%	7.33%	0.00%
Nabshāl (100%)	does not exist		1.71%	7.35%	included in Tamīm	
Umrū 'al-Qays (100%)	does not exist		0.00%	13.24%	included in Tamīm	
Tamīm (100%)	9.09%	0.00%	11.11%	26.47%	10.67%	24.32%
Khuẓā'ah (100%)	does not exist		19.66%	14.71%	15.33%	13.51%
Tayyī' (100%)	does not exist		9.40%	14.71%	7.33%	13.51%
Azd (100%)	3.03%	33.33%	5.98%	17.65%	5.33%	18.92%
Musiyah (100%)	36.36%	0.00%	included in Sundry Yaman		included in Madh̄hij	
Madh̄hij (100%)	48.48%	16.67%	included in Sundry Yaman		14.67%	5.41%
Sundry Yaman Tribes (100%)	None		19.66%	8.82%	10.00%	4.05%

Figure No. 8
Tribal Contributions to the Ethnic Contours of the Collective Profile

and operationally, a part of the domain of the Marw command. These areas were, anyway, sparsely populated in terms of individually known Organization membership.

As sparsely populated, in these terms, were the Persian and Iraqi territories lying between Jurjān in the east and Kūfah in the west. The absence of known organized centers of Revolutionary activities between these two centers creates a huge gray area. In terms of geography, the Persian slices of these areas did belong to the Marw command. In terms of general popular sympathies, the spontaneous flocking of human resources to the Revolutionary cause, the course of Qaḥṭabah's campaign, and the dynamics of its almost frictionless progress through many of these territories, where no Umayyad forces (especially Syrian after Ṭūs) were present, must provide ample demonstration of the positive atmosphere. Therefore, the border-line nature of the area is relevant only when it comes to the question of assigning the ties of individual members to the respective Chapter of the Organization. Here, each case had to be taken on its own merit.³¹

Other considerations also had to be heeded while deciding upon the more appropriate placement of other border cases. The bridge group, i.e., the resident emissaries (nos.57 through 61) are considered Kūfans. Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī himself is one of them. Notwithstanding Abū Muslim's controversial ethnic origins and the fact that his Revolutionary activities, and those of the other emissaries, matured in Khurāsān, they are placed in the Kūfah listings. It was the Kūfan commission and the Kūfan credentials which gave them their openings. In the case of Abū Muslim particularly, the attainment of these credentials appears to have been the reason, or, at least, one of the reasons why he suffered a Kūfan sojourn at all.

Different considerations lie behind yet other placements. Ghālib (no.18) is considered by some modern scholars to be a Khurāsānite from Nīshāpūr.³² Ṭabarī's text³³ gives ample reason for such a reading. But, a careful reading of *Akhbār*'s text in conjunction with Ṭabarī's³⁴ would indicate that Ghālib, and his group, were Kūfans who may have

³¹ Thus, for example, Khalaf ibn al-Muwarri' al-Hamadhānī (no.235) is considered to be a Khurāsānī, because he joined Qaḥṭabah's march from east to west; while the Ṭjlites of Iṣfahān (nos.12, 27, 30, 52) are considered Kūfans, because their Revolutionary connections materialized, or were effective, during the clandestine stage, in Kūfah. Their domiciles offered no significant Organizational turf, except probably by inference from their special relation to Abū Muslim.

³² The other members of Ghālib's dissident group (nos.3, 13, 56) are ignored by these scholars.

³³ Ṭabarī, II: p. 1501.

³⁴ *Akhbār*, p. 204.

migrated to Nishāpūr, or, more likely, who were on frequent missionary trips between the two localities, committed to the cause of 'Alīd descendants. Here they are listed as Kūfans.

The locality to which a member is assigned has been inferred from a number of indications. It may have been his familial residence, his personal domicile, his place of birth, the major scene of his Revolutionary activities, etc. or, in some cases, the place may represent a combination of more than one of these criteria of geographical identification, whatever it may be that the sources provide. Geographical *nisbahs* provided by later sources as an element of the name are not considered as viable indications, unless supported by other sources. But, where a source (especially *Akhhbār* or to a lesser extent, Ṭabarī, who provide most of this type of information) specifies a locality; it has been allowed to override all other indications. The most prominent case in point is that of Ziyād ibn Ṣaliḥ (no.395). Ziyād's sphere of activity, even before 126/743-744, was in Balkh, and Ṭukhāristān in general.³⁵ Although this fact serves the thesis of this study, the necessity of maintaining a degree of uniformity in marshalling the statistical data superseded this advantage. *Akhhbār* lists Ziyād as one of the *du'āt* of Marw. Accordingly, in the Tabulations, Marw is listed as his locality. The same applies to Abū Dawūd (no.237) and others.

These listed localities refer, in most cases, to cities and/or their suburbs and vicinities in the province. In the case of Jurjān, the capital city is not distinguished from the whole territory. In the case of Marw, because of the availability of more specific information, the particular quarter or suburban village, or both, are sometimes reported. Especially Ṭabarī,³⁶ and, to a lesser extent, *Akhhbār*,³⁷ are, in this respect, a mine of information. Ṭabarī sometimes provides Marw, the specific quarter, and the particular village. This contributes to the production of an approximate geopolitical map of Marw and its environs.

Marw, having been: (1) the capital of the province, (2) the headquarters of the Organization, and (3) the hub of Arab presence, polarized all strains of activity. The intersection of all three relevant axes resulted in a high concentration of the historiographically known members in Marw, and bestowed on the oasis and the city a status which attracts mixed appraisals. The historiographical attention is completely compatible with an historiographically interesting situation that must have resulted from the intersection of all three axes, or of the

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

³⁶ Ṭabarī, especially II: pp. 1950-73.

³⁷ *Akhhbār*, p. 273 ff.

second axis with any of the other two. This state of affairs should pose no problem.

It is the logistical aspect of the intersection of the third axis with the second that may, and that actually did, create a misunderstanding. And it is Bukayr's strategic genius that is to blame for the puzzlement. At first glance, and in hindsight, the choice of Marw as the Organizational headquarters may seem natural. But was it? Did Bukayr choose the seat of Arab power because he had numerous followers amongst its Arabs, or because he could foresee that a serious challenge to the Arab Establishment, when the time came, would have to have its nerve center right at the core of Arab existence in the East? It may be difficult to judge Bukayr's motives, but, relating this question to the question of the strange leadership structure which emerged from the general assembly, would throw some light on Bukayr's strategy and tactics.

As indicative, if of more consequence, is the precise role Marw played in the outbreak of the Revolution, and the interesting and precise deliberations by Abū Muslim and his staff regarding the place from which they should proclaim the Revolution.³⁸ It is clear, from the unfolding of the open Revolution, that, while it was charted and directed from Marw, it was physically shouldered and brought to sweeping victory elsewhere across the Iranian landscape. As far as the evaluation of Bukayr's role in choosing Marw, once the above facts are clear, it could be deemed a stroke of luck or a display of strategic genius; it would not really matter.

When it comes to the evaluation of the geographic factor in the Revolution and in the evolution of the Organization, it must therefore be absolutely clear that we would be looking at two separate factors: the political and the demographic; and that they are not necessarily proportional. Marw achieved a political presence incommensurate with its demographic weight in the Revolutionary balance. On the other hand, Transoxania, Ṭukharistān and Jurjān, severally, and even combined, exhibited an inferior political weight, incommensurate with their demographic superiority in the Revolutionary balance.

It is partly the failure to make this distinction, which led Wellhausen to confine the Revolution to Khurāsān proper, i.e., to the exclusion of Ṭukhārīstān and Transoxania, with special emphasis on Marw and its villages.³⁹ But Wellhausen mainly reflects Ṭabarī, and he had no access to the source material we now have—notably *Akhhbār*. Ironically, Shaban concurs with Wellhausen only on this point, but he stretches it beyond

³⁸ See Agha, 'Abū Muslim,' pp. 341–3.

³⁹ Wellhausen, pp. 397, 498, 532, and *passim*.

what Wellhausen actually intended.⁴⁰ Shaban, as would already be expected, does confine the Revolution, not only to Marw, but to the “Arab quarters in Merv, namely ... the Arab Settlers,” from where “[Abū Muslim’s] main support came;” he is completely oblivious to the rest of the Revolutionary geography.⁴¹ Daniel, duly aware of a “true mass uprising throughout Khurāsān,”⁴² rejects Shaban’s assertion and correctly states that “Merv, therefore, was not the source of the revolt but only its focal point.”⁴³

Now, therefore, the following quantitative observations reflect the political, not the demographic, heft of the various localities; and, inevitably, they project a portrait drawn in the light of historiographical attentiveness, which is obviously biased to higher profile situations.⁴⁴

The Revolutionary centers attested through this quantitative exercise cover the better part of the map of the Iranian East — not to mention the parts which I failed to personally verify.⁴⁵ Thirteen general and specific localities provide Revolutionary abodes to 177 of the 340 members. Thus, 52% of the Khurāsānite membership are attached to geographical centers, while 48%, 163 members, are not. The Revolutionary map extends from as far in the north as Khwārizm, to Bukhārā, Āmul, and Balkh in the east, through Ṭālaqān, and, advancing westward, Marw al-Rūdh, Harāt, Abīward, Nasā, Nīshāpūr, Jurjān, and Rayy. And, of course, Marw at the heart. But this is deceptive—both in what it includes such as Nīshāpūr, Jurjān, Nasā, and Abīward, for example; and in what it excludes such as Bal’āmī’s unnamed forty

⁴⁰ Shaban paraphrases Wellhausen as noting that ‘all the missionaries of the Hashimiyya were sent to Merv and all their activities in Khurāsān were confined to this district,’ (*Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 157). Actually, despite his emphasis of Marw’s role, Wellhausen recognizes all of Khurāsān proper as the Revolutionary turf (pp. 397, 498), and he even notes ‘the successes gained by the Shī’ite movement simultaneously at other points, in Biward, in Marwrudh, and especially in Herat,’ while Abū Muslim was still at Mākhuwān, (p. 529).

⁴¹ Shaban, *Abbāsīd Revolution*, p. 156, cf. p. xv; for his synoptic and arbitrary review of the geography of the Revolution, see p. 158.

⁴² Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 52.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 51; Daniel, however, excludes Transoxania, and includes the majority of the Arabs in the mass rising (pp. 52, 58, and 86).

⁴⁴ The following analysis is based on figure no.9, p. 290. The map (figure no.10, p. 291) which carries the same caption, is an additional visual instrument. The distinction between Marw and its villages in the chart is superficial; it only reflects the specific information provided in the sources, but which is neither exclusive nor inclusive. In the following observations they are combined and referred to as the Marw Oasis, district, or simply Marw.

⁴⁵ Daniel cites Bal’āmī stating ‘that the partisans collected revenue from forty different towns...’ (Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 51) from the London: British Library manuscript, Add. 23497, of Bal’āmī’s *Tārīkh*, f. 235b., unavailable to me; cf. Daniel, p. 51 n.135.

Localities Tribal Groups	Khawārizm	Bukhārā	Āmul	Balkh	Ṭalāqān	Marw al-Rūdh	Marw	Marw Villages	Harāt	Abward	Nasā	Nishāpūr	Jurjān	Rāy	Unspecified	Total
Tribally Unidentified	1		2	2		6	14	14	1	1		1	7		106	155
Tribally Identified	1	1		2	1	10	48	21		9	8	1	11	1	71	185
Yaman	1	1				1	19	15		9	6		11		39	102
Muḍar				1		9	26	5			1	1		1	21	65
Rabī'ah				1	1		3	1			1				11	18
Khuzā'ah	1						9	13			5				5	33
Ṭayyī'							8								13	21
Azd							1	1		5			3		9	19
'Akk										4	1				1	6
Musliyah													6			6
Balance Yaman		1				1	1	1					2		11	17
Umru' al-Qays							9									9
Nahshal						7										7
Balance Tamīm						2	4								9	15
Balance Ṭābikhah							4								5	9
Mudrikah							3	1							4	8
Qays				1			6	4			1	1		1	3	17
Total	2	1	2	4	1	16	62	35	1	10	8	2	18	1	177	340

* Localities are listed in map order, i.e., from north to south, and from east to west.

* Numeral represents number of members from the group in the locality.

* Last column represents total numbers of members from each group.

* Last row represents total numbers of members traced to the locality.

* Directly counted from the Khurāsān Membership Tabulations, Agha, "Agents," pp. 511-9.

Figure No. 9
Geographical Distribution of the Organization Members in Khurāsān




Figure No. 10
Geographical Distribution of the Organization Members in Khurāsān

towns,⁴⁶ or *Akhbār*'s Sughd and Zamm and 'all along' the Oxus,⁴⁷ and Dīnawarī's all-inclusive map.⁴⁸

The north and the east are only sparsely populated by members whose names are known—only 10 all together (5.65% of those geographically located and 2.94% of the total): 2 in Khwārizm, 1 in Bukhārā, 2 in Āmul, 4 in Balkh, an 1 in Ṭālaqān. This scarcity, and the fact that the pro-Umayyad forces, including some Transoxanian princes, made a last stand at Balkh, misled Daniel to his erroneous placement of Transoxania in the Umayyad camp. The fact is that, of the known names, Transoxania was carried single-handedly by al-'Alā' ibn Ḥurayth, at the head of his huge grass-roots constituency; and Eastern Ṭukhāristān, (Balkh-Ṭālaqān) was carried by Abū Dāwūd Khālid ibn Ibrāhīm and Ziyād ibn Ṣāliḥ at the head of the faceless local partisans. As sparsely populated are Harāt in the south, and, in the west, Nīshāpūr and Rayy, with 1 member, 2, and 1 in each respectively.

The concentration is in the middle. Ninety-seven members populate the two Marw columns in figure no.9, that is, 54.80% of all geographically located members, and 28.53% of the Chapter's strength. Impressive as it is, this qualitatively attested thick Revolutionary presence in Marw is far from underwriting a demographic preponderance of the district. It can hardly be used to deny the existence of effective field commands in other centers. Isolated Jurjān in the north west comes in as a distant second, but, in comparison to the thin spread in other centers, its 18 members (10.17% of the located and 5.29% of the total), underline its status as a sub-regional command, which had been conferred on it by Abū Salamah. Back to the central territory, Marw al-Rūdh comes in a close third, with 16 members (9.04%/4.71%), Abīward and Nasā score fourth and fifth, with 10 members (5.65%/2.94%) and 8 members (4.52%/2.35), in each respectively.

⁴⁶ See previous note.

⁴⁷ *Akhbār*, pp. 278, 289, 293.

⁴⁸ Dīnawarī spreads the Revolutionary activity thick (100,000 according to one account, or, according to another, a minimum of 200,000 respondents—pp. 360, 356) and wide all across the Iranian East: 'Marw, Bukhārā, Samarqand, Kishsh, Nasaf, Saghāniān, Khuttalān, Marw al-Rūdh, Ṭālaqān, Harāt, Pushanj, Sijistān,' '... Abīward, Ṭūs, Nīshāpūr, Sarakhs, Balkh, ..., Ṭukhāristān, ...' (Dīnawarī, pp. 338, 359-60). Despite the overall confused character of Dīnawarī's account, and his apparent deliberate attempt at establishing unsubstantiated full coverage of the Iranian map, his 'folksy' account can only be corroborated by Bal'amī and *Akhbār*. But, above all, it would be corroborated by any careful study of Ṭabarī's accounts of Abū Muslim's moves in Marw, which were made possible only through the fact that he controlled the action in the entire province.

Using geographic placement as a measure of Recognizability would only confirm the foregoing results of the application of the Criteria of Visibility and Recognition. One hundred and six members of the converts (68.39% of them, representing 31.18% of the Chapter's strength) are not placed. Of the tribally identified, both Arab and *mawālī* together, only 71 members (38.38% of Which, representing 20.88% of the Chapter's strength) are not placed. Distinguishing the Arabs from the *mawālī*, it will be found that only 23 Arabs were not placed (33.82% of them, representing 6.76% of the Chapter strength) compared to 48 *mawālī*, (41.03%/14.12%).

The tribal features of the Organization in the main centers are: very mixed in Marw; preponderantly Muḍarite in Marw al-Rūdh; and Yamanite in Jurjān, Abīward and Nasā. This is in keeping with the general picture of Arab deployment in the province.

In Marw, where all tribal groups were represented—in their blend of ethnic Arabs and their *mawālī*—28 members (28.87% of the district's profile) are converts, 34 (35.05%) are Yamanites, 31 (31.96%) Muḍarites, and only 4 members (4.12%) from Rabī'ah. Within the Yaman, the Khuzāite majority, 24 members (70.59%), is to be expected; and the Azdite near absence, only 2 members (5.88%), is only a confirmation of the pure tribal character of the Kirmānī rebellion. The noteworthy phenomena, though, are the concentration of all 9 members from Umru' al-Qays, and of 10 of the members from Qays (71.43% of the geographically located Qaysites, and 58.82% of all Qaysite participation) in Marw. The se two phenomena serve to highlight the estrangement between these noted Revolutionaries and their tribal bases. In the case of the Arabs amongst them, the estrangement was not only tribal, but also ethnic. If a progressively direct proportion were to be established between the high profile Revolutionaries and their tribes, the Revolutionary Qaysite concentration in Marw would be incommensurate with the federation's demographic concentration in Nishāpūr. The same applies to Umru' al-Qays, whose late arrival in the province must have precluded intensive settlement in the overcrowded and converted capital district. The anomaly which Umru' al-Qays represents in all respects is, once again, obvious.

In Jurjān—a recent conquest consolidated at the time by the Azdite Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab—the Yamanite character is predominant. Eleven members of the 18 Jurjānites (61.11%) are Yamites; the remaining 7 are converts. The 3 Azdites are *mawālī*; the 6 members from Musliyah (3 Arabs and 3 *mawālī*) testify to Bukayr's role and to the role of his adoptive tribe. Abīward is almost a monopoly, shared equally by the

Azdite band of the 4 sons of ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Zayd (nos. 102, 105, 361, 382), a fifth Azdite (no.400), and the ‘Akkite band of 4 *mawālī*: the 3 Nahīk brothers (nos. 212, 365, 370) and al-Haytham ibn Mu‘āwiyah (no.184) who, the Rāwandīyyah claimed, was the incarnation of Gabriel, while his compatriot, ‘Uthmān ibn Nahīk, was that of Adam.⁴⁹ Nasā is almost a Khuzā‘ite monopoly, with the notable presence of Muqātīl ibn Ḥakīm al-‘Akkī. The Tamīmīte strong hold of Marw al-Rūdh is dominated by 6 converts, (37.50%), and Khāzim’s estranged band of 7 Nahshalites (43.75), already discussed above.

III. Other Features

III.1 *The Ethno-Tribal Features of the Open Revolution: The Revolutionary Eruption, and the March West*⁵⁰

Notwithstanding the natural bias of historiographical attentiveness in favor of higher profile cases at the expense of the less known personages and the faceless masses, the score, from this historical point on, will be a constant reminder of the magnitude of the histrionic cataclysm which unfolded only through shattering the tribal Arab structure. Even if only slightly, and still far short of the reality, the ascendancy of the grass-roots will be quantitatively attested. Even this present relatively high-profile Statistical Base, which can hardly throw the dimmest light on the dark depths of the mass eruption, will show marked signs of the divorce between the Bukayrist historic structure of the Organization, as depicted in its historic demographic balance between the *mawālī* and the Arabs, on one hand, and the grass-roots Revolutionaries, on the other. Now the Organization and the Revolution are two entities—distinct, but historically intertwined. The following table shows the relative

⁴⁹ Ṭabarī, III: p. 129.

⁵⁰ These two stages unfolded completely in Khurāsān, even though the second reached Kūfah. The following analysis rests, therefore, on tables pertaining only to the Khurāsān Chapter: II.E.4-8, and II.E.9-12, in Agha, ‘Agents,’ pp. 738-47, and 748-55. 2. References to the first eruption are based on table E.4, *ibid.*, pp. 738-9; to special roles, on table E.5; *ibid.*, pp. 740-1; to the purge, on table E.6, *ibid.*, pp. 742-3; to consolidation, on table E.7, *ibid.*, pp. 744-5; and references to the composite profile of the entire eruption stage, which is considered formally complete by the commencement of Qaḥṭabah’s campaign, are based on table E.8, *ibid.*, pp. 746-7. References to Qaḥṭabah’s campaign, from Abīward to Kūfah, though he fell a few kilometers short of his goal, are based on table E.9, *ibid.*, pp. 748-9; to the events which unfolded in Kūfah after the advent of the *Khurāsānīyyah*, on table E.10, *ibid.*, pp. 750-1; to the post-Kūfah campaigns, through Zāb and up to Egypt and the eradication of the last Umayyad signs of life, on table E.11, *ibid.*, pp. 752-3. References to the composite profile of this stage rest on table E.12, *ibid.*, pp. 754-5. The following analysis concentrates on highlights. Further specific information is contained in the relevant tables.

contributions of each of the three Ethnic/Socio-religious groups to the Revolutionary effort, at each of the four distinguishable stages.

Historical Stage	Arab	<i>Mawālī</i>	Converts
Pre-General assembly	42.86%	52.38%	4.76%
Post-General assembly	20%	45.71%	34.29%
Open Revolution	23.71%	45.36%	30.93%
The March West	30.43%	29.57%	40%

The imaginary curve of each of the three groups explains the other two. But there are snags. The slight, but marked dive of the converts' curve, between the second extended stage and the third brief but intense stage, may be attributed to the intense historiographical interest in the Revolutionary moment. In such a situation, the focus would be sharp, but its span would be limited.

That is to say, the less prominent people, whose presence may be recorded in a notable moment, slip away from focus, whereas they are still as present as those who remain in focus. That is why, when the open Revolutionary stage is broken down into its four brief and successive or simultaneous steps, the converts' curve, within the stage, sharply declines, the *mawālī*'s curve behaves in its usual mediocre fashion, and the Arabs' curve climbs sharply. In the spectacle of Revolutionary eruption, in which 73 men feature, 19.18% are Arabs, 46.58% are *mawālī*, and 34.25% are converts. Of the 23 men who feature in special roles in the management of the movement immediately in the wake of the first eruption, 30.43% are Arabs, 39.13% *mawālī*, and 30.43% converts. In the purge of the province, 32 men appear: 31.25% Arabs, 40.63% *mawālī*, and 28.13% converts. The Arabs hit an improbable high of 54.17%, the converts a dismal low of 12.5%, and the *mawālī*'s a modest 33.33% of the 24 men who participated in the consolidation of the territorial gains within the province. This is a total of 152 roles depicted in all four steps of this stage; of these, 28.95% are performed by Arabs, 42.11% by *mawālī*, and 28.95% by converts. But because so many names appear in more than one of the four steps, the Arabs more so than the others (roughly twice per each Arab to 1.5 times per non-Arab); omitting the duplicate appearances would result in 97 names making the 152 appearances. The same observations apply to the

March West when broken down into its three phases.⁵¹ But the phenomenon of more converts making fewer appearances, and fewer Arabs and *mawālī* making more appearances, is more pronounced in the March.

This is why we cannot make a direct correlation between the Relative Representation of a group in a certain phase and its real Revolutionary size—especially in the case of the incognito converts. Take, for example, the not unique case of ‘Ubayd Allāh al-Kābulī (no.358). The fact that he only appeared at the battle of Zāb does not mean that he was not with the Khurāsāniyyah since they started their March from Abīward, or even before that in the Revolutionary ranks.

If this sounds like a double-standard, it is. But it is not mine; it is inbuilt in the nature of the medieval historiographical standards for what is noteworthy. Because of intense historiographical focus, when a number of the members of the Arab Revolutionary constituency do not appear at a certain juncture, the likelihood is that they were not there. And because of slight historiographical focus, when a number of the converts are not represented at a certain juncture, it does not necessarily mean that they were not actually there. This is the lot of the converts. They are invariably under-represented in every positive category, according to any of the criteria.⁵² The only exception is the lowest Rank in the formal structure, that of *du‘āt al-du‘āt*, as shall be seen.

Such is not the case with the almost total absence of the celebrated Ṭā‘id contingent from the scene of Revolutionary eruption, and the parallel absence of the equally celebrated Khuzā‘ah from the March West. What makes the phenomenon more striking is the preponderant presence of each of them on the scene from which the other is absent. This immediately following table shows how much of the Revolutionary effort each of the tribes shouldered, in the different phases of the two stages.

⁵¹ This breakdown can be monitored in the respective tables II.E.9-11, *ibid.*, pp. 748-55.

⁵² For ratios of under-Representation, see the last two columns, Representation Ratio, in all or any specifically required table, especially in Series II and III; i.e., those on the Khurāsān Chapter, and the Organization as a whole. In this respect, the Kūfan Chapter is a non-issue.

Revolutionary Stages and Phases	Khuzā'ah		Ṭayyi'	
	Relative Representation	Tribal Comparative Standing	Relative Representation	Tribal Comparative Standing
First Eruption	20.55%	1 st	2.74%	Last
Special Roles	30.43%	1 st	0%	-
The Purge	18.75%	2 nd	3.13%	Last
Consolidation	37.5%	1 st	0%	-
Total	20.62%	1 st	2.06%	Last
Qaḥṭabah's Campaign In Kūfah	2.63%	7 th	17.11%	1 st
Post-Kūfah Campaigns	0%	-	23.08%	1 st
Total	7.14%	5 th	14.29%	2 nd
Total	4.35%	6 th	12.17%	2 nd

By itself Qaḥṭabah's absence from all events preceding his March is as big a riddle as his mysterious death. The claim that the *Imām* Ibrāhīm directed Abū Muslim to stay in Khurāsān in order to proclaim the Revolution, and send Qaḥṭabah in his stead to meet Ibrāhīm in Makkah,⁵³ does not stand to reason. There was no shortage of *nuqabā'* and other Organization notables who allegedly knew the secret identity of the *Imām*, and who could spare the top military man of the Organization for the most crucial military moment in its history—that is, if the whole myth of the 'Abbāsīd connection is to be entertained at all. But even if Qaḥṭabah was absent for whatever reason, he represents only 4.76% of the known Ṭayyi' Revolutionary contingent; the remaining 20 Ṭā'ids included such prominent figures as would have definitely been reported if they were present. Where were the Ṭā'ids? Does Qaḥṭabah's absence from the pages of the informed *Akhbār*, with no word of his whereabouts between his last appearance prior to Abū Muslim's arrival in Khurāsān⁵⁴ and the commencement of the March,⁵⁵ mean anything: Had Qaḥṭabah had a disagreement with Abū Muslim over some ideological or political matters? Was he, like Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, initially resistant to Abū Muslim's take-over? Had Qaḥṭabah and Abū Muslim resolved any such differences, superficially, before Qaḥṭabah marched? Did this have anything to do with Qaḥṭabah's assassination? Does Abū al-Jahm's vague proximity to Qaḥṭabah, upon the strange discovery of his mysterious death, have any bearing on the

⁵³ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1951, 1963 – 4.

⁵⁴ *Akhbār*, p. 256.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

question.⁵⁶ And do the erratic behavior of Qaḥṭabah's rash son, Ḥumayd, and the discretely anti-Abū Muslim conduct of his serene brother, al-Ḥasan, indicate that they may have had some suspicions?⁵⁷

The above are clearly suggestive questions, no definite answers can be given, and, therefore, they will be left open. Without a conspiracy theory that would venture as interpretation of the apparently related events, the Ṭā'id absence from the first scenes of the Revolution, and Qaḥṭabah's death, remain equally mysterious.

Not so mysterious is the absence from the March of a proportionate participation by the mercantile contractors of the Revolution, the Khuzā'ah. The interests of the Khuzā'ite Arabs and their numerous *mawālī* were in the province; and Abū Muslim still had use for them there, before he would finally crack down on Sulaymān's Khuzā'ite wing, the true historic leadership of the tribe, and of the Khurāsān Chapter.

III.2 *Conflicting Loyalties*⁵⁸

This is an attempt at tracing and freezing the personal, political, ideological, factional, ethnic, nationalistic, or tribal loyalties, which marked the careers of many of the members of the Organization. It is a quest to elicit such loyalties—to personages, forces, and trends as may have taken deep or shallow roots in the hearts and minds of men. This is rough terrain. Often, such loyalties are, and were, elusive—difficult to capture; and changing—impossible to freeze. Loyalties are attested to different Hāshimite branches and offspring; to different tribal chieftains

⁵⁶ Both, Ṭabarī, III: p. 15, and Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 137, report: '[Qaḥṭabah] was found [slain] and Abū al-Jahm [Ibn 'Aṭīyah] buried him (*wujūda Qaḥṭabah fa-dafanahu Abū al-Jahm*).' Abū al-Jahm (no.85) is also reported by both (III: p.67; and pp. 156, 191) to have been Abū Muslim's spy; cf. Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 342.

⁵⁷ Ḥumayd had first joined 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Alī in his rebellion, then he rejoined the loyal ranks; thereafter, he behaved suspiciously in the war against the Zaydite 'Alī, Muḥammad al-Nafṣ al-Zakiyyah, and is even reported to have had paid allegiance to him. In contrast, al-Ḥasan was discretely targeted by the Abū Muslim loyalists Ghaylān ibn 'Abd Allāh and Mālik ibn al-Haytham, who apparently conspired to have him discharged from his command at Wāsiṭ; and, as discretely, he informed on Abū Muslim and Mālik. On Ḥumayd, see: Ṭabarī, III: pp. 93-5, 141, 233-4, 238-40, 244-8, 310, 313-5; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 106; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 365-6; Azdī, pp. 163-4; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 354; Isfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 368-70. On al-Ḥasan, see: Ṭabarī, III: pp. 62-4, 101; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 145.

⁵⁸ These loyalties were monitored according to an extended scale and are codified in field Kf.29 = Kn.35 in the Membership Tabulations, Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 509-19; the field is elucidated, *ibid.*, pp. 563-4. Being of dubious statistical validity, no elaborate Statistical Tables are computed for these loyalties. Any count referred to here below is taken directly from the said field. The only exceptions are the Abū Muslim loyalists, for whom Tables C.4 of all three series are computed; *ibid.*, pp. 625-6, 710-11, 810-11.

and groupings; to different economic, regional, ethnic and other demographic interests; to other earlier or contemporaneous political movements, such as the Murji'ah; to different religious denominations; to different personages and/or what they stood for, such as Khidāsh, Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, Qaḥṭabah, Khāzim, Abū Salamah, Abū Muslim, etc., and last, but not least, the 'Abbāsīd 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Alī. In a latter-day grand stand, 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Alī polarized the Arabist sentiment around his person. In a context of intrigue and swiftly and frequently changing loyalties, the possible combinations would appear to be too many to be either viable or of use in a statistical environment. To simplify the potential mess, this attempt is reduced to recording the more statistically relevant or historically indicative data. With this concession to simplicity, the exercise compromises its pure statistical significance.

The 'Abbāsīds, as a cause and as a dynasty, are not a factor in classifying members' loyalties. They are not considered here as an independent force around or against which members polarized. But even if this contentious issue is neutralized, considering them as such a factor would be redundant. For, when they did finally become such a force, they became the regime. Such pro-regime loyalties are already monitored;⁵⁹ whereas opposition to them automatically marked by marking the presence of the supporters of 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Alī or other rebels.

Before al-Manṣūr transformed the reigning dynasty into the ruling dynasty, the 'Abbāsīd cause was formally identified with Abū Muslim's, and actually subordinated to it. Actually, during Abū Muslim's rise and through his history, he took them, to the echelons of whatever degree of power he allowed them, on his coattail. The generals in Kūfah who installed al-Saffāh were Abū Muslim—not 'Abbāsīd—loyalists. The majority of those who appear to have toiled in the 'Abbāsīd cause, were either Abū Muslim loyalists, or were indifferently, passively or grudgingly led in the irresistible direction which Abū Muslim charted.

If, during the period of almost complete identification, tensions existed, the 'Abbāsīds dared not show it, nor did it reflect on the loyalties of members. Those who sided with al-Manṣūr during his only and last showdown with Abū Muslim did so after the fact, out of anti-Abū Muslim sentiment, or in natural obedience to the power in whose presence they happened to be.

⁵⁹ Codified in field Kf.28 = Kn.34 of the Membership Tabulations, *ibid.*, pp. 509-19, which is elucidated in pp. 562-3, and from which Tables C.3 of all three series are computed, *ibid.*, pp. 623-4, 708-9; 808-9.

Of course, by then, an independent ‘Abbāsīd sentiment must have started to crystallize. It was a synthesis of the natural tendency to blend into the ‘best of all possible worlds’ the personal loyalties the ‘Abbāsīds cultivated over the previous five years and the remnants of the Arabist sentiment. In the shifting sands of the demographically changing geopolitical balance of power and after its shattering defeats (under the strange mix of the successive banners of the pro-Umayyad *mubayyidah* of Abū al-Ward and of al-Sufyānī, and then the ‘Abbāsīd rebel ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī), the Arabist trend was left only with the banner hoisted by the ruling Arab sovereign to rally around.

This Arabist sentiment must have infiltrated the ranks of the veteran Bukayrist Organization, as it indeed did. But the Organization itself, as transformed by Abū Muslim, was on its way to be effectively dissolved, and soon to be superseded by the *Abnā’* establishment, where the first truly independent ‘Abbāsīd loyalty bloomed and flourished. For the period of effective Organization relevance, the ‘Abbāsīd factor, if such did exist, was subsumed in the Abū Muslim factor.

Thus, Abū Muslim is the first and major factor around whom loyalties may be systematically monitored; and there are other factors. Where loyalties overlapped or changed from one position to the other, the earlier, the more durable, the more sincere, or the more relevant, overrides. Each case is taken on its own merit.

The Abū Muslim loyalist members figure in prominent favorable and favored roles and positions: in the Marw coup against Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, amongst the first waves of respondents during first eruption, through deliberations and delegating to confidants, in the post-victory Kūfah coup against Abū Salamah, and in implementing Abū Muslim’s agenda at different junctures. This category also includes those members who rose in rebellion, associating their causes with avenging Abū Muslim’s murder.

Although rather odd, the singular case of Khidāsh is included in this category. Because a more suitable category cannot be envisaged, because the popular base is visibly common, and because it was Abū Muslim who brought the common cause to victory; the situation had to be reversed. Instead of classifying the neo-Khidāshist Abū Muslim as a Khidāshist, the dead Khidāsh had to be classified as a posthumous Abū Muslimist. Khidāsh’s followers who outlived him, and of whose identities we naturally know very little,⁶⁰ must have filed into the Abū Muslimist ranks.

⁶⁰ Incredibly, Sulaymān ibn Kathīr’s son, Muḥammad, and, more credibly, Mālik ibn al-Haytham, are reported to have been respectively: a Khidāshist and a Khurramī,

Of the 88 thus-determined Abū Muslim loyalists, 88.64% are non-Arabs (47.73% converts, 40.91% *mawālī*) and only 11.36% Arabs. Tribally, it is extremely instructive to note that those whose Revolutionary association placed them in a more detached position from their ethnic and/or tribal environments, i.e., the Muḍarites and the Rabaʿites, are more impressively Abū Muslimites than those whose Revolutionary association ought to have let them be in their element, i.e., the Yamanites. That is, the more out of their element (the outcasts?) the closer these tribally-identified Establishment inhabitants were to Abū Muslim's most elemental grass-roots cataclysm. To quantify the above, Muḍar alone provides 25% of Abū Muslim's loyalists, that is 30.56% of all Muḍarite Revolutionary participation; Rabīʿah provides 10.23%, a more impressive 39.13% of its total participation; the Yaman furnishes only 17.05%, a dismal 11.63% of its Revolutionary strength. Going down the genealogical structure, Musliyah (the adoptive tribe of Bukayr, Abū Salamah, and the majority of the Kūfan 'Founding Fathers') provides 0%; so does its sister tribe, Hamdān.

From a symbolically more relevant perspective, the above figures translate into the over-representation ratios of 1.78:1 and 1.39:1 for Rabīʿah and Muḍar respectively, out-doing even the converts, at 1.08; the great Revolutionary Yaman alliance scores an under-representation ratio of 0.53:1.

It may be assumed that a great number of the veteran members and historic leaders of the Organization, unofficially and non-committally harbored pro-ʿAlīd sentiments along with their official commitment to the doctrine of *al-riḍā*. However, this cannot be conjectured in a statistical milieu. Despite the combined Abū Muslim-ʿAbbāsīd reign of terror, and their suppression of information that might detract from their Revolutionary legitimacy, pro-ʿAlīd sentiment is still detectable in a few cases amongst Organization members. This category may overlap with or be subsumed in rebellious cases which expressed themselves in a variety of insurrections, during and in the post-Abū Muslim eras. The assertion of such sentiments draws largely on explicit statements, and, only in very few cases, on inference.

Then there are the survivalists. This is the category most prone to judgementalism. To it are relegated those members who were confronted with situations, where they had to take sides, but, inexplicably or unconvincingly, took the side which was, for obvious reasons pertaining to each case, incompatible with what would have been expected of them as hardened Revolutionaries and ideologues.

Some of them succumbed to pressure or knelt before power; others swam with the current. Here belong the spineless such as Khālid ibn ‘Uthmān, Abū Muslim’s friend and chief of his body guard; and the cowardly apostates such as Ziyād ibn Šālih’s generals who betrayed him; and the opportunist survivors such as Yaqtīn ibn Mūsā, Abū Salamah’s friend and associate; and the apparently conviction-starved, disciplined man of the team who follows his orders to the brink of death such as Mūsā ibn Ka’b.

The necessary precautions thus-exercised make the possible results, except in the case of the Abū Muslim loyalists, statistically insignificant and irrelevant. Nevertheless, a straightforward count within the Khurāsān Chapter would yield the following:

Anti-Abū Muslim sentiment	=	7 members	2.06%
Anti-Abū Muslim mutiny	=	2 members	0.59%
Abū Muslim loyalists	=	77 members	22.65%
Pro-‘Alīds	=	8 members	2.35%
Pro-‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī	=	4 members	1.18%
Post-Abū Muslim Rebellions not associated with his name	=	6 members	1.76%
Various loyalties	=	47 members	13.82%
Survivalists	=	5 members	1.47%
Undeterminable	=	171 members	50.29%
Undetermined	=	13 members	3.82%
Total	=	340 members	100%

The preponderance of the undeterminable is only befitting the generally obscure and feature-anemic collective profile of the Organization, which spearheaded one of the great revolutions in history, and which was commandeered into its goal by one of the most obscure personages in history.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

A COLLECTIVE PROFILE (IV): THE FORMAL LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES IN KHURĀSĀN

The choice of a leading body of seventy unnamed *du'āt* and twelve named *naqībs*, from their number, or in addition thereto, has indeed been attributed, in different traditions, to different agents at different dates.¹ But the most credible and complete is *Akhbār*'s unique account.²

I. *The 'General Assembly' of 120/738*

The chronology of the occurrence, which is dubbed in this book as the 'general assembly', has already been discussed, and the second quarter of 120/spring 738 has been established as the likeliest date.³

Akhbār's account is distinguished, not only for its uniqueness and completeness, but also for two important attributes. The first is its being utterly free of all 'Abbāsīd interpolations—a rare quality, especially in *Akhbār*. The second is that it takes on the form and texture of an official record of the proceedings of the meeting. But it is a composite record of two main parts:

(1) The 'official minutes' of the meeting, which also divide into two parts: (A) Bukayr's opening address, and the discussion which followed it,⁴ and (B) 'The decrees' promulgated, starting with the 'preamble'; then the decision to choose 12 *naqībs*; the list of their names; the decision to choose the balance of the 'Seventy'; and the list of their names. Here ends the 'official document'.⁵

¹ Ṭabarī attributes to Abū 'Ikrimah the choice, as early as 100/718-719, of 12 *naqībs* and 70 men (II: 1358); but, in the version of Abū al-Khaṭṭāb, the measure is attributed to the 'Abbāsīd Muḥammad ibn 'Alī himself, in 103 or 104/721-713 (Ibid., II: 1987-8). In this version, there was no choice of 70 men, but only of 12 *naqībs* from amongst the respondents, whose number had reached 70. The same is in Balādhurī, but attributed to Muḥammad ibn Khunays (*Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 115). Azdī attributes to Bukayr the choice of the 12 *naqībs*, but as early as 107/725-726 (Azdī, p. 26).

² *Akhbār*, pp. 213-23.

³ *Supra*, pp. 20-25. Sharon calls the document, which emerged from the meeting, 'the convention', and erroneously dates it to 126/743-744, *Black Banners*, pp. 189, 191 ff.; Lassner calls the meeting 'the conclave of 120 A.H.,' *Revolution*, p. 77.

⁴ *Akhbār*, Bukayr's address: p.213, line 16-p.215, line 1; Discussion, p.215, line 2-line 12.

⁵ *Akhbār*, p.215, line 14-p.219, line 4. There are four conspicuous cases of interference in the document, which will be discussed below. This is the part of the document which

(2) This part of the account has the appearance of an ‘addendum’ collected by the anonymous compiler of *Akhbār*, from *mashāyikh al-Shī‘ah* (the notable scholars of the *Shī‘ah*—read ‘Abbāsīd partisans) whom he met. This ‘addendum’ comprises four more lists of propagandists,⁶ which will be discussed below.

The first part of the ‘official minutes’, i.e., Bukayr’s address and the subsequent discussion, especially the interjection by al-‘Alā’ ibn Ḥurayth and Bukayr’s response, must set the tempo for any serious in-depth inquiry into Bukayr’s strategy and the far-reaching effects latent in his subtle concession to al-‘Alā’’s demand. Viewed in its historical context, the meeting unfolds as follows.

Speaking in grave circumstances, which came as a direct result of Khidāsh’s populism and premature indiscrete and indiscriminate expansionist tactics, Bukayr tried to drive home, to the partisans, the absolute necessity of absolute reserve and secrecy.⁷ Then, gently, he laid down the single item in his agenda for the meeting, his remedy for the quantitatively inflated, but organizationally scattered and penetrated situation. He deemed it appropriate to choose 12 *naqībs* from their number.⁸ Harping on the same theme, and driven by an uncompromising feel for the value of tight centralized control, he formulated a clear ‘job description’ for the *naqībs*. It was indeed tedious—to verify the sincerity of every single individual respondent.⁹ But politically, it was potential dynamite. True, it established a closed-but-connected secure system of a bunch of cells, but it also naturally implied the hierarchy inherent in a beehive. The great organizer he was, Bukayr bowed to the egotistical sensibilities of the members, even before they had the chance to express them; he announced that the *naqīb* position would betoken no social or political preference.¹⁰ Then, tentatively, and diplomatically,¹¹ Bukayr deferred to his audience: they had the option of carrying on with his proposal, or, if they did not like it, the entire assembly, including Bukayr himself, would discard it,¹² and, presumably, take matters from there.

Sharon calls ‘the convention’; he gives a full translation of the preamble, the names of the *nuqabā’*, and stops before the list of the balance of the Seventy starts, *Black Banners*, pp. 191-3. But he completely fails to discuss, or even acknowledge, the extremely informative highlights of Bukayr’s address and the discussion which followed.

⁶ *Akhbār*, pp. 219-23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 214, lines 2-5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 214, line 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 214, lines 6-7.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 214, line 10.

¹¹ Certainly not as a threat eningly, as Lassner construes it, *Revolution*, p. 79. And certainly not as a democratic gesture.

¹² *Akhbār*, p.214, line 19-p.215, line 1.

It must be unequivocally clear that Bukayr did have an absolutely clear agenda for absolute centralism. But, if he was tentative about his agenda, it was only because he knew he was not in a position to enforce it unless the partisans accepted it. He was diplomatic because he was a natural diplomat, and because he had better be. He did address the sensibilities which an accomplished organizer should address; but, there was also a factor bequeathed to him by the conscious or the inadvertent marriage between Khidāsh's populism and certain local Iranian interests capable of expressing themselves loudly. About this factor, there was nothing much that Bukayr could do.

The heir to the legacy of the house of Quṭbah, al-‘Alā’ ibn Ḥurayth ibn Quṭbah (‘al-Khuzā’ī through clientage, the ethnic Iranian from Sughdiana) provided the loud voice. Although al-‘Alā’, like his father and uncle before him, was a resident of Marw,¹³ like them also, he represented in the capital the interests of his Transoxanian constituency. The Sughdians have had a long awaited ‘blind date’ with a revolution—any revolution; and Bukayr’s centralism didn’t fit in with al-‘Alā’'s ambitions for his people.¹⁴ He interjected: “Oh Abū Hāshim! If you suspend those in the [other] districts, and refrain from admitting them, until those whom you install today as *nuqabā’* get to know them, your following will be few (*yā Abū Hāshim! idhā waqafta amra man fī al-kuwar walam taqbalhum ḥattā ya’rifahum man tunaqqib al-yawma qalla tabā’uka*).” Mūsā ibn Ka’b seconded him.¹⁵

Despite Bukayr’s obsession with secrecy as an overriding consideration over quantity, he had little choice but to compromise. He diluted the primacy of the *naqīb* Rank per se by spreading it over the expanse of all districts where propagandists operate, and he limited the jurisdiction of the board of 12 *naqībs* by restricting it to Marw. In effect, he offered a new definition and a wider perspective; he responded to al-‘Alā’:

You are right. But the *nuqabā’* are [empowered] only over those who are in Marw and those who come to it in response to your propagandists who are in it. As for all other districts, every propagandist in them is a *naqīb*, he chooses for himself, from its inhabitants, trustworthy people who would verify for him the [truth of the] matter [about] those who respond [favorably] to him (*al-qaww ‘alā mā qultumā, wa-lākinna al-nuqabā’ innamā hum ‘alā man bi-Marw wa man atāhā muḥīban li-man fī-hā min du’ātikum wa ammā sā’ir*

¹³ He was a resident of of the Marw village, Mākhuwān, where Abū Muslim would later establish his trench after leaving Sulaymān ibn Kathīr’s village, Ṭabarī, II: pp.1967-8.

¹⁴ On al-‘Alā’, his house, and the Sughdian connection, see supra, pp.149-53.

¹⁵ *Akhbār*, p. 215, lines 5-7.

al-kuwar fa-kull dā'iyah bi-hā naqīb yakhtār li-nafsihi umanā' min ahlihā yuṣahhīhūn la-hu amra man yujībuh).

To this satisfactory compromise, the partisans unanimously consented.¹⁶ This explains Bal'amī's assertion that the "partisans collected revenue from forty different towns, each of which had its own *naqīb*."¹⁷ And it may partially explain the slight differences in the lists which some of the other sources give of the 12 *naqībs*.

This is not to say that the *nuqabā'* of Marw lost their distinction. They probably were a little more than firsts among a larger pool of equals during the clandestine stage. A great measure of their prominence is certainly owed to the political centrality of Marw and to historiographical attention. But Bukayr's concession to al-'Alā's demand certainly reduces, or even annuls the significance of the absence from the list of certain names, such as al-'Alā's own; or that of Abū 'Awn 'Abd al-Malik ibn Yazīd, who carried Jurjān for the Organization and the Revolution; or that of Ziyād ibn Šālīḥ of Balkh, or Khāzīm ibn Khuzaymah of Marw al-Rūdh, etc. These and their likes were much more consequential than a good many of the twelve Marwites *naqībs*. By the same token, the multitudes which comprised their constituencies were much more consequential than the entire population of Marw, which took months to raise the token army with which Abū Muslim maintained his symbolic presence in Marw, before these men and their masses turned it into the only real presence across the province. In short, what is true of Marw is true of its twelve *naqībs*.

The compromise was thus the seed from which Bukayr's later organizations grew, i.e., the creation of the two additional regional field commands: in Transoxania (under al-'Alā?), and in Jurjān (under Abū 'Awn?). These organizations were also the necessary prelude to the Revolution, and, ironically, to the eradication of Bukayrism.

In the preamble to the second part of the official minutes, the adherence to the *sunnah* of Moses and the Prophet (choosing 70 men and 12 *naqībs* from their number) is made official.¹⁸ The important components of this part, however, are the two lists: that of the 12, and that of the balance of the 70. In the first list, there are four signs of later interference. Two of the four signs are of no vital consequence.¹⁹ The

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 215, lines 7-10.

¹⁷ As cited by Daniel, *Khurasan*, p. 51, from a manuscript of Bal'amī's *Tārīkh*, in London: British Library, Add. 23497, f. 235b., not available to us. See Daniel, note 135 p. 69, and his Bibliography list, p. 202.

¹⁸ Cf. Sharon, *Black Banners*, pp. 191, 192, n.; Lassner, *Revolution*, p. 63.

¹⁹ Two comments (apparently by the compiler, the transmitter, or a scribe) on the true *walā'* connections of the two *naqīb*'s, Ṭalḥah ibn Zurayq and Shibl ibn Ṭahmān, i.e.,

third does not seem to carry a political significance.²⁰ It is the fourth interference that concerns us. Naming the *nuqabā'*, it says: "... 'Amr ibn A'yan, he was installed in place of al-'Alā' ibn Ḥurayth ... (... *ju'ila makān al-'Alā'* ...)." ²¹ The first question that must be asked is: Is this actually an interference in the text of the document, reflecting a later development; or is it an authentic entry, recording that al-'Alā' was actually considered but dropped? Or is it simply a reflection of later disagreement among reporters on the correct list? This latter possibility is supported by Balādhurī's conclusion of his list, he says: "... and some of the [authorities] list al-'Alā' ibn Ḥurayth in place of 'Īsā ibn A'yan."²² The formal aspect of the question may be irresolvable. But the crux of the matter is that al-'Alā' was undoubtedly eligible. He appears on the list of the *du'āt* as the only *dārī* in Khwarizm; and he appears as a *naẓīr naqīb* on the list of the twenty-one *nuzarā'*.²³

Whether considered and dropped, appointed then discharged, or deemed eligible only in the public perception, al-'Alā' forces an issue. Strong indications exist that a battle over his appointment may have been fought. The following remarks may throw some light on an early division in the ranks of the Revolutionary leadership of Khuzā'ah — a division which persisted, and which was later manipulated by Abū Muslim:

- (1) When Bukayr was recruiting in Marw, ca. 103/721-722, Khuzā'ite partisans came to him in two separate blocks, one was led by Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, the other by al-'Alā'. The distinction in *Akhhbār* is pointed.²⁴
- (2) Whether the alternative to al-'Alā' was 'Īsā or 'Amr, the two brother *naqībs*, were of the Khuzā'ite *mawālī* close to Sulaymān.
- (3) Around the period, Sulaymān was the most influential Organization member in Khurāsān, and he did use his influence to cast aside Khālid ibn Kathīr ibn Abī al-'Awrā' al-Tamīmī in favor of his son-in-law, Lāhiz ibn Qurayz, also of the Tamīm.²⁵ Did Sulaymān lobby for Ibn A'yan to be a second *naqīb* from the same house at the expense of al-'Alā'?
- (4) Whether for real strategic reasons, or to consolidate his authority away from the shadow of Sulaymān, or both, when Abū Muslim

to which tribes they were attached, *Akhhbār*, p. 216, lines 5, 8.

²⁰ It is a comment that the *naqīb* al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshī' replaced Bukayr ibn al-'Abbās, when the latter became blind. The replacement apparently carries no political connotations, since Ibn al-'Abbās was al-Qāsim's uncle (*Akhhbār*, p.217, lines 1-2, ed.n. 3).

²¹ *Akhhbār*, p. 216, line 7.

²² Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 116. Note that Balādhurī mentions 'Īsā ibn A'yan, not his brother 'Amr, as the 'contestant'.

²³ *Akhhbār*, pp. 219, 220.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 201-2.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

abandoned Saqīdunj, the village of his nemesis, he moved to al-‘Alā’'s village, Mākhuwān.²⁶

(5) After accomplishing his mission by sweeping Transoxania in the early stages of the Revolution, al-‘Alā’ appeared close to Abū Muslim, in charge of the vanguard of his army advancing to Nīshāpūr, and was subsequently appointed subgovernor of Sarakhs. That was shortly before Ṣafar, 131/October, 748.²⁷

This last mission is the last we hear of al-‘Alā’. Did he fall out with Abū Muslim? And if so, was it among the causes or the effects of the unrest in Transoxania?²⁸ The house of Quṭbah had earlier been allied to a rebel (Mūsā ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Khāzim) and they had contributed much to the extent of power he attained. When they turned against him, or he against them, they caused him much trouble, but they paid with their lives. But of Ḥurayth and Thābit, we at least know the end. Did al-‘Alā’ and his constituency repeat the history of their fathers, in an era much of the history of which is submerged in misrepresentation, under-reporting, over-reporting, and obliteration? Did Abū Muslim despatch al-‘Alā’ to Khwārizm (i.e., to his death)?

II. *The Leadership Structures as Embodied in the Lists*

II.1 *The Board of Nuqabā’*

Akhhbār provides only one list of the *nuqabā’*,²⁹ and it contends that it is the standard uncontested list.³⁰ Some of the other sources provide slightly or substantially different lists.³¹ *Akhhbār*'s list is predominantly repeated in some sources without alteration. This study adopts *Akhhbār*'s list as standard.³²

It appears that, during the clandestine stage, in addition to their recruitment activities, the *Nuqabā’* operated as a collective ‘board’ in charge of collecting contributions from the partisans, dispensing it to the

²⁶ Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1967-8.

²⁷ *Akhhbār*, p. 337.

²⁸ For a brief review of the Transoxanian unrest, cf. Daniel, *Khurasan*, pp. 87-90, 111-2.

²⁹ *Akhhbār*, p. 216.

³⁰ *Akhhbār*, p. 220.

³¹ For example, Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1997-8; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 115-6; Ibn Hazm, *Jamharah*, passim; Azdī, p. 26; Jāhīz, *Manāqib*, pp. 22, 24; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465. See the discussion of these lists and how they bear on the determination of the ethnic identities of the *nuqabā’*, supra, pp. 226-9; the lists are depicted in figure no.11, p. 309 ff.

³² This is reflected in field 19 of the Khurāsān Membership Tabulations, Agha, ‘Agents,’ pp. 511-9, expounded, pp. 558-9.

No.	<i>Abhān</i> 's Standard List, (pp. 216-7)	Tabarī		Balādhurī, <i>Abasīb al-Asbāf</i> III, (pp. 115-6)	Azdī, (p.26)	Jāhiz, <i>Manāqib</i> , (pp. 22, 24)	Ibn Habbīb, (p. 465)	Ibn Hazm, <i>Jam barak</i> (passim)
		First List, (III; p. 593)	Second List, (IV; p. 191)					
1	Abū 'Abd al-Hamīd Qahtabah ibn Shabbīb al-Ḥāṭī, of Banū Nabhān	Qahtabah ibn Shabbīb al-Ḥāṭī	From Tayyī' Qahtabah ... (Ziyād), ... Ibn Shabbīb ...	Qahtabah ibn Shabbīb al-Ḥāṭī, (Ziyād), Abū 'Abd al-Hamīd	Qahtabah ibn Shabbīb al-Ḥāṭī	authentic Arabs ... Abū 'Abd al-Hamīd Qahtabah ibn Shabbīb al-Ḥāṭī	Qahtabah ibn Shabbīb ... of Banū ... Nabhān of Tayyī'	
2	Abū al-Najm 'Imrān ibn Ismā'īl, of Al Abī Maṭī	'Imrān ibn Ismā'īl Abū al-Najm, a <i>mawālā</i> of Al Abī Maṭī		'Imrān ibn Ismā'īl, <i>mawālā</i> Abū Maṭī, Abū al-Najm	'Imrān ibn Ismā'īl Najm al-Qurashī <i>mawālā</i> Al Abī Maṭī	Abū al-Najm 'Imrān ibn Ismā'īl <i>mawālā</i> Al Abī Maṭī	'Imrān ibn Ismā'īl Abū al-Najm, <i>mawālā</i> Al Abī Maṭī	
3	Abū Muḥammad Sulaymān ibn Kathīr al-Khuzā'i, then of Aslam	Sulaymān ibn Kathīr al-Khuzā'i	from Khuzā'ah Sulaymān ibn Kathīr	Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, Abū 'Alī <i>mawālā</i> Khuzā'ah (or of their own pedigree, ibn ...)	Sulaymān ibn Kathīr al-Khuzā'i	authentic Arabs ... Abū Muḥammad Sulaymān ibn Kathīr al-Khuzā'i	Sulaymān ibn Kathīr ibn ... of Banū ... of Alšā of Khuzā'ah	
4	Abū Naṣr Mālik ibn al-Haytham al-Khuzā'i, then of Ka'b	Mālik ibn al-Haytham al-Khuzā'i	from Khuzā'ah ... and Mālik ibn al-Haytham	Mālik ibn al-Haytham, Abū Naṣr	Mālik ibn al-Haytham al-Khuzā'i	authentic Arabs ... Abū Naṣr Mālik ibn al-Haytham al-Khuzā'i	Mālik ibn al-Haytham ibn ... of Banū ... Salīl of Khuzā'ah	
5	Abū Mansūr Talḥah ibn Zurayq, <i>mawālā</i> Talḥat al-Talḥāt or another	Talḥah ibn Zurayq al-Khuzā'i	From Khuzā'ah ... and Talḥah ibn Zurayq	Talḥah ibn Zurayq Abū Mansūr	Talḥah ibn Zurayq Abū Mansūr	Abū Mansūr <i>mawālā</i> Khuzā'ah	Talḥah ibn Zurayq <i>mawālā</i> Khuzā'ah	
6	Abū al-Hakam 'Isā ibn A'yan <i>mawālā</i> Buraydah ibn Ḥuṣayb al-Aslamī	'Isā ibn A'yan <i>mawālā</i> Khuzā'ah		'Isā ibn A'yan Abū al-Hakam	'Isā ibn A'yan al-Khuzā'i	Abū al-Hakam 'Isā ibn A'yan <i>mawālā</i> Khuzā'ah	'Isā ibn A'yan al-Khuzā'i, Abū al-Hakam	

Figure No. 11
Comparative Lists of *Muqabāt*

No.	Alkhabār's Standard List, (pp. 216-7)	Ṭabarī		Balādhurī, <i>Abṣāb al-Ashraf</i> III, (pp. 115-6)	Azdī, (p.26)	Jāhiz, <i>Manāqib</i> , (pp. 22, 24)	Ibn Ḥabīb, (p. 465)	Ibn Ḥazm, <i>Jamharah</i> , (passim)
		First List, (III: p. 593)	Second List, (IV: p. 191)					
7	Abū Ḥamzah 'Amr ibn Ayan, replaced al-'Alī' ibn Hurayth	'Amr ibn Ayan Abū Ḥamzah, a <i>maṣūlā</i> of Khuḏā'ah	from Khuḏā'ah ...and 'Amr ibn Ayan	'Amr ibn Ayan al- Khuḏā'ī, Abū Ḥamzah,			'Amr ibn Ayan al- Khuḏā'ī, Abū Ḥamzah,	
8	Abū Dāwūd Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm al- Raba'ī, then of Dhuhl	Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm Abū Dāwūd of Banū 'Amr ibn Shaybān ibn Dhuhl	from Bakr ... Abū Dāwūd Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm, of Banū 'Amr ibn Shaybān	Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm, Abū Dāwūd	Abū Dāwūd Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm al- Dhuhlī	authentic Arabs... Abū Dāwūd Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm al- Dhuhlī	Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm, Abū Dāwūd al- Dhuhlī	Abū Dāwūd Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm ibn... of Banū 'Amr ibn Shaybān ibn Dhuhl
9	Abū 'Alī Shiblī ibn Ṭahmān <i>maṣūlā</i> of Asad, or Azd	Shiblī ibn Ṭahmān Abū 'Alī al- Harawī, a <i>maṣūlā</i> of Banū Ḥanfiyah	from Bakr ... and Abū 'Alī al-Harawī or; alternatively Shiblī ibn Ṭahmān	Shiblī ibn Ṭahmān al- Raba'ī, Abū Ismā'īl	Shiblī Abū 'Alī al-Shaybānī		Shiblī ibn Ṭahmān al- Raba'ī, of Shaybān	
10	Abū 'Uyaynah Mūsā ibn Ka'b al- Tamīmī, of Banū Umru' al-Qays ...	Mūsā ibn Ka'b al- Tamīmī	from Tamīm Mūsā ibn Ka'b Abū 'Uyaynah, of Banū Umru' al-Qays	Mūsā ibn Ka'b al- Tamīmī, Abū 'Uyaynah	Mūsā ibn Ka'b al- Tamīmī	authentic Arabs ... Abū 'Uyaynah Mūsā ibn Ka'b al- Marrānī	Mūsā ibn Ka'b al- Tamīmī, Abū 'Uyaynah	Mūsā ibn Ka'b ibn ... of Banū Umru' al-Qays
11	Abū Ja'far Lāhiz ibn Qurayz al- Tamīmī, of Banū Umru' al-Qays	Lāhiz ibn Qurayz al- Tamīmī	from Tamīm ... and Lāhiz ibn Qurayz al- Tamīmī, of Banū Umru' al-Qays	Lāhiz ibn Qurayz, Abū al-Naḍr	Lāhiz ibn Qurayz al- Tamīmī	authentic Arabs ... Abū 'Amr Lāhiz ibn Qurayz al- Marrāṭ	Lāhiz ibn Qurayz al- Tamīmī	Lāhiz ibn Qurayz ibn ... of Banū Umru' al-Qays
12	Abū Saḥl ibn Mujāshī' of Banū Umru' al-Qays	al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshī' al- Tamīmī	from Tamīm ... and al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshī' of Banū Umru' al-Qays	al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshī' al- Tamīmī, Abū Ḥamīd	al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshī' al- Tamīmī	authentic Arabs ... Abū Saḥl al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshī' al- Muzani	al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshī' al- Tamīmī	Al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshī' ibn ... of Banū Umru' al-Qays

Figure No. 11 (Continued)
Comparative Lists of *Niqabā'*

No.	Al- <i>Kh̄bār</i> 's Standard List, (pp. 216-7)	Tabarī		Balādhurī, <i>Ab̄s ab̄ al-As̄hraf III</i> , (pp. 115-6)	Azdī, (p. 26)	Jāhiz, <i>Man āqib</i> , (pp. 22, 24)	Ibn Ḥabīb, (p. 465)	Ibn Hazm, <i>Jamharah</i> , (passim)
		First List, (III: 593)	Second List, (IV: 191)					
	Al-'Alā' ibn Hurayth, replaced by 'Amr ibn A'yan			or, alternatively: al-'Alā' ibn Hurayth in place of 'Isā ibn A'yan				
	Bukayr ibn al-'Abbās replaced by al-Qāsīm ibn Mujāshī'							
	Khālīd ibn Kathīr replaced by Lahiz ibn Qurayz							
			From Khuzā'ah ... and Ziyād ibn Šālīh	Or alternatively: Ziyād ibn Šālīh in place of 'Imrān ibn Ismā'īl				
			from Tamīm ... and Aslam ibn Sallām Abū Sallām					
							Al-'Aghlab ibn Sālim	

Figure No. 11 (Continued)
Comparative Lists of *Nuqabā'*

West, and maintaining their ties to the Kūfan leadership and the congregation of Banū Hāshim in Makkah and Madīnah. From the little we know, the main activity of a contingent of them (visiting Kūfah and performing the pilgrimage), keeps recurring as a repetitive pattern, performed mainly by Sulaymān, Qaḥṭabah, Mālik, and Lāhiz.³³

The all-pervasive ‘Abbāsīd *riwāyah* has it that the pilgrimage season was an opportunity for these *nuqabā’* to meet the ‘Abbāsīd *Imām*, finance him, and receive his instructions, without arousing suspicion. That the season did provide cover for the *nuqabā’* is not contended; the subject of the visit is. The Hāshimites too had their own board of contenders, as is clear from the Abwā’ meeting.³⁴ The ‘Abbāsīds were members of the board, but as has already been advanced, and as is readily clear from the proceedings of the Abwā’ meeting, they were not the prominent members. The *nuqabā’*, who were party to the charter of *al-riḍā min Āl Muḥammad*, used the season to meet with the board from amongst whose members *al-riḍā* was presumably to be chosen.

The board of *nuqabā’* was headed by Sulaymān ibn Kathīr, as all the sources state. Its secretary was, apparently, Ṭalḥah ibn Zurayq.³⁵ We may assume that Qaḥṭabah was in charge of the military affairs. Beyond that, nothing much could be discerned about their collective activity can be elicited. Individually, of course, they must have been engaged in recruiting partisans, and in the performance of their main duty as defined by Bukayr, i.e., confirming or rejecting the results of the recruiting efforts of their assistant *du‘āl*, but in Marw alone.

The ethnic composition of this important but limited leading body should no longer be an issue after the discovery of *Akhhbār*.³⁶ It has become clear, albeit also strangely unbalanced. However, with *Akhhbār’s* provision of a total of 148 names manning this and other Ranks in the lower structures of leadership, it would be futile to start commenting on the possible criteria of selection, and their significance, before the composition of the overall structure is reviewed.

³³ Cf. *Akhhbār*, pp. 167, 240, 255-6; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1639-40, 1726-7, 1769, 1916, 1937, 1951, 1962-4, 2000; Balādhurī *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*: pp. 116, 118-20; Dīnawarī, pp. 339, 343; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 327, 332, 343; Azdī, pp. 50, 53; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, IV: p. 52.

³⁴ Cf. Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 206-8.

³⁵ *Akhhbār*, pp. 270-1; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1989.

³⁶ Shaban is right in pointing out that F. Omar, who had seen and appreciated *Akhhbār* before its publication, did not rely on its list of the *nuqabā’*. It is strange that he did not. But Shaban is wrong to dismiss *Akhhbār*. The result was that they both came to the same wrong conclusions about the ethnic composition of the board (‘Abbāsīd Revolution, pp. xxi-xxii, 151; Omar, *‘Abbāsīd Caliphate*, p. 72).

Ethnically, the 12 are divided into: 7 (58.33%) Arabs, and 5 (41.67%) non-Arabs.³⁷ The non-Arabs are all *mawālī*. The converts should not be expected to partake in the high echelons. Thus, we have a 100% tribal profile, inequitably shared by the three great tribal alliances. The Yaman have 50%, Muḍar 33.33%, and Rabīʿah 16.67%. Of course, since the huge sector of the converts is completely unrepresented, all three alliances stand to be, and actually are, over-represented. But if the Yaman have the lion's share in simple numerical count, this share of theirs, compared to their overall Relative Revolutionary Size, translates into the lowest over-representation. The highest goes to Rabīʿah, at a Representation Ratio of 3.14:1, then Muḍar, at 1.74, and Yaman at 1.66.

The imbalance grows only more odd at a lower level of the genealogical scale. Khuzāʿah alone gets 5 *naqībs*, 41.67% of all *naqībs*, 83.33% of all Yamanite *naqībs*, attaining an over-representation of 4.29:1, to Ṭayyī's 1, 8.33%, 16.67%, and 1.34:1, respectively. The rest of the Yaman get nothing. Tamīm gets 3 *naqībs*, 25% of all, 75% of Muḍarite *naqībs*, and an over-representation of 2.74:1. The remaining Muḍarite *naqīb* is from Mudrikah, whose Revolutionaries are 100% *mawālī* of Quraysh and its cousins; and the *naqīb* himself, ʿImrān ibn Ismāʿīl, is the *mawālā* of none other than the Banū Umayyah themselves. He later became Abū Muslim's father-in-law.

Further down the genealogical scale, the inequitability becomes an irresolvable riddle. The tiny and insignificant Umru' al-Qays monopolizes 100% of Tamīm's share, 75% of all of Muḍar's share, and 42.86% of the Arabs' share, compared to Khuzāʿah's 28.5%, Ṭayyī's 14.29%, and Rabīʿah's similar share. At 25% of all *naqībs*, compared to its trivial 2.65% Relative Revolutionary Size, Umru' al-Qays attains a staggering over-representation ratio of 9.43:1. The next highest is Khuzāʿah's 4.29, then Mudrikah's 3.54, Rabīʿah's 3.14, and Ṭayyī's 1.34. Qays, the Azd, the rest of Yaman; the rest of Tamīm; and the multitudes of the native Iranians; get nothing. The mighty score poorly.

II.2 *Nuzarā' al-nuqabā'*³⁸

From this point on, *Akhbār* holds a monopoly on the provision of formal lists.

³⁷ For this and the following analysis of this list, see Table II.D.1, in Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 718-9.

³⁸ The following analysis of the two lists depicting this structure is based on the computations in Tables II.D.2-3, *ibid.*, pp. 720-3.

The rank theoretically second in importance to a *naqīb* is that of a *naẓīr naqīb*, plural *nuzarāʾ al-nuqabāʾ*, which literally means counterpart to a *naqīb*. In the light of the function which this rank carried (the substitution for a deceased *naqīb*), it may be better rendered as vice-*naqīb* or alternate head-man. There is no agreement on their number: It is said to have been twelve, twenty, or twenty-one. *Akhhār* provides two lists. One list contains twelve names, the second twenty-one. Both lists fall outside the ‘official minutes’, in the addendum.³⁹

Only one of the two lists must be the correct one, but it may not be possible to determine which. Both betray signs of a remedial or compensatory measure to redress some of the geographical and tribal imbalances in the *nuqabāʾ* structure, but the Ethnic/socio-religious imbalance remains enshrined. In both lists, the converts have no share. The Arab-*mawālī* balance in the first list is a replica of the one in the *nuqabāʾ* list, but is sharply reversed in the second to a 28.57%-71.43% in favor of the *mawālī*. The tribal balance, in both lists, improves in favor of the Yaman, at the expense of Rabīʿah, while Muḍar remains stable.

II.3 *The Duʿāt*⁴⁰

The sacred figure 70 can be confusing. There are two sets of 70 in *Akhhār*, the first comprises the 12 *naqībs* and the balance. This list is a part of the official minutes. Then, in the addendum, there is another list, incongruent but which partially overlaps with the first. These are “the seventy who are the *duʿāt*.”⁴¹ The first list furnishes 59 names, one more than the balance promises, and it distributes them inequitably over 7 centers, with a high concentration of 40 in Marw—no doubt, to counter the hostile environment—going down to only one in Khwārizm and the whole of Transoxania. Notably, this singular *dāʿī* is al-ʿAlāʾ—no doubt, capitalizing on the virtually open field he enjoyed there. The second list delivers only 65 names, 5 short of the promised 70; and it offers no geographical placements.

If these two lists represent the same Rank, with the same functions; then we face the same situation as with the two lists of the *nuzarāʾ*; i.e., it may not be possible to determine which is the correct list. There are no signs of distinct functions; therefore, one of the two may be considered remedial, but they may be addressed together. Collectively, these are the *duʿāt*, the propagandists, and they represent the middle level of

³⁹ *Akhhār*, pp. 219-20.

⁴⁰ The following analysis of the two lists depicting this structure is based on Tables II.D.4-5, Agha, ‘Agents,’ pp. 724-7.

⁴¹ *Akhhār*, pp. 221-2.

leadership. Each of them may be viewed as a quasi-*naqīb* amongst his constituency. It is here where the converts make a first appearance, registering a 27.12% presence in the first list, and 30.77% in the second—a noteworthy score coming from zero in the two higher ranks. The Arabs' share drops to 20.34% in the first, and to 29.23% in the second, comparable to their lower representation in the second list of the *nuzarā'*. The *mawālī* still hold the high ground at 52.54% in the first list, and 40% in the second.

Tribally, the Yaman representation drops sharply to a little more than half its shares in the *nuzarā'* lists. The difference goes to the converts; most of the trivial loss to Muḍar is collected by Rabī'ah's insignificant gain. But Rabī'ah still hovers around a mild under-representation ratio. Inter-tribal-alliance balances, although still vastly unbalanced, show a more equitable spread.

II.4 *Du'āt al-du'āt*⁴²

The designation of *du'āt al-du'āt*, the lowest rank in the leadership apparatus, is given to 37 members whose names make up this last list. No hint is given as to what their function was. In the Ismā'īlī apparatus of later times, the title *Dā'ī al-du'āt* was given to the chief *Dā'ī*, or the head ideologue; and it makes perfect linguistic sense. But the same term, especially in the plural form, lends itself to an opposite connotation—those *du'āt* who work for the *Du'āt*. Junior propagandists may be an adequate English rendering of the term as used within the context of the Organization's apparatus. Their almost total obscurity confirms this inference.

Their obscurity may have meant insignificance in the Establishment domain, but not necessarily so in the Revolutionary context. These were the officials of the Organization closest to the grass-roots. They must have been at liberty to traverse the province under cover of their nativity, and, more importantly, their anonymity—as Abū Muslim himself had been when he was merely whoever he was!

It is in this list where the converts make their first substantial positive showing (62.16% of the list) and the Arabs their poorest (2.7%). The *mawālī* maintain a mediocre profile of 35.14%. The resulting 1.36:1 over-representation ratio is the only positive over-representation the converts enjoy within this statistical base. Under this criterion, the whole tribal structures start to approach irrelevance. The following composite tables visually capture the preceding comparisons.

⁴² The following analysis is based on Table II.D.6, Agha, 'Agents,' pp. 728-9.

A. Ethnic/socio-religious balances

	Arabs	Mawālī	Converts
<i>Nuqabā'</i>	58.33%	41.67%	0%
<i>Nuzarā'</i> (list of 12)	58.33%	41.67%	0%
<i>Nuzarā'</i> (list of 21)	28.57%	71.43%	0%
<i>Du'āt</i> (Balance of 1 st Seventy)	20.34%	52.54%	27.12%
<i>Du'āt</i> (2 nd Seventy)	29.23%	40%	30.77%
<i>Du'āt al-Du'āt</i>	2.7%	35.14%	62.16%
Grand Total of Men	23.65%	41.89%	34.46%

B. Tribal balances ethnic Arabs and mawālī combined)

	Yaman	Muḍar	Rabī'ah
<i>Nuqabā'</i>	50%	33.33%	16.67%
<i>Nuzarā'</i> (list of 12)	66.67%	33.33%	0%
<i>Nuzarā'</i> (list of 21)	61.90%	33.33%	4.76%
<i>Du'āt</i> (Balance of 1 st Seventy)	37.29%	30.51%	5.08%
<i>Du'āt</i> (2 nd Seventy)	38.46%	27.69%	3.08%
<i>Du'āt al-Du'āt</i>	18.92%	16.22%	2.7%
Grand Total of Men	36.49%	25%	4.05%

This closes the depiction of the crucial organizational measures taken by Bukayr in 120/738. Internally, these measures were a turning point for the Organization; but, as far as the rest of the world was concerned it still operated undercover for nine more years; and, for a little longer, under a semblance of hierarchy.

III. Leadership-Base Quantitative Correlation

On this count the revisionists made two mistakes. The first is that they failed to distinguish between the tribal and the ethnic. Thus they postulated an Arab majority in the ranks of the leadership of the Organization. The second mistake is that they postulated a progressive correlation between an assumed majority at the top and the unknown quanta of the popular bases of the Revolution; as if equitability of representation is an established fact. As has already been shown, the Arab majority is a myth. Equitability of representation is no less mythical. Otherwise, judging by their shares in the board of *nuqabā'* Muḍar ought to have constituted one third of the Revolution, and of the Organization. Khuza'ah ought to have provided 83.33% of the Yamanite contribution. Umru' al-Qays' ought to have provided all of Tamīm's contribution, 75% of Muḍar's, 42.86% of the Arabs'; its contribution ought to have been three times bigger than Ṭayyī's, equally bigger than Rabī'ah's, and infinitely larger than that of Qays, the Azd, and the converts combined?

Umru' al-Qays is not a singular case, but it is the most conspicuous and the most illustrative. The Umru' al-Qays anomaly unravels on the most important level that has been misunderstood or misrepresented. If these quantitative exercises prove to be inaccurate, or even wrong in every respect, there is at least one point which they decisively prove at every level and by every criterion. They prove the invalidity of the application of the principle of equitable representation to our historiographical data relating to this clandestine form of political existence. No progressively affirmative correlation may be established. A conceptual correlation, continuously adjusted to the changing political and historiographical considerations, may, however, be possible. Can such a correlation be detected in the process of selection in the general assembly?

What other criteria of selection, if not equitable representation, were then applied? In certain cases, individual precedence, *sābiqah*, and/or a veteran status may have been one.⁴³ But this would probably have not been enough. Sulaymān's pressure to exclude and include may explain certain cases, but not all. Even if we were in a position to explain every individual case, we would still be at loss to explain the panoramic ethnic/socio-religious composition of the entire structure, which alone has a bearing on the demographic question. Why were all the *naqībs*, and all the *nuzarā'* in both lists, either Arabs or *mawālī*, without a single convert? Why did the Arabs, who had the larger share in the Umayyad Establishment, have the larger share in the higher echelons of the Organization, and the very lowest—to the point of vanishing—in the lower, i.e., on the echelons closest to the grass-roots level? And why is it that the converts' curve behaves exactly in an opposite fashion, rising from zero on the higher levels to around 30% on the medium level and to a substantial 62% on the level closer to the grass-roots?

The answer may be found in Bukayr's definition of the role of the *nuqabā'*; and it may be elaborated by his concession to al-'Alā's concerns. The job of a *naqīb* was to verify and scrutinize, to sift sincere respondents from potential spies. The job of the *du'āt*, and, more so, the junior *du'āt*, was to propagandise. The first role is required most in hostile territory and in a dangerous demographic and political environment. In friendly territory, there is no such looming danger;

⁴³ For example, Mālik ibn al-Haytham, Mūsā ibn Ka'b, 'Amr ibn A'yan, 'Imrān ibn Ismā'īl, Khālid ibn Ibrāhīm, and Ṭalḥah ibn Zurayq had joined the Organization as early as 103/721-722; and Sulaymān ibn Kathīr had paid allegiance even earlier (*Akhhār*, pp. 202, 199). Sulaymān, Mālik, Mūsā, Lāhiz, Khālid, and Ṭalḥah, had also been imprisoned, beaten and otherwise abused by the authorities (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1586-87).

therefore, as Bukayr put it, every “*dā’ī* was a *naqīb*” in his own territory, and he enjoyed the freedom of decision. That was increasingly the lot of the Iranian operatives.

It is not because they represented an equitably large constituency that members of the Establishment, Arabs and then *mawālī*, carried more weight in the higher structures of the Organization; it is because the environment they were operating in was so hostile to their activity but so familiar to their scrutinizing eyes.

IV. *The Destinies of the Leaders*

On the grand scale of the entire Organization, the question of the destinies with which the rank and file of the 401 members met may be unindicative of the intra-Organization upheaval which Abū Muslim’s hijacking of the Organization precipitated.⁴⁴ What became of the celebrated *nuqabā’* is probably our best guide. The following remarks may build up towards a suggestion.

1. All three Arab *naqībs* from Umru’ al-Qays were, at best, shabbily treated by Abū Muslim. One was executed,⁴⁵ one was isolated in a political no-man’s land,⁴⁶ and the survivor⁴⁷ was apparently man-handled, first into docility, and later into the anti-Abū Muslim ‘Abbāsīd camp—that is, when the time came for such a camp to crystallize.

2. Both Khuzā’ite Arab *naqībs* were, ironically, reported to have had Khurramī connections. Sulaymān ibn Kathīr’s son was accused of being a Khidāshist, and Abū Muslim is reported to have killed him — incredibly for this reason.⁴⁸ More importantly, Abū Muslim killed Sulaymān himself, the most senior of all *naqībs*.⁴⁹ Mālik ibn al-Haytham was himself, reportedly, a Khurramī. If indeed he was one, the fact would indicate that he had strong Khidāshist roots, and it would go a long way towards explaining the undisputable fact of his having been Abū Muslim’s staunchest personal ally, even after Abū Muslim himself had been slain.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ The overruled question can still be investigated by monitoring field Kf.30 = Kn.36 in the Membership Tabulations, as codified and elucidated in Agha, ‘Agents,’ pp.509-19, 564-5.

⁴⁵ Lāhiz ibn Qurayz (no.249).

⁴⁶ Al-Qāsim ibn Mujāshī’ (no.316).

⁴⁷ Mūsā ibn Ka’b (no.292).

⁴⁸ Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān ibn Kathīr (no.276); cf. Balādthurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, p. 168.

⁴⁹ Sulaymān ibn Kathīr (no.350).

⁵⁰ Mālik ibn al-Haytham (no.252); cf. Madā’inī in Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islam*, X: p. 413.

3. Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm, Abū Dāwūd, the Arab *naqīb* from Rabīʿah, was also an Abū Muslim ally—apparently an early one. He was Abū Muslim’s right hand in the purge of Ṭukhārīstān, and remained faithful to him until shortly before the latter’s execution. If the prize of Khurāsān’s governorship explains Abū Dāwūd’s transfer of his long-standing loyalty, and if Mālik’s Khidāshist roots explain his Abū Muslim loyalty, nothing in the sources helps to explain Abū Dāwūd’s initial alliance with Abū Muslim; but the fact remains well attested.⁵¹

4. The seventh Arab *naqīb*, the celebrated Ṭāʿīd, Qaḥṭabah ibn Shabīb, was mysteriously killed at the moment of his glorious triumph. It is not completely beyond reason to wonder whether Abū Muslim was an accomplice in Qaḥṭabah’s murder.⁵²

5. Of the 5 *mawālī naqībs*, only ʿImrān ibn Ismāʿīl (a *mawālā* of the Banū Umayyah but also Abū Muslim’s father-in-law) was covered by any reporting beyond the immediate aftermath of the Revolution. He was killed while governing Sijistān for Abū Muslim.⁵³ Although we know that Shibl ibn Ṭahmān, the *mawālā* of Ḥanīfah/Rabīʿah, was appointed by Abū Muslim as subgovernor of Harāt, apparently immediately after the Revolution, nothing further is known of his personal or political fortunes.⁵⁴ Peculiarly—or perhaps, not so peculiarly—all three Khuzāʿite *mawālī naqībs* were almost completely overshadowed in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution. Unless the unique reference to Abū Maṣṣūr al-Kātīb, who went into the service of al-Manṣūr,⁵⁵ concerns Ṭalḥah ibn Zurayq (himself also called Abū Maṣṣūr, and also a scribe), nothing would be otherwise known of his personal and political fortunes.⁵⁶ Two brother-*naqībs* were assigned to historiographical oblivion: these were the sons of the glorious house of Aʿyan, which produced five Revolutionary brothers, and which boasted a well documented *walāʾ* bondage to the famous Companion of the Prophet, Buraydah ibn al-Ḥuṣayb al-Aslamī of Khuzāʿah.⁵⁷

This was the most visible Bukayrist legacy torn asunder—by violence, intimidation, conspiracy, banishment, neglect and marginalization. The

⁵¹ Khālīd ibn Ibrāhīm (no.237).

⁵² Qaḥṭabah ibn Shabīb (no.314).

⁵³ ʿImrān ibn Ismāʿīl (no.209).

⁵⁴ Shibl ibn Ṭahmān (no.338).

⁵⁵ Khalīfah, p. 467.

⁵⁶ Ṭalḥah ibn Zurayq (no.351). The later Ṭāhirid dynasty were not his own descendants, but those of his brother’s, Muṣʿab ibn Zurayq (no.298).

⁵⁷ The two brother-*naqībs* were: ʿAmr ibn Aʿyan (no.127) and ʿĪsā ibn Aʿyan (no.210). The remaining three of the five brothers were: Budayl ibn Aʿyan (no.147), Marwān ibn Aʿyan (no.256) and Umayyah ibn Aʿyan (no.368). It is interesting—although not necessarily indicative—to note the Umayyad tenor on some of their first names.

board of *nuqabā'* represented the original orientation of the Hāshimīyyah, even after al-'Alā' ibn Ḥurayth's exertions. It reflected a brokered rather than a representative leadership—one that was put together to respond to logistical needs, and to project a desired, not an existing, balance between the sophisticated Muslim Revolutionaries of the Arabs and the *mawālī*. It all but forgot about those outside the imperial structure. The Khidāshist grass-roots, now resurgent and triumphant, had no use for this leadership which had supplanted their own.

* * *

Of course, numbers and statistics do not tell it all; especially when the statistics, such as those available to us, are based on a *de facto* list, a relatively high-profile-within-the-context (rather than a representative) statistical base, which is bequeathed to us by a historiographical body of reporting, which is not without its own inherent and circumstantial problems.

But, do the above computations, correlations, comparisons, and discretionary mathematical manipulations tell us anything about the relevant historical issues (the defining features of the Organization; the tribal and ethnic contours of its human landscape; the nature and magnitude of the bewildering mosaic of contributions, justly or unjustly earned rewards and inflicted punishments; the cataclysmic shifts and changes which made of Abū Muslim's takeover the highest expression of the historic ethnicum socio-religious fault line in the Muslim polity)? Do they start to dispel some of the most widely held notions—actually myths—about the nature and magnitude of the shifting demographic balances (Arab / Mawālī / Converts, Muḍar / Rabī'ah / Yaman, Arab / Iranian) in the history of the Organization and that of the Revolution? And about the specific inflated or deflated inputs of specific Arab tribes, the brunt of whose input and the glory of whose leadership were variously borne and enjoyed by its *mawālī*, but eventually credited to its Arab name—so much so that al-Khuzā'ī, for example, whether an Arab or a *mawālā*, became historiographically almost synonymous to Revolutionary? Do these mathematical manipulations help to put to rest the inherently ailing myth of an early and sustained substantial Ṭā'īd connection to the Organization? And do they provide firm coordinates for a map of the human geography of the Organization and the Revolution?

Once again in this book, the rhetorical questions are only a style of formulating their own answers. Some of these questions have not been

conclusively answered through the preceding analysis. Of course. There remains an unlimited number of Groups to be Measured, Criteria to be considered, and correlations to be established. The Membership Tabulations are rife with raw and improvised Data Given, and the feasible correlations and comparisons are almost infinite. A sense of purpose and direction, and, hence, a selective approach were mandatory. I have tried to use the data without prejudice, but of course purposefully. If the data lend themselves to different views, they are accessible,⁵⁸ but that requires a different viewer.

⁵⁸ See note no.1, p. 224.

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EPILOGUE

The attending symbolism—intended or inadvertent—is overpowering. Around 100/718, when the ‘Alīd Abū Hāshim died and the Organization sat on its own independent course, Abū Muslim was about to be born (?) and Naṣr ibn Sayyār was a middle-aged veteran of the Umayyad Establishment—almost as old as the Establishment itself. Three decades later, Naṣr and Abū Muslim collided. The young won, the old lost. Symbolism aside, the period is not measurable by the number of years. And, ‘Abbāsid apocalypitics aside, there were no signs of the momentous upheaval which was to come three decades down the road. But something was brewing. For the historian who arrives after the fact, events have a way of falling into patterns and emerging, in retrospect, in configurations understandably, if not inevitably, leading to the landmark occurrences which crown the chain of these events.

The destruction of the Umayyad regime was not the result of a lengthy process of decay and disintegration. The Revolution broke out into the open only four years after the end of one of the longest and reasonably stable Umayyad reigns. In Khurāsān itself, home of the Revolution, it ended one of the two longest terms in the governorship of the province—a term the first half of which had been marked by stability, flexibility, reform and promise. What signs of turmoil and trouble that might have been apparent earlier indicated nothing more than the usual disturbances—tribal trouble in the inside, and frontier clashes of a localized nature, which had abounded all through the Umayyad period. A mortal blow of existential proportions such as the one they received, inevitable as it might be reckoned in hindsight, was hardly seen coming.

In an ostensibly sudden eruption, the Umayyad Establishment was engaged by an ‘alien’ force. The characters of both forces contributed to the ostensible abruptness of the end. The mortal enemy was a clandestine revolutionary Organization which had been reared and bred in utmost secrecy. This deadly efficient Organization, unseen for a protracted preparatory stage, was only the spearhead and the organizing power which molded, streamlined, drove and led the primal forces of the conquered land.

There had been long-term and deep-rooted factors embedded in the nature of the Umayyad Establishment itself: its power base, elements of perpetuation, institutions, ideology and basis of sovereignty and political

legitimacy. These were not anomalies of the system; they were properties of the organic constitution of the very existence of the Establishment. They were part and parcel of the same regime which had been successful for almost eighty-five years, despite of, but also due to these very same properties. Just as it is with all organic structures, the principle of growth is itself the principle of dissolution—what feeds life feeds death. If conquest is the first principle of imperial existence, the attendant subjugation of the conquered is its inherent mortal defect, and the first principle of its demise. These are the dynamics of the rise and fall of empires.

In the case of the Arab empire, an intriguing element, peculiar to it, added to the velocity and momentum of these universal dynamics, and it put a unique twist on the outcome. The inclusive and egalitarian character of Islam, coupled with its being accepted by wide sectors of the conquered, made a historical paradox of the phenomenon of a conquering Muslim Arab race. Islam is capable of being a conquering religion, but, once accepted by the conquered, it can no longer remain so. The race which conquers in the name of Islam cannot retain both racial supremacy and Islamic legitimacy if the conquered races chose to embrace the religion of the conqueror. History does not tolerate paradoxes for long. For this paradox to be resolved, Arabs would have had to be de-Islamicized, or the Muslim Arab Establishment had to be de-Arabianized. The first alternative was not a possibility; Islam was the source of Arab power and inspiration, and the principle of their legitimacy. As it were, the outcome was merely an end to this first era of the history of Islam. Arabs lost supremacy, but Islam and Arabic continued to prosper. The Establishment, inasmuch as it was an Islamic edifice, was not destroyed, but was taken over and overhauled. It was de-racialized, or more accurately de-Arabianized; its power base and elements of perpetuation were redistributed, more equitably in racial terms, and they were set in harmony with the principles of its own legitimacy. The 'Arab' Muslim kingdom fell, and the inter-racial 'Muslim' empire rose, with Persian overtones.

Some factors of decay that pertain to the Establishment itself did manifest themselves at times in forms of grievances and uprisings, and were mostly dealt with by suppression. At times they were actually recognized as failures of the system and were addressed, inevitably by half measures: sometimes out of piety, sometimes out of political expediency. Yet, they were so inherent in the nature of the realm, that they could not have possibly been conceived of as a mortal threat to its existence. Even when Naṣr ibn Sayyār, ahead of others, saw the gravity of the situation and warned of it, change was not possible. Not only

because it was too late, but because structural metamorphosis does not occur in establishments. An establishment transforming itself into what it is not is a contradiction in terms.

Those factors were the defining structural properties of the Establishment. Under the dynamics of rise and fall, and as a result of the mutual identification between the conquered and the conqueror, and in the midst of an uncontrollable wave of conversion to the equalizing religion, those structural properties degenerated, as a matter of course, into fatal structural flaws. Change could be brought about, as it was, only by a revolution; and the agents of change in such magnitude could never be themselves the beneficiaries of the status quo.

Change from within an incumbent establishment might be attempted by benevolent avant-garde seers; but only by individuals, within certain perimeters and limitations which the individual reformer himself would not seek to overstep. The establishment would resist such of its sons. Such individuals would be caught between the resistance their establishment offers them, the limitations they naturally impose on themselves, and the intransigence of the advocates of real change—agents of an uncompromising revolution which would claim the heads of the ‘heads’ of the realm, not exempting the heads of the reformers. Such individuals are doomed to natural failure; and such was the episode of Naṣr ibn Sayyār and Abū Muslim; namely, the episode of the Umayyad regime and its topplers.

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APPENDIX ONE

PROSOPOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX

I. *The Kūfah Chapter*

I.1 *Members Active Mainly in Kūfah and the West*

- (1) *Abū ‘Amr al-Azḏī*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 192)
- (2) *Abū ‘Amr al-Bazzār*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers, and a member of Abū Hāshim’s entourage of seven who witnessed his death in Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī’s house. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 183; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 91)
- (3) *Abū Khālid al-Ḥawāliqī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; dissented from the policy of non-commitment to a specific Hāshimite; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. A pro-‘Alīd. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 204, 403)
- (4) *Abū Kūdām*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Hamdān of Yaman; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; dissented from the policy of non-commitment to a specific Hāshimite; featured in a setting of familiarity with the clandestine affairs of the Organization. A pro-‘Alīd. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 231)
- (5) *Abū Mūsā*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Damascus. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed by an Umayyad governor. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1502)
- (6) *Abū Yahyā Mawlā Banī Salamah*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Salamah (of Qushayr?); no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1467; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 193)
- (7) *‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Umayr al-Musī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; an eye-witness/first hand reporter on some clandestine activity. A pro-‘Alīd. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 186, 230-31, 249, 348)

- (8) *‘Abd al-Salām ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Nu‘aym al-Ghāmīdī*: Arab, of Ghāmīd of Azd of Yaman; no relation to other members known. A nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālīd or in his own government. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 377; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1480)
- (9) *‘Ammār al-‘Ibādī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed by an Umayyad governor. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1488, 1492; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 197, 199)
- (10) *‘Amr ibn Shabīb al-Muslī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; an eye-witness/first hand reporter on some clandestine activity. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 197, 201, 240, 247, 249, 263; cf. Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 520)
- (11) *‘Amrawayh al-Ẓayyāt*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. A nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālīd or in his own government. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 376)
- (12) *‘Āsim ibn Yūnus al-‘Ijlī*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of ‘Ijl of Bakr of Rabī‘ah; related to some other members. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in eight out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 255, 259, 263, 266; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1727; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 119; Azdī, p. 50; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 146; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 327; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252-3)
- (13) *‘Ayyāsh ibn Abī ‘Ayyāsh*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; dissented from the policy of non-commitment to a specific Hāshimite; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. A pro-‘Alīd. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 204)
- (14) *Bishr ibn al-Furāfīṣah al-‘Abdī*: Probably Arab, of ‘Abd al-Qays of Rabī‘ah; no relation to other members known. A nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālīd or in his own government. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 368-9)
- (15) *Buḡayr ibn Māhān, Abū Hāshim*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; related to some other members. One of the twenty Founding Fathers; fourth chief of the Organization. Was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Perished before the ‘Abbāsīd realm was proclaimed. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in nine out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Supra, part one, chapter one and passim)
- (16) *Al-Faḍl ibn Sālīm al-‘A‘mā ibn Buḡayr*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; related to some other members. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; an eye-witness/first hand reporter on some clandestine activity. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name

recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 183)

- (17) *Fuḍālāh ibn Mu'ādh ibn 'Abd Allāh*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Hāshim of Quraysh of Kindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Damascus. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. Had a special connection to the 'Abbāsids. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 179-80, 197-8, 201)
- (18) *Ghālīb*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; dissented from the policy of non-commitment to a specific Hāshimite; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. A pro-'Alid. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 204; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1501; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 200-201)
- (19) *Ḥafṣ al-Asīr*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 191, 253, 259)
- (20) *Ḥafṣ ibn Sulaymān al-Khallāl, Abū Salamah*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; related to some other members. One of the twenty Founding Fathers; fifth and last chief of the Organization. Was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. Featured in the immediate aftermath of the Khurāsāniyyah's advent in Kūfah; a nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālīd or in his own government; took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A pro-'Alid. Killed by Abū Muslim. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in fourteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Supra, part one, chapter two and passim)
- (21) *Al-Ḥajjāj ibn Arṭa'ah ibn Thawr al-Nakha'ī, Abū Arṭa'ah*: Arab, of Nakha' of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. A nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālīd or in his own government. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Died in grace. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in eleven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 368; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1850, III: pp. 61, 72, 276, 321; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 91, 151, 155; Ibn Khallikān, II: pp. 54-56; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 391, 403; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 294; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 264, II: p. 291; Baghdādī, *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, VIII: p. 230 ff.; Dhahabī, *Tārikh al-Islām*, IX: pp. 21, 33, 45, 100-104; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 340, V: pp. 14, 21. Ibn Durayd, p. 404)
- (22) *Al-Ḥasan ibn Ḥamzah*: Probably non-Arab; related to some other members. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; an eye-witness/first hand reporter on some clandestine activity. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 192 ff., 203 ff)
- (23) *Ḥayyān al-'Atṭār*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Nakha' of Madhḥij of Yaman; related to some other members. One of the twenty Founding Fathers, and a member of Abū Hāshim's entourage of seven who witnessed his death in Muḥammad ibn 'Alī's house. Was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed by an Umayyad governor. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 184, 195, 401; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1358; Dīnawarī, pp. 334-7; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 308; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 159)

- (24) *Hayyān al-Sarrāj, Abū al-Hudhayl*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 192)
- (25) *Al-Hilqām ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Tamūmī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Tamūm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. A nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālīd or in his own government. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 369)
- (26) *Ibrāhīm ibn Salamah*: Non-Arab, *mawla* of Nakha‘ of Madhhij of Yaman; related to some other members; from Ḥumaymah. One of the twenty Founding Fathers, and a member of Abū Hāshim’s entourage of seven who witnessed his death in Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī’s house. Featured in the immediate aftermath of the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent in Kūfah; took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. Had a special connection to the ‘Abbāsids. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 184, 189-92, 195-7, 268, 394, 410; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1937, III: pp. 27-8, 35-6; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 139; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 295, 323)
- (27) *Idrīs ibn Mā‘qil ibn ‘Umayr al-‘Ijlī*: Arab, of ‘Ijl of Bakr of Rabī‘ah; related to some other members. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny, founder of a dynasty of ‘*Abnā*’. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in eleven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 255, 263-7; Ṭabarī, III: p. 1727; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 118-9; Ibn Hazm, *Jamharah*, p. 313; Azdī, p. 50; Dīnawarī, pp. 338-9; Ibn Qutaybah, *Mā‘ārif*, p. 420; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 78; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 549, (Caskel), I: p. 158, II: p. 353; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 49, 52; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252, 301)
- (28) *‘Isā ibn Ḥamzah al-Hamdānī, Abū Masrūr*: Non-Arab, *mawla* of Hamdān of Yaman; related to some other members. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; an eye-witness/first hand reporter on some clandestine activity. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 200, 231, 363-4)
- (29) *‘Isā ibn Ibrāhīm al-Sarrāj, Abū Mūsā*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in six out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 253-5; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1726; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 84-85, 119-20; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252, 254; see also no.40 below)
- (30) *‘Isā ibn Idrīs ibn Mā‘qil al-‘Ijlī*: Arab, of ‘Ijl of Bakr of Rabī‘ah; related to some other members. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in ten out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 253, 255, 257-60; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1726-7; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 118-20, 208; Azdī, p. 50; Dīnawarī, pp. 338-9; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 327; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 550, (Caskel), I: p. 158, II: p. 358; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 72; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 49-52; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252-3)
- (31) *Mān ibn Yazīd al-Hamdānī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Hamdān of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers. An eye-witness/first hand reporter on some clandestine activity. No specific loyalty can be

ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 191-2; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 129)

- (32) *Maṣqalah al-Ṭahhān, Abū Bisṭām*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ḥārith of Madhhij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers, and a member of Abū Hāshim's entourage of seven who witnessed his death in Muḥammad ibn 'Alī's house. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 183-4)
- (33) *Maysarah al-Rahhāl*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 191)
- (34) *Maysarah al-Nabbāl, Abū Rabāḥ*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Azd of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers, and a member of Abū Hāshim's entourage of seven who witnessed his death in Muḥammad ibn 'Alī's house; second chief of the Organization. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Perished before the 'Abbāsīd realm was proclaimed. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in six out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 183, 188-9, 192, 194, 196; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1434, 1467; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 114-7; Dīnawarī, pp. 334-6; Ya'qūbī, *Tarīkh*, II: pp. 298, 308, 312; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 182, 193; cf. Nawbakhtī, p. 55)
- (35) *Mudrik*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ḥārith of Madhhij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; featured in a setting of familiarity with the clandestine affairs of the Organization. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 249)
- (36) *Al-Mughīrah ibn al-Rayyān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. A nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālid or in his own government. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 376-7. Also known to biographical dictionaries and Traditionists, cf. Dārquṭnī, II: p. 1071, and note)
- (37) *Muḥammad ibn al-Mukhtār, Abū Ibrāhīm*: Probably non-Arab; related to some other members. One of the twenty Founding Fathers. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 192)
- (38) *Muḥammad ibn Sālim al-'Amā ibn Bujayr*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Musliyah of Madhhij of Yaman; related to some other members. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; an eye-witness/first hand reporter on some clandestine activity. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 192)
- (39) *Al-Mundhūr ibn Sā'id al-Hamdānī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Hamdān of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 192)
- (40) *Mūsā ibn Surayj al-Sarājī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in

three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 191, 194-5, 203, 266; *Ṭabarī*, II: p. 1726; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 51; see also no.29 above)

- (41) *Mūsā ibn Yazīd*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 260)
- (42) *Musāwir al-Qaṣṣāb*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Dīnawarī, p. 358)
- (43) *Rawḥ ibn Hātīm ibn Qubaysah*: Arab, of ‘Aṭik of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members. A nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālīd or in his own government; took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Died in grace. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in eight out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Ṭabarī*, III: pp. 64-5, 69, 139-40, 461, 467-8, 482-4, 491, 505, 517-21, 569, 606, 609; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 111, 230, 249; Azdī, p. 117; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 372, 384, 398, 411; Ibn Khallikān, II: pp. 305-7; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 370; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 204, II: p. 485; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, II: p. 172; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, IX: pp. 9, 367-8, XI: pp. 10, 121 ff., Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VII: p. 441; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 337, 369, V: 53-54, 56, 65, 68-69, 82, 84-85, 88, 94)
- (44) *Sābiq al-Khwārizmī*: Non-Arab, *mawla* of Hāshim of Quraysh of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Ḥumaymah. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. Featured in the immediate aftermath of the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent in Kūfah; took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in six out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 395, 402, 409-10; *Ṭabarī*, III: pp. 27, 34-5; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 123, 139; Azdī, p. 121; Mas‘ūdī, pp. 95-99; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 35, 349; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 369; cf. Jahshayārī, pp. 86-88)
- (45) *Salamah ibn Bujayr ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Muslī*: Non-Arab, *mawla* of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the twenty Founding Fathers, and a member of Abū Hāshim’s entourage of seven who witnessed his death in Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī’s house; first chief of the Organization. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Perished before the ‘Abbāsīd realm was proclaimed. Name recognition of the second grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 180, 183, 188-90, 192-3, 196; cf. *Ṭabarī*, II: pp. 738-40; and Ibn A‘tham, VII: p. 198)
- (46) *Salīm ibn Bujayr al-A‘mā, Abū al-Faḍl*: Non-Arab, *mawla* of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; related to some other members. One of the twenty Founding Fathers; third chief of the Organization. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Perished before the ‘Abbāsīd realm was proclaimed. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 186, 191-2, 194-5, 201, 204-5; *Ṭabarī*, II: p. 1467; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 117; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 193)
- (47) *Usayd ibn Dughaym al-Muslī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; an eye-witness/first hand reporter on some clandestine activity. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 238, 249, 337)

- (48) *‘Uthmān ibn ‘Isā*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 260)
- (49) *Al-Walīd al-Azraq*: Probably non-Arab; related to some other members. One of the twenty Founding Fathers. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 192; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1488; Dīnawarī, p. 336)
- (50) *Al-Walīd ibn Sa’d*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Hāshim of Quraysh of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. A pro-‘Alid. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eight out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 27, 34; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 139; Khalīfah, III: p. 424; Dīnawarī, p. 358; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 96; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 57; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 323)
- (51) *Yaqīn ibn Mūsā al-Abzārī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; an eye-witness/first hand reporter on some clandestine activity. A nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālid or in his own government; took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A survivalist/team player. Died in grace. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in seven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 231; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 103, 390, 486, 502, 520, 549, 562, 567, 630, 650; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 201-3, 174; Azdī, p. 164; Dīnawarī, pp. 336, 358, 375; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, pp. 366, 396; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 139; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 44, 60, 64, 69, 110)
- (52) *Yūnus al-‘Ijlī, Abū ‘Āsim*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of ‘Ijl of Bakr of Rabī‘ah; related to some other members. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1726; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 51; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 253)
- (53) *Yūnus ibn Ubayy al-Hamdānī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Hamdān of Yaman; no relation to other members known. A nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālid or in his own government. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 368)
- (54) *Yūsuf ibn Thābit*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. A nominee/appointee by Abū Salamah to Muḥammad ibn Khālid or in his own government. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 377)
- (55) *Ẓiyād, Khāl al-Walīd al-Azraq*: Probably non-Arab; related to some other members. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed by an Umayyad governor. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1488; Ibn al-Athīr, p. 197)
- (56) *Ẓiyād ibn Nadhīr*: Ethnically undetermined, of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; dissented from the policy of non-commitment to a specific Hāshimite; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. A pro-‘Alid. Nothing is

known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 204)

I.2 Resident Emissaries to Khurāsān

- (57) *Abū Muslim ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (?) ibn Muslim (?) al-Khurāsānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; attested geographical mobility (probable Khurāsānite origin). A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in nineteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Supra, part one, chapter three and passim)
- (58) *‘Ammār ibn Yazdād, Khūdāsh*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known; Kūfah to Marw. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Killed by an Umayyad governor. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Supra, chapter one, section V and passim)
- (59) *Kathīr ibn Sa‘d, Abū al-Ḥasan*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; Kūfah to Marw. A veteran of the clandestine stage but not a founder; was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1503; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 116; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 201)
- (60) *Muḥammad ibn Khunays*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Hamdān of Yaman; no relation to other members known; Kūfah to Marw. One of the twenty Founding Fathers, and a member of Abū Hāshim’s entourage of seven who witnessed his death in Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī’s house. Was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed by an Umayyad governor. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in seven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 183; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1467, 1488; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 115-6; Azdī, p. 26; Dīnawarī, pp. 334-5; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta‘rīkh*, p. 308; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 193, 197)
- (61) *Ẓayād ibn Dīrham al-Ṣādiq al-Hamdānī al-Sarrāj, Abū ‘Ikrimah*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Hamdān of Yaman; related to some other members; Kūfah to Marw. One of the twenty Founding Fathers. Was also directly involved in the affairs of the Khurāsān Chapter. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed by an Umayyad governor. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in seven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 191-2, 203; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1453, 1467, 1488, 1501-3; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 114, 116; Azdī, pp. 18, 26; Dīnawarī, pp. 334-7; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta‘rīkh*, p. 308; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 193, 197, 200)

II. The Khurāsān Chapter

- (62) *Abū al-‘Abbās al-Marwazī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Saqādim. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 331; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1955, III: p. 1; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 300)

- (63) *Abū ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Mākhuwānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Mākhuwān. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1989-1993)
- (64) *Abū ‘Amr al-ʿAjāmī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the *duʿāt al-duʿāt*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222; Ṭabarī II: pp. 1958, 1968)
- (65) *Abū al-ʿAsad al-ʿAʿmash*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 345)
- (66) *Abū al-ʿAṣbagh*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Aligned himself with ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 93)
- (67) *Abū ʿĀsim al-Ṣaghānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the *duʿāt al-duʿāt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223)
- (68) *Abū Hamzah al-Ḥurabī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the *duʿāt al-duʿāt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223)
- (69) *Abū al-Ḥanad al-ʿAʿwar*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 339)
- (70) *Abū Kāmīl*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. Displayed anti-Abū Muslim sentiment without going into open mutiny. Perished before the ‘Abbāsīd realm was proclaimed. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 327, 331-2, 354; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1950, III: pp. 1, 7; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 317, 319)
- (71) *Abū Khālīd al-Marwazī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 2004, III: pp. 21, 369, 455, 606; Ibn al-Athīr, V: p. 85)
- (72) *Abū Mājīd*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Hamdan of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 367)

- (73) *Abū Marḏīyyah al-Balkhī*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Bāhilah of Qays of Muḏar; no relation to other members known; from Balkh. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhhbār*, p. 219; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1229)
- (74) *Abū Muḡātil al-Khurāsānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 36, 409)
- (75) *Abū al-Mutawakkil al-Ḥurjānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Jurjān. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 55)
- (76) *Abū al-Najm al-Sijistānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 354; Ibn al-Athār, V: p. 28)
- (77) *Abū Nuṣayb*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Jurjān. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhhbār*, p. 294; see also no.78 below)
- (78) *Abū Nuṣayr al-Ḥurjānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Jurjān. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhhbār*, pp. 224, 371; cf. Ṭabarī, III: pp. 15-17)
- (79) *Abū Sa'd al-Sharawī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A survivalist/convictionless/team player. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 82; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 349)
- (80) *Abū Sayf*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āl al-du'āl*. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhhbār*, pp. 223, 240)
- (81) *Abū Shākir*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A survivalist/convictionless/team player. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 82; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 349)
- (82) *Abū Sharāḥīl*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H.

R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. ((Or Abū Saʿīd, or Sharāḥīl) *Akhbār*, pp. 281, 344, 374; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1968, III: pp. 21, 28, 36; Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, II: p. 349; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336)

- (83) *Abū Suwayd al-Khurāsānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 368; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 246; Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, II: p. 377; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, X: p. 38)
- (84) *Abū Turāb*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the *duʿāt al-duʿāt*. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 168)
- (85) *Abū al-Jahm ibn ʿAtīyyah al-Bāhili*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Bāhilah of Qays of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw/Mākhuwān. *Nazīr naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s standard list of twelve; also listed as such in *Akhbār*'s second list of twenty one. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in nine out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 219, 220, 339, 376; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1953, 1968, 2001, III: pp. 3, 15, 27-8, 35-6, 67, 77, 88, 91, 111, 116, 409; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 136, 137, 139, 140, 156, 163, 190, 191; Azdī, pp. 121, 140, 160; Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, II: pp. 349, 359, 361; Masʿūdī, pp. 99, 133; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 336, 342, 358-9, X: p. 161; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: pp. 59, 65, 66; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 300, 318, 342, 346, 354)
- (86) *Ibn Hakīm*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 288)
- (87) *Abū Saʿīd ibn Muʿāwiyyah ibn Yazīd*: Arab, of ʿAtīk of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 337)
- (88) *Ibn al-Najāh*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 80, 83)
- (89) *Ibn Zuraḡq ibn Shawdhāb al-Shaybānī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Shaybān of Bakr of Rabīʿah; related to some other members. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the sixth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 258)
- (90) *Abū Hakīm Ibn Bazī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Duʿāt*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 218)

- (91) *Al-‘Abbās ibn Yazīd ibn Z̧yād*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 48, 55)
- (92) *‘Abd Allāh al-Rāwandī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the *du‘āt al-du‘āt*. Nothing is known about his personal destiny, founder of a dynasty of ‘*Abnā*’. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222. cf. Azdī, pp. 194-5, 201)
- (93) *‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Yazīd*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Hanā’ah of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members; from Jurjān. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A pro-‘Alid. Banished from public life. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 537)
- (94) *‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Bakhtarī al-Khuzā‘ī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Khuzā’ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Khalīfah, II: p. 426)
- (95) *‘Abd Allāh ibn Bassām*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Layth of Kinānah of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent therein. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 17, 28, 36-7; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 140; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 349-50; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 324, 326)
- (96) *‘Abd Allāh ibn Bisṭām*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1668, cf. pp. 1512, 1535; Blankinship, “*al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān*,” pp. 270-1)
- (97) *‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Buḥturī al-Tamīmī*: Arab, of Umru’ al-Qays of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*’s first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār*’s second list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 221; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1993-4)
- (98) *‘Abd Allāh ibn Sa‘ūd*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw al-Rūdh. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1960)
- (99) *‘Abd Allāh ibn Shu‘bah ibn Zahr*: Probably Arab, of Nahshal of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw al-Rūdh. One of the *du‘āt al-du‘āt*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. A representative of sundry special interests.

Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 223, 297)

- (100) *‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Uthmān al-Ṭā’ī al-Samarqandī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Ṭayyī’ of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in six out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 364, 370; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1958, 2001, 2005, III: pp. 28, 36, 38, 48; Azdī, p. 135; Dīnawarī, p. 362; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 301, 324, 327, 330)
- (101) *‘Abd al-ʿAlā ibn Ḥakīm al-Asadī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Asad of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. One of the *du’āt al-du’āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223)
- (102) *‘Abd al-ʿAzīz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Ṣayd*: Arab, of Dahmān of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members; from Abīward. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 122-3; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 107, 230, 249, 257; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 217, II: p. 123; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 358)
- (103) *‘Abd al-Ghaḥfār ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Ṭālaqānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 229)
- (104) *‘Abd al-Ḥamid ibn Rib’ī ibn Khālīd al-Ṭā’ī, Abū Ghānim*: Arab, of Nabhān of Ṭayyī’ of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw. *Dā’ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*’s first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du’āt*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār*’s second list of the ‘Seventy *Du’āt*’. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests/aligned himself with ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī. Banished from public life, founder of a dynasty of ‘*Abnā’*’. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in nine out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221, 343-4, 365, 376; Ṭabarī, II: p. 2001, III: pp. 5, 15, 28, 36, 38, 53-4, 93; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 105, 109, 110, 135, 137, 139, 248; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 404; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 257, II: p. 124; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 263; Ya’qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 349; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 336, 340, 354; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 324, 327, 334)
- (105) *‘Abd al-Ḥabbār ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Ṣayd al-ʿAzdī*: Arab, of Dahmān of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members; from Abīward. *Dā’ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*’s first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du’āt*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār*’s second list of the ‘Seventy *Du’āt*’. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. Displayed anti-Abū Muslim sentiment without going into open mutiny/a post-Abū Muslim anti-‘Abbāsīd rebel but not in the cause of avenging Abū Muslim. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in fifteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, 218, 221, 317, 404; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 2003-4, III: pp.

- 67, 76, 100, 122, 128, 129, 134-6, 425, 437, 459, 487; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 107, 135, 153, 163-4, 227-30; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 385; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 233, (Caskel), I: p. 217, II: p. 124; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 503; Ibn Ḥabīb, pp. 374, 450, 486; Azdī, pp. 140, 160; Dīnawarī, p. 362; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, VIII: pp. 365-6, IX: pp. 7-8; Hamzah, p. 167; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 358, 364, 366-7, V: p. 51)
- (106) *'Abd al-Karīm ibn Muslim*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 20)
- (107) *'Abd al-Malik ibn Harthamah*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Khwārism. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. Anti-Abū Muslim/'Abbāsīd rebel. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Narshākhī, p. 91)
- (108) *'Abd al-Malik ibn Sa'd*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 1950; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 299)
- (109) *'Abd al-Malik ibn Yazīd al-Azdī al-Khurāsānī, Abū 'Awn*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Hanā'ah of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members; from Jurjān. *Nazīr naṣīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list of twelve; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A pro-'Alīd. Banished from/abdicated public life. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in thirteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 219, 220, 224, 240, 247-8, 293-4, 335, 339, 341, 343, 357-9, 378; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1964, 2001-4, III: pp. 9-10, 37-40, 45, 48-50, 72-5, 81, 84, 183, 357-8, 459, 470, 477, 536; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 135, 137; Azdī, pp. 117, 125-6, 128-30, 132, 134-6, 140, 236, 252; Khaṭīfah, II: pp. 446, 463, 472; Dīnawarī, pp. 362-4; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 343; Mas'ūdī, III: p. 183, IV: pp. 87, 100; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: pp. 481-2; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 338, 340, 348, IX: pp. 54, 367, 371; Ibn Khallikān, I: p. 443; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 288; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 302, 313, 318-9, 326-7, 330-1, 340, 344, 375, V: pp. 29, 52-5)
- (110) *'Abd al-Rahmān ibn al-Mukhl*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'ī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (111) *'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Nu'aym*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 21)
- (112) *'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Sulaymān, Abū 'Iṣām*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Umayyah of Quraysh of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'ī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known

about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1953; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 226-8; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 300)

- (113) *‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab*: Arab, of ‘Atīk of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed in a state of rebellion against the new regime (?). Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 378; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1978-9, III: p. 74)
- (114) *‘Abd al-Wāhid ibn Abī ‘Awn*: Non-Arab, *mawla* of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members. A post-Abū Muslim anti-‘Abbāsīd rebel but not in the cause of avenging Abū Muslim/a pro-‘Alīd. Banished from public life. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 2454-7; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 288)
- (115) *‘Abdawayhi ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm Kirdām al-Khurāsānī*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Harāt. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1957, III: pp. 156, 302; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 327-8)
- (116) *Abrāz Khudāh*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed in the service of the new regime. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 249)
- (117) *Al-Aghlab ibn Sālim ibn ‘Iqāl al-Tamīmī al-Marwūdihī*: Arab, of Sa’d of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw al-Rūdh. Listed as *naqīb* only by other than the *Akhbār*’s standard list. Listed as *dā’ī* only in *Akhbār*’s alternative list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āl*’. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny, founder of a dynasty of ‘*Abnā’*’. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eleven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 221, 335; Ṭabarī, III: p. 69; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 146-7, 153; Ibn Hazm, *Jamharah*, p. 221; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 245, (Caskel), I: p. 75, II: p. 145; Ibn Habīb, p. 465; Khalīfah, II: p. 465; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rikh*, II: p. 386; Ibn Khallikān, VI: p. 317; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 281-2, V: pp. 26, 31)
- (118) *Al-Aḥjam ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Khuzā‘ī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Khuzā‘ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Nasā. *Dā’ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*’s first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āl*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār*’s second list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āl*’. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1950, 1963; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 299)
- (119) *Ahlam ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Bassām*: Non-Arab, *mawla* of Layth of Kinānah of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 18-21; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 137)
- (120) *Al-Akhyam ibn ‘Abd al-Azīz al-Marwūdihī*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw al-Rūdh. *Dā’ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*’s first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āl*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār*’s second list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āl*’. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A

- representative of sundry special interests. Killed in the service of the new regime. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 219, 222; Ṭabarī, III: p. 354; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, IX: p. 53; Ibn al-Athīr, V: p. 28)
- (121) *Al-'Ala' ibn Hurayth ibn Qutbah al-Khuzā'i*: Non-Arab, of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Khwāriṣm. Considered for the position of a *naqīb*, but, for political reasons, excluded; listed as *naqīb* only by other than the *Akhbār's* standard list. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the second grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 202, 216, 219-20, 273, 278, 337; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1953, 1968; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 116; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 300)
- (122) *Al-'Ala' ibn Sālim*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Saqādīm. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 274)
- (123) *Alī ibn Ma'qil*: Ethnically undetermined, of Ḥanīfah of Bakr of Rab'ah; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 2002; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 313. See also (but probably unrelated), *Akhbār*, pp. 295-6, 309-10, 331, 334-5)
- (124) *Alqamah ibn Ḥakām*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Saqādīm. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 274)
- (125) *'Amir ibn Ismā'il ibn 'Amir al-Muslī al-Jurjānī*: Arab, of Musliyah of Madhijj of Yaman; related to some other members; from Jurjān. Featured in covert action only before the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Died in grace. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in sixteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 180, 191, 224, 240, 293-4, 329-30, 339-41, 343-6, 358-9; Ṭabarī, II: p. 2001, III: pp. 46-50, 254, 302-3, 380, 496; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 100, 104; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 414; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 262, II: p. 160; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 288; Azdī, pp. 135-6, 158, 226; Khalīfah, p. 372; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 87-8, 100-1; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: pp. 469-70, 480-1; Ibn Khallikān, III: p. 151; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 340, 537, IX: pp. 38, 362, 447; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 331-2, V: pp. 17, 41)
- (126) *'Amr ibn al-Ash'ath al-Bāriqī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Bāriq of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 220)
- (127) *'Amr ibn A'yan al-Khuzā'i, Abū Ḥamzah*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Aslam of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Fanīn. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār's* standard list.

Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 202, 216, 278, 280, 297-8; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1953, 1964, 1988; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 115; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 159)

- (128) *‘Amr ibn Hassān*: Arab, of Nabhān of Ṭayyī’ of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā’ī* only in *Akhbār*’s alternative list of the ‘Seventy *Du’āt*’. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1422; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 257, II: p. 175)
- (129) *‘Amr ibn Nihy*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du’āt al-du’āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (130) *‘Amr ibn Sinān al-Murādī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Murād of Madhij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 248)
- (131) *Asad ibn al-Marzubān*: Probably non-Arab; related to some other members. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A survivalist/convictionless/team player. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in six out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 345, 370; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 16, 344, 368, 920; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 139, 245-6, 254; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 487; Azdī, p. 214; Ibn al-Athīr, V: p. 23)
- (132) *Al-Ash’ath ibn Yahyā ibn al-Nu’mān al-Ṭā’ī, Abū Ḥulāmāh*: Arab, of Nabhān of Ṭayyī’ of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā’ī* only in *Akhbār*’s alternative list of the ‘Seventy *Du’āt*’. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1422; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 229; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 257, II: p. 200; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 264)
- (133) *Aslam ibn Abī Sallām al-Bajālī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Bajālah of Anmār of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Listed as *naqīb* only by other than the *Akhbār*’s standard list. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 281-2, 288, 291; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1988; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 310)
- (134) *Aslam ibn Hassān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 4)
- (135) *Aslam ibn Ṣubayh*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 279, 283, 304; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1668; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 305)

- (136) *ʿAwn ibn ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Yazīd*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Hanāʿah of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members; from Jurjān. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A pro-ʿAlīd. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 184)
- (137) *Al-Azhar ibn Shuʿayb*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 223, 240; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1950; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 299)
- (138) *Bahdal ibn Iyās al-Dabbī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Dabbah of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dāʿī* only in *Akhbār*'s alternative list of the 'Seventy *Duʿāl*'. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1968)
- (139) *Bakkār al-Anṣarī*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Anṣār of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed in the service of the new regime. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 66)
- (140) *Bakkār al-Marwazī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed in the service of the new regime. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 248)
- (141) *Barāz*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. ((Gardīzī, *Ẓayn al-Akhbār*, p. 123). Reference owed to Daniel, *Khurasan*, pp.131-3. However, circumstantially, this Barāz appears to be the same person whom Balādhurī calls 'Yazīd', *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 229)
- (142) *Bashīr ibn Kathīr ibn Umayyah*: Arab, of Afṣā of Khuzāʿah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Saqīdunj. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Displayed anti-Abū Muslim sentiment without going into open mutiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 271)
- (143) *Bassām mawlā Khāzīm*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Nahshal of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw al-Rūdh. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 356)
- (144) *Bassām ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Bassām*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Layth of Kinānah of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. Participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A pro-ʿAlīd (?). Killed by al-Manṣūr (?). Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in nine out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 321-2, 351, 374, 377; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1959,

1996, III: pp. 18, 21, 37, 48, 75-6, 83; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 131-2, 138, 170-1, 176; Azdī, pp. 135, 140; Khalīfah, II: p. 412; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 345; Ibn Qutaybah, *Mā'arīf*, p. 371; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 346; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 311, 322, 326, 330, 342, 345; Balādhurī, *Futūh*, p. 485)

- (145) *Bazī mawlā Mu'ādh*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (146) *Bishr ibn al-Nuhayd*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Musliyah of Madhhij of Yaman; related to some other members; from Jurjān. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 199)
- (147) *Budayl ibn A'yan*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Aslam of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Fanīn. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Yāqūt, IV: pp. 278-9)
- (148) *Bukayr ibn al-'Abbās*: Ethnically undetermined; related to some other members; from Marw. Chosen as *naqīb*, but, for health reasons, replaced. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 217)
- (149) *Buraydah ibn Khushayb*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'i* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221. Probably a namesake of the well-known companion of the Prophet or a mix-up)
- (150) *Buwayf*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Naṣr ibn Mu'āwiyah of Hawāzin of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Hurmuzfārah. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1955)
- (151) *Dā'iyah ibn Nijād*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'i* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (152) *Dalāstākhanjī*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A post-Abū Muslim anti-'Abbāsīd rebel but not in the cause of avenging Abū Muslim. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 122)
- (153) *Dawūd ibn Karāz al-Bāhili*: Ethnically undetermined, of Bāhilah of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry

sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221, 281; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1968-9, 1993, 1996, III: pp. 238, 354; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 130; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 305, V: p. 28)

- (154) *Dhu'ayb ibn al-Ash'ath*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 378; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 4, 54)
- (155) *Al-Faḍl ibn Humayd al-Murādī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Murād of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 377)
- (156) *Al-Faḍl ibn Sulaymān al-Ṭā'ī al-Ṭūsī, Abū al-'Abbās*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Abīward. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Died in grace, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eleven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1433, 1533, 1950, 1963, 2001, III: pp. 20, 68, 131, 324, 367, 455, 517-8, 521, 605, 740; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 236, 272; Khalīfah, II: pp. 467, 469, 472, 479, 498, 502; Dīnawarī, p. 362; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 389, 401; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, I: p. 26; Narshākhī, pp. 55-6; Ibn Khallikān, V: p. 412; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, X: p. 25, XI: p. 5; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 299, V: pp. 68, 83, 85)
- (157) *Ghālīb ibn Sa'īd, Abū Manṣūr*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 163, 291, Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1950, 1963; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 83; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 299)
- (158) *Ghaylān ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Asmā' al-Khuzā'ī, Abū Fuḍālah*: Arab, of Afṣā of Khuza'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Nasā. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1954, III: pp. 64-5; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 200, II: p. 270; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 462; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 299, 337)
- (159) *Ḥabīb ibn Durays*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'ī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (160) *Ḥabīb ibn Rustam, Abū Nu'mān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E.

- O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (161) *Hafṣ ibn Dīnār*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Shaybān of Bakr of Rabīʿah; no relation to other members known; from Ṭālaqān. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 83)
- (162) *Hāḡib ibn Dīrham*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *duʿāt al-duʿāt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (163) *Hāḡib ibn Ṣaddān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 36)
- (164) *Al-Hajjāj ibn Sulaymān ibn Hāzīm al-Azdī*: Arab, of Jahḍ am of Azd of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Duʿāl'*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Duʿāl'*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 211, II: p. 291)
- (165) *Ḥammād ibn ʿAmr*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw al-Rūdh. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 354; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 318, V: p. 28)
- (166) *Ḥanzah ibn Zunaym al-Bāhili*: Ethnically undetermined, of Bāhilah of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Saqādīm. One of the *duʿāt al-duʿāt*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1955-7; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 243)
- (167) *Ḥanzfah ibn Qays*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Saqādīm. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1957)
- (168) *Ḥarb ibn Marthad*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dāʿī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Duʿāl'*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (169) *Ḥarb ibn ʿUthmān*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Qays ibn Tha'labah of Bakr of Rabīʿah; no relation to other members known; from Balkh. Featured in covert action only before the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 501; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 200)

- (170) *Harb ibn Ziyād al-Tālaqānī*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dāʿī* only in *Akhhbār*'s alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhhbār*, p. 222; Ṭabarī, III: p. 83; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 229-30)
- (171) *Al-Harīsh ibn Muhammad al-Dhuhlī*: Arab, of Dhuhl of Bakr of Rabʿah; related to some other members. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed by 'Abd al-jabbār. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 128; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 366; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 364)
- (172) *Al-Harīsh ibn Sulaymān*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Nasā. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'; also listed as such in *Akhhbār*'s second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhhbār*, pp. 218, 221; Dīnawarī, pp. 341, 359; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 225)
- (173) *Al-Hārīth ibn Sayyār*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āl al-du'āl*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhhbār*, p. 222)
- (174) *Hārūn ibn al-Šīq al-Tufāwī*: Ethnically undetermined, of al-Tufāwah of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'; also listed as such in *Akhhbār*'s second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhhbār*, pp. 217, 222)
- (175) *Al-Ḥasan ibn Ḥamdān*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Sa'd of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. *Naẓīr naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhhbār*'s standard list of twelve; also listed as such in *Akhhbār*'s second list of twenty one. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhhbār*, pp. 219, 220; Ṭabarī, III: p. 83; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 229)
- (176) *Al-Ḥasan ibn al-Junayd*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Āmul. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 83)
- (177) *al-Ḥasan ibn Mākhanbadh*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Āmul. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'; also listed as such in *Akhhbār*'s second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhhbār*, pp. 219, 222)
- (178) *Al-Ḥasan ibn Qaḥṭabah ibn Shabīb al-Tāʿī*, *Abū al-Husayn*: Arab, of Nabhān of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw. *Naẓīr naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhhbār*'s standard list of twelve. Listed as *dāʿī* only in *Akhhbār*'s alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military

campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests/displayed anti-Abū Muslim sentiment without going into open mutiny. Died in grace, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in eighteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 219, 221, 228, 330-6, 341-2, 350-1, 356-7, 371, 377; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 2003-5, III: 1-9, 12-21, 37, 61-6, 71, 93-101, 125, 353, 493-6, 646, 882; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 106-7, 110, 135, 137-8, 145-9, 151, 172, 191, 207, 242; Ibn Hazm, *Jamharah*, p. 404; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 257, II: p. 319; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 263; Azdī, pp. 116-7, 119, 125-6, 142, 211, 242, 286, 290; Khalīfah, II: pp. 421, 423-4, 426, 468; Dīnawarī, pp. 367, 371; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 343-5, 354, 358, 372, 384, 396-7, 402; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 85, 180; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma'ārif*, pp. 371-2, 582; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 213, 218, 481, VI: p. 144; Baghdādī, *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, VII: pp. 403-4; Ibn Khallikān, VI: pp. 314-5, 318-9, 321; Dhahabī, *Tārikh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 334, 341, 354, IX: p. 52, X: pp. 11, 14; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 57, 61; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 313-4, 317-9, 320-1, 326, 336-7, 348-50, 359, 365, V: pp. 28, 62, 63, 106, 158)

- (179) *Al-Ḥasan ibn 'Ulwān, Abū Khālid*: Probably non-Arab; related to some other members; from Marw/Hurmuzfarrah. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī II: p. 1955)
- (180) *Al-Ḥasan ibn Zūrārah ibn 'Amir*: Arab, of Musliyah of Madhhij of Yaman; related to some other members; from Jurjān. Featured in covert action only before the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Perished before the 'Abbāsīd realm was proclaimed. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 224)
- (181) *Hāshim ibn Ḥakīm al-Muqanna' al-Khurāsānī*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Killed by al-Mahdī. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in seven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī III: pp. 484, 494, 499; Narshākhī, pp. 24, 94-104; Azdī, p. 244; Khalīfah, p. 469; Ibn Khallikān, III: pp. 263-5; Dhahabī, *Tārikh al-Islām*, X: pp. 358-60; Ibn al-Athīr, V: pp. 52, 58-9, 136)
- (182) *Hāshim ibn 'Uqāb al-Khuzā'ī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221)
- (183) *Al-Haytham ibn Bassām*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kāfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 48)
- (184) *Al-Haytham ibn Mu'āwiyah al-'Akkī, Abū al-Khaṭṭāb*: Ethnically undetermined, of 'Akk of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Abūward. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Died in grace. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221; Ṭabarī III: pp. 129, 137-42, 373, 377-8; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 331; Dhahabī, *Tārikh al-Islām*, IX: pp. 5, 359, 361; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 365, 367, 369, V: pp. 38-40)

- (185) *Al-Haytham ibn Shu'bah ibn Zuhār*: Arab, of Nahshal of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw al-Rūdh. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 48-9, 130-1, 238, 354, 357; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 146-7, 153; Ibn Khallikān, VI: p. 317; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 342, IX: p. 53; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 338, 366, V: pp. 28-9, 153)
- (186) *Al-Haytham ibn Sulaymān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'i* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221)
- (187) *Al-Haytham ibn Yazīd ibn Kaysān*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Hurmuzfarrāh. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1955)
- (188) *Al-Haytham ibn Ziyād al-Khuzā'i*: Ethnically undetermined, of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. An Abū Muslim loyalist/had a special connection to the 'Abbāsids. Killed by 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Alī. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 221, 286; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 4, 21; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 104-6, 147, 149, 188-9; Azdī, p. 125)
- (189) *Haywah ibn al-Muḥill al-Tufāwī, Abū 'Āsim*: Ethnically undetermined, of al-Tufāwah of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 222. Cf. Ṭabarī, II: p. 1157)
- (190) *Hayyah ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Khaladah al-Mara'i*: Arab, of Umrū' al-Qays of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. Displayed anti-Abū Muslim sentiment without going into open mutiny. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 221, 275, 284; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 135; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 251, (Caskel), I: p. 80, II: p. 293)
- (191) *Hayyān ibn Rabī'ah*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 217)
- (192) *Hayyāsh ibn Ḥabīb al-Ṭā'i*: Probably Arab, of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Aligned himself with 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Alī. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final

- destiny, nothing is known (?). Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 338, Ṭabarī, III: pp. 38, 93, 102; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 105, 108)
- (193) *Ḥazawwar mawlā al-Muhājir*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ḍabbah of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Featured in covert action only before the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Killed by an Umayyad governor. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1589; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 225)
- (194) *Hilāl ibn ‘Abd, Abū Qurrah*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du‘āt al-du‘āt*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known (?). Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222, 277; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 251)
- (195) *Humayd al-Azraq*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1957)
- (196) *Humayd al-Wartakānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw al-Rūdh. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 78)
- (197) *Humayd ibn al-Khattāb al-Mahrī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Mahrān of Quḍ ā‘ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 288)
- (198) *Humayd ibn Qaḥṭabah ibn Shabīb al-Ṭā‘ī*: Arab, of Nabhān of Ṭayyī’ of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw. *Naẓīr naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* standard list of twelve. Listed as *dā‘ī* only in *Akhbār’s* alternative list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wasīṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests/displayed anti-Abū Muslim sentiment without going into open mutiny. Died in grace, founder of a dynasty of ‘*Abnā’*’. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in seventeen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 219, 221, 351, 371, 373-4, 377-8; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 15, 21, 37, 45, 48, 54-5, 93-5, 120-3, 141-2, 225, 230, 233-4, 238-40, 244-8, 310, 313-5, 353; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 105-6, 108-10, 138, 170; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 404; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 257, II: p. 332; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 263; Azdī, pp. 134, 163-4, 177, 187, 189, 236; Khalīfah, II: pp. 449, 463-4; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 343, 345, 365-6, 376, 378, 390; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma‘ārif*, p. 378; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 146; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 267-70; Narshākhī, p. 96; Ibn Khallikān, VI: p. 322; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, VII: p. 403; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 340, 354, 360; IX: pp. 13, 27-8, 30, 40-2, 51, 354, 367; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 320, 322, 326, 330, 348, 357-8, 369, V: 8-10, 18-9, 36, 51-4)
- (199) *Humayd ibn Ruzayn*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Khuzā‘ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Saqīdunj. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1954)
- (200) *Hurayth ibn ‘Atīyyah*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’.

No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 218)

- (201) *Ibrāhīm al-Jurashī*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Jurash of Ḥimyar of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (202) *Ibrāhīm, Abū Zayd*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (203) *Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ḥasan al-Bukhārī, Abū al-Rabī'*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 342)
- (204) *Ibrāhīm ibn Ḥassān al-Abrāš al-Sulamī al-Marwazī, Abū Ḥammād*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Sulaym of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1958, III: pp. 4, 73, 123, 299; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 88, 147; Ibn Qutaybah, *Mu'arraf*, p. 409; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 344; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 341)
- (205) *Ibrāhīm ibn al-Khaṭṭāb al-'Adawī*: Ethnically undetermined, of 'Adiy of Ribāb of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Featured in covert action only before the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1501)
- (206) *Ibrāhīm ibn Maymūn al-Ṣā'igh*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed by Abū Muslim. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ibn Sa'd, VII: p. 370; Ibn Abī al-Wafā, I: pp. 49-50; Rāzī, II: pp. 134-5; known in numerous biographical dictionaries, cf. Dārquṭnī, III: p. 1438, n.7; cf. Ṭabarī, II: p. 1919; Ibn Kathīr, X: pp. 70, 72)
- (207) *Ibrāhīm ibn Yazīd al-Khurāsānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1958, III: p. 12)
- (208) *Imrān ibn al-Ḥakam*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (209) *Imrān ibn Ism'īl al-Qurashī, Abū al-Najm*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Umayyah of Quraysh of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār's* standard list. Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim

- loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in nine out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 202, 216, 270, 273; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1503, 1960, 1988; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 156-6, 130; Jāhiz, *Manāqib*, I: p. 24; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465; Azdī, p. 26; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 201, 252, 301, 310)
- (210) *‘Isā ibn A‘yan al-Khuzā‘ī, Abū al-Hakam*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Aslam of Khuzā‘ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Fanīn. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār’s* standard list. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in seven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 216, 233, 286-7, 315-6, 342; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1953; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 115-6; Jāhiz, *Manāqib*, I: p. 24; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465; Azdī, p. 26; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 300; Yāqūt, IV: p. 279)
- (211) *‘Isā ibn Māhān*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Khuzā‘ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Naẓīr naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* standard list of twelve; also listed as such in *Akhbār’s* second list of twenty one. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed by Abū Muslim, founder of a dynasty of ‘*Abnā‘*’. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 220; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 82-3; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 137, 169; Khalīfah, II: p. 493; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 158; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 344-5)
- (212) *‘Isā ibn Nahīk al-Akkā, Abū Zayd*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ṣuḥār of ‘Akk of Yaman; related to some other members; from Abīward. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār’s* second list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Died in grace, founder of a dynasty of ‘*Abnā‘*’. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 131, 420; Khalīfah, II: p. 467; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, IX: p. 6; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 366)
- (213) *‘Isā ibn Rifqah al-Ṭufawī*: Ethnically undetermined, of al-Tufawah of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār’s* second list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221)
- (214) *‘Isā ibn Sālīm, Abū Khālīd*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du‘āt al-du‘āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223)
- (215) *‘Isā ibn Shibl*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Saqādīm. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār’s* second list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 222, 277; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1955)
- (216) *‘Isā ibn Ṣubayh, Abū Ayyūb*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du‘āt al-du‘āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is

- known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (171) *Ishāq al-Turk*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ibn al-Nadīm, p. 408. The reference is initially owed to Daniel, *Khurasan*, pp. 132, 139)
- (172) *Ishāq ibn Ibrāhīm*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 28,36; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 323; Ṭṣāhānī, *Maqātil*, p. 286)
- (173) *Ishāq ibn Talḥah*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 38; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 327)
- (174) *Ismā'īl Akhū Khāzīm*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Nahshal of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw al-Rūdh. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed in the service of the new regime. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 38)
- (175) *Ismā'īl ibn 'Amir ibn Nāfi'*, *Abū 'Amir*: Arab, of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; related to some other members; from Jurjān. Featured in covert action only before the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 199, 201, 267; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 262, II: p. 358)
- (176) *Ismā'īl ibn al-Mutawakkil*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 9)
- (177) *Jabbār ibn al-Nu'mān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'i* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (178) *Al-Jahm ibn al-'Alā'*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 336)
- (179) *Al-Jahm ibn Sinār*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āl*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223)
- (180) *Jahwar ibn Marwār al-'Ijlī*: Arab, of 'Ijl of Bakr of Rabr'ah; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up

military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A post-Abū Muslim anti-‘Abbāsīd rebel but not in the cause of avenging Abū Muslim. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in ten out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 2000-1, III: pp. 64-7, 98, 119, 122; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 107, 153, 246-8; Ibn Durayd, p. 346; Khalīfah, II: p. 443; Dīnawarī, p. 362; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 368; Mas‘ūdī, IV: p. 145; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 360-2; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 71; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 350, 357-8)

- (227) *Jamīl ibn Mahrān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 1)
- (228) *Jibrā’l ibn Yahyā ibn Qurrah al-Bajālī*: Arab, of Bajīlah of Anmār of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in nine out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 135, 328, 354, 459, 484; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 223, II: p. 262; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 350; Azdī, pp. 173, 201; Khalīfah, II: pp. 445, 453; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 371; Narshākhī, pp. 98-9; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 365, IV: pp. 8, 47, 367, X: p. 5; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 365, V: pp. 22, 28, 52-3)
- (229) *Jūlān ibn al-Ṣughdī, Abū Khaldījah*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1957)
- (230) *Al-Junayd ibn Khālid ibn Huraym al-Taghlibī*: Probably Arab, of Taghlib of Rabī‘ah; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Persecuted by ‘Abd al-jabbār. Name recognition of the second grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 128; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 229; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 366)
- (231) *Jurdī (Jardī? Gardī?) ibn ‘Ukwān*: Probably non-Arab; related to some other members; from Marw/Hurmuzfarrāh. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1955)
- (232) *Kāmil ibn al-Muzaffar, Abū Šālīh*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Hamdan of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā’ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār’s* second list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 215, 218, 221, 223, 232-3, 248, 273-4, 276-7, 279-80, 291, 297, 306; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1950, 1956-7, 1968-9, 1989, III: p. 83; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 305, 345)
- (233) *Khabrān mawlā Qaḥṭabah*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Nabhān of Ṭayyī’ of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 15)

- (234) *Khalaf ibn al-Barāḍ*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār*'s second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221)
- (235) *Khalaf ibn al-Muwarri' al-Hamadhānī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Tamīm of Kindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 12)
- (236) *Khalīd ibn Barmak*, *Abū al-'Abbās*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Bahrā' of Quḍ ā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Jurjān. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār*'s second list of twenty one. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Died in grace, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in twelve out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 220, 240, 333, 349, 378; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1181, 1964, 2001, 2005, III: pp. 5, 21, 72, 78, 81, 84, 320, 345-6, 381, 384, 417; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 136, 138; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 441; Azdī, pp. 140, 160, 200-1, 207-8; Dīnawarī, p. 362; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 343; Mas'ūdī, II: p. 382, IV: pp. 79, 233; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, V: p. 113; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 701; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 348, IX: pp. 45, 49 f., 364, X: pp. 18, 160-2; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VII: pp. 228-9; Ibn Khallikān, I: p. 332, VI: pp. 219-20; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 105, 198, 302, 313, 318, 322, 340, 344, V: pp. 20, 23, 25, 39, 42)
- (237) *Khalīd ibn Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Dhuhli*, *Abū Dāwūd*: Arab, of Dhuhl of Bakr of Rabī'ah; related to some other members; from Marw/Fanīm. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār*'s standard list. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist/a representative of other special interests. Killed in the service of the new regime (?). Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in sixteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 202, 216, 271-2, 277-8; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1225, 1358, 1586, 1952-3, 1960-4, 1988, 1997, 2001, III: pp. 74, 79-83, 94, 107, 119, 121, 134, 138, 774; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 116-7, 131, 169, 226-8; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 319; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 531, (Caskel), I: p. 152, II: p. 341; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 57; Jāhīz, *Manāqib*, I: p. 22; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 158; Azdī, pp. 26, 38; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 242-3; Dīnawarī, p. 362; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 79; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 345, 347-8, 351, 356, 359, 365; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 60, 63-4; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 222, 302, 310, 312-3, 341, 343-4, 352, 357-9, 363-4, V: p. 137)
- (238) *Khalīd ibn Kathīr ibn Abī al-'Awra* *al-Tamīmī*, *Abū al-Mughīrah*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Tamīm of Kindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Considered for the position of a *naqīb*, but, for political reasons, excluded. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār*'s second list of twenty one. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Killed or persecuted by 'Abd al-jabbār. Name recognition of the second grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 220; Ṭabarī, III: p. 128; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 366; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 364)
- (239) *Khalīd ibn 'Uthmān ibn Mas'ūd*, *Abū Ishāq*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Mākhuwān. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with

- Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests/an Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221, 233, 278, 280, 291; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1958, 1968, 1989, III: pp. 94, 107-17; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 356-9; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 64, 66, 68-9; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 305)
- (240) *Khalīfah ibn Mahwān, Abū Hāshim*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Saqādīm. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1957)
- (241) *Al-Khalīl ibn Kīrshā al-Tamīmī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. One of the *du'āl al-du'āl*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 222)
- (242) *Al-Khalīl ibn Sa'ūd al-Sarawī, Abū Sa'ūd*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Balkh. *Dā'i*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 219, 222)
- (243) *Khāzim ibn Khuzaymah ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Tamīmī, Abū Khuzaymah*: Arab, of Nahshal of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw al-Rūdh. *Naẓir naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list of twelve; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. Participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Died in grace, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eighteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 219, 220, 321-2, 332, 335, 356, 367, 374, 377; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1959-60, 1964, 2001, III: pp. 2-3, 9, 12, 20, 62, 68-9, 76, 79, 123-4, 130, 132, 134, 137-40, 143, 305-6, 355, 358; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 138, 146-7, 149, 153, 171, 227, 229, 235, 249-50; Ibn Hazm, *Jamharah*, p. 230; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, pp. 208-9, (Caskel), I: p. 62, II: p. 346; Azdī, pp. 155, 167; Khalīfah, II: pp. 424-6, 444, 463; Dīnawarī, pp. 362, 371, 380; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 354, 372, 380, 384; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma'ārif*, pp. 371, 417; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, pp. 158, 325-9; Ibn Khalīkān, VI: p. 319; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, V: 88 f; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 342, 346, 354, 361; IX: pp. 6-9, 14, 39, 53; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 57, 61; Jāhiz, *al-Jidd wa al-Hazl*, I: p. 256; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 301, 313, 319, 337-8, 342-3, 349, 358, 366-70, V: pp. 25, 29; Dārquṭnī, II: p. 651)
- (244) *Khūdhām ibn 'Ammār al-Kīndī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Kindah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Saqādīm. One of the *du'āl al-du'āl*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1955, 1957)

- (245) *Khufāf ibn Hubayrah ibn Mālik al-Māzinī al-Marwūdī*: Arab, of Māzin of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw al-Rūdh. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests/aligned himself with 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Alī. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in seven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 335; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 19-20, 48, 93, 127; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 105, 170; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 211; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 262, (Caskel), I: p. 82, II: p. 348; Azdī, p. 163; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 348, 363-4)
- (246) *Khuzaymah ibn Khāzim ibn Khuzaymah al-Nahshalī, Abū al-'Abbās*: Arab, of Nahshal of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw al-Rūdh. Participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Died in grace, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eleven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1956, 1960, 1997, III: pp. 603, 648, 683, 708, 730, 740, 775-6, 809, 856, 903, 916, 1002-6, 1011, 1028, 1384-5; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 209, (Caskel), I: p. 62, II: p. 351; Azdī, p. 262; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: pp. 354, 372, 380, 384; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma'ārif*, p. 417; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 263; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, IV: p. 214; Ibn Ḥabīb, pp. 298, 375; Baghdādī, *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, VIII: p. 342; Dīnawarī, p. 381; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 301, 311, 317, V: pp. 17-8)
- (247) *Kulthūm ibn Bukayr*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'ī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221)
- (248) *Kulthūm ibn Shabīb al-Azdī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Azd of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 378; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 4, 54)
- (249) *Lāhiz ibn Qurayz ibn Surayy al-Tamīmī, Abū Jā'far*: Arab, of Umru' al-Qays of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār's* standard list. Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Displayed anti-Abū Muslim sentiment without going into open mutiny. Killed by Abū Muslim. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in eleven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 216-7, 220, 255, 273, 280, 284-6, 301, 318, 389; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1586-7, 1726, 1769, 1916, 1988-95; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 115, 117-20, 130-1, 168; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 214; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 250, (Caskel), I: p. 80, II: p. 375; Azdī, pp. 26, 38, 53; Dīnawarī, pp. 339, 343; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh*, II: p. 342; Jāhiz, *Manāqib*, I: p. 22; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465; Baghdādī, *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, X: p. 209, Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 222, 252, 261, 291, 310)
- (250) *Ma'bad ibn al-Khalīl ibn Anas al-Tamīmī*: Arab, of Umru' al-Qays of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Persecuted by 'Abd al-jabbār/died in grace. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in seven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 221; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 128, 380, 461; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 251, (Caskel), I: p. 80,

II: p. 380; Khalīfah, II: pp. 463, 473; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 373; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 366; Ibn al-Athīr, V: pp. 41, 53)

- (251) *Māhān ibn Bakht mawlā Qaḥṭabah*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Nabhān of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 233, 246; Iṣḥāhānī, *Maqātil*, p. 269; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, IX: p. 27)
- (252) *Mālik ibn al-Haytham ibn 'Aẓaf al-Khuzā'ī, Abū Naṣr*: Arab, of Salūl of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār's* standard list. Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in seventeen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 202, 216, 240, 273, 279, 356; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1586-7, 1736, 1769, 1957-8, 1968, 1987-9, 1993, 2001; III: pp. 64-6, 71, 93, 101, 107, 112, 116, 119, 130, 774; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 106, 115, 117, 145, 151, 201, 203, 210; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 236; Ibn Durayd, p. 470; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 199, II: p. 388; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 442; Jāhiz, *Manāqib*, I: p. 22; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465; Azdī, pp. 26, 38, 50, 53, 166, 177-8, 180-1, 194; Khalīfah, II: p. 439; Dīnawarī, pp. 337, 339, 343; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 327, 332, 343, 345, 367; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 140; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 354, IX: p. 6, X: p. 413; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 52; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 222, 224, 252, 261, 301, 350-6, 310, 313, 337, 348, 350, 352, 355)
- (253) *Mālik ibn al-Ṭawwāf ibn Ḥadramī al-Tamīmī al-Khurāsānī*: Arab, of Umru' al-Qays of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in six out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 377; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 4, 5, 9, 37; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 135, 137; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 251, (Caskel), I: p. 80, II: p. 395; Jāhiz, *Manāqib*, I: p. 22; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 326)
- (254) *Marrār ibn Anas al-Dabbī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Ḍabbah of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in nine out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221; Ṭabarī, III: p. 59; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 155-6; Azdī, p. 145; Dīnawarī, p. 368; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 352; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 341; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 60; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: 336)
- (255) *Marwān al-Jurjānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Jurjān. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 55)

- (256) *Marwān ibn Aʿyan al-Khuzāʿī*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Aslam of Khuzāʿah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Fanīn. Listed as *dāʿī* only in *Akhbār*'s alternative list of the 'Seventy *Duʿāl*'. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221)
- (257) *Masʿadah al-Ṭāʿī*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 2004)
- (258) *Masʿūd ibn ʿIlāj*: Probably Arab, of Bakr of Rabīʿah; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 15-17, 21)
- (259) *Mazʿad ibn Shaqīq al-Sulamī*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Sulaym of Qays of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Duʿāl*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār*'s second list of the 'Seventy *Duʿāl*'. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 221, 291; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1986)
- (260) *Mihqān ibn Ghazwān al-ʿAbdī*: Ethnically undetermined, of 'Abd al-Qays of Rabīʿah; no relation to other members known; from Nasā. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Duʿāl*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār*'s second list of the 'Seventy *Duʿāl*'. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1972; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 151; Dīnawarī, p. 359; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 303)
- (261) *Al-Minhāl ibn Fattān ibn Sharīk*: Arab, of Sulaym of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 2016, III: pp. 38, 49; Azdī, p. 128; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 402, (Caskel), I: p. 123, II: p. 408; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 340; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 327)
- (262) *Muʿādh ibn Muslim ibn Muʿādh*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Dhuhl of Bakr of Rabīʿah; no relation to other members known. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnāʾ'. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in eight out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 225; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 354, 477, 484, 500, 558, 684; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 205, 246; Azdī, p. 224; Khalīfah, II: pp. 453, 468, 472; Narshakhī, pp. 99-101; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, IX: p. 371, X: pp. 5, 15; Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 303; Ibn al-Athīr, V: pp. 28, 52, 55, 57-8, 63, VI: p. 36; Ḥamzah, p. 168)
- (263) *Mudrik ibn Kulthūm*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *duʿāt al-duʿāt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)

- (264) *Al-Mufaddal ibn al-Sharqī al-Sulamī*: Probably Arab, of Sulaym of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Nasā. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1951; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 299)
- (265) *Al-Muhājir ibn 'Uthmān al-Khuzā'ī, Abū Khālid*: Ethnically undetermined, of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Nasā. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 202, 222; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1950-1, 1963; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 299)
- (266) *Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Hanaḥī, Abū 'Abdah*: Ethnically undetermined, of Hanīfah of Bakr of Rabī'ah; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221)
- (267) *Muhammad ibn al-Ash'ath ibn 'Uqbah al-Khuzā'ī*: Arab, of Aslam of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known. *Naẓīr naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list of twelve; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Died in grace, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in thirteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 219, 220; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1978, 2001, III: pp. 71-5, 122, 138, 141, 304, 353; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 89, 247; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 241; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 363, (Caskel), I: p. 201, II: p. 422; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 459; Jāhīz, *Manāqib*, I: p. 23; Azdī, p. 211; Khalīfah, II: pp. 443, 464; Dīnawarī, pp. 362, 373; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 343, 384, 386; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām VIII*: pp. 343, 345, 362, IX: pp. 10, 12, 39, 52, 262-3; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 281, 306, 313)
- (268) *Muhammad ibn Farrūkh, Abū Hurayrah*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Killed by al-Rashīd. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in six out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 36, 469-71, 606; Azdī, pp. 236, 238, 252, 267; Khalīfah, II: pp. 479, 488; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 405-6; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, XI: p. 61; Ibn al-Athīr, V: pp. 55, 70, 84-5. This man is likely to have been the same Abū Hurayrah to whom heresiographers ascribe the 'sect' called 'Hurayriyyah' or 'Rāwandīyyah'; cf. Nawbakhtī, p. 68; Nāshī, pp. 31-2)
- (269) *Muhammad ibn al-Hārīth*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 761)
- (270) *Muhammad ibn al-Hashraj*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'ī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221)

- (271) *Muḥammad ibn al-Husayn al-ʿAbdī*: Ethnically undetermined, of ʿAbd al-Qays of Rabīʿah; no relation to other members known. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent therein. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in six out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 28, 36, 89-90, 288, 300-1; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 186, 188, 250; Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil*, p. 324; Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾriḫ*, II: pp. 364, 377; Dhahabī, *Tāriḫ al-Islām*, IX: p. 38; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 324, V: pp. 16-7)
- (272) *Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥḥid al-Ḥimyarī al-Marwūdī*, *Abū Ḥumayd*: Arab, of Ḥimyar of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw al-Rūdī. Listed as *dāʿī* only in *Akhbār*’s alternative list of the ‘Seventy *Duʿāl*’. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist/a survivalist/team player. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eleven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 221, 223, 240, 389-90; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 27-8, 34-6; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 139-40, 169, 202-4, 251; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 274, II: p. 423; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 535; Azdī, p. 121; Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾriḫ*, II: pp. 345, 349-50; Masʿūdī, IV: pp. 98-9; Dhahabī, *Tāriḫ al-Islām*, VIII: p. 356; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 63; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 323-4, 352-3)
- (273) *Muḥammad ibn Saʿd*, *Abū Ismāʿīl*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Jurjān. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 240, 294)
- (274) *Muḥammad ibn Shihāb al-Māzinī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Māzin of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ibn Aʿtham, VIII: p. 188. The reference is owed to Blankinship, “*al-ʿArab fī Khurāsān*,” p. 167)
- (275) *Muḥammad ibn Ṣul*, *Abū ʿUmār*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Khathʿam of Anmār of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Jurjān. Listed as *dāʿī* only in *Akhbār*’s alternative list of the ‘Seventy *Duʿāl*’. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Killed by ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAlī. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in eight out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 221, 378, 356; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 39, 47, 81, 84; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 106-7, 281; Azdī, pp. 121, 128, 141, 145-8, 150, 164; Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾriḫ*, II: pp. 357-8; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, IV: p. 218; Ibn Khallikān, I: pp. 44-6; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 327, 330, 339, 344, 348)
- (276) *Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān ibn Kāthir*: Arab, of Afṣā of Khuzāʿah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Saqdūnj. *Naẓīr naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār*’s standard list of twelve; also listed as such in *Akhbār*’s second list of twenty one. Displayed anti-Abū Muslim sentiment without going into open mutiny. Killed by Abū Muslim. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 219-20; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 168; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 242)

- (277) *Muhammad ibn Thābit al-ʿAbdī*: Ethnically undetermined, of ʿAbd al-Qays of Rabīʿah; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ibn Saʿd, VIII: p. 370; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1923)
- (278) *Muhammad ibn ʿUwān al-Marwazī*: Probably non-Arab; related to some other members; from Marw/Hurmuzfarrah. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 271-2; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1955; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 168)
- (279) *Muhammad ibn ʿUthmān*: Probably non-Arab; related to some other members. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed in the service of the new regime. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 238)
- (280) *Muḥriz ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ḥubayrī, Abū al-Qāsim*: Probably non-Arab; related to some other members; from Marw/Saqādim. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Duʿāt*'. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in six out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 278-9, 327, 331; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1955-7, 2001, III: pp. 1, 9, 46, 99, 461, 547; Azdī, p. 126; Khalīfah, II: p. 475; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, IV: p. 480; Baghdādī, *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 207; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 252, 300, 305, 317)
- (281) *Al-Muḥtafīz ibn ʿUthmān ibn Bishr al-Muzanī*: Arab, of Muzaynah of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1969, 1985; Ibn Ḥazm, *Ḥamharah*, p. 202, Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ḥamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 88, II: p. 425)
- (282) *Mujāshīʿ ibn Ḥurayth al-Anṣārī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Anṣār of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Killed by ʿAbd al-jabbār. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 248; Ṭabarī, III: p. 128; Yaʿqūbī, *Taʾrīkh*, II: p. 371; Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 366; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 364)
- (283) *Mukḥāriq ibn Ghaffār ibn Ḥittān al-Ṭāʿī*: Arab, of Thaʿlabah of Ṭayyīʿ of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests/aligned himself with ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAlī. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eight out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 339-40, 364, 370, 378; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 4, 17, 39, 54, 93; Azdī, pp. 127-8, 131, 163; Khalīfah, II: p. 465; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ḥamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 252, II: 426; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 257; Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 338, 354; Ibn al-Athīr, V: pp. 26, 33)

- (284) *Al-Mukhtār ibn Suwayd ibn Abī Ḥuhayr, Abū al-Ṣabāh*: Arab, of ‘Uthmān of Azd of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā’ī* only in *Akhbār*’s alternative list of the ‘Seventy *Du’āt*’. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 216, II: p. 426; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 498)
- (285) *Al-Mundhūr ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 2001)
- (286) *Al-Muntaḡī ibn al-Ḥubayr*: Ethnically undetermined, of Azd of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Perished before the ‘Abbāsīd realm was proclaimed. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1996)
- (287) *Muqātil ibn Ḥakīm ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-‘Akkī*: Probably non-Arab, *mawla* of Ṣuḥār of ‘Akk of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Nasā. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār*’s second list of twenty one. *Dā’ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*’s first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du’āt*’. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed by ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī, founder of a dynasty of ‘*Abnā’*’. Name recognition of the second grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eleven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 220, 314, 327, 330, 338-9, 341, 343-8, 374, 377; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1972, 2001-5, 2016, III: pp. 4-5, 20, 87, 93-4; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 106, 109, 135-6, 138, 151, 189; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 219, II: p. 431; Azdī, p. 164; Khalīfah, II: pp. 436, 439, 464; Dīnawarī, pp. 359, 362-3; Ya’qūbī, *Ta’rīkh*, II: p. 343; Ibn Qutaybah, *Mā’arīf*, p. 371; Ibn Khallikān, I: p. 46; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 303, 318, 346, 348)
- (288) *Muqātil ibn Mālīk al-‘Akkī*: Ethnically undetermined, of ‘Akk of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 15, Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 320)
- (289) *Mūsā ibn ‘Aqīl*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 388; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 4, 68-9)
- (290) *Mūsā ibn ‘Aḥīyyah, Abū Khuzaymah*: Non-Arab, *mawla mawla* of Bāhilah of Qays of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw/Mākhuwān. One of the *du’āt al-du’āt*. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (291) *Mūsā ibn Ḥassān al-Aqtā’*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā’ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*’s first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du’āt*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār*’s second list of the ‘Seventy *Du’āt*’. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221)

- (292) *Mūsā ibn Kūb ibn ‘Uyaynah al-Tamīmi, Abū ‘Uyaynah*: Arab, of Umru’ al-Qays of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār’s* standard list. Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A survivalist/convictionless/team player. Died in grace. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in fifteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 202, 216, 273, 278, 281, 342, 378; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1952, 1964, 1969, 1988, 1997, 2002-4, III: pp. 38-40, 56-7, 77, 80-1, 138, 375, 381-3, 459, 774; Balādhuṭī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 107, 115, 117, 135, 141, 151, 195, 227; Jāhiz, *Manāqib*, I: pp. 22, 23; Ibn Ḥabīb, pp. 374, 465; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 214; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 250, (Caskel), I: p. 80, II: p. 435; Azdī, pp. 26, 38, 128-9, 222, 224; Khalfāh, II: pp. 427, 439; Dīnawarī, p. 337; Ya’qūbī, *Ta’rikh*, II: pp. 349, 354, 358, 362, 365, 372, 389; Mas’ūdī, p. 99; Dhahabī, *Tārikh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 335-6, 348, 356, IX: pp. 5, 301, 360, 364; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 59, 68; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 222, 305, 310-11, 318, 323, 327, 335, 341-4, 368, V: p. 137)
- (293) *Mūsā ibn Maḡmūn*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests/displayed anti-Abū Muslim sentiment without going into open mutiny. Killed by ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 95)
- (294) *Mūsā ibn Mūsā al-Furjāni*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Jurjān. Featured in covert action only before the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 215)
- (295) *Mūsā ibn Ṣubayh, Abū Nu’aym*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1957)
- (296) *Mūsā ibn Thābit*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 370)
- (297) *Muṣ’ab ibn Qays al-Ḥanafi*: Ethnically undetermined, of Ḥanfalāh of Bakr of Rabī’ah; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār’s* second list of twenty one. *Dā’ir*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du’āl*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 220, 281, 342-3; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1957, 1968)

- (298) *Muṣ'ab ibn Zūrayq ibn As'ad*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 220; Ibn Khallikān, II: pp. 517-8, 522; Ibn al-Athīr, V: p. 54)
- (299) *Al-Musayyab ibn 'Uthmān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223)
- (300) *Al-Musayyab ibn Zūhayr ibn 'Amr al-Dabbī, Abū Muslim*: Arab, of Ḍabbah of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. *Naẓīr naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list of twelve; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A survivalist/convictionless/team player. Died in grace, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in fifteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 219, 220, 378; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 2003-4, III: pp. 3, 21, 80, 135, 138, 150, 195, 284, 293, 325-6, 382-4, 389, 428-9, 458, 500-3, 517; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 135, 138, 163, 227, 272; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 204; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 295, (Caskel), I: p. 89, II: p. 436; Azdī, pp. 208, 269; Ibn Ḥabīb, pp. 374-5; Khalīfah, II: pp. 466, 468-9, 472-3, 500; Narshākhī, p. 101; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 384, 389, 429; Ibn Qutaybah, *Mā'ārif*, p. 413; Mas'ūdī, IV: 130, pp. 149-50; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, XIII, p. 137; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 348, IX: p. 46, X: pp. 15, 25; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 317, 322, 243, 368, 372, V: pp. 25, 39, 42, 50, 63, 68, 89; Dārquṭnī, I: p. 352)
- (301) *Muslim al-Sijistānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (302) *Muslim al-Arghadhī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw al-Rūdh. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 79)
- (303) *Naḍlah ibn Nu'aym ibn Khāẓim al-Nahshālī*: Probably Arab, of Nahshal of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw al-Rūdh. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 78-9, 123-4; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 229, 249)
- (304) *Al-Naḍr ibn Ghānim al-Tā'ī, Abū Ghānim*: Ethnically undetermined, of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (305) *Al-Naḍr ibn Nu'aym al-Dabbī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Ḍabbah of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1966; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 304)

- (306) *Al-Naḍr ibn Ṣubḥ ibn ʿAmīr al-Tamīmī*: Arab, of Umru' al-Qays of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 220, 278; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1953, 1959, 1964, 1999; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 251, (Caskel), I: p. 80, II: p. 441; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 301, 312)
- (307) *Nāfi' al-Marwazī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 2004)
- (308) *Nahār ibn Ḥuṣayn al-Sa'dī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Sa'd of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 18, 36, 356-7; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, IX: p. 53; Ibn al-Athīr, V: pp. 28-9)
- (309) *Nājiyah ibn Uthaylah al-Bāhili*: Ethnically undetermined, of Bahilah of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 222, 271)
- (310) *Nasr ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Khuẓāʿī*: Probably Arab, of Khuẓā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dāʿī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 221, 300; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1155; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 99)
- (311) *Nasr ibn Mālīk ibn al-Haytham al-Khuẓāʿī*: Arab, of Salūl of Khuẓā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw. Listed as *dāʿī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Died in grace. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in thirteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 221, 279; Ṭabarī, III: p. 491, 1343, 1510; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 236; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 199, II: p. 446; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 442; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 375; Khalīfah, II: p. 474; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 401; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 143; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 359; X: p. 5; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 66-7; Ibn Khallikān, V: p. 193; Ibn al-Athīr, V: p. 61)
- (312) *Nasr ibn Rashīd*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Killed in the service of the new regime. Name recognition of the seventh

- grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 82; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 349; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 344)
- (13) *Nūṣayr ibn al-Muḥtafiẓ ibn ‘Uthmān al-Muzanī*: Arab, of Muzaynah of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Aligned himself with ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 38; Balādhuṛī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 105; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ḥamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 88, II: p. 227)
- (14) *Qaḥṭabah ibn Shabīb ibn Khālīd al-Tā’ī, Abū ‘Abd al-Ḥamūd*: Arab, of Nabḥan of Ṭayyī of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār’s* standard list. Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. A representative of sundry special interests. Perished before the ‘Abbāsīd realm was proclaimed, founder of a dynasty of ‘*Abnā’*’. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in twenty out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 167, 213, 216, 240, 255, 256, 321, 323-4, 327-39, 341-8, 363-7, 369-73, 387-8, 391, 393-4; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1691, 1727, 1769, 1914, 1930, 1951-3, 1962-4, 1988, 2000-6, 2016, III: pp. 1-9, 12-9, 38, 61, 774; Balādhuṛī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 81, 115-6, 118-20, 134-9, 148; Ibn Ḥazm, *Ḥamharah*, p. 404; Ibn Durayd, p. 396; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ḥamharah*, p. 262, (Caskel), I: p. 257, II: p. 454-5; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 263; Jāḥīz, *Manāqīb*, I: p. 22; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465; Ibn Khallikān, VI: pp. 220, 314-5; Azdī, pp. 26, 50, 53, 116, 118-9; Khalīfah, II: pp. 412, 418, 420-3; Dīmawarī, pp. 339, 341, 343, 361-3, 366-7; Ya’qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 327, 332, 343-4; Ibn Qutaybah, *Ma’ārif*, pp. 371-418; Mas’ūdī, IV: pp. 79, 85; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 27, 330-4, 518-9, X: p. 161; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 52, 55-7; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, IV: pp. 210, 218, 480-1)
- (15) *Al-Qāsim Kātib ‘Amīr*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 345)
- (16) *Al-Qāsim ibn Muǧāshī ibn Tamīm al-Tamīmī, Abū Saḥl*: Arab, of Umru’ al-Qays of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār’s* standard list. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. A pro-‘Alīd. Banished from public life. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in ten out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 280, 291, 323, 327-8, 389; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1952, 1962-4, 1968-70, 1986-9, 1993, 2000-2, III: p. 532; Balādhuṛī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 115, 135; Jāḥīz, *Manāqīb*, I: p. 22; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465; Ibn Ḥazm, *Ḥamharah*, p. 214; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Ḥamharah*, p. 250 (Caskel), I: p. 80, II: p. 466; Azdī, p. 26; Khalīfah, II: p. 412; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 305, 309, 310, 313, V: p. 72)
- (17) *Qays ibn al-Sariyy al-Mustī, Abū ‘Ubaydah*: Ethnically undetermined, of Musliyah of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Jurjān. Featured in covert action only before the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 198, 201)
- (18) *Quraysh ibn Shaqīq al-Sulamī*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Sulaym of Qays of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in

Akhbār's second list of twenty one. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 217, 220; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1993-4; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 123, II: p. 471)

- (319) *Qurayz ibn Majjāj ibn al-Mustawrid*: Probably Arab, of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the third grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 389-90)
- (320) *Qutaybah Kātib 'Amir*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 340)
- (321) *Rizām ibn Sābiq*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 132)
- (322) *Sabbā' ibn al-Nu'mān al-Azdī*: Probably Arab, of Azd of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed by Abū Muslim. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1524-5, 1858, 2001, III: p. 82; Dīnawarī, p. 362; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 342; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 349; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 205, 267, 344, V: p. 11)
- (323) *Sād al-Ṭalā'ī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 364)
- (324) *Sā'id ibn 'Amr*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 20)
- (325) *Sā'id ibn Yahyā al-Ṭā'ī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āl' al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (326) *Salamah ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭā'ī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'ī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221; Ṭabarī, II: p. 2001, III: pp. 17, 28, 36-8; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 349; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 336; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 324, 327. Cf. no.329 below)
- (327) *Sāliḥ ibn Sulaymān al-Dabbī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Ḍabbah of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'ī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Participated in the immense purges in the

districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1958; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 301)

- (328) *Sālim Ṣaḥīb Liwā' ʿAmir*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 345)
- (329) *Salm mawlā Qaḥṭabah*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 370; Ṭabarī, III: p. 17; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, pp. 138-9. Cf. no.326 above)
- (330) *Sāriyah ibn Nuwayb al-Tamīmī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221)
- (331) *Al-Sariyy al-Ju'fī*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ju'fī of Madhḥij of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 329)
- (332) *Sayf ibn Nahā al-Ṭāʿī, Abū al-Mahdī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (333) *Shabīb ibn Wāj al-Marwūdī*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw al-Rūdh. Participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in nine out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1960, III: pp. 110-5, 492; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashrāf III*, pp. 139-40, 205-7, 247; Azdī, p. 242; Dīnawarī, p. 377, Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 367; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 141-2; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 209, Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 358; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 65, 69; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 353, V: p. 61)
- (334) *Shahrām*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, II: p. 164 f)
- (335) *Shajarah al-Kindī*: Probably non-Arab, *mawlā* of Kindah of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 344)

- (336) *Sharīk ibn Shaykh al-Mahrī*: Arab, of Mahrān of Quḍā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Bukhārā. A representative of sundry special interests/anti-Abū Muslim/'Abbāsīd rebel. Killed by Abū Muslim. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in seven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 74; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 171; Narshākhī, pp. 91-3; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 354; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 345; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 60; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 341)
- (337) *Sharīk (Shurayk?) ibn 'Uṣayy al-Tamīmī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 222; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1953, 1964; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 299)
- (338) *Shibl ibn Ṭahmān al-Rabā'ī al-Harawī, Abū 'Alī*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ḥanīfah of Bakr of Rab'ah; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār's* standard list. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in seven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 216, 301, 310, 315; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1967, 1977, 1988, 1992; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 115; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465; Azdī, p. 26, Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 155; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 309-10)
- (339) *Shu'bah ibn 'Uthmān ibn Khuraym al-Tamīmī al-Marwūdhī*: Arab, of Māzin of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'ī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*'. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wasiṭ and Egypt. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 221; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 46-9; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 264, (Caskel), I: p. 82, II: p. 531; Azdī, p. 158; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 331)
- (340) *Shurayh ibn 'Abd Allāh*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabāh's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 5)
- (341) *Sinān ibn 'Abd Allāh*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Jurjān. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 294)
- (342) *Sinbādih*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Nishāpūr. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Killed by al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eight out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 119-22; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 246; Khalīfah, II: p. 442; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 368; Mas'ūdī, IV: pp. 144-5; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām* VIII: pp. 359-60; Dhahabī, *Sīyar*, VI: p. 71; Ibn al-Athīr, p. 357)
- (343) *Ṣubayh al-Aqtā', Abū Hāshim*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy

- Du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 218)
- (344) *Ṣubayḥ, Abū Ismā'īl*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223)
- (345) *Ṣubayḥ ibn Ṣurayq, Abū Janāḥ*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223)
- (346) *Ṣubḥ ibn al-Ṣabāḥ*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (347) *Sulaymān al-Qurashī*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Narshākhī, pp. 91-2)
- (348) *Sulaymān ibn al-Aswad*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 28, 36, 74; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 324, 342)
- (349) *Sulaymān ibn Hassān*: Ethnically undetermined; related to some other members; from Marw/Hurmuzfarrāh. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1955)
- (350) *Sulaymān ibn Kathīr ibn Umayyah al-Khuzā'ī, Abū Muḥammad*: Arab, of Afṣā of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Saqīdunj. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār*'s standard list. Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. Displayed anti-Abū Muslim sentiment without going into open mutiny. Killed by Abū Muslim. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in nineteen out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 199, 201-3, 208, 213, 216, 220, 223, 248, 255-6, 268-82, 285-6, 288, 291-2, 317; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1358, 1480, 1586, 1639-40, 1731, 1769, 1916, 1937, 1949-56, 1960-2, 1966, 1984-5, 1988, 1992, III: pp. 91, 114; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 115-21, 130, 168; Ibn Hazm, *Jamharah*, p. 242; Ibn Durayd, p. 480; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 200, II: p. 518; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 463; Jāhiz, *Manāqib*, I: p. 22; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 465; Azdī, pp. 26, 38, 50, 53, 65, 165; Dīnawarī, pp. 337, 339, 343; Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, X: p. 209; Ibn Khallikān, II: p. 522; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 359, 446; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 52, 66; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 159, 194, 222, 235, 252, 254, 261, 291, 295, 299, 300, 302, 209, 310, 336, 354)
- (351) *Ṭalḥah ibn Ṣurayq ibn Aṣ'ad, Abū Maṣṣūr*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Alīn. *Naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s standard list; also listed as *naqīb* in other than *Akhbār*'s standard list. Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738.

- Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in nine out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 202, 215-6, 270-1, 273; *Ṭabarī*, II: pp. 1358, 1586, 1962, 1969, 1985-9; *Balādhurī*, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 116-7; *Jāhiz*, *Manāqib*, I: p. 24; *Ibn Ḥabīb*, p. 465; *Azdī*, pp. 26, 38; *Khalifāh*, II: p. 467; *Dimawarī*, p. 337; *Ibn al-Athīr*, IV: pp. 159, 222, 309)
- (352) *Tamīm ibn ‘Umar ibn ‘Abbād al-Tamīmī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A pro-‘Alid. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the second grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 232-3, 243, 347; *Ṭabarī*, II: p. 1660; *Balādhurī*, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 172-3; *Khalifāh*, II: p. 463)
- (353) *Ṭarkhān al-Jammāl*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Ṭabarī*, II: p. 1950; *Ibn al-Athīr*, IV: p. 299)
- (354) *Ṭarkhūn ibn al-Ḍā’ī*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Ḍā’ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*’s first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 218)
- (355) *Thābit ibn Shaddād*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā’ī* only in *Akhbār*’s alternative list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āt*’. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)
- (356) *Turār Khudāh*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsīt and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. Aligned himself with ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Ṭabarī*, III: pp. 93, 356)
- (357) *Turayf ibn Ghaylān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Ṭabarī*, III: p. 4)
- (358) *‘Ubayd Allāh al-Kābulī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsīt and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Ṭabarī*, III: p. 42)
- (359) *‘Ubayd Allāh ibn Bassām*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Layth of Kinānah of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah’s advent therein. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources.

- (*Akhbār*, pp. 233, 376; *Ṭabarī*, II: pp. 1723-4, 1846, 1859, 1923. See also no.95 above—probably one and the same)
- (360) *‘Umar al-Naḡham*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Ṭabarī*, III: p. 83)
- (361) *‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ṣayd*: Arab, of Dahmān of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members; from Abīward. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed sometime after the death of al-Manṣūr. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Ṭabarī*, III: pp. 459-60; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 227; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 374; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rīkh*, II: pp. 371, 389)
- (362) *‘Umar ibn Ḥafṣ ibn ‘Uthmān Hazārmard al-‘Atakī*, *Abū Ḥafṣ*: Arab, of ‘Atīk of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A pro-‘Alid. Killed in the service of the new regime. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in eleven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 338-9; *Ṭabarī*, III: pp. 139, 145, 282, 359-72; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 145, 176-7, 230-1, 247, 257; Ibn Durayd, p. 482; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 204, II: p. 571; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 466; Azdī, pp. 91, 213, 216; Khalīfah, II: pp. 437, 439, 444, 463, 465; Ya‘qūbī, *Ta’rīkh*, II: pp. 373, 384, 386; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, IX: pp. 9, 15, 352, 355; Ibn al-Aṯḥir, IV: p. 368, V: pp. 30-2)
- (363) *‘Umar ibn Mā‘bad al-‘war al-Khuzā‘ī*, *Abū al-Buḥturī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Khuzā‘ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘ūt*’; also listed as such in *Akhbār’s* second list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘ūt*’. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 318, 221, 286)
- (364) *‘Umar ibn al-Mukhtār al-Thaqafī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Thaqif of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Rayy. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 262-3)
- (365) *‘Umar ibn Nahīk*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ṣuḥār of ‘Akk of Yaman; related to some other members; from Abīward. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār’s* second list of twenty one. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 220)
- (366) *‘Umar ibn ‘Uthmān*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Balkh. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘ūt*’. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 219)
- (367) *‘Umayr ibn Ṣuraym*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Khuzā‘ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Saqdunj. One of the *du‘ūt al-du‘ūt*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223)

- (368) *Umayyah ibn A'yan al-Khuzā'ī*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Aslam of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Fanīn. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 220)
- (369) *Usayd ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Aḥjam al-Khuzā'ī, Abū Malīk*: Arab, of Ka'b of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Naṣā. *Naẓīr naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list of twelve; also listed as such in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption; assuming a high-profile role in the spectacle; participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption; appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Died in grace, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eleven out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 220, 333, 278, 342-3, 351; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1950, 1963-4, 1972, 1987, 2002-4; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 197, II: p. 196; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 451; Khalifāh, II: p. 463; Dīnawarī, p. 359; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'riḫh*, II: p. 371; Azdī, pp. 140, 160; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 78; Dhahabī, *Tāriḫh al-Islām*, IX: p. 8; Ibn al-Aṭhīr IV: pp. 299, 309, V: p. 35)
- (370) *Uthmān ibn Nahīk ibn Wahb al-'Akkā*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Ṣuḥār of 'Akk of Yaman; related to some other members; from Abīward. *Naẓīr naqīb*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* standard list of twelve. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed in the service of the new regime, founder of a dynasty of 'Abnā'. Name recognition of the second grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in twelve out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 220; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1963, 2001, III: pp. 20, 65, 68, 76, 110-5, 129-31; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 146, 148, 153, 205-7, 235-6; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, (Caskel), I: p. 219, II: p. 579; Azdī, pp. 165, 198; Khalifāh, II: p. 467; Ya'qūbī, *Ta'riḫh*, II: pp. 367, 389; Dīnawarī, p. 377; Mas'ūdī, IV: p. 141; Dhahabī, *Tāriḫh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 357, 359, IX: pp. 5, 6, X: p. 161, Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: pp. 64-6, 69; Ibn al-Aṭhīr, IV: pp. 313, 337-8, 353-4, 365-6)
- (371) *Uthmān ibn Quratah*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 378)
- (372) *Uthmān ibn Rāfi'*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 2004)
- (373) *Uthmān ibn Zurayn*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw/Saqīdunj. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1954)
- (374) *Uyaynah ibn Mūsā ibn Ka'b*: Arab, of Umrū' al-Qays of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; related to some other members; from Marw. Listed as *dā'ī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere

- between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A post-Abū Muslim anti-‘Abbāsīd rebel but not in the cause of avenging Abū Muslim. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eight out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 221, 378; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 38-9, 138-9, 409; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, p. 107; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharah*, p. 214; Khalīfah, II: p. 463; Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: pp. 372-3; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 338, IX: p. 9; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 327, 368, V: p. 96)
- (375) *Wadās ibn Nadlah*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 38; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 327)
- (376) *Wādīh al-Hurmuzfārī, Abū al-Waddāh*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Layth of Kinānah of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Saqādīm. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āl’*; also listed as such in *Akhbār’s* second list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āl’*. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 222, 277; Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1954-5, 1968; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 300)
- (377) *Al-Wāzī‘ ibn Kathūr*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known; from Marw. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two lists of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āl’*; also listed as such in *Akhbār’s* second list of the ‘Seventy *Du‘āl’*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 222)
- (378) *Yahyā ibn ‘Aqīl al-Khuzā‘ī*: Probably Arab, of Khuzā‘ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Featured in covert action only before the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Perished before the ‘Abbāsīd realm was proclaimed. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. of the third grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1501, 1571; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VII: p. 502; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 201; otherwise well-known in biographical dictionaries on traditionists, cf. Dārquṭnī, III: p. p. 1584 and n.4)
- (379) *Yahyā ibn Nu‘aym ibn Hubayrah al-Shaybānī, Abū al-Maylā‘*: Arab, of Shaybān of Bakr of Rab‘ah; no relation to other members known. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: pp. 1583, 1589, 1662, 1925, 1966-7, 1970, 1997-8; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 312)
- (380) *Yasār mawlā Qaḥṭabah*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Nabḥān of Ṭayyī‘ of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah’s campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 15)
- (381) *Yazdān ibn Ḥassān*: Ethnically undetermined; related to some other members; from Marw/Hurmuzfārrah. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1955)
- (382) *Yazīd ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Azdī*: Arab, of Dahmān of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members; from Abīward. *Dā‘ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār’s* first of two

- lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āt*'. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 218)
- (383) *Yazīd ibn Hātim ibn Qubaysah*: Arab, of 'Atīk of Azd of Yaman; related to some other members. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 352-3, 356; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 67, 120, 142, 189, 297, 319, 353, 359, 369-73, 377-9, 470, 484, 503, 518, 521, 569)
- (384) *Yazīd ibn Marthad*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. One of the *du'āt al-du'āt*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 223)
- (385) *Yazīd ibn al-Nuhayd*: Non-Arab, *mawla* of Musliyah of Madhij of Yaman; related to some other members; from Jurjān. Featured in covert action only before the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Perished before the 'Abbāsīd realm was proclaimed. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 198-202)
- (386) *Yazīd ibn Qaḥṭabah ibn Shabīb*: Arab, of Nabhān of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; related to some other members; from Marw. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. A representative of sundry special interests. Killed in the service of the new regime. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Khalīfah, II: p. 424; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: p. 334; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 57)
- (387) *Yūsuf ibn 'Aqīl ibn Hassān*: Arab, of Nabhān of Ṭayyī' of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 364; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah* (Caskel), I: p. 257, II: p. 597; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, I: p. 264)
- (388) *Yūsuf ibn Muḥammad*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Featured in a role in Kūfah upon/after the Khurāsāniyyah's advent therein. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 36)
- (389) *Zabārah al-Bukhārī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. A post-Abū Muslim anti-'Abbāsīd rebel but not in the cause of avenging Abū Muslim. Killed in a state of rebellion against the new regime. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 247-8)
- (390) *Al-Zibriqān*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 356; Ibn al-Athīr, V: p. 28)
- (391) *Ziyād*: Non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A post-Abū Muslim anti-'Abbāsīd rebel but not in the cause of avenging Abū Muslim. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the eighth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: p. 122)

- (392) *Ẓiyād ibn Farrūkh*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 370)
- (393) *Ẓiyād ibn 'Isa*: Ethnically undetermined; no relation to other members known. Participated in the immense purges in the districts/in the Marw skirmishes following the first eruption. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1958; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 301)
- (394) *Ẓiyād ibn Miškān*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Māzin of Tamīm of Khindif of Muḍar; no relation to other members known. Participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the seventh grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in four out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, III: pp. 20, 120, 122; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 138, 248, 251; Azdī, pp. 166, 177; Ibn al-Athīr, pp. 357-8)
- (395) *Ẓiyād ibn Ṣālih al-Khuzā'ī*: Non-Arab, *mawlā* of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw. Listed as *naqīb* only by other than the *Akhbār's* standard list. Listed as *naẓīr naqīb* only in *Akhbār's* second list of twenty one. *Dā'ī*, in accordance with *Akhbār's* first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. Featured in covert action both before and after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. Anti-Abū Muslim/'Abbāsīd rebel. Killed by Abū Muslim. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in eight out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 202, 218, 220, 268, 368; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1988, III: pp. 18, 65-6, 74, 80-3; Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-Ashraf III*, pp. 116, 168-9, 171; Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II: p. 354; Narshākhī, pp. 91-3; Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, VIII: pp. 345, 347, 349; Dhahabī, *Siyar*, VI: p. 60; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: pp. 310, 321, 337, 341, 344)
- (396) *Ẓiyād ibn Salmān al-Khuzā'ī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Khuzā'ah of Yaman; no relation to other members known. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 258)
- (397) *Ẓiyād ibn Sayyār al-Azdī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Azd of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Marw/Kharqān. Participated in the spectacle of the first eruption. An Abū Muslim loyalist. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 1957)
- (398) *Ẓiyād ibn Zurārah ibn 'Uqbah al-Aqtā' al-Qushayrī*: Arab, of Qushayr of Qays of Muḍar; no relation to other members known; from Nīshāpūr. Appointed to office by Abū Muslim in consolidation of the initial and immediately successive territorial gains. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign. A representative of sundry special interests. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the second grade. He appears in three out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (Ṭabarī, II: p. 2016, III: pp. 2-3; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, p. 346, (Caskel), I: p. 105, II: p. 608; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 317)
- (399) *Ẓiyādah ibn Mahrān al-Tālaqānī*: Probably non-Arab; no relation to other members known. Listed as *dā'ī* only in *Akhbār's* alternative list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl'*. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fifth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in one out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222)

- (400) *Ẓuhayr ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥayyān al-Azdī*: Arab, of Ghāmid of Azd of Yaman; no relation to other members known; from Abīward. *Dāʿī*, in accordance with *Akhbār*'s first of two lists of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'; also listed as such in *Akhbār*'s second list of the 'Seventy *Du'āl*'. Participated in Qaḥṭabah's campaign; participated in post-Kūfah military campaigns, somewhere between Wāsiṭ and Egypt. Took up military/administrative appointment in the new regime. A pro-ʿAlid. Appeared in later roles in the service of the state, but, of his final destiny, nothing is known. Name recognition of the first grade. E. O. H. R. of the first grade. He appears in five out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, pp. 218, 221; Ṭabarī, III: pp. 4, 21, 123; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharah*, (Caskel), I: p. 218, II: p. 610; Ibn al-Kalbī, *Nasab*, II: p. 485; Ibn al-Athīr, IV: p. 358)
- (401) *Ẓurayq ibn Shawdhab al-Shaybānī*: Ethnically undetermined, of Shaybān of Bakr of Rabīʿah; related to some other members. One of the *du'āl al-du'āt*. Featured in covert action only after the general assembly of ca. 120/737-738. No specific loyalty can be ascertained. Nothing is known about his personal destiny. Name recognition of the fourth grade. E. O. H. R. nil. He appears in two out of the twenty-three and sundry sources. (*Akhbār*, p. 222; Ṭabarī, II: p. 1964)

APPENDIX TWO

SPECIAL APPENDIX

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